Dual-Use in a New Security Environment

The Case of Missiles and Space

Jürgen Scheffran

Advanced technology is an essential element of both the economy and national security. While the dichotomy between civilian and military technology has been more pronounced during the East-West conflict, the boundaries eroded after the end of the Cold War. In the past, the military was often thought to be a pacemaker in many fields of high-tech development, even though the spin-offs remained less than expected. Scarce resources and lack of public acceptance, combined with converging demand profiles, supported the dual-use of civil and military technologies, exploiting the ambivalence of science.[1]Dual-use refers here to those technologies that have actual or potential military and civilian applications. The strategy of “commercial-off-the-shelf” (COTS) development puts more emphasis on spin-in: taking advantage of economies of scale, a technology developed in the civilian-commercial sector is used for military purposes. Modern semiconductor, nuclear, laser, bio, computer, and communication technologies, to mention a few, are employed not only in the manufacture of civilian products but also increasingly in the production of weapons.

Dual-Use and Ambivalence of Science and Technology

Scientific knowledge and technical know-how are essential preconditions for weapons development and sources of proliferation. Their export is widely seen as detrimental to international security. Countries that either want to keep their advantage in military technologies or want to prevent negative impacts on their own security are more ready to control their exports of “sensitive” technologies to “critical” countries. Major suppliers have agreed that certain technologies which are clearly devoted to the development and production of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological) and related dual-use items, including delivery systems, should be subject to strict export controls. When the Wassenaar Arrangement replaced the COCOM list in 1996, the export control focus shifted from an East-West to a North-South context, which is also true for the Trigger List of the London Nuclear Suppliers Club, the Australia Group for chemical weapons, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).[2]

The changes in the definition of “the enemy” and the shift towards actual warfighting have expanded the tasks for the military which pushes towards a “Revolution in Military Affairs”. To strengthen the supposed technology lead of the United States against potential competitors and adversaries, the US Department of Defense has published since 1989 an annual list of about 20 military-critical technologies (MCTL) which provides a “compendium of existing goods and technologies that DOD assesses would permit significant advances in the development, production and use of military capabilities of potential adversaries.” The MCTL is accompanied by the Developing Science and Technologies List (DSTL) which comprises “scientific and technological capabilities being developed worldwide that have the potential to significantly enhance or degrade US military capabilities in the future.”[3] In 1997, the Clinton Administration initiated the Dual-Use Applications Program (DUAP) which was designed to focus only on technologies that are potentially useful to the military and by making awards through a competitive selection process.[4] The Bush Administration in turn changed tacks, focusing less on dual-use and more on dedicated military technology.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the declared “war on terrorism,” the parameters changed again. According to Judith Reppy, “the old certainties of the Cold War have disappeared, but the need to control the proliferation of weapons technology has not.” The new security environment “effectively demolished the rigid categories of the Cold War, which had made it possible to frame the problems of dual use as involving promotion and control of military-relevant technologies in a state-based regime with a clearly-defined enemy. The contemporary strategic landscape is much more ambiguous and the list of potentially dual-use technologies much more expansive.”[5] More attention was paid to biological weapons and the potential danger from developments in biotechnology, the “quintessential dual-use technology”. Jay Stowsky identifies three major trends in the new era: “the shift of technological leadership from the military to the commercial sector, the decline of technological dominance by U.S.-based firms, and the emergence of critical dual-use technologies that can be constituted and thus easily disseminated electronically.”[6]

Conditions have also changed for space systems and related rocket technologies. With the increasing privatization and commercialization of outer space and the emphasis of the Bush Administration on missile defense and space dominance, spaceflight moved again to the center of the international security debate. The “missile threat” from emerging military powers such as Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan competes with the nuclear threat. In both fields dual-use is an essential problem that requires international control efforts to diminish the security risks. In the MCTL, the list of critical space technologies takes the largest part.

