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International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
NATO expansion and nuclear weapons in Europe
Steps towards non-nuclear European security
Since the end of the Cold War, public debate on security issues, and
in particular on nuclear weapons, has receded and become overshadowed
by other more apparently pressing problems. Despite this fact,
opinion polls in many countries show an overwhelming majority in
favour of the abolition of nuclear weapons. For this reason, NGOs
working in the peace and security fields see a necessity to propose a
political programme of action to move from military defence alliances
dependent on nuclear deterrence to a cooperative and non-nuclear
security structure that aims to prevent and resolve conflicts rather
than solve them by use of force.
On March 13, 1997 the European Parliament adopted a resolution,
calling "on the Member States to support the commencement of
negotiations in 1997 leading to the conclusion of a convention for
the abolition of nuclear weapons". With this resolution the European
Parliament joined for the first time the International Court of
Justice, the Canberra Commission and more than 60 active and retired
high-ranking military officers in seriously questioning the legitimacy
of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence. While today
there is a realistic chance to finally develop a European Security
Architecture no longer based on nuclear weapons, NATO governments
still neglect this option. Instead, they continue to insist that
European security will require nuclear weapons. They intend to base
the future European Security Architecture on a reformed and enlarged
NATO and to develop a (Western and Central) European Defence and
Security Identity. Thus, the opportunity to develop a truly
Pan-European Security Architecture no longer centred around a
military alliance has been missed.
NATO still clings to its nuclear warfighting doctrine and insists on
retaining nuclear weapons. Up to 200 US nuclear bombs are still
deployed throughout seven European NATO-members; France and Britain
retain their national nuclear postures. NATO refuses to give up its
doctrine to use nuclear weapons first. Thus NATO explicitly
contradicts the advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) of July 8, 1996, which declares the use and threat of
use of nuclear weapons to be generally contrary to international law.
It should be emphasised that the ICJ declared the threat or use of
nuclear weapons to be generally illegal. The ICJ did not approve any
"right" to threaten or use nuclear weapons, but it asserted that it
"cannot conclude definitively" whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful "in an extreme circumstance of
self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake". NATO nuclear strategy is not covered by this doubtful area of
uncertainty. Indeed, NATO threatens to use nuclear weapons even when
no member state is threatened in its very survival.
NATO nuclear forces serve much broader political purposes: "The
nuclear forces of the Alliance continue to play a unique and
essential role in Alliance strategy. (...) A credible Alliance nuclear
posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common
commitment continue to require widespread participation by European
Allies involved in collective defense planning, in nuclear roles, in
peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command,
control and consultation arrangements." (NATO: The Alliance New
Strategic Concept, Rome, 1991) NATO's nuclear strategy has not been
changed since the ICJ advisory opinion.
Due to NATO enlargement the number of countries committed to such
policies will be increased. At the next NATO summit from 8 to 9 July
in Madrid, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and possibly other
states are expected to be invited to become member states of NATO in
1999. Independently of whether NATO deploys nuclear weapons in the
new member states, it will increase the number of countries relying
on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. It will expand NATO's
system of nuclear sharing arrangements.
NATO stated in the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian
Federation: "The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no
intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the
territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's
nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future
need to do so." NATO also stated that it does not intend to build or
use nuclear weapons infrastructure on the territory of its new
members. (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
between NATO and the Russian Federation of 27 May 1997)
Nevertheless, the Founding Act fails to provide an internationally
binding guarantee that NATO will not deploy nuclear weapons in these
countries. In fact, NATO unilaterally reserves the right to change
this declared policy on nuclear deployments in the new member
states. It is intended that they will become full and equal members
and thus eligible to fully participate in NATO nuclear sharing and
decision-making arrangements. Full membership status includes the
right to ask for the deployment of US-nuclear weapons as well as an
obligation to accept that US nuclear weapons can be deployed at least
during wartime (Denmark, Norway).
Participation of non-nuclear weapons states in NATO nuclear sharing
includes the possibility that the control over nuclear weapons in
wartime will be transferred to the Armed Forces of non- nuclear weapon
states (NNWS). Peacetime storage of nuclear weapons on the territory
of a new NNWS and peacetime training of the use of nuclear weapons
are possible, which is already the case for existing member NNWS.
