INESAP

International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

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Bulletin 27 – Detecting Nuclear Weapons Materials

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IAEA Project on Novel Techniques

J. Whichello, D. Parise, N. Khlebnikov

Implementation of international nuclear safeguards has changed considerably over the past 15-20 years. Early detection of undeclared facilities, activities and materials requires new approaches, supplemented by technologies that differ significantly from those used traditionally for on-site verification. In this framework, the International Atomic Energy Agency established the Novel Techniques and Instruments for Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Materials and Activities project within the Department of Safeguards to identify specific Safeguards implementation needs that may not be met by traditionally used methods and instruments, and to initiate any necessary research and development of novel techniques and instruments that could provide more effective solutions for the Agency’s implementation of additional protocols, including the conducting of complementary access. Techniques, based on the detection of emanations associated with nuclear processes, are being investigated. These include both the on-site sampling and monitoring of specific solid, liquid and gaseous materials to provide new methods and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities from distances ranging from hundreds of meters to many kilometres. For example, laser-based methods have demonstrated real-time monitoring of atmospheric materials, on-site chemical analysis and the capability of detecting a previous exposure to ionizing radiation. On the basis of IAEA priorities and resources, a limited number of projects have been selected and cooperation with Member States has been initiated to take technologies to the maturity level needed for the use in field. This paper will introduce the novel technologies project and describe some of the techniques and instruments currently under consideration by the Department of Safeguards for the detection of undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to maximize the contribution of nuclear technology to human endeavours, while verifying its peaceful use. The Agency’s mission is addressed through:

  • science and technology, mobilizing peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology to developing countries;
  • safety and security, protecting people and the environment from harmful radiation exposure;
  • safeguards and verification, preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

In the area of safeguards and verification, the Agency carries out inspection activities that include confirming a State’s declared nuclear material (including plutonium and enriched uranium) and maintaining vigilance for evidence of undeclared activities.

In 2004, the IAEA General Conference called on the Secretariat to examine innovative technological solutions to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the efficiency of safeguards[1]. Member States also agreed to provide appropriate assistance to facilitate exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the implementation of additional protocols. The Novel Technologies Project[2] was established in 2005 to identify and to develop techniques and instruments for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, facilities and materials.

The IAEA strategic objectives for 2006 to 2011[3] aim to enhance the Agency’s detection capabilities through the development of new, or improved, safeguards approaches and techniques and the acquisition of more effective verification equipment. The following specific goals are applicable to the Novel Technologies Project:

  • improve present detection capability;
  • pursue research and development (R&D) activities in the development of novel technologies for detection of undeclared activities;
  • utilize, inter alia, Member States Support Programme mechanisms as well as internal resources and expertise;
  • optimize safeguards equipment and technology.

Development and Implementation of Safeguards Methods and Instruments

Implementation of effective and efficient safeguards has increasingly relied on the development and deployment of methods and instruments meeting specific functional and technical requirements. Accordingly, equipment development has complemented the safeguards implementation approaches. For example, early safeguards equipment was developed for the purpose of supporting on-site materials and activity verification at declared locations.

After the 1991 Gulf War and the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, safeguards approaches were enhanced to include additional methods and techniques, providing the IAEA with further tools by which it could better detect undeclared activities. These included environmental sampling, information analysis, export monitoring, satellite imagery, and new technologies (e.g. ground penetrating radar). New technologies were also developed in support of additional protocols, including some for conducting complementary access inspections.

By their very nature, clandestine weapons programmes typically take place at undeclared locations or at declared locations which may be used as a “cover” for an undeclared process. The location of such activities requires appropriate equipment that can detect unique characteristics related to the particular activity. The Novel Technologies Project was established to broaden the range of techniques and instruments available to the Agency, including emerging novel techniques[4] and instruments that can assist in the detection of undeclared activities in undeclared locations (e.g. small industrial areas, universities, workshops, etc.).

The Novel Technologies Project

In early 2005, the IAEA Department of Safeguards undertook an initial solicitation of suggestions and proposals through its Member State Support Programme (MSSP) system. Broad requirements, based on general Safeguards needs, were prepared and sent to all MSSPs and other international organizations. Over 60 proposals, covering a wide range of techniques, were received and reviewed by the Safeguards Department. Techniques regarded as “new” were forwarded to the relevant organizational unit in the IAEA for further consideration. Those regarded as “novel” methods or instruments that addressed a particular safeguards problem were selected for further development and evaluation within the Novel Technologies Project. Interestingly, many were based on emerging laser and other forensic techniques.