Peaceful Purposes and the Military Use of Outer Space

During the Cold War, space technology was a synonym for technological progress and military dominance. Outer space became a testing ground for military innovation. The inherent ambivalence of space technologies made it possible to hide military intentions behind the label of “peaceful purposes,” similar to the nuclear sector. The definition of “peaceful” remains controversial. While some insist it means “non-military”, the interpretation of the U.S. government covered only “non-aggressive” acts, which allowed a number of military activities in outer space.[7] Consequently, three quarters of the superpowers’ space objects served military purposes.[8] Since the early 1980s, the budgets for military space projects exceeded the budget of NASA, which despite its peaceful mission also pursued military projects. The 1991 Operation “Desert Storm” in Iraq was labeled the first „space war“ because it involved the full arsenal of space systems for military purposes.[9]

There is a close affinity between civil and military space technologies, both of which are facing extreme technical requirements (e.g. high speed, extreme ranges of pressure and temperature, weightlessness, radiation). Space technologies have an inherent dual-use capability and enhance the warfighting capability of the major military powers, contributing to an increased threat to other countries. In many countries ballistic missiles and space launchers were developed and proliferated in conjunction. Satellites acquire and distribute information both for civilian and military purposes in telecommunication, navigation and monitoring. They became essential to carry out such operations as the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War. The whole space infrastructure can be used for military purposes, including rockets and space vehicles, launchers and tracking systems, and testing and production facilities.[10]

Development of a missile defense system that involves weapons systems for space warfare would push the lines even further. The U.S. Space Command takes a leading role in promoting space dominance, a concept that is not compatible with peaceful uses of space under any interpretation.

As long as the major powers use space systems for their military forces, other countries will follow. Regional powers exploit the dual-use of reconnaissance, communication and navigation satellites to deploy their military force more effectively. An indigenous space reconnaissance ability gives a state an independent, day-to-day observation capability. Space use in the projection of military power increases instabilities and fosters proliferation. Some applications of satellites, however, can contribute to international security and stability, such as arms control verification or crisis prevention and mitigation. Satellite data can be internationalized to prevent unilateral advantages from their use. The question remains where to draw a line between space applications that undermine from those that enhance international security and stability.

Ballistic Missiles and Space Launchers

In most cases civilian space launchers were developed after their military counterparts, ballistic missiles. Countries that have placed satellites into orbit also produce military ballistic missiles (except Japan). At present, only two Third World countries, India and Israel, have orbited a satellite. At least eight other countries - Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan - have initiated civilian space programs for the purpose of building satellite launch vehicles.[11] Even North Korea claimed that its 1998 failed ballistic missile test was to place a satellite in orbit.

Scientific and technological cooperation, including education and training, the exchange of experts, joint experiments, and the acquisition of subcomponents provide a basis for indigenous missile development. The observation of research and development in related fields gives hints as to how far the necessary scientific and technological precursors for indigenous missile production and operation have already developed.

Because ballistic missiles are complex technical systems, their indigenous development or re-development from space launch vehicles is a demanding, time-consuming and costly venture; technical difficulties drastically increase with longer missile ranges. The design of delivery systems requires technical know-how in many fields of research, including propellants and propulsion, guidance and flight control, materials science, and reentry vehicles. Particular components for missile production are necessary but not sufficient for a successful missile program. Missiles contain thousands of components, all of which must be designed, manufactured, and tested carefully if a country is to be confident that they will operate reliably under the stress of combat. Due to the increasing complexity, the number of tests for more advanced ballistic missiles has been gradually increasing.

The exchange between civilian and military space technologies not only refers to complete missile systems but to a larger degree to subsystems, such as propulsion units, heat shields, guidance sets, or electronic equipment. There is an overlap in the infrastructure to develop, test, manufacture, deploy, and operate missiles, including radars, telemetry systems, and testing, production, maintenance, and launch facilities. The personnel of space complexes is also crucial, as they can potentially distribute their knowledge to other countries – a problem that became critical when the scientists and engineers from space and missile programs in the collapsing Soviet Union failed to find new jobs as part of the conversion process.[12]

With the increasing commercialization of space technology, a growing number of private companies have been selling subsystems on the international market and providing assistance in building an indigenous space infrastructure. While developing countries gather basic knowledge for missile development and production from space launchers, experiences and technologies are not always transferable without costs.

Early generations of space launchers and ballistic missiles were very similar and thus could be used interchangeably. Technologies diverged with increasing sophistication and different requirements for civilian and military purposes of rockets.[13] Although component technologies of space launchers and long-range ballistic missiles overlap in many fields (e.g. propulsion units, heat shields, guidance sets, and electronic equipment), differences exist in the trajectory, the rocket size, the payloads, the guidance and propulsion types, launch facilities, and the numbers of test flights.

