Session Reports
Session 1a
Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC)
Report: Martin Kalinowski
In the opening plenary session Rebecca Johnson discussed the prospects for negotiations on nuclear disarmament and she pointed out that there is a new trend towards qualitative rather than the classical quantitative disarmament approach which reduces the number of deployed nuclear weapons. Steps like a No-First-Use Treaty, dealerting of nuclear weapons, ending the deployment on foreign territory, sequestration of warheads, and extending the area of nuclear weapons free zones in the world establish a qualitative disarmament which may lead to the marginalization of nuclear weapons.
Jürgen Scheffran discussed the difference between an incremental and a comprehensive approach to negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention and he presented a scheme that demonstrated that both approaches are not necessarily excluding each other.
Merav Datan introduced to the content of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention as well as to the historic process which led to the drafting of the Model by an international group of disarmament experts and diplomats. The drafting process was managed by the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and scientific-technical input was provided by INESAP.
Wu Jun made clear that China always supported the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and actually supported the Nuclear Weapons Convention.
Session 1b
Consequences from the advisory opinion of the World Court of Justice
Report: Luis Masperi
The difficult part of the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the possibility of exception for use of nuclear weapons when the survival of a state is at stake. A state corresponds to the people, a territory and a government and it is not clear which component may be at stake and who decides. Moreover if nuclear weapons are inhumanitarian how can they be used even in extreme circumstances? Additionally the possible exception is a privilege for nuclear weapon states.
Apart from this point, it is clear that the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would now be considered a violation of international law because it did not correspond to an extreme circumstance of selfdefence. An important part of the opinion of the ICJ is the recommendation for negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament.
Describing the possible role of nuclear weapons one only finds that of deterring attacks but the organisation of deterrence is very complicated. In any case war has its own laws which tend to escalate violence and according by nuclear weapons appear inadmissible.
Once the inhuman character of nuclear weapons has been accepted the practical steps are still difficult. The commitment of no-first-use by the four nuclear weapon states apart from China would be relevant since the strict application of this doctrine would be equivalent to the abolition of nuclear weapons.
The end of the Cold War has produced a change of the attitude of the USA and Russia which is positive. But possession of nuclear weapons continues to give international prestige and deterrence is still an important strategy for the nuclear weapon states. But nuclear deterrence is a mistake since nuclear weapons have not protected peace and security with them is unstable.
The non-universality of the present non-proliferation regime is dangerous. Regarding the two countries of South Asia which are not parties to the NPT both in India and Pakistan a minimum capability of deterrence has popular support.
Regarding the future, the two nuclear weapon states have created a situation where to dismantle their arsenals will be extremely expensive. Even while the number of warheads is being reduced, nuclear weapon states are still improving the quality of their arsenals.
If the other nuclear weapon states will continue the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, China may consider the opportunity of joining the disarmament process. According to what has been announced the reduction of arsenals will proceed slowly for the next decades so that one might hope to reach the abolition of nuclear weapons one century after the explosions of nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Session 1c
Lessons from Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC and CWC)
Report: Allison Macfarlane
In this session, both speakers (Jonathan Tucker and Deng Hongmei) made suggestions for the Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) by comparison with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Jonathan Tucker spoke on ,Lessons from the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions for a future ban on nuclear weapons". He first discussed the similarities of the CWC and BWC with the NWC, such as complete elimination of stockpiles, 95% of weapons are concentrated in two states, and the problems of dual-use materials. He then discussed some important differences between the CWC and NWC, like the difference in destructive power between the weapons, and emphasised that the military significance of small numbers of nuclear weapons is a major distinguishing factor. He concluded that the CWC informs the NWC by showing the need for mutually reinforcing verification measures, the need to make provisions for dual-use materials and processes, and the need to involve industry in NWC discussions.
The second talk was presented by Deng Hongmei on ,The CWC and its lessons for the future NWC". She began her discussion of this topic by considering the advantages and disadvantages of the CWC, such as the inclusion of strict verification with routine and challenge inspections, which is positive in contrast to the lack of a prohibition on research on chemical weapons. She then highlighted lessons from the CWC for the NWC, in particular, as to the scope of the treaties, to the verification and protection of confidential information, especially with regards to challenge inspections, and to a disarmament schedule.
The talks and consequent discussion were quite fruitful and occupied the entire time allotted. Zhuang Jianzhong pointed out that it's most important for all countries involved in the NWC to have a common wish to destroy nuclear weapons. Jackie Cabasso commented on the interconnections between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy and that the NWC should include a monetary incentive for developing countries to avoid the use of nuclear energy. Overall, the participants and speakers felt that the CWC especially had important lessons for the future NWC and that we will learn more as the CWC evolves.
