Standing at the Nuclear Precipice: Iran

Aslı Ü. Bâli

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) underwent its most recent five-year review session in May 2005. There were numerous proposals on the table to strengthen non-proliferation mechanisms, reinforce disarmament commitments, close loopholes in the verification and monitoring procedures associated with the regime, and create more effective multilateral arrangements for the management of fissile materials. Despite the urgency of the issues addressed by these proposals, none were adopted and the review session was widely regarded as a failure.[1]

Perhaps even more puzzlingly, despite the fact that the United States “repeatedly declared that nuclear proliferation, including the risk of terrorists obtaining a nuclear weapon, is the biggest single threat to the United States, the administration decided against sending Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the conference, leaving arguments to midlevel diplomats.”[2] The source of the dispute at the conference was the bargain at the heart of the NPT framework: non-proliferation in exchange for disarmament and civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The breakdown of the conference reflects an international climate in which non-nuclear weapons states are unwilling to accede to additional demands for the limitation of their access to the nuclear fuel cycle, while the nuclear weapons states fail to implement their disarmament commitments under Article VI of the NPT and, more specifically, those commitments undertaken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

With the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the existing non-proliferation regime status quo will remain in effect until at least the next review conference in 2010. The regime as it currently stands is comprised of NPT obligations, the inspections regime established under the NPT Safeguards Agreement and, for countries that have ratified additional obligations, the stricter inspection regime of the Additional Protocol. While this regime is widely credited with averting a world of rapid proliferation in the sixty years following the invention of atomic weapons, it is under increasing strain. As an example of the fraught politics of non-proliferation compliance and enforcement, this paper will examine the emerging crisis over Iran’s nuclear energy program.

The Iranian case is conventionally understood as an enforcement problem. Iran, like all non-nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT, has two obligations under the treaty: not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons (Article II ) and to accept safeguards, implemented by the IAEA, to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy to military uses (Article III).

Because enforcement of the Article II obligations of nonnuclear weapons states would require unacceptably intrusive inspections, there is no specific enforcement mechanism for this obligation. Rather, the reporting obligations of countries and the IAEA’s monitoring and verification authority associated with Article III are designed to ensure that declared nuclear energy facilities are being operated according to relevant safety requirements and that there is no diversion of fissile materials from permitted civilian facilities. The IAEA discovered since 2002 that Iran had failed, over an extended period, to comply with some of its reporting obligations. While there has been no concrete evidence of the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons program or other military use, Iran was in non-compliance with its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement.

Following the revelations that countries like Iraq and North Korea had developed clandestine nuclear weapons programs despite their IAEA Safeguards Agreements, the IAEA adopted an Additional Protocol for broader inspections that would enable the Agency to monitor not only declared facilities but also to uncover the presence of undeclared facilities. From 2003 until 2006, Iran voluntarily complied with the Additional Protocol inspections regime.[3]

While Iran has permitted extensive inspections of its nuclear facilities since 2002, such inspections were not deemed to be an adequate confidence-building measure to permit Iran to proceed with its civilian nuclear energy program. Although the IAEA has certified that none of the declared nuclear materials in Iran have been diverted to military purposes and has found no evidence of a militarized nuclear program in Iran, outstanding questions about the Iranian program persist. As negotiations to persuade Iran to forgo the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle have stalled, the Iranian government decided in early 2006 to resume limited uranium enrichment activities, prompting a decision by the IAEA Board to have the Agency report on the Iranian dossier to the Security Council.

Alternatives to the Current Approach in the Iranian Case

The present course on the Iranian nuclear file appears to be one of confrontation and referral to the Security Council for possible coercive action to force Iran to desist in its efforts to develop a domestic nuclear fuel-cycle. Such coercive efforts are unlikely to succeed. When the North Korean nuclear file was brought before the Council, the result was censure by the Council but no further action, undoubtedly due to Chinese reticence on permitting more coercive measures to be adopted. While Iran may not be shielded on the Council from coercive intervention to the same degree, any effort to undertake stiffer coercive measures will likely be viewed in much of the developing world as the application of a double standard. In an international context in which numerous nonnuclear weapons states have been permitted to develop domestic fuel-cycles and where countries that have developed known nuclear weapons capacity outside of the treaty regime have faced few sanctions for their efforts, a confrontational approach to the Iranian case raises the specter of inconsistency.