NATO nuclear sharing and decision making arrangements are perceived as
a violation of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) by many non-NATO NNWS. Agreement among the parties to the NPT
as to whether this is in compliance or in violation of the NATO
countries' obligations under the NPT has never been reached. NATO
unilaterally declares its nuclear sharing arrangements to be in
compliance with the NPT, but even so the NATO states did not use the
opportunity to deposit clear and formal reservations to that
effect. Nevertheless, during both the NPT Review and Extension
Conference in 1995 and the 1997 PrepCom for the Review Conference in
2000, the issue was again subject to controversy. When reevaluating
this question it should be taken into account that Russia has
withdrawn all of its nuclear weapons from the territory of foreign
countries.
NATO argues that the Alliance's expansion will provide more stability
for Europe. Despite the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian
Federation, the opposite may in fact become true. Neither the
Founding Act nor NATO's enlargement effectively ensure the prohibition
of new division lines through Europe. They might even contribute to
their creation.
The goal of being admitted to NATO has already become a driving force
for many countries to overexaggerate the perceived threat from
Russia. In an enlarged NATO they might feel a need to continue to do
so in order to show that their decision to join was justified. Those
not admitted during the first round of enlargement, will continue to
compete for accession. Those countries, which do not join might start
to overexaggerate the perceived threat from NATO, and may seek closer
cooperation with Russia. If that option is not available to them, they
could eventually feel isolated and insecure. One answer to this
problem may be to develop a neutral position.
If the Founding Act between NATO and Russia succeeds in keeping fear
of NATO low in Russia and in developing a common international
security policy, it may result in a joint northern block confronting
southern countries. It may thus become an instrument for increasing
north-south tensions in the world.
More likely, however, the NATO Russia Founding Act will not eliminate
Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia is raising serious
security concerns. NATO expansion will leave Russia greatly
outnumbered by NATO's conventional forces. NATO has promised to seek a
solution at the Vienna negotiations about the Conventional Forces
Treaty in Europe, but has not yet tabled a proposal for future
conventional force limitations that could really meet Russian
concerns. Russia might therefore finally decide to compensate its
conventional inferiority by copying NATO's "flexible response"
strategy of the 1970s and 1980s. As a consequence, Russia would have
to rely heavily on tactical nuclear weapons and would also have to
resort to a first use policy. Because of this possibility, NATO
expansion may put the ratification of START II at risk and thus
jeopardise the future of nuclear disarmament.
The cost of NATO expansion must also be taken into account especially
given current severe economic and social problems. Cost estimates
range from US$ 20 to US$ 125 billion over 7-12 years. They will have
to be shared between the current and the new NATO members. Severe
burdens will be placed on the new member states already struggling to
transform their weak economies. They will be forced to spend scarce
resources, urgently needed for stabilising the countries' economies
and saving their social security and education systems, on new defence
equipment. They might be forced to repeat a core mistake from Cold War
times - spending much more on armaments than their economies can
afford. This might destabilise newly established democracies and
encourage radical positions.
The USA and several European countries are at present negotiating
sales of fighter aircraft to candidate states for NATO membership,
which indicates underlying motives for NATO expansion quite separate
from the NATO claim of desiring stability in the region.
"The debate on the European nuclear deterrent will be the moment of
truth in the construction of a European political union". (Assembly
of the WEU, Document 1420, 19.5.94, p.35) European Union members are
in the process of developing their own security and defence
identity. The Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty,
Art. J4) commits them to eventually frame "a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common defence". Forming the latter will
inevitably put the future of the British and French nuclear arsenals
onto Europe's agenda. While this is not likely to happen soon, the
European Union members will eventually have to take a decision:
whether the European Union should become a nuclear or a non-nuclear
state. The European governments are slowly starting to explore this
ground.
France and Germany have already declared themselves "ready to engage
in a dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence in the context of a
European defense policy." (Franco-German defence and security
concept, Nuremberg, Dec. 9, 1996). The former French Prime minister
Alain Juppé proposed a "concerted" deterrence for Europe under which
France would be prepared to discuss putting its nuclear weapons at
European disposal.
Britain and France have formed the "Anglo-French Joint Commission on
Nuclear Policy" in 1992, which is used for intensifying technical
cooperation as well as political consultations between both countries.