Session 1d
Verification of nuclear disarmament
Report: Ayman Khalil
Sun Xiangli from the Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics gave an outline of early efforts of limiting nuclear weapons including SALT1, SALT2 , INF. Such agreements significantly reduced the threat of nuclear war. The end of cold war era further stimulated efforts of reaching additional agreements, namely START1 and START2. Dr. Xiangli went on to highlight the importance of verification which plays a key role in various treaties. Being part of the overall verification process, the monitoring of dismantling activities is important to insure an irreversible disarmament process. This could be done by radiation detection, i.e. measuring gamma ray energy spectrum at a close range. The speaker described measures that should accompany the disarmament process, this includes de-alerting process. High levels of alerts give rise to accidental or unauthorized launch. De-alerting may be accomplished by removing warheads or guidance systems from missiles or by keeping submarines out of range of potential targets. Dr. Xiangli concluded that technical efforts should be supplemented by political efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.
Jürgen Scheffran (IANUS) discussed the link between security and verification of nuclear disarmament. He refered to some principles of adequate verification, which aim at reducing the risk of non-compliance to tolerable levels. Based on a list of verification means and procedures he discussed potential elements of a verification regime for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, in particular, an International Monitoring System, an implementing Agency, on-site inspections, safety controls, confidence-building, societal verification and dispute settlement. Finally, he presented a monitoring matrix linking verification requirements and means for the case of ballistic missiles.
Martin Kalinowski from IANUS gave cases in which the Nuclear Weapon Convention (NWC) could be violated and measures against such cases. In particular emphasis was made to the case of illegally acquiring nuclear weapons. In spite of the safeguards mechanism within the NPT, large amounts of material unaccounted for (MUF) occur in large bulk handling facilities. A clear example of this may be seen in the US plutonium inventory for the first 50 years which classified not less than 2.8 tons of plutonium as (MUF). Dr. Kalinowski highlighted some of the NPT weaknesses (loopholes) including the possibility of having clandestine nuclear activities and the inability of the current safeguards system to detect diversions before it takes place. He then highlighted the NWC approach for break-out states which allows for an efficient international reaction that would disable such efforts. This includes putting technical threshold at a high level. Moreover, The problem of MUF could be solved by reducing accessibility to nuclear weapon usable material and production techniques. Therefore the Model NWC forsees banning some nuclear technologies (e.g. reprocessing of spent fuel for commercial purposes). In addition the NWC would adopt new concepts like "Safety Control" which would aim at preventing diversions in addition to verifying non-diversions.
Suzanna van Moyland from the Verification Technology Information Center (VERTIC) gave a summary of the additional protocol for IAEA safeguards. Among the provisions of the protocol, articles 2 and 3 deal with information that have to be provided on the following: 1- Uranium Mines and Uranium and Thorium concentration plants, 2- Nuclear material exempted from safeguards, 3- Scale of operation on each site, 4- Nuclear fuel cycle (R&D activities), 5- Nuclear related equipment and non-nuclear material. The speaker outlined other provisions of the additional protocol which include overruling the safeguards agreement if a conflict takes place between the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. The additional protocol also provides a room for environmental sampling (being air, water or soil sampling) which may be classified into 3 categories (depending on geographical range). Dr. van Moyland stressed that the additional protocol will seriously effect disarmament among nuclear weapon states and would pave the way to a nuclear weapon free world, pointing that IAEA approved a model additional protocol to add on the comprehensive safeguards agreement.
Session 1e and 3b
Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) and nuclear weapons research
Report: Abdel Gawad Emara
The first paper presented by F. H. Hammad deals with the establishment of a regional monitoring and verification system from a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. A number of safeguards and disarmament principles to establish a Cooperative Integrated Monitoring and Verification System (CIMVS) were given. The design elements for a CIMVS were also reported.
The second paper was presented by Bahig Nassar. He was questioning about a new U.S. policy which enables it to keep its dominance and nuclear superiority.
