NATO’s Nuclear Sharing and Incirlik

Aslıhan Tümer

NATO and Nuclear Sharing

Extract of Final Communique Ministerial meeting of Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on Thursday, 8 June 2006

1. The Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group met in Ministerial Session on 8 June 2006. …

6. At our Nuclear Planning Group meeting, we reviewed the status of NATO’s nuclear forces and other related issues and activities. We re-affirmed that the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. In keeping with this goal, we continue to place great value on the nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO, which provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. We recalled that NATO’s nuclear forces are maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability. We noted with appreciation the continuing contribution made by the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear forces to deterrence and the overall security of the Allies, and reaffirmed the value of this capability. The dangers inherent in the growing risk of nuclear proliferation underscore the importance of NATO maintaining a credible and flexible deterrent posture.

7. In this regard, we note that deterrence and defence, along with arms control and non-proliferation, will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives. We reaffirmed our full commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts and an essential basis for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In this context, we expressed serious concern over the possible consequences for security and stability, resulting from instances of non-compliance with the Treaty. We call again on all countries to abide by their commitments in this domain.

The term “nuclear sharing” refers to the deployment of US nuclear bombs in several European countries under NATO agreement.[1] In addition to the UK, five non-nuclear weapon states – Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Turkey – are nuclear sharing countries with a total of 480 tactical US nuclear weapons deployed under cooperation agreements. The programs for these free-falling nuclear bombs include maintenance of national dual-capable aircraft as carrier systems for nuclear missions and training of national aircrews in the use of nuclear weapons.

The B61 bombs are easily transportable and fully integrated into the conventional forces. Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons are not regulated by any arms control or disarmament agreements and are increasingly perceived as “usable.” Combined, this makes them one of the most dangerous weapon types ever produced. At this time, the US is the only country that still deploys nuclear weapons outside its own territory.

According to the US-based Natural Resources Defense Council, 90 of the 480 nuclear sharing bombs are deployed in Turkey.[2] They cannot be employed without an explicit command from the US leadership.

NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept confirms a continuing commitment to nuclear sharing. A key basic principle of NATO is that of “collective defense,” which means that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all members. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty states that, if one of the members is attacked, each member will take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,” to restore security.

The new US policy involves both a willingness to use nuclear weapons first and to use them in response to conventional attacks.[3] US nuclear plans and scenarios also foresee roles for the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. The decision to execute these plans would be taken by the US President without consultation of the host country. US journalist Seymour M. Hersh has revealed striking facts about these