While the three big European countries have thus started to intensify
consultations on defence related nuclear matters on a bilateral
level, they might wish to explore the ground behind closed doors for
a consensus about the future role of British and French nuclear
weapons in European security.
Nevertheless attempts to speed up the development of a European
defence including a nuclear component has met with serious
resistance. Firstly, countries with a longstanding history of
neutrality, such as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland do not at present
want to enter collective defence commitments. In a new development,
the recently elected UK government has stated its opposition to a
common EU defence policy. Secondly, the public in many countries is
largely opposed to a common European nuclear deterrent. Finally, the
creation of an Independent European Nuclear posture is bound to
violate Articles I and II of the NPT. It is likely to require a step
by step approach of integration which includes interim steps of
nuclear sharing arrangements somewhat modelled on those of NATO,
before Europe is one state, thus transferring nuclear weapons to NNWS.
More attention needs to be given to the development of a common
security for the whole of Europe including the East and Russia, based
on conflict prevention rather than on a military
alliance. Examination of the likely causes of conflicts and methods of
increasing stability within Europe should lead to a joint
conceptualisation of a common security architecture by European
countries on an equal basis.
To achieve these goals a democratic organisation, in which NGOs play a
significant role, should progressively take over the role as the
overall decision-making security body for Europe. The likely
candidate for this would be the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). All existing military alliances in
Europe should eventually dissolve when the political and civilian
security model of the OSCE, as defined in Lisbon in December 1996, is
ready to be fully implemented, as they would become obsolete. The
European Union, the strongest substructure in financial and political
terms in the OSCE, should adapt its emerging Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) to strengthen the stabilising capability of the
OSCE, as the most important component of pan-European security.
A very important problem is the present parallel existence of military
alliances alongside the OSCE which compete for dwindling resources,
political mandates and status. As long as most financial resources
are drained by the military aspects of security, which protect the
interests of only some member states, the OSCE can never achieve its
very important objectives for stability and peace in
Europe. Moreover, the costs of the expansion of NATO will make it
almost impossible for many member states to set apart adequate and
urgently needed resources for the OSCE.
Intervention in a conflict, once it has become violent, inevitably
turns out to be more expensive than mediation and conciliation in the
early stages, which also seeks to prevent the human and social
tragedy of war. The necessary shift from the intervention option and
military solutions to the conflict prevention option requires drastic
readjustments of the current disparity between the budgets of NATO
and the OSCE.
OSCE action has demonstrated that OSCE member states are able, without
the help of NATO, to prevent conflicts from openly breaking out, and
to allow democratic elections to take place, as has been attempted in
Chechnya and Albania, although with only a moderate degree of
success. Early detection, early warning, negotiations, mediation,
consultations, arbitrations, sanctions, follow-up procedures are
important existing components of the OSCE mandate. The help of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) working in peace and conflict
research as well as in the field (in humanitarian or medical
assistance and particularly women's groups) would be invaluable for
all of these components to be adequately fulfilled.
In its Annex, the Lisbon Document, emphasised the importance of
establishing ,Nuclear Free Weapon Zones" (NFWZ) in the OSCE region as
a step towards total nuclear disarmament, also contained in the
Stockholm Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July
1996. A strategy for achieving this goal needs to be more clearly
defined.
The USA should immediately withdraw all nuclear weapons from the
territory of non-nuclear weapon states. Such withdrawals should be
made legally binding.
First of all, all nuclear weapons should immediately be taken off
alert, as a next step, warheads should be separated from delivery
systems and removed from their deployment sites to an existing,
remote and safe storage site, under international inspection (e.g. by
the OSCE).
As an important step towards a nuclear-weapons free Europe, all
states in Central and Eastern Europe which are currently free of
nuclear weapons should be declared a nuclear weapon free zone. No
country should undertake any preparations or construction of
infrastructure to be able to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory.
Decisive steps should immediately be undertaken by all European
states to comply with Article VI of the NPT and with the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of July 8, 1996,
by starting negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) to
eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide. This should be coordinated
with efforts to promote the effective implementation of the
Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions as well as to improve
international control of delivery systems.
The Member States of the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva
should be creative in finding ways of ending the impasse currently
overshadowing the negotiations on nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation issues.
In no case should nuclear weapon states continue or start to offer a
nuclear umbrella to non- nuclear weapons states.
