Scientific Expertise and the Bomb
Detecting Nuclear Weapons Materials
The cases of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea show the limits of the established safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While safeguarding Iraq failed before the 1991 Gulf war, UN inspectors gained unprecedented access to critical facilities after the war and were able to shut down Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. North Korea diverted nuclear materials at an early stage and gradually increased its nuclear weapons capability, despite its membership in the NPT and the establishment of IAEA safeguards. In spite of the Six Party talks, Pyongyang prepared and conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 — an event that marks a tremendous setback in international nonproliferation efforts. And Iran continues to challenge the IAEA and stretches the limits of its “inalienable right” for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
IAEA safeguards are meant to provide accountancy, containment, and surveillance of nuclear material, but they aim at timely detection rather than early prevention of material diversion. Because of unavoidable measurement uncertainties, loss of material, and lax practice, the diversion of weapons-size quantities remains a possibility. The promotion of “peaceful” uses of nuclear power contributes to the problem. In addition, safeguards are virtually nonexistent in nuclear weapon states and do not fully apply before enrichment or fuel fabrication is started. Developments in laboratory testing, laser enrichment, and computer simulation further undermine the non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
The experience with clandestine nuclear weapons programs calls for strong and efficient verification measures. The 93+2 Programme of the IAEA resulted in a number of limited improvements, and the 1997 Model Additional Safeguards Protocol expanded safeguards authorities and activities, but failed to provide the IAEA with technical means to detect clandestine activities from a distance. This leaves uncertainties about efforts to acquire relevant materials which contributes to disputes and accusations of hidden nuclear weapons ambitions.
It is practically impossible to develop, test, and deploy nuclear weapons without leaving any marks. Splitting the atom not only releases nuclear energy at a large scale, it also emits particles into the environment which are hard to contain. The production of nuclear weapons materials requires large facilities such as reactors and enrichment plants, the construction of which is difficult to hide. Even if they release only small amounts of substances, highly sensitive detection mechanisms may indicate the source.
Uncovering the bomb-making process by detecting its signatures is one of the goals of the independent Group of Scientific Experts (iGSE) on the detection of clandestine nuclear-weapons-usable materials production. With support from the MacArthur Foundation and complementary to the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), this INESAP project brings together international experts to use science-based policy research to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation efforts (see iGSE project description). One focus will be to apply technologies for remote environmental monitoring, in particular to explore the usability of atmospheric krypton and xenon measurements as indicators for plutonium separation (see contributions by Heiner Daerr, Markus Kohler, Martin Kalinowski, Johann Feichter, Ole Roß, and Yuri Dubasov). It assesses atmospheric transport modeling and statistical data analysis (Don Wuebbles, Daeok Youn, Martin Kalinowski) to demonstrate the capabilities in locating a possible source based on reported data.
Further approaches seek to avoid civilian use of nuclear-weapons-usable materials, apply methods of satellite detection (Gotthard Stein), examine methods to reconstruct past production (nuclear archaeology and forensics) and explore other novel techniques and instruments for nuclear detection (Julian Whichello). This research will increase transparency on nuclear activities which will be relevant for negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty and a Comprehensive Cutoff Convention as well as future disarmament treaties like the proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention.
The IGSE builds on six decades in which scientists lived up to their responsibility by using their expertise to stem the nuclear arms race. The lifelong experience of Wolfgang Panofsky is a vivid example of how physics and politics have been closely intertwined. Scientists and engineers increasingly play a role in nuclear disarmament and securing peace (see Dominique Lalanne, Jürgen Scheffran, and the Rome Declaration of Nobel Peace Laureates).
Under the current US Administration nuclear weapons continue to play an indefinite role (Jackie Cabasso), while outer space becomes a new arena for warfare, as is envisaged in the new National Space Policy (Theresa Hitchens). These power projections spur regional nuclear arms races (Fernando Barros), increase the level of threat perception, including the missile threat (Jürgen Scheffran), and provide a justification to go nuclear. With this in mind, North Korea rushed into its first nuclear test, whether it actually worked or not (see technical analysis by Ole Roß und Martin Kalinowski).
It is not too late to find ways out of the new arms race, which is most urgent in critical regions such as the Middle East (Pugwash Council). The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report has provided a solid groundwork for diminishing the risks from “Weapons of Terror” (Henrik Salander). The requirements for verification of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are laid out by Trevor Findlay in his contribution to the Article VI Forum in Ottawa. The challenges, opportunities, and NGO recommendations for progress on nuclear disarmament have been delivered to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly by Zia Mian and Merav Datan on behalf of the NGO community. Finally, Felicity Hill introduces the new International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons: ICAN!
Jürgen Scheffran, December 2006