Beyond the Iranian case, numerous developments over the last decade have undermined the bargain underlying the NPT. For illustrative purposes, here are six examples of such developments.

In addition to these six developments, the proposal of new measures by the Bush administration to limit access to the nuclear fuel cycle for countries that do not currently have enrichment and reprocessing capabilities further antagonized non-nuclear weapons states that fear the addition of further discrimination within the non-proliferation regime.[5] Escalating the confrontation over the Iranian case by taking it to the Security Council may further harm the NPT regime. In this section I will consider the alternatives to a Council enforcement action in dealing with the Iranian nuclear file.

No Military Option

Before considering the various multilateral options available, it is worth addressing reports that both the United States and Israel are developing contingency plans for unilateral (or possibly bilateral) air strikes against Iranian nuclear installations. There are two strong reasons to doubt the effectiveness of air strikes as a means of deterring the Iranian nuclear program.

First, few analysts believe that air strikes would be able to destroy all of Iran’s nuclear program – while strikes may result in a delay of Iran’s nuclear development, Iran would retain the capacity to develop an indigenous fuel cycle. Unlike Libya, for example, Iran has not developed its nuclear program strictly through the acquisition of turn-key equipment on black markets. Rather, Iran has developed a domestic nuclear engineering capacity that would very likely survive strikes. It is this indigenous knowledge base, more than the physical infrastructure of Iranian nuclear facilities, that is the basis of the Iranian nuclear program.

Secondly, strikes against Iranian facilities would very likely trigger a rally-round-the-flag effect that would consolidate domestic support for an accelerated nuclear program. Indeed, one of the strongest motivators for Iran’s current nuclear program is likely the desire to acquire a virtual deterrent by evolving a latent weapons capacity in response to Iran’s threat perceptions.

The best way to slow Iran’s nuclear program is to alter its threat perception. This is the reason that prominent commentators have argued for providing Iran with security guarantees as part of any negotiation over its nuclear program. Engaging in strikes would, of course, have the opposite effect of security guarantees – it would confirm Iran’s view that it is surrounded by hostile states or forces with nuclear capacities and validate the view that Iran requires a nuclear deterrent for its domestic national security.[6]

In addition to these considerations, unilateral strikes against Iran would be an extremely difficult undertaking. Iran’s territory is mountainous with a rugged terrain. The country is almost triple the land mass of Iraq with four times the population. Further, the Iranian shoreline permits it substantial control over access to the Straits of Hormuz through which a substantial portion of the world’s oil supply is shipped. Following its brutal experience in the Iran-Iraq war, Iran has a also developed an arsenal of missiles that are capable of reaching a wide variety of targets in the Middle East. Iranian ties with significant factions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine are also sources of concern. Finally, Iranian nuclear facilities are widely dispersed across the country and have large underground components.

In order to effectively strike at Iran’s nuclear program, it would be necessary to disable Iran’s ability to use missiles in retaliation and to secure the Straits of Hormuz in addition to destroying its nuclear facilities. Such a military undertaking has been estimated by some military analysts to require over 500 separate strikes in an operation that would take several days.[7] Other analysts have suggested that the Israeli air force may not have the conventional bombing capacity to undertake such air strikes.[8] Reports emerged in February [2006] that the Pentagon had commissioned urgent contingency plans for aerial strikes on Iran, to be delivered directly to the office of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.[9]

The reality remains that as a result of Iran’s strategic economic position and its links to other actors in the region, there is no good military option against Iran’s nuclear program, whether unilateral or multilateral. Any military approach would run the risk of starting a nuclear confrontation in the Middle East, provoking a serious fuel shortage in the world economy and destabilizing countries from Afghanistan to Israel-Palestine.

