International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Lightsabers at the Ready

Theresa Hitchens

The administration of U.S. President George Bush released its long-awaited National Space Policy (NSP) in October 2006, to a chorus of negative public reaction – sometimes bordering on the hysterical – around the world. At the same time, the official response from Washington’s traditional allies to what arguably represents a more unilateral and militaristic U.S. approach to space was a deafening silence. The disconnect lies not only in the language of the policy itself, but also in the political and budgetary realities facing would-be space warriors in the United States. While the new Bush policy, taken in the context of other U.S. policy and military doctrine documents released over the past six years, can be read as giving a green light to the development, deployment, and use of anti-satellite and space-based weapons, it neither explicitly articulates a space weaponization strategy nor guarantees that the United States will choose the “Star Wars” path.

The New NSP

Although the new NSP was signed by Bush on Aug. 31, 2006, it was not released until Oct. 6, 2006 at 5 pm – the Friday before the three-day Columbus Day holiday weekend.[1] There was no press release or formal briefing, instead an unclassified summary of the policy was posted to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy website. Neither were ambassadors or other allied officials in Washington briefed in advance regarding the policy. Thus, it is fair to say that the White House’s public relations strategy was to minimize attention to, and the political and public importance of, the policy. Indeed, since the release and the storm of negative media reaction both in the United States and around the world, administration and Pentagon officials have launched a public and diplomatic campaign to downplay the new NSP as little more than a continuation of the previous NSP, which dates to 1996 and the administration of Bill Clinton.

It is true that much of the Clinton policy’s language has been incorporated into the new version, and that the wording regarding the controversial issue of attacking satellites is substantially similar. However, analysis of the two texts reveals a number of subtle, but important, differences. Taken together, the changes in wording aggregate to a much more unilateralist vision of the U.S. role, particularly its military role, in space. The policy is heavily oriented to the national security role of space and space assets, as seen through a ‘hard power’ rather than ‘soft power’ lens – which is a departure from previous U.S. space policies dating back to Eisenhower, which sought to balance those aspects. For example, the Bush NSP states:

“In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power.” (Emphasis added.)

While seeking to assert “unhindered” U.S. rights to act in space, the new policy at best ignores U.S. obligations towards other space-faring nations under a spectrum of international accords and agreements. A distrust of international instruments or efforts to establish collective security in space also is evident – reflecting the Bush administration’s long-standing skeptical posture regarding international regimes and laws. While there are welcome statements regarding the need to cooperate on issues such as Earth observation and space surveillance, the cooperative spirit is undercut by language that indicates any such cooperation will be forthcoming on strictly U.S. terms. Finally, although the document stresses the need for “public diplomacy” to promote U.S. positions, it at the same time uses language that, on its face, seems to discredit the use of diplomatic tools that might be useful for reaching consensus decisions about mutual interests among space-faring nations.

For an example of the unilateralist tone, one can compare the Clinton and Bush policies on the issue of the right of free passage in space – a central tenet of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to which the U.S. is a signatory:

• Clinton NSP: “The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights.”[2] (Emphasis added.)
• Bush NSP: “The United States considers space systems to have the rights of passage through and operations in space without interference. Consistent with this principle, the United States will view purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights.” (Emphasis added.)

In another telling example, in contrast to the Clinton-era document which explicitly promotes international dialogue, cooperation and treaty obligations, the Bush policy states:

“The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.” (Emphasis added.)

The policy’s central theme – protecting U.S. rights to freedom of action in space – is not a new thrust, that goal was apparent in the Clinton policy as well. Both the Clinton and Bush policies can be read as condoning the development of anti-satellite weapons and/or space-based weapons. However, no NSP can be read in a vacuum. Whereas the language of the 1996 NSP endorsed a “space control” strategy, the Clinton administration was extremely skeptical of the strategic wisdom of offensive space weapons. As a result, rather than actively supporting antisatellite weapons programs as perhaps indicated by its policy declarations, the Clinton administration canceled a number of research and development programs that could have resulted in such capabilities. During the Clinton era, numerous Air Force planning documents lamented the lack of political will behind a space control strategy.[3]