The third paper was presented by Hiro Umebayashi. The purpose of his paper was to report recent positive and negative developments in relation to the efforts for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
Session 2a
Rethinking Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Report: Rebecca Johnson
The four speakers stimulated a very interesting discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the current non-proliferation regime. Ni Shixiong provided a theoretical overview of the ethics, conditions and dynamics governing the nuclear age. Wang Ling and Zhu Chenghu acknowledged recent bilateral progress, but Zhu argued that even after reductions, the weapons stocks remained at too-high levels and that the current regime was undemocratic and reinforced the big powers' interests. Wang and Zhu both castigated the double standards operated by the United States, with arms sales and nuclear-related assistance to its allies, while it condemned and denied those it classified as 'bad boys'.
Alice Slater agreed with Zhu's characterisation of the US as the engine of the nuclear arms race and the 'Super Proliferator'. She outlined the perspectives and programme of the Abolition 2000 network of NGOs to push for full implementation of the NPT. The following discussion looked at the dilemmas of the NPT and CTBT regimes, the dichotomy between the nuclear haves and have-nots and the problems of undeclared/threshold states. There was significant debate on China's role and the opportunities for China to take a more pro-active role in regional and international non-proliferation.
Session 2b
Drawing further states into the disarmament process
Report: Rebecca Johnson
Five speakers analysed the difficulties and opportunities for involving the smaller declared and undeclared NWS into the nuclear disarmament process. Bahig Nassar showed how the US and NATO were strengthening their hegemony from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, and argued that without a fundamental restructuring of the military alliances, there was no hope of building a NWFZ in the Middle East. Luis Masperi and Owen Greene offered alternative proposals for involving the smaller NWS. Masperi advocated an important role for scientists and argued that since the US and Russia will not eliminate their nuclear weapons in the near future, the three smaller NWS must go first. Greene considered it unlikely that Britain, China and France would disarm and leave the US and Russia as the sole NWS, but proposed extending the nuclear disarmament process to include five-power talks, with especial emphasis on transparency, no increase commitments, de-alerting and multilateralising the ABM Treaty.
Han Hua and Praful Bidwai provided contrasting analyses of perceptions and security concerns in South Asia, sparking an interesting — and pessimistic — discussion of the likely role of India in the near future.
Session 3a
The Nuclear Weapons States
Report: Alice Slater
Vijai Nair questioned US and Russian commitment to nuclear disarmament. He urged a holistic approach to abolition noting that while ,step by step" is inarguable, there is a tendency to isolate the steps. He called for a proactive abolition initiative to take advantage of recent reports that the UK is considering a reduction in the Trident fleet, taking its submarines off permanent patrol, and advocating a no first use policy for NATO. Nair urged greater understanding of India's nuclear strategy, and urged abolitionists to use the ,acceptable parts of India's logic" in dissenting to the CTBT and NPT for shaping a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) and to exploit the leverage of India's security fears and potential to go overtly nuclear to move the NWS towards a NWC. He quoted Chinese scholar, Cao Xiaobing, that we must reengineer strategic thought to end the destabilising doctrine of nuclear deterrence and establish a fair economic order which runs counter to maintaining and expanding military blocs.
Xia Lipping, speaking on the impasse to START III noted that the US and Russia are ,cooperating partners" in clinging to the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons and continuing the qualitative arms race. The US is devising new warheads (the B-61 and W-87) and Russia tested a new strategic missile in July. Xia proposed eight steps between now and after START III for nuclear disarmament, including the steps outlined by the Canberra Commission and the creation of a suitable political climate by improved relations between countries. After START III, Xia proposed that the US and Russia go down to 1000 warheads each in START IV, after which all declared NWS should go to 200 with strict verification that would allow the threshold states to then join in the dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and materials.
Huang Zuwei stated that the projected START III reductions of deployed strategic warheads to 2.000- 2.500 was inadequate and that levels should go to 1.000-1.500 and should also cover tactical nuclear warheads, Cruise missiles and undeployed nuclear weapons. Noting China's concern that strategic defence capabilities will affect the nuclear force balance among the declared nuclear states, Huang suggested a multi-lateral ABM treaty, recommending that the other three declared NWS states be included in future ABM amendment talks. He also urged that the fissban on weapons materials be expanded to include civilian use fissile material and reprocessing to be placed under IAEA monitoring and that the same measures be taken to limit the stockpile of reactor-produced plutonium.
Liu Erxun, noted that even after START I there will still be about 20.000 warheads in the world. He suggested a series of timebound steps with further reductions in deployed warheads, arriving at 1.000 for US and Russia in 2100 and 200 for each country by 2105. He suggests that the Russian Duma's resistance to ratifying START II is based on their concerns about NATO expansion and the preservation of the ABM Treaty. US plans to deploy a Nationwide Missile Defense system (NMD) by 2003 will undermine Russian confidence in the ability of its remaining deterrent forces to retaliate after absorbing a fist strike. Russia is also concerned about the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) demarcation agreement. No agreements has been reached on high-velocity TMD systems which have significant potential to intercept strategic ballistic missiles thus undermining the ABM Treaty. All of the panellists from China urged a No-First-Use-Treaty.