What then are the principal alternatives to a coercive, confrontational or military approach to the Iranian case? While this is a complicated and multi-dimensional question, in the remainder of this section I will consider the following four principal alternatives: the current Russian enrichment proposal together with limited Iranian enrichment; multinational participation and controls over an enrichment program within

Iran; the development of a much stricter on-site inspection system within Iran to monitor permitted civilian enrichment activities; and the long-term development of a multilateral fuel cycle control regime applied on an equitable basis. The key to any viable proposal is a compromise that permits some symbolic degree of enrichment with “objective guarantees” of the non-diversion of enriched uranium to military uses and the appearance of a non-discriminatory resolution to the current stand-off.

Options for Effective Multilateralism

The principal option for a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear program on the table prior to the reporting of Iran’s nuclear file to the Security Council was the Russian proposal to develop an enrichment facility located in Russia as part of a joint venture with Iran.

The idea underlying this proposal is that the Iranians would be able to participate economically through an equity stake in the facility and a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply, while limiting Iran’s access to an indigenous enrichment capacity. The strength of the proposal lies in addressing Iran’s concerns about the stability of its market access to nuclear fuel. The shortcoming, however, is that if the Iranians are not permitted access to sensitive technologies at the facility, the proposal does not address the Iranian demand that it be permitted to engage in limited enrichment research on its own soil.

The Iranian argument against the proposed joint venture should it have no access to the underlying technologies is presumably that it does not offer greater security than Iran’s earlier equity investment in the French Eurodif enrichment facility. In the Eurodif case, Iran had an equity stake in the facility but as a result of changes in political circumstances it was denied access to the nuclear fuel supply in which it had invested.

Recent reports confirm that the obstacle to reaching agreement on the Russian proposal is the “red line” declared by the United States and Europe that there can be no compromise on permitting Iran limited domestic enrichment capacity restricted to research under strict IAEA inspections and controls. This opposition to limited Iranian enrichment is based on the desire to close the “loophole” in the NPT that permits countries to develop enrichment technologies within the treaty regime that might contribute to a latent weapons capacity. While this loophole is an appropriate source of concern, singling out Iran as the one case in which this loophole is to be closed is a risky strategy. Failure to secure a negotiated solution in the Iranian case may do greater damage to the already wounded non-proliferation regime than a compromise would.

To find a compromise that will take most enrichment activities out of Iran while permitting a face-saving symbolic domestic capacity that enables the Iranian government to claim that it has not relinquished its “inalienable right” to pursue a domestic fuel cycle may be the best available course. Such a compromise should then be followed by a multilateral initiative to strengthen the inspections regime across the board in a fashion that appears equitable and nondiscriminatory. Perhaps through discussion under the aegis of the Security Council, a compromise position that would enable Iran to accept the Russian proposal may yet become possible.

A second alternative to the Russian proposal might be to locate an enrichment facility in Iran but under direct multilateral control. Under this scenario, Iran would invite foreign investment and participation in any enrichment facility on its territory. Arrangements for the multinational controls on the facility might even extend to installing “black box” enrichment technologies in the facility, to be operated by multinational staff that would not, however, have access to the technical specifications of the centrifuge configuration necessary for enrichment.

The model of a multilateral arrangement for the ownership of the facility, perhaps including regional participation by some of the Gulf Arab states, would be an attractive option, particularly if the provision of “black box” technology could be rendered truly proliferation-resistant.[10] Moreover, Iranian President Ahmadinejad has frequently invited multinational investment in Iran’s nuclear energy sector, which might enable Iranian officials to place a multinational facility within a framework acceptable to the hard-line leadership of the current Iranian regime.[11]

Iran has also offered to place any limited enrichment capability it would be permitted to operate under strict on-site, in-person 24-hour IAEA monitoring. This option might be pursued in conjunction with the Russian proposal or in its place. Iran’s oft-stated willingness to accept extremely intrusive inspections to meet the standards of “objective guarantees” that it is operating a proliferation-resistant nuclear energy program may enable an acceptable compromise to be reached that would set an excellent precedent for strengthening monitoring and verification standards under the nonproliferation regime while simultaneously providing strong safeguards against the diversion of fissile materials under cover of a civilian energy program in the Iranian case.