Satellites and Space Tracking

There are currently more than 800 active satellites in orbit, over 50 percent of which are U.S. satellites. Russia and China follow with 89 and 35 satellites, respectively.[14] Satellites serve as force multipliers and essential nodes in the global C3I-systems (Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence), connecting sensors to weapons and soldiers to decision-makers, increasing the efficiency of warfare. Military satellites are often complex, costly, secretive, and better protected against attack than civilian satellites (e.g. by hardening or higher maneuverability). The main satellite functions have an inherent dual-use potential.

  1. Remote sensing and reconnaissance satellites monitor the earth with multi-spectral scanners to collect data which are of both civilian and military relevance. They are an important source of information about the state and changes of the earth and could contribute to a more sustainable use of resources. Civilian applications exist in many areas such as agriculture, fishery, environmental monitoring, weather forecasting, geology and resource exploration, cartography, and urban planning. Relevant military applications are target planning, damage assessment, verification of arms control agreements, and observation of enemy territories, facilities and vehicles. Meteorological satellites that measure temperatures, water distribution, and cloud covers are indispensable in real-time weather observation and forecasting for civil and military users worldwide. Electronic reconnaissance satellites intercept the exchange of information for purposes of warfare, industrial espionage, crimefighting, and verification. Early warning satellites are equipped with infrared sensors to detect the hot exhaust gases of missile launches, but may also detect large fires. Satellites also help in early warning and management of natural disasters, such as storms and floods.
  2. Position finding and navigation satellites provide precise real-time data on the position of mobile objects on land and sea, in air and space down to a few meters. The Global Positioning Systems (GPS) was developed for the U.S. military and has become highly successful in the civilian sector. Russia is competing with its GLONASS system, while Europe is preparing GALILEO. GPS data can be used by any country to improve the accuracy of its military operations.
  3. Communication satellites transmit a vast range of data with high speed and assure almost instant global communication, regardless of the distances or positions involved. Computers, communication technologies, and mobile phones have become integrated into a global network with satellites as vital nodes. Civil and military communication satellites use similar technology, but technical demands in the military sector are usually higher with regard to the security of transmission, survivability, operational flexibility, and maneuverability.

Satellite capabilities have increasingly proliferated, in particular for reconnaissance. Since the early 1970s, China took a leading role among developing countries. Israel launched its first satellite in 1989 and started satellite reconnaissance with Ofeq 2 in 1990. India has a developed program of civil and military satellites. The proliferation of military satellites could intensify warfare on earth and contribute to an arms race in space. On the other hand, with a growing number of satellite “eyes” it becomes more difficult to hide arms production, war preparation and violation of arms control agreements.

The dual-use of manned spaceflight is less relevant. Space stations have been used for research on zero-gravity, crystallography, and solid state physics. Critics point out that most experiments could be done by automata at much less cost without the presence of human beings in space. Involving human beings in space military activities is risky and costly.

Systems for the monitoring of space activities are inherently dual use. They allow the remote tracking, surveillance, and observation of suspicious activities on earth and in space with optical, infrared, radar, electronic, electromagnetic, and other technology. Since all space objects are launched from earth, they cannot be hidden from space tracking systems. Since several decades, the United States has maintained a global Space Surveillance Network (SSN) under the control of the U.S. Space Command to detect, track, catalog, and identify all objects larger than 10 cm in diameter in Earth orbit, with a primary interest in operational satellites. The SSN includes U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force operated ground-based phased-array and conventional radars as well as optical sensors (telescopes) at 25 sites worldwide. The Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep-Space Surveillance System telescopes are upgraded to cover objects 5 cm across or larger. Russia operates a similar but less capable system. The European Space Agency maintains the European Space Research Organisation Tracking and Telemetry Network to track their own satellites and those of their industrial customers. These systems could be integrated into an International Monitoring System, which would include a variety of global verification means and make relevant data available to all states as part of an agreement.

