International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

iGSE – a New INESAP Project

In March 2006, the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) launched a new project: the independent Group of Scientific Experts on the detection of clandestine nuclear-weapons-usable materials production.

The iGSE will address the most significant gap and largest challenge for verification of nuclear non-proliferation: the detection of clandestine weapons-usable materials production. A network of excellence, the independent Group of Scientific Experts (iGSE), has been formed to develop and demonstrate technologies and procedures for remote environmental sampling for clandestine nuclear-weapons-usable materials and other novel methodologies.

The unique features of this project are the combination of the required expertise; the independence of scientists from governmental, diplomatic, and organizational interests; real demonstrations in field tests; coordinated research efforts and common applications for funding; and public availability of the project results.

The goal of the iGSE is to facilitate progress in verification methodologies and new measurement technologies with respect to unreported production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The iGSE will work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), and the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM).

Project Launching Workshop in Vienna (May 2006)

The iGSE founding workshop took place in Vienna on May 10-13, 2006. It was hosted at the University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Science (BOKU). The workshop was attended by 24 participants from eight countries and two international organizations (CTBTO PrepCom and IAEA).

The meeting began with a tour through the IAEA Laboratory at Seibersdorf. This provided first hand information about the safeguards needs and the current capabilities for environmental sample analysis. After the excursion, the iGSE Advisory Board had its inaugural meeting.

On the next day, the workshop was opened by two keynote addresses, one given by Ola Dahlmann about the experiences of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) that worked for two decades since 1976 with a mandate by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to develop and demonstrate the global monitoring system for verifying the CTBT. The second keynote address was given by Julian Whichello on the Novel Technologies Program set up by the IAEA with the goal to solicit proposals for new measurement technologies that could be used to detect unreported nuclear weapons material activities. In the following three sessions related to sensors, meteorology, and other expertise, every participant explained his or her possible contributions to achieve the iGSE goals.

Based on these potentials, the workshop participants agreed on formalities, goals, and a working program for the iGSE. It was agreed to distinguish between iGSE members and observers. Accordingly, 16 workshop participants agreed to join the iGSE as members, four as observers. The remaining four participants had already agreed to serve as advisors. The participants discussed goals and scope of the iGSE, agreed on the individual contributions, and defined a work program both for the rest of this grant period as well as for the subsequent 3-years working phase. They also considered options for raising the separate funding that will have to be secured to conduct the 3-years program.

iGSE Work Program for 2006 and Beyond

In the initial project phase (2006), the project will define the agenda and prepare a proposal for a 3-year working phase of the iGSE; assure that research and development work on verification of non-production of nuclear-weapons-usable materials is optimized by coordinated efforts.

The goals of the subsequent 3-year iGSE working phase will encompass the following:

• Summarize the state-of-the-art, identify open issues for further research, and initiate related projects.
• Develop practical procedures for air sampling during complementary access inspections to detect clandestine production of weapons-usable nuclear materials based on existing technology and published data.
• Apply atmospheric transport modeling and statistical data analysis to demonstrate the capabilities in locating a possible source based on reported data.
• Demonstrate the proposed verification procedures to detect known activities (e.g. krypton-85 as indicator for plutonium separation; UF₆ and its reaction products such as (HF)n and UF2(OH)2 as indicator for uranium enrichment) and report about the findings.
• Set up an interactive online archive for viewing and downloading observation data, a map showing the source location as determined by atmospheric transport modeling, plus supporting information and explanations.
• Raise public awareness of the existence of efficient verification means.