The final, more long-term option would be to seek to develop a regional or global arrangement to produce or guarantee reliable access to nuclear fuel on a proliferation-resistant basis. If such an arrangement were limited to guaranteeing supply, it would closely parallel the recent proposal by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei who has argued for the creation of a fuel bank as a last-resort supplier and the adoption of “objective, apolitical nonproliferation criteria” to guarantee fuel supplies such that a country that meets its NPT obligations should be assured of access to nuclear fuel.[12]

The better alternative may be a multinational alternative to the indigenous fuel cycle. This would entail the creation of regional or international fuel cycle centers, either through the conversion of existing national facilities in the case of regions where such facilities exist, or through the construction of new facilities. Such centers could be developed on the Eurodif model, whereby recipient states would have an equity share in the facility but would not have access to sensitive technologies. Alternatively, they could be developed on the Urenco model that would permit members to share resources, access to technologies and expertise on the fuel cycle.

The course of the Iranian nuclear dispute suggests that the United States and Europe would strongly prefer the Eurodif model while most developing countries would prefer the Urenco model. These issues would need to be addressed in the event that such multinational fuel cycle centers are seriously considered as a solution for meeting the increasing energy needs of developing countries while addressing concerns about the dual-use potential of sensitive enrichment technologies. However, the adoption of such a solution will likely not materialize in time to present a serious alternative to resolve the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program. That said, many analysts believe that Iran is a decade away from a complete indigenous fuel-cycle that would give it a latent weapon capability.[13] With a timeline of a decade or more, it may be possible to consider this alternative, even in the Iranian case.

Iran and the Damage to the Non-Proliferation Regime

The Iranian case has drawn attention to an issue that has been of concern to non-proliferation advocates for years – the potential to develop a civilian nuclear energy program in compliance with the NPT and then exploit the dual-use nature of nuclear fuel cycle technology to acquire a latent weapons capacity or to develop an actual arsenal. Most commentators have focused on this aspect of the Iranian case, however, to the exclusion of other, less apparent damage that has been done to the non-proliferation regime as a result of the handling of the Iranian file since 2002.

The Iranian case has been interpreted by developing countries as calling into question their right to civilian nuclear energy programs under the NPT. This perception combined with the failure of nuclear weapons states to engage in serious disarmament and the lack of meaningful technical cooperation between the weapons states and others under the Treaty represents a serious and less well-studied threat to the bargain underlying the regime.[14] The energy needs of the developing world in the next century are clearly going to require the rapid development of alternatives to fossil fuel consumption. Developing world energy consumption will set the stage for a century in which the expansion of the use of nuclear energy is a near certainty.[15]

Under these circumstances, the developing world is watching the course of the Iranian case very closely to determine the extent to which the Iranian precedent will limit their rights under Article IV of the NPT.

If the developing world perceives a new form of discrimination being introduced to the NPT regime – one which distinguishes between states permitted to have a nuclear fuel-cycle and others – the costs of membership in the NPT may come to be seen as outweighing the benefits. Particularly when set beside the nuclear weapons states record of compliance with their disarmament commitments, and more recent developments in which some states are even considering expanding and modernizing their existing nuclear arsenals, further restrictions on the rights of non-weapons states under the NPT regime may undermine its legitimacy and credibility in much of the developing world.

Should the current crisis with Iran result in an Iranian withdrawal from the NPT, the non-proliferation regime may not be able to withstand the damage. The worst fears of non-proliferation experts that the Iranian case might trigger a cascade proliferation effect, particularly in the Middle East, would then become far more plausible. As a result, the stakes of promoting a nuclear-free Middle East are higher today, perhaps, than they have ever been. Yet the prospects for a WMD-free zone in the region are grim.

For this reason, it is imperative to find a way to resolve the conflict over the Iranian nuclear file within the NPT framework. The recent moves to report the Iranian file to the Security Council are unhelpful in this regard. The Council has already been weakened by the course of the military intervention in Iraq. For instance, the introduction of American intelligence regarding Iran’s nuclear program will be reminiscent of the case for intervention against Iraq in a way that may delegitimize the role of the Security Council in this case. Finally, as discussed above, the Council is not an attractive forum for resolving the Iranian crisis precisely because there are no good options available to the Council for action to unblock the current impasse. Moving the Iranian file to the Council absent an IAEA report that Iran is in violation of its Article II obligations under the NPT (to forgo acquisition or production of nuclear weapons) is premature.