The Bush administration’s policy comes in a totally different context: as a capstone to other more explicit military documents and official statements that signal movement toward space weaponization. For example, both the Joint Doctrine for Space Operations published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 2002[4] and the U.S. Air Force Counterspace Operations Doctrine published in August 2004[5] state that the United States has the “freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack” in space, and lay claim to the mission of “force application” from space. Both go further to detail specific tactics – including destruction of satellites on orbit – for offensive “space control” operations, as well as potential targets to include “third party” commercial or governmental satellites. In a similar vein, John Mohanco, U.S. State Department deputy director for multilateral nuclear and security affairs, told the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that the U.S. government will “continue to consider” “space-related weaponry” for satellite protection. Given this context – as well as the common legal adage that “that which is not expressly forbidden is allowed” – it seems evident that the Bush NSP indeed endorses a space warfare strategy.

As noted, the new NSP has released a chorus of disapproval in media around the world, both for its aggressively unilateral tone and for its apparent endorsement of space weapons. Although official statements from other nations have been few and far between, diplomats from France, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom privately have expressed dismay and concern regarding the new U.S. stance. European nations worry that the bellicose U.S. posture and the emphasis on possible use of military force in space serves to legitimize the development and use of space weapons, something European leaders see as dangerous.

At the same time, expert critics inside and outside the United States also recognize that despite the Bush administrations fire-breathing rhetoric, there remain questions about the political and budgetary feasibility of implementing a space warfighting strategy. For one thing, Congress – even under previous Republican control – has been leery about funding technology development for anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and space-based weaponry, including spacebased missile defense. The U.S. House of Representatives, in deliberating the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Department budget, stripped funding for a laser test at the Starfire Optical Range that members suspected was related to developing a ground-based laser ASAT – although the money was restored in House and Senate conference committee after a public relations blitz by the U.S. Air Force. The conferees agreed, however, to bar spending on spacebased missile defense until the U.S. Missile Defense Agency submitted a detailed report about its costs and potential political risks. With the House and Senate now controlled by the Democratic Party, which traditionally has been opposed to space weaponization, there is even more reason to expect continued congressional skepticism.

In addition, there is little evidence that the Bush administration has, or intends to, push forward an aggressive spending plan for the development and deployment of such weapons. While there is research on enabling technologies, a study by the Center for Defense Information and The Henry L. Stimson Center of the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2007 budget request could pinpoint only about $1 billion in related technology research.[6] Granted, there may also be funding in classified programs related to space weapons, but considering the state of current technology research in the unclassified realm, it is doubtful that there is a secret crash program that could produce new weapons in the near term. Given that the space warfighting strategy outlined by the U.S. Air Force would cost billions in new investment, and that weapons development programs generally take at least a decade to come to fruition, the prospects for a space shooting war led by the United States in the near term are dim.

Nonetheless, it is apparent that this is the dangerous path the current U.S. administration would like to tread. Further, it is also apparent that other nations – perhaps in defensive response to the United States or perhaps due to their own calculations about the potential tactical value of space weapons – have begun their own experiments with such technologies, including China, Russia, India, Israel, and France at a minimum. While there has yet to be an arms race in space, the foundation for such a debilitating competition is already in place. It therefore behooves those policy-makers and space experts around the world who understand the extreme dangers to the future use of space from a weaponized environment to begin speaking out more strongly, and working more diligently to prevent a real “Star Wars.”

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1.   White House, US National Space Policy, unclassified version, undated; http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf.
2.   The White House, Science and Technology Council, Fact Sheet: National Space Policy, September 19, 1996; http://history.nasa.gov/appf2.pdf.
3.   For example, see United States Space Command, Long Range Plan, April 1998; www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/lrp/toc.htm. The document states that in order for a robust space control strategy to be implemented, “The United States will need to develop national policies supporting space warfare, weapons development and employment, and rules of engagement…” This suggests those policies had not been developed. Further, the plan states clearly that “At present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with U.S. national policy.”
4.   Office of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations: Joint Publication 3-14, Aug. 9, 2002; http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.
5.   United States Air Force, Counterspace Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Aug. 2, 2004; http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf.
6.   Center for Defense Information and The Henry L. Stimson Center, Space Weapons Could Emerge From Pentagon Budget, March 7, 2006; www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3347.