Session 3b
Nuclear Weapons Research
Report: Jacqueline Cabasso
The main paper was presented by Jacqueline Cabasso.
Nuclear Weapons Forever: Why "Stockpile Stewardship" is Fundamentally Incompatible With the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Process of Nuclear Disarmament - A growing number of mainstream bodies, including the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, are putting forward proposals for systematic approaches to nuclear disarmament. These proposals are being advanced in a context where U.S. government policy assumes that a substantial nuclear arsenal will be retained indefinitely, and in which the U.S. plans to build and operate a modernized nuclear weapons research, development, testing and manufacturing complex with greater research and experimental capabilities than were available during the Cold War.
As the "price" for their acquiescence to the CTBT, the American President has promised his nuclear weapons laboratories $4.5 billion a year for the so-called "Stockpile Stewardship and Management" (SS&M) program, in constant dollars an amount well above the annual Cold War spending average for directly comparable activities: nuclear weapons research, development, testing, production and disassembly.
The U.S. plans to keep the entire SS&M complex operational throughout the full course of any conceivable future disarmament negotiations, to the point where all existing nuclear warheads have been eliminated, and perhaps beyond. Yet the U.S. arms control community has been unwilling to examine closely the contradictions between SS&M and the notion of the CTBT as a step towards elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus, instead of analyzing the global relationship between the CTBT, SS&M, and the future of nuclear weapons, the debate in the U.S. has been diverted mainly to the narrow question of prospects for early Senate ratification of the Treaty.
As now proposed, the SS&M program conflicts with most of the disarmament agendas which have been recently put forward - and at virtually every step along the way:
- The SS&M program violates the spirit, the intent, and possibly the letter of the CTBT and jeopardize prospects for its entry-into-force;
- The SS&M program anticipates the design and deployment of nuclear weapons with new military capabilities, in violation of the NPT obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons;
- The SS&M program will complicate verification measures critical to achieving significant stockpile reductions;
- The SS&M program has the potential to ignite a new arms race as a result of the close interconnections between research, design, and testing of thermonuclear weapons and other forms of advanced weapons research;
- The SS&M program is premised on a strategy of "lead and hedge," which will make permanent arms reductions more difficult to achieve;
- The SS&M program will increase the political power of the nuclear weapons labs and their control over weapons-related information, and may thus help to preserve nuclear weapons programs even where they impede arms control efforts;
- The SS&M program may lead to the diffusion of nuclear weapons-relevant information from U.S. programs to the rest of the world, thus heightening proliferation concerns.
At this session of the conference the first issue of INESAP technical reports was presented. It is co-authored by Andre Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni and deals with "The Physical Principles of Thermonuclear Explosives, Inertial Confinement Fusion, and the Quest for Fourth Generaltion Nuclear Weapons". This report is an assessment of the prospect of developing new (i.e. fourth generation) nuclear weapons in the context of the recently agreed Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and of the current moratorium on nuclear testing in effect in all nuclear-weapon States.
The conclusion stresses that considerable research is underway in all five nuclear-weapon States (as well as in several other major industrialized States such as Germany and Japan) on ICF and on many physical processes that provide the scientific basis necessary to develop fourth generation nuclear weapons. Substantial progress has been made in the past few years on all these processes, and the construction of large ICE microexplosion facilities in both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States is giving the arms race a fresh boost. The world runs the risk that certain countries will equip themselves directly with fourth generation nuclear weapons, bypassing the acquisition of previous generations of nuclear weapons.
Session 4a and 4b
No-First-USE Treaty and relations to conventional weapons
Report: Liu Huaqiu
Three speakers talked about a No-First-Use (NFU) Treaty and its verification. They consider that NFU Treaty would at present be a breakthrough in nuclear arms control and a key step towards a NWFW.
During the discussion, there were different views heard such as:
- A NFU Treaty is difficult to verify. Now the best way is that the five nuclear weapon states make a NFU declaration.
- Some arms control treaties have no verification regime, so we could have a NFU Treaty without verification, too.
- The United States will not accept a NFU Treaty. We should continue to push deep reduction.
- Without a NFU Treaty, the USA and Russia still keep up their extended deterrence, thus deep reduction is likely impossible, let alone the NWFW.