Instead of continuing to take a relatively ad hoc approach to the Iranian case, it would be far more beneficial to view the Iranian case in the context of a broader effort to strengthen the NPT monitoring and inspections system as well as non-weapons states’ incentives to remain within the Treaty regime. In the words of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “we cannot continue to lurch from crisis to crisis, until the regime is buried beneath a cascade of proliferation.”[16] Treating the Iranian case as an opportunity to move towards a proliferation-resistant global nuclear fuel-cycle is perhaps the best alternative to the present course. By putting the emphasis on long-term solutions applicable beyond the Iranian case, a more sustainable approach to the regime as a whole may be possible. While a good interim solution for the current Iranian crisis would be to pursue a modified version of the Russian proposal, with strong support from the United States and Europe, including security guarantees, the long-term emphasis should be on a broader approach. Working towards a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle regime at the international level will require a balanced and non-discriminatory approach.

Within Iran’s own region, such an approach would also have to bear in mind the present threat perceptions of the states of the region. For instance, developing a multilateral fuel cycle solution in the Middle East will only be feasible if it is accompanied by a commitment to achieving a weapons-of-mass-destrcution-free zone in the region. Otherwise, incentives to defect will remain difficult to deter.

Iran remains a decade away from being able to enrich sufficient quantities of uranium for militarized use – the international community should pursue a nonconfrontational solution to the problem while time still permits. One key will be shifting Iran’s threat perception both by providing it with security guarantees and by abandoning an approach that sets the Iranian case apart from all others. The IAEA’s Director- General has publicly argued that the international community must “abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue nuclear weapons but morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security – and indeed continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.”[17]

Policy makers reviewing options for dealing with the Iranian case would do well to heed this cautionary advice. The doctrine of preemption, even where designed to curtail proliferation, will in all likelihood exacerbate proliferation as other states seek to acquire weapons as a deterrent.

Rather than adopting a confrontational approach that may stimulate proliferation, the Iranian case presents an important opportunity for the international community to find a diplomatic solution within the NPT framework that will set a positive precedent for developing multilateral approaches to the management of the global fuel cycle.