Optically Stimulated Luminescence (OSL)

Need:
  • To determine whether, or not, an undeclared location has been used previously for storing radiological material
 Proposed Solution:
  • Use OSL to measure the radiation-induced signature retained in many common building materials.
Application:
  • On-site verification
  • Complementary access inspections
Figure 1: Basic Methodology 1 An undeclared location is used for the storage of undeclared materials

Figure 1: Basic Methodology 1 An undeclared location is used for the storage of undeclared materials

 Figure 2: Basic Methodology 2 The materials are removed and the location is subsequently “disguised”

Figure 2: Basic Methodology 2 The materials are removed and the location is subsequently “disguised”

 Figure 3: Basic Methodology 3 An IAEA inspector collects samples of the surrounding building materials.

Figure 3: Basic Methodology 3 An IAEA inspector collects samples of the surrounding building materials.

 Figure 4: Basic Methodology 4 The collected samples are analyzed for residual nuclear activation, indicating the previous presence of stored nuclear materials.

Figure 4: Basic Methodology 4 The collected samples are analyzed for residual nuclear activation, indicating the previous presence of stored nuclear materials.

Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS)

Need:
  • To determine whether, or not, an undeclared location has been used previously for storing radiological material
 Proposed Solution:
  • Use OSL to measure the radiation-induced signature retained in many common building materials.
Application:
  • On-site verification
  • Complementary access inspections
Figure 5: Basic Methodology 1 Unidentified materials found during an on-site complementary access inspection.

Figure 5: Basic Methodology 1 Unidentified materials found during an on-site complementary access inspection.

 Figure 6: Basic Methodology 2 LIBS is comprised of (i) a laser system to ablate the surface of the material to be analyzed to create a micro-vapour, and (ii) a spectrometer to generate a spectroscopic profile of the microvapour’s constituent components.

Figure 6: Basic Methodology 2 LIBS is comprised of (i) a laser system to ablate the surface of the material to be analyzed to create a micro-vapour, and (ii) a spectrometer to generate a spectroscopic profile of the microvapour’s constituent components.

 Figure 7: Basic Methodology 3 A trained IAEA inspector operates the LIBS unit on-site. The spectroscopic profile is compared to those in its library to determine the material’s make-up and history.

Figure 7: Basic Methodology 3 A trained IAEA inspector operates the LIBS unit on-site. The spectroscopic profile is compared to those in its library to determine the material’s make-up and history.

Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)

Need:
  • To detect the presence and nature of nuclear fuel cycle process activities at suspected locations
 Proposed Solution:
  • Use a mobile LIDAR laboratory in the vicinity of a suspected site to detect the presence of characteristic gaseous compounds, emanating from nuclear fuel cycle processes into the atmosphere.
Application:
  • Away-from-site (stand-off) detection
Figure 8: Basic Methodology 1 LIDAR methods are used routinely by environmental monitoring agencies to determine the presence of pollutants in the atmosphere.

Figure 8: Basic Methodology 1
LIDAR methods are used routinely by environmental monitoring agencies to determine the presence of pollutants in the atmosphere.

Figure 9: Basic Methodology 2
A mobile LIDAR travels to the vicinity of a suspected location engaged in undeclared nuclear fuel cycle processes. A laser, tunable to precise wavelengths (λ), selectively stimulates specific airborne molecules emanating as gaseous compound from the process. A lightsensitive telescope scans the atmosphere, detecting the presence, or absence, of the stimulated molecules.

 Figure 9: Basic Methodology 2 A mobile LIDAR travels to the vicinity of a suspected location engaged in undeclared nuclear fuel cycle processes. A laser, tunable to precise wavelengths, selectively stimulates specific airborne molecules emanating as gaseous compound from the process. A lightsensitive telescope scans the atmosphere, detecting the presence, or absence, of the stimulated molecules.

Sampling and Analysis of Atmospheric Gases

Need:
  • To detect the presence and nature of nuclear fuel cycle process activities at suspected locations
 Proposed Solution:
  • Use on-site LIBS to determine the nature and history of compounds and elements
Application:
  • Away-from-site (stand-off) detection
Figure 10: Basic Methodology 1 A mobile on-site laboratory samples and concentrates atmospheric-borne pollutants. Local meteorological conditions and the GPS location are also recorded.