Dedicated and Non-Dedicated Space Weapons

Besides dedicated space weapons, there are non-dedicated systems which are designed for other purposes but have the ability to destroy targets in space or from space. How effectively they can be converted into a space weapon depends on technical parameters and cost efficiency of operation, the possible consequences for security, and the options for arms control to restrain their capabilities and monitor their use.[15]

  1. Maneuverable spacecraft, whether manned or automated, whether for civilian or military purposes, can be used in an anti-satellite (ASAT) role. They could push targets off orbit, collide with them, employ electronic jamming or laser blinding devices, or release explosives, chemicals, or radioactive materials. In addition to these hostile activities, a manned space vehicle such as the Space Shuttle or the Russian Soyuz could hijack the target in the same way they perform a rendezvous with a space station or satellite. Maneuverability of any spacecraft is confined by fuel availability. Rendezvous have only been performed with cooperative low orbit targets, even in the case of the Soviet co-orbital ASAT test series of the 1970s and 1980s. Dealing with a non-cooperative and fast moving target is difficult and requires precise orbit data and demanding trajectory calculations. A rendezvous is further complicated if the target has a maneuvering capability on its own. Rendezvous maneuvers will become more common for repair (as has been achieved with the Hubble telescope), upgrading or refueling of space objects. Satellite maneuverability is gaining in importance for cluster missions for distributed reconnaissance and environmental observation, relocation of reconnaissance satellites over conflict areas, steering space objects out of the way of space debris, etc. While currently available only to advanced spacefaring nations, experience with space maneuvers could proliferate to more countries or satellite operators. Approaching a target in an ASAT mission could be detected with existing tracking systems and on-board sensors (optical tracking, interpretation of ground communication data, interception of the payload’s telemetry signals). To prevent misinterpretation of a non-aggressive rendezvous maneuver as an ASAT attempt, advance notice of maneuvers and rendezvous would be helpful.
  2. Space mines are maneuverable space objects masquerading as satellites, with their sole purpose to destroy a satellite. Maneuvering and stationing space mines close to other space systems is observable and would raise suspicion. A space mine must change its orbit and trajectory to approach the target satellite for an attack, which would need support from ground- or space-based tracking systems and on-board homing sensors. Alternatively, immediately after its release from the launching vehicle, a space mine could attempt to approach and attach itself to the target satellite, to detonate when the destruction mechanism is triggered. Target destruction could be achieved by a nuclear explosion, conventional explosives, emission of projectiles or shrapnel, and direct collision. A space mine could put at risk a single satellite or – if considerable amounts of shrapnel were released – a larger area or complete orbit. A space mine’s approach could be detected with radar systems in low altitudes and with optical systems in higher orbits as long as space mines are larger than 5-10 cm. Concealing a space mine within a satellite with permitted functions would be difficult to detect until the approach maneuver is initiated. Only pre-launch inspection of payloads could ensure that no such capability is hidden. In order to design reliable space mines and improve approach accuracy, multiple tests would be required. Verification of non-existence of space mines would be difficult, verification of non-use could be facilitated by providing information on any object’s purpose and trajectory prior to launch. Notification of trajectory changes could be made compulsory for all states parties to an ASAT ban.
  3. Microsatellites, which have an inherent dual-use potential, are increasingly used. Small satellites capable to perform orbital maneuvers and autonomous proximity operations in space could inspect other satellites, di­agnose malfunctions, and provide on-orbit servicing. They also have inherent capabilities to act as anti-satellite weapons. NASA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Air Force plan demonstra­tion missions for proximity operations with microsatellites.[16] For instance, the Defense Technology Area Plan (2000) called for the ability to “conduct missions such as diagnostic inspection of malfunc­tioning satellites through autonomous guidance, rendezvous, and even dock­ing techniques.” The Air Force’s Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS) is a series of Air Force Research Laboratory satel­lites designed to demonstrate imaging applications of proximity operations. DARPA’s Orbital Express is to demonstrate the feasibility of using automated spacecraft to refuel, up­grade, and extend the life of on-orbit spacecraft. NASA’s Demonstration of Au­tonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) is an advanced flight demon­strator to rendezvous with a communica­tions satellite of the U.S. Department of Defense and perform several au­tonomous rendezvous and close prox­imity operations (the intended rendezvous failed on April 15, 2005).[17]
  4. Ballistic missiles, including space launchers, sounding rockets, and missile defense interceptors, are designed to traverse space and release an object (the payload, warhead, or interceptor vehicle). They also have the potential to destroy a satellite, but the attacking vehicle must approach the target object with high accuracy. Only satellites on specific orbits could be reached from a given launch pad on earth. Even then, an ASAT missile could only attack one satellite at a time. While objects in low orbits could be attacked within minutes, it would take hours to reach the geostationary orbit. Most destructive are nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Even though military satellites are hardened against the long-range effects of nuclear explosions, they have little chance to survive an nearby explosion. Non-hardened electronics are highly susceptible to the electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Nuclear explosions in low-earth orbits can produce indiscriminate and long-term damage to space objects through radiation capture in the Van-Allen Belt. If Interncontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are equipped with conventional warheads, the military effectiveness is considerably reduced, though some of the disadvantages (e.g. fallout, secondary effects, political damage, escalation risk) of nuclear weapons disappear. With the lower accuracy and impact radius of conventional warheads, a non-dedicated system remains unreliable without a testing program, which could easily be detected by other states.
  5. Missile defense systems, similar to space weapons, have the mission to destroy military-relevant targets. Technologies for ASAT and for missile defense have much in common. In both cases, interception must either occur in the course of a rendezvous or co-orbital maneuver or by crossing the satellite trajectory with high relative velocity at just the right moment. For their development and production they require various technologies in the civilian sector: computer, laser, material, satellite, and nuclear technologies, to mention just a few. Experience with missile defense tests would increase the confidence of an attacker in system operation for ASAT purposes. With their current series of missile defense tests, the United States is gaining experience that could also be applied to ASAT weapons. At the same time, the U.S. missile defense program proves how difficulty it is to hit an object in space.
  6. Air-launched rockets have advantages for both commercial and military purposes. Ideally, a missile could hit a satellite just ten minutes after launch from a plane with little early warning. It is hard to distinguish between an ASAT mission and a permitted one, and the non-existence of such systems is difficult to verify. The Pegasus air-launch system is carried aloft by a carrier aircraft to around 13 km. A U.S. Air Force project uses a modified Boeing 747–400F as the carrier for the proposed Space Maneuver Vehicle to lift 3,000 kg payloads to low-earth orbit. Several Russian commercial enterprises are working on similar projects, e.g. the An-225 Mriya carrier aircraft, the world’s largest heavy lifter with a maximum payload capacity of 260 tons, to launch an expandable, re-usable orbiter.
  7. Directed energy weapons, in particular lasers weapons, are ideally suited for use in outer space. Large distances can be traversed at the speed of light in fractions of a second, and the vacuum creates no attenuation of the beam energy. Laser weapon programs have been conducted for many years and were hampered by physical and technical problems, including high energy requirements, the need for precision targeting, and the lack of system serviceability. The United States is working on ground-, air- and space-based laser systems for missile defense, all with inherent ASAT capabilities. And the Russian Federation has reportedly worked on a space-based laser weapon program. Although directed energy weapons are dedicated weapons, they require a number of technologies from the civil sector. The most effective means to prevent lasers from being used as ASAT weapons is a ban on testing laser weapons. If satellites for collecting and transmitting solar power were built, they might also be used for destructive purposes.

