“Weapons of Terror”
Henrik Salander
It may seem paradoxical that we, after the end of the Cold War, in an era with no major ideological differences between great powers, are unable to agree on measures to address the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Notably, states were not able to agree on any substantive issues at the 2005 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the UN Summit in September 2005 could not adopt a single line on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation. While little or no progress is made to reduce the threat of WMD in multilateral forums, the nuclear weapon states are backing down from previously made commitments. It is truly worrying that while new threats to global and human security are rapidly emerging, the old threats and challenges still linger. Today, we are actually witnessing an increased reliance by nuclear weapon states on their nuclear arsenals, the development of new weapons systems is contemplated, and the policy of no first use appears to be history. It has been said that we are actually entering a new era of arms races.
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Report
In 2003, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Anna Lindh, asked Dr Hans Blix to set up an independent international commission to look at the issues concerning WMD and their means of delivery. Dr Blix was given the mandate to handpick the commissioners and to chair the commission. 14 experts from all over the world were chosen; among them former US Secretary of Defence, Dr William Perry; former UN Under Secretary for Disarmament Affairs, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala; and Director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Dr Patricia Lewis. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) commenced its work in early 2004.
On June 1, 2006, the unanimous WMDC Report, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, was presented to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. In the report, the Commission provides an overview of the current states of affairs in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation and gives 60 concrete recommendations on how to meet current challenges and reduce the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. Its central message is that in the last decade the arms control and disarmament process has stagnated and must be revived and pursued in parallel with efforts to prevent the spread of WMD to further states and to terrorist movements.
A central theme in the Report is that the total elimination of WMD is the most reliable way to prevent their use. The aim should thus be set at ultimately outlawing also nuclear weapons, as has been done with biological and chemical arms. Aware of the difficulties facing multilateral efforts to address the issue of WMD, the Commission strikes a careful balance between long-term goals and short-term possibilities. Many of the proposals are not new, but make valid points which are yet to be acted upon. While the Report also contains recommendations relating to biological and chemical arms, it is focused mainly around the threat posed by nuclear weapons. In this brief presentation of the Report, I will do the same.
Recent setbacks in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation – the failure of the last NPT Review Conference, the inability to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to India and Pakistan, the nuclear test by North Korea, and the difficult issue of Iran’s enrichment activities – have led to a discussion on the collapse of the NPT. I would say, paraphrasing Mark Twain, that the rumour of the death of the treaty is greatly exaggerated. The NPT is a fundamental bargain where the nonnuclear states commit themselves to refrain from developing nuclear weapons, while retaining the right to use nuclear technology for civilian purposes. In turn, the nuclear weapon states commit themselves to a process of gradual disarmament.
The Commission’s Recommendations
The NPT has been – and remains – of tremendous value. Without it the nuclear weapons might have spread to many more than the eight or nine states, which now have them. However, the treaty and the bargain at its core are under strain today. Iraq, Libya and North Korea ignored their non-proliferation pledges and the five nuclear weapon states parties are not living up to their pledges to move to nuclear disarmament. The WMDC states, in it’s very first recommendation, that “All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty need to revert to the fundamental and balanced non-proliferation and disarmament commitments that were made under the treaty and confirmed in 1995 when the treaty was extended indefinitely.”
In addition to proposing concrete measures to meet current challenges, the recommendations in the WMDC Report relate to the institutional framework in which negotiations on disarmament and non-proliferation take place. The principal body for discussion of disarmament issues within the UN, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, has not even been able to agree on an agenda for almost a decade. As decisions are taken by consensus, different interests are constantly blocking each other. The WMDC proposes that the CD should be able to adopt a Program of Work by qualified majority present and voting. This would open up for substantive discussions and could be an important vitamin injection in multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.
The Commission also points out the important role of the Security Council in international efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, the Council does not always have the proper technical support to assess proliferation risks and evaluate evidence put forward by member states. It is therefore proposed that a small subsidiary unit should be established to provide professional technical advice to the Security Council on matters relating to WMD. Further, the Commission proposes that the General Assembly, in light of the lack of progress in multilateral efforts during the last ten years, convene a World Summit to address the challenges of WMD disarmament, non-proliferation, and terrorist use of WMD. Admittedly, there are not many indicators suggesting that progress is possible in the near future, but this gives us all the more reason to intensify our efforts. Thorough preparations and a clear aim will be necessary for a World Summit to be successful and planning should start as soon as possible.