Figure 10: Basic Methodology 1
A mobile on-site laboratory samples and concentrates atmospheric-borne pollutants. Local meteorological conditions and the GPS location are also recorded.

 Figure 11: Basic Methodology 2 Samples are brought to a field laboratory for analysis.

Figure 11: Basic Methodology 2
Samples are brought to a field laboratory for analysis.

Figure 12: Basic Methodology 3 The sample analysis data is combined with meteorological data and suitable atmospheric modelling to provide an estimate of the source direction.

Figure 12: Basic Methodology 3
The sample analysis data is combined with meteorological data and suitable atmospheric modelling to provide an estimate of the source direction.

 Figure 13: Basic Methodology 4 The airborne material is identified and the probable location of the source is estimated.

Figure 13: Basic Methodology 4
The airborne material is identified and the probable location of the source is estimated.
Project Tasks

The methodolgies shown in Figures 1-13, meeting specific safeguards needs for both on-site and away-from-site detection of undeclared activities, have been selected by the Agency’s Department of Safeguards for further development and evaluation.

Project Activities

In parallel to pursuing the tasks outlined above, the project has also convened specialist technical meetings on techniques for the verification of enrichment activities,[5] noble gas sampling and analysis[6] and laser spectrometry techniques.[7] Further specialist meetings covering novel technologies are being planned. Additionally, the project has been active with the support of Member States in establishing contacts with international research and development organizations and experts engaged in a wide range of sensor and detection technologies. MSSPs have also been supportive, agreeing to assist the project by facilitating technical exchanges with both private and government operated R&D laboratories and by providing access to experts for short-duration tasks, attendance at technical meetings, advising on novel methods and instruments, conducting field tests and in the provision of supplementary funding.

The Project has also commenced the establishment of a secure technical database to handle relatively large volumes of technical information. It is also intended to provide non-sensitive information regarding the Project’s tasks and activities on a dedicated web-site to further raise the profile of this work to the international R&D community.

Project Planning

The Novel Technologies Project was established to develop and evaluate effective techniques, meeting IAEA needs, which can be incorporated within safeguards approaches to search for, and to detect evidence of, undeclared nuclear fuel-cycle activities, particularly at undeclared locations. To that end, the project will continue to conduct surveys to identify safeguards needs that cannot be met with available techniques, broaden technical collaboration with other non-proliferation organizations and the international R&D sector and, where required, initiate further tasks that will lead to safeguards-useable methods and instruments. The basis of that will be a review and analysis of the nuclear fuel cycle processes, identifying the most safeguards-useful activity indicators[8] and emanating signatures[9] that can “travel” from the source location and be detected with a high level of confidence and accuracy. Indicators and signatures will be information, matter and/or energy associated with a particular nuclear fuel cycle process. Once identified, methods useful for the detection of promising indicators and signatures will be assessed by experts to determine if suitable methodology or instruments are available. Where none exist in a safeguards-useable form, the project will define appropriate technical and procedural requirements, initiating the necessary R&D and testing regimes.

Conclusions

The establishment of the Novel Technologies Project has provided a mechanism for the IAEA to address the technologies required for emerging and future inspectorate needs. Moreover, it has facilitated the Agency’s access to a greatly expanded range of methods and instruments, thereby allowing safeguards planners the opportunity to develop novel verification and detection approaches.

  1.   IAEA General Conference, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol, resolution adopted on 24 September 2004.
  2.   Full project title: Novel Techniques and Instruments for Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Facilities, Materials and Activities
  3.   IAEA, Medium Term Strategy 2006-2011, www.iaea.org/About/mts2006_2011.pdf.
  4.   “New technologies” are defined as those for which the methodology is already understood and implemented by the Agency for safeguards applications. Examples include the next generation surveillance and sealing system. “Novel technologies” are defined as those for which methodology has not been applied previously to safeguards applications.
  5.   IAEA, Technical Meeting on Techniques for the IAEA Verification of Enrichment Activities, STR-349, Vienna, 2005
  6.   IAEA, Technical Meeting on Noble Gas Monitoring. Sampling and Analysis for Safeguards, in publication, IAEA, Vienna, 2006
  7.   IAEA, Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards, in publication, IAEA, Vienna, 2006
  8.   “Indicators” refer to entities that go into making the process operative. Examples include resources, required materials, facility design and related R&D.
  9.   “Signatures” refer to entities produced by the nuclear fuel cycle process when it is in operation. Examples include produced materials, process by-products, and energy emanations.
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