Altogether, non-dedicated systems are a relevant but limited threat to the functioning of space objects. They cannot be completely excluded as long as civil spaceflight continues or ICBMs exist. Arms control can diminish the risk from such systems. States can agree to test or deploy ballistic missiles or space launchers in a way that limits their usability for ASAT missions.

European Dual-Use Concepts

While the United States is playing a leading role in promoting the weaponization of space, other parts of the world explicitly pursue a dual-use strategy. A forerunner is the European Union and the European Space Agency.[18] While by its constitution ESA is confined to use spaceflight for “exclusively peaceful purposes,” in recent years it has gradually revised its rejection of the military use of space and pointed to the “security dimension” of space. Space is seen as a “strategic asset” which needs to be exploited by dual-use technology. Within the framework of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), the European Union takes space ca­pabilities into account, for instance for decision-making on conflict prevention and crisis management in the context of the so-called Petersberg Tasks. A 2003 “international report” on space and security policy in Europe states that “The development of dual-use technologies calls for a ‘European’ approach to space security, linking the present na­tional defence programs with mainly civilian European programs.”[19]

The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program is “a joint endeavor by ESA and the Eu­ropean Commission to establish an independent capability for global monitoring, in support of European environment and security goals.”[20] Galileo is a system of 30 global navigation satellites to provide real-time navigation, timing, and posi­tioning signals for a wide range of applications, including automatic airplane landing, railway control, and fisheries to oil prospecting and positioning for mountain hikers. Originally planned and promoted as a strictly civil­ian system, it can be used for the precise targeting of mis­siles and bombs and remote control of unmanned aerial vehicles. Co-operation agreements have been signed with China and India, raising arms control questions. Another project is SAR-Lupe (for “synthetic aperture radar”) which is Germany’s first satellite-based recon­naissance system which is supposed to meet “military requirements … for worldwide coverage.” The French contribution consists of its military optical Helios satellites.