The WMDC gives a large number of proposals relating to concrete measures to be taken in order to reduce the danger of existing arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, halt the spread of weapons, and prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD. In the following I will introduce some of the most urgent recommendations of the Commission.
The single most important issue to push forward is the ratification by the United States and others that have not yet done so, of the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after 44 designated states involved in nuclear activities have ratified it. Of course a special responsibility rests with these designated states. Ten of the necessary ratifications are still missing.[1] The entry into force of the CTBT is vital for efforts to prevent the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons, to help reduce the reliance on nuclear deterrence in security policies, and to reset the stage for global nuclear disarmament. It would be a powerful signal that the world is once again seriously committed to the disarmament process.
A credible non-proliferation regime requires all non nuclear weapon states to accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards and Additional Protocols. The Commission urges all states to accept such safeguards and sign the Additional Protocol. This must be balanced, however, with undertakings by states already in possession of nuclear weapons not to continue their production and development of such arms. Ceasing the production of fissile material for weapons use is key.
The second most important issue would therefore be a treaty on the cut-off of production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons use (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, FMCT). In the view of the Commission, a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons purposes must provide for strong and effective international verification. The United States recently presented a draft FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva,[2] which could serve as a basis for further negotiations. However, the draft does not provide any international verification mechanism. Without international verification, the international community is left to rely on national intelligence services in the event of a suspected breach of the treaty. We have learned from recent history that this is unsatisfactory.
The Report further stresses the need to address the proliferation risks connected to the nuclear fuel cycle. A massive increase of civilian nuclear energy production can be anticipated as the energy consumption in developing countries is exploding. The right to nuclear power and technology for peaceful purposes must never be allowed to be used as a facade for military programs. We must therefore intensify our efforts to explore the possibilities for an effective international arrangement to ensure availability of nuclear fuel for civilian reactors, while minimizing the risk of weapons proliferation. The WMDC suggests that the IAEA could be a forum for further exploration in this regard. A number of interesting proposals have already been put forward and discussions are likely to continue.
The WMDC also highlights the importance of addressing the reasons for countries to seek nuclear weapons. After all, the overwhelming majority of states are not at all interested in developing nuclear weapon programs. In fact, the trend since the creation of the NPT has been the opposite. Countries like South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia even gave up existing nuclear weapons to join the treaty. Still, there are countries actively attempting to develop nuclear weapons. One reason might of course be the fact that many nuclear weapon “have-nots” feel cheated by the “haves” that are not living up to their end of the bargain in the NPT. This could be remedied by a return to credible negotiations towards disarmament. A critical first step would be a review, by all nuclear weapon states, of the role of nuclear arsenals in their national security doctrines. Taking nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert, as well as further steps towards reducing nuclear arsenals would also be significant confidence-building measures in this respect.
Another important driving factor, and probably the most important one, is a perceived security threat. India’s weapon was a response to China’s; the Pakistani weapons program was a response to the Indian; and the Iranian program may have been started as a response to Iraq’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons, etc. It can also be argued that the current North Korean weapons program is inspired by a perceived threat to the regime in Pyongyang.
The WMDC Report gives fairly detailed recommendations in relation to the difficult cases of Iran and North Korea. I will not go through these proposals in depth here. The advised strategy is that of diplomacy and patience. Pressure might be necessary in some situations to uphold the credibility of the international community, but pure display of force runs a risk of adding to perceived threats rather than create incentives for positive action. Regional approaches should be developed and explored further. Confidence-building measures on a regional level can contribute to easing tensions and limit mutually perceived threats. Parallel steps, by India and Pakistan, towards a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons use is one example; an agreement to end all enrichment activities in the Middle East, including Israel and Iran, is another.
The Report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission is available at the WMDC website. The Chairman’s Preface, the Synopsis, and the Recommendations of the report are included in the official UN document A/60/934. The document is available in all official languages of the UN (Arab, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) and can also be accessed via the WMDC website.
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China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed but not ratified the CTBT; while India, North Korea, and Pakistan have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.
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[the editor:] The draft treaty is online available.