Many people agree that nuclear disarmament should go hand in hand with conventional disarmament, but there was no agreement on how both should be linked and how far general disarmament should proceed before nuclear weapons are eliminated. The conventional disarmament should not be left out of a schedule towards NUFW.
Session 4c
Ballistic missile defence, counter-proliferation and the future of the ABM Treaty
Report: Huang Zuwei
The presentations made by five speakers in this session covered Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and deep nuclear reduction, impacts of deploying high performance Theater Missile Defence (TMD) on regional security and stability, specifically in North East Asia and the Middle East. The demarcation agreement between BMD and TMD reached between US and four former Soviet Union countries is waiting for the ratification by Russian Duma and the US Senate. Some participants predict that Duma will not ratify the agreement until their pre-conditions were satisfied for START II ratification.
Since the ABM/TMD issue is closely related to further cuts of strategic nuclear weapons, a number of session participants suggested to enlarge the ABM Treaty into a multi-lateral treaty jointed by other declared nuclear weapon states.
Strong voices from Chinese participants against the US pushing joint development of Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system between US and Japan. They emphasised that this move will lead to instability in this region.
The other participants proposed to work on a Middle East ABM Treaty to limit the development in this region.
Session 5a
Nuclear energy and non-proliferation issues in Asia
Report: Huang Zuwei with the assistance of Jor-Shan Chio
Four papers were presented in this session. The main concerns of the speakers are:
- Growing energy (especially electricity) needs in East Asia Region. Nuclear energy programs and viewpoints from Japan, China (including Taiwan), South Korea, North Korea, India, and Pakistan are reviewed. The US involvement in nuclear energy issues in this region, Russian's nuclear wastes in the far east, and how to establish a nuclear framework in East Asia were also covered.
- Efforts should be made to stop the energy route to nuclear weapons. Special concern mentioned in this session include fissile material production in India and Pakistan which lead to the production of weapon usable fissile materials, and 87% public opinion in South Korea support to having nuclear weapons showed the intention of seek nuclear weapons in some area.
The discussion after the presentation centered around the "regional approach" to peaceful use of nuclear energy. There were questions on whether the regional approach would directly imply the promotion of nuclear energy, especially to third world country. Strong opinion were voiced by some of the session participants that the conference should pursue a truly nuclear-free world, including the abolishing of not only nuclear weapons, but also nuclear energy. There were also strong opinion from others that nuclear energy would be needed by many developing countries, to meet their energy needs as well as in raising the standard of living.
Session 5b
Future perspectives for the cut-off agreement
Report: Martin Kalinowski
Though the cut-off of nuclear-weapon-usable materials enjoys a high priority for a large number of countries and though it is on top of the international political agenda, the prospects for negotiations being started at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva are not very positive. Martin Kalinowski discussed possibilities how the current deadlock at the CD can be overcome. He suggests that an explicit linkage between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should be integrated in a cut-off agreement. His claim is that a production stop for tritium might serve this purpose because an increasing shortage due to the radioactive decay of tritium (5.5% per year) will qualitatively disarm the affected warheads in a reversible way. Tritium decay can provide a weak timetable for disarmament and might serve as a compromise to those states which demand a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament.
Zhu Qiangguo commented from a Chinese standpoint on a fissile material cut-off agreement. According to him, China has declared that it stopped the production of nuclear-weapon-usable materials. He identified the main problems of a production ban in the rules for a future agreement and in the unequal past production of fissile materials as the baseline that must be adequately addressed. Regarding the rules he stressed that an agreement should be non-discriminatory, multi-lateral and efficiently verified.
Abdel Gawad Emara discussed some technical and non-proliferation aspect of burning of MOX fuel for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. His analysis made clear that MOX has several disadvantages as all other options have as well. He therefore recommends that more than one option should be pursued. In her presentation Allison Macfarlane compared two methods for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium which could avoid the burning of plutonium in MOX fuel. She demonstrated with a number of experimental data and by using - if available - natural analogues that a crystalline ceramic material as contender for radioactive material is clearly the better choice as compared with vitrification of waste in glass.
Wolfgang Liebert together with his colleagues Alexander Glaser and Christoph Pistner prepared a paper on Elimination versus disposal option for plutonium. In this paper the authors present computer calculations on their own concept for a plutonium-burner-reactor which does not produce electrical power. After long time exposure of several decades to a neutron flux the elimination of more than 90% of plutonium-239 and up to 80% of all plutonium is feasible.