Even though these strategies and programs do not pursue the weaponization of space, they contribute to the growing militarization of space. They raise the strategic interest in space and thus undermine incentives to keep space for peaceful purposes.

From Export Control towards Cooperation and Common Security in Outer Space

Judith Reppy comes to contradictory conclusions on dual-use. In the context of the revolution in military affairs (RMA), the “military utility of dual-use technology is greater than ever, and the need for a policy to control diffusion of the relevant technology remains a pressing security concern.” On the other hand, it is “difficult to identify any area of the field that is not of potential interest for military applications. In these circumstances the very notion of dual use, which was predicated on the ability to make distinctions among technologies and among countries of concern, has to be questioned. … Non-state actors, such as terrorists, pose another problem, as they operate outside the framework of agreements governing international relations. Moreover, there are more potential suppliers of dual-use technologies.” In response, Reppy suggests a moderate approach: “This is a call for good old-fashioned technology assessment combined with a realistic analysis of the threat, all done with an eye to reducing the extent to which our own investments in new technology may increase the danger of weapons proliferation. …With a shorter list of critical technologies as a result of the assessment exercise, the costs of export controls to industry should be reduced and the government’s ability to engage international cooperation in the control regime enhanced.”[21]

The consequence would be a more streamlined approach towards technology control that restrains the most dangerous technologies and seeks international cooperation in other fields of dual-use technologies. A similar approach between “shield or share” (Stowsky) has been suggested by Péricles Gasparini Alves to manage the transfer of dual-use of missile and space technologies. He provides a comprehensive survey on the technologies and the selective control regimes, including the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restrains the free access to space technologies, in conflict with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The strengths and limits of this regime have been acknowledged earlier as well as the need to go beyond it.[22]

To overcome some of these difficulties, Gasparini Alves suggests great efforts “to demonstrate how practical measures could stimulate the transition from a confrontational relationship to one which would be based on cooperation. Conceivable mechanisms for cooperation would include increasing transparency of transferred technologies as a first step. In this regard, a step-by-step approach in cooperative initiatives could build confidence between suppliers and recipient States. Such initiatives could prepare the grounds for other measures which would have a more restrictive character: e.g., measures aimed at building security by addressing issues related to dual-use outer space technologies and activities.”[23] Initiatives would involve confidence- and security-building measures on outer space and a multilateral agreement, “aiming at ensuring the transfer of dual-use outer space technologies while curbing destabilising military use of space technologies.”

Where to draw the line depends on political attitudes and the security context. For proponents of missile defense and space dominance, outer space is inextricably linked to warfare, which would preclude any international control.[24] For others, outer space is a common heritage of mankind that needs to be protected by international law for peaceful and sustainable uses.[25] Michael Krepon proposes a Code of Conduct to strengthen space security.[26] And Detlev Wolter suggests to negotiate a multilateral “Treaty on Common Security in Outer Space” which would include “the prohibition of active military uses of a destructive nature in the common space; a comprehensive package of confidence-building measures with multilateral satellite monitoring and verification systems as well as a protective regime for peaceful space objects based on immunity rules for satellites, such as a ‘rules of the road’ and a ‘code of conduct’.”[27]Such political and legal frameworks need to be combined with concepts for preventive arms control that tackle the dual-use problem in the early phases of research and development.[28]