  1.   See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Month of Talks Fails to Bolster Treaty, The New York Times, May 28, 2005, page A1 (noting that the “month-long conference at the United Nations to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ended Friday in failure, with its chairman declaring that the disagreements between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear states ran so deep that ‘very little has been accomplished.’”).
  2.   Ibid.
  3.   Iran has signed the Additional Protocol but the Iranian parliament has refused to ratify the agreement until it is assured that Iran’s “legitimate right” to a civilian nuclear energy program including uranium enrichment facilities is recognized by the IAEA. Moreover, as a consequence of the decision to refer the Iranian nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council, as will be discussed further below, Iran has suspended its voluntary compliance with the stricter inspections under the Additional Protocol as of February 2006.
  4.   Of course, neither India nor Pakistan are NPT signatories, but are nonetheless bound by the broader nonproliferation norm attendant to the numerous WMD-related conventions to which they are parties, as well as the positions taken on proliferation by the UN Security Council.
  5.   The Bush proposal was widely seen as crafted to ensure access to domestic fuel-cycles to U.S. allies – such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Brazil – while denying it to much of the developing world and specifically Iran. The text of President Bush’s announcement of the new policy on February 11, 2004 at the National Defense University is available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html.
  6.   In this sense, the U.S. military strategy in the Middle East has been, to some degree, too successful. Iran’s strategic motivations for seeking a nuclear deterrent have certainly been strengthened by the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. American agreements for the use of bases in Central Asia have also exacerbated the Iranian perception of encirclement. When Israeli and Pakistani nuclear weapons and the presence of NATO air bases and arsenals in Turkey are added to this equation, it is clear that without security guarantees it will be difficult to persuade Iran to abandon nuclear research.
  7.   See, e.g., comments of retired Air Force Colonel Dam Gardiner, who has taught strategy for the U.S. Department of Defense at its National War College, as reported in the Wall Street Journal. Carla Anne Robbins and Greg Jaffe, Why U.S. Wages Diplomacy with Defiant Iran, Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2006, page A4 (quoting Gardiner as stating that air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities would require “upwards of 500 aim-points [separate strikes.] That is not an overnight operation. It is at least three or four days.”)
  8.   For instance, the former Israeli forces chief of strategic planning, Shlomo Brom, was quoted in one article as stating that the logistics of air strikes against Iran would pose a significant obstacle for the Israeli air force. Will Israel Strike Iran?, Newsweek, February 13, 2006. Further, recent reports have suggested that the U.S. is trying to blunt the likelihood of Israeli unilateral action by extending a defensive shield over Israel. Dan Williams, US shield blunts Israeli military option on Iran, Reuters, February 9, 2006. On the other hand, Israel may pursue other tactics to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program and/or assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists along the lines of its efforts to disrupt the Iraqi nuclear program prior to the Israeli strike on the Osiraq facility. See, e.g., Terrence Henry, Can sabotage and assassination stop Iran from going nuclear?, Atlantic Monthly, December 2005.
  9.   Philip Sherwell, US prepares military blitz against Iran’s nuclear sites, Sunday Telegraph (UK), February 12, 2006 (noting that “strategists at the Pentagon are drawing up plans for devastating bombing raids backed by submarine-launched ballistic missile attacks against Iran’s nuclear sites as a ‘last resort’… They are reporting to the office of Donald Rumsfeld… ‘This is more than just the standard military contingency assessment,’ said a senior Pentagon adviser. ‘This has taken on much greater urgency in recent months.”)
  10.  On the possibility of developing proliferation-resistant “black box” facilities for a regional joint venture enrichment plant, see Babur Habib et. al, Stemming the Spread of Enrichment Technology: Fuel-Supply Guarantees and the Development of Objective Criteria for Restricting Enrichment, Liechtenstein Institute of Self-Determination at Princeton University, January 2006; www.princeton.edu/~lisd/doc/exec_summary.pdf.
  11.  For instance, in his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2005, President Ahmedinejad stated that “as a further confidence building measure and in order to provide the greatest degree of transparency, the Islamic Republic is prepared to engage in serious partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment program in Iran.” President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 17, 2005, available at www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf.
  12.  On El-Baradei’s comments regarding such a proposal, see David Holley, Nuclear Chief Offers a Nonproliferation Plan: Promise Them Fuel, L.A. Times, October 6, 2005.
  13.  Dafna Linzer, Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb: US Intelligence Review Contrasts with Administration Statements, The Washington Post, August 2, 2005, page A01; www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080101453.html. A recent article has noted that estimates of when Iran might acquire a nuclear weapon generally range from a few months to 15 years. The article notes that because such estimates and forecasts are “sometimes colored by judgments of the risks of guessing wrong. That may explain the gulf between Israel’s claim that the world has as little as six months before the ‘point of no return’ and estimates that an Iranian warhead is many years away.” William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, As Crisis Brews, Iran Hits Bumps in Atomic Path, New York Times, March 5, 2006.
  14.  On the failure of the 2005 Review Conference, see notes 1-2 above and accompanying text.
  15.  In light of the energy needs of the developing world, policy planners concerned with stemming the proliferation of nuclear technologies would do well to invest rapidly in alternative energy sources including the following forms of energy: solar thermal, solar photo-voltaic, wind, hybrid wind-solar, fuel cell, geothermal, small-scale hydro-electirc and tidal. For more information on the availability and sustainability of such alternative sources of energy, see International Sustainable Energy Fund: Proposed Model Statute, Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE), April 2001; www.gracelinks.org/energy/docs/ISEF-Statute-final.pdf.
  16.  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address to United Nations Association of the United Kingdom, January 31, 2006; www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10332.doc.htm.
  17.  Mohamed El-Baradei, Saving ourselves from self-destruction, New York Times, February 12, 2004.

This article is an abridged version of a paper the author presented at the 2006 International Law Symposium, „At the Nuclear Precipice. Nuclear Weapons and the Abandonment of International Law“ held by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on February 23-25, 2006. The complete text is available at wagingpeace.org.