To exclude all doubts on the intended legal implications of
deposited reservations made by various states during the NPT
ratification process in the late 60s and early 70s (,European
Option"), the Treaty on the European Union should be amended by a
specific clause (e.g. Title V, Article J.4, Paragraph) which could
read: ,Under international obligations established by the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Union renounces the
production and possession of nuclear weapons or any form of control
over them, as part of its common defence." If the European Union
accedes to the NPT, it should do so with a non-nuclear status.
Military as well as commercial production, reprocessing, and reuse
of all nuclear-weapons- usable materials, including tritium, should be
unilaterally phased out or prohibited by an internationally agreed
cut-off treaty. The first step should be to establish transparency by
creating a complete and detailed inventory, updated annually, of all
such materials, past and present. The next step should be the
reduction and elimination of existing stocks, taking into account
materials in warheads. The current impasse regarding a fissile
materials cut-off agreement can only be overcome if disarmament
measures are linked to non-proliferation measures.
Levels of conventional armament under the new CFE should be reduced
to the absolute minimum level required for purely defensive
operations. Levels should not only be measured in numbers but also in
technical quality. Commercial arms transfers should be controlled and
reduced and a conversion programme for the arms industry needs to be
initiated.
OSCE member states should continue, in a constructive and innovative
way, the ongoing process of the drafting of ,A Common Security Model
for Europe in the 21st Century". The security needs of each and every
group of OSCE member states should be integrated into the framework
of a ,common and cooperative security without dividing lines" as
defined in the Lisbon Document. Steps should be taken by member
states, especially the members of the European Union within the
proposed CSFP, to strengthen the OSCE both politically and
financially.
The OSCE should improve its decision-making process by refining the
Moscow mechanism for the ,unanimity minus one" procedure. Recognition
by all member states of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in
Geneva, as the OSCE's mandatory dispute-resolution authority (for
instance by deleting the proviso clause) is essential. The OSCE should
improve the performance of its tasks, by expanding the existing Forum
for Security Cooperation (FSC) and the Economic Forum, and in
particular by establishing a sanctions authority, which would measure
case by case the effectiveness and consequences to the population of
imposing sanctions, and draw up a code disallowing sanctions on
humanitarian and medical assistance.
A concept for the establishment of fully integrated OSCE mobile
peace-keeping police contingents, trained in conflict moderation and
capable of self-defence should be developed. An initiative to develop
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) into
a forum for cross-frontier NGO cooperation should be launched.
Setting up an early-warning system for conflict prevention which is
supported by civilians and local organisations can help to identify
flash-points before conflicts break out. Recognised mediation
training in conflict resolution should be more widespread and could be
encouraged as a voluntary service. East and west European citizens
should establish a Citizen Verification Network which observes their
own military as closely as possible and especially any actions taken
with regard to nuclear weapons.
There needs to be more widespread discussion on the lessons that are
learned from each war or conflict that is experienced. Mediators
should be encouraged to regularly communicate with each other to
share their experiences with each other and also with NGOs. A network
of people working in conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance and
research should be established. A self administered NGO liaison
within the OSCE should be established, which would draw on the
experience and capacities of NGOs in the field of peace work, and
would support NGOs in introducing, on a decentralised basis, a
voluntary Civil Peace Service (CPS), and a European civilian youth
association.
Yearly allocations to the OSCE, from 1998 on, irrespective of
increases in their financial contributions to the actual
implementation of individual missions, should be at least doubled.
The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) should be entrusted with
the task of elaborating a comprehensive disarmament treaty (new
Military Forces in Europe - MFE - treaty), in order to achieve
nuclear-weapon-free zones in the area of the OSCE (beginning with
Central and Nordic Europe and Central Asia) as a step towards the
global abolition of all nuclear weapons. Furthermore, negotiations
with Mongolia (not an OSCE member state and a declared nuclear
weapons free state) should be initiated, to allow their participation
in the proposed OSCE nuclear-free zone in Central Asia (Almaty
Declaration).
The Schlaining Declaration of NGOs was concluded at the NGO Conference
"A Nuclear Weapons-Free Europe. Visions for non-nuclear European
Security" in Burg Schlaining, Austria, June 13th to 15th 1997. It is
signed by representatives of the following NGOs:
Solange Fernex, Fax: +33-3-89407804
Further information can be obtained from any of the above listed NGOs.