  1.   See the contributions in: W. Liebert, R. Rilling, J. Scheffran (eds.), Die Janusköpfigkeit von Forschung and Technik, Marburg: BdWi-Verlag 1994. J. Scheffran, W. Liebert, Ambivalence of Science and Dual-Use of Technology Transfer, in: J. Rotblat et al. (eds.), Shaping Our Common Future: Dangers and Opportunities, World Scientific, 1994, pp. 1117-1134.
  2.   The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) ceased to function on March 31, 1994, after the end of the Cold War. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies; www.wassenaar.org.
  3.   Most recent lists can be found under www.dtic.mil/mctl.
  4.   U.S. Army Fort Monmouth, NJ, Dual Use Science & Technology Program BAA, 23 Jan 98; www.monmouth.army.mil/duap.htm.
  5.   J. Reppy, Managing Dual-Use Technology in an Age of Uncertainty, The Forum, Vol. 4 No. 1, Article 2, 2006; www.bepress.com/forum/vol4/iss1/art2.
  6.   J. Stowsky, Secrets to Shield or Share? New Dilemmas for Dual Use Technology Development and the Quest for Military and Commercial Advantage in the Digital Age, BRIE Working Paper 151, 2003.
  7.   B. Jasani (ed.), Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space, UNIDIR, Taylor & Francis, 1991.
  8.   B. Jasani (ed.), Space Weapons and International Security, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1987.
  9.   J. Pike, S. Lang, E. Stambler, Military use of outer space, in: SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1992, Oxford University Press, pp. 121-146.
  10.   J. Scheffran, D. Engels, E. Heinemann, Dual-use in der Raumfahrt, in: W. Liebert et.al., op.cit., pp. 108-130.
  11.   T.G. Mahnken, Why Third World Space Systems Matter, Orbis, Fall 1991, p. 563-579. P.G. Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, Geneva:, UNIDIR, 1992.
  12.   A. Schaper, J. Scheffran, Neue zivile Aufgaben für den militärischen Nuklear- und Raumfahrtkomplex in der GUS, in: Sicherheit und Frieden, 4/1992, pp. 202-209.
  13.   J. Scheffran, Dual Use of Missiles and Space Technologies, in: G. Neuneck, O. Ischebeck (eds.), Missile Technologies, Proliferation and Concepts for Arms Control, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1993, pp. 49-68.
  14.   Union of Concerned Scientists, Satellites: Types, orbits, countries, and debris, May 2006, www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_­weapons/whats-in-space.html.
  15.   R. Hagen, J. Scheffran, Is a space weapons ban feasible? Thoughts on technology and verification of arms control in space, UNIDIR Disarmament Forum, 1/2003, pp. 42-51. A more technical and detailed discussion is given in: D. Wright, L. Grego, L. Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005.
  16.   For further details see: J. Lewis, Space Weapons in US Defense Planning, INESAP Information Bulletin No.23, April 2004, pp. 11-16.
  17.   NASA, Summary of DART Accident Report, www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/dart/main/index.html.
  18.   See further R. Hagen, Europe – the Leading Space Power?, INESAP Information Bulletin No.23, April 2004, 16-18
  19.   ESA und Istituto Affari Internatzionali:, International Report on Space and Security Policy in Europe, Rom, November 2003;
  20.   R. Hagen, op.cit.
  21.   All quotes from Reppy 2006, op cit.
  22.   J. Scheffran, A. Karp, The National Implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The US and German Experiences, in: H.G. Brauch, H.J. v. d. Graaf, J. Grin, W. Smit (eds.), Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology, Amsterdam: VU University Press 1992, 235-255; J. Scheffran, Beyond the MTCR, INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 4, January 1995, 19-21.
  23.   P. Gasparini Alves, The transfer of dual-use outer space technologies: Confrontation or co-operation?, PhD Thesis, University of Geneva, 2001, www.unige.ch/cyberdocuments/theses2001/GaspariniP/these.html.
  24.   L. J. Dodgen, Space: Inextricably linked to warfighting, Military Review, Jan-Feb, 2006, www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ.
  25.   R. Hagen, J. Scheffran, International Space Law and Space Security-Expectations and Criteria for a Sustainable and Peaceful Use of Outer Space, in: M. Benkö, K.-U. Schrogl (eds..), Space Law: Current Problems and Perspectives for Future Regulation, Eleven International Publishing, 2005, 273-301; J. Scheffran, Risk reduction and monitoring in outer space, in: Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Use, UNIDIR Geneva, United Nations Press, 2005.
  26.   See Proximity Operations in Space by Michael Katz-Hyman of this INESAP Information Bulletin.
  27.   D. Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2006.
  28.   J. Altmann, W. Liebert, G. Neuneck, J. Scheffran, Preventive Arms Control as a Prerequisite for Conversion of Military R&D, in: J. Reppy, V. Avduyevsky, J. Rotblat (eds.), Conversion of Military R&D, Macmillan, 1999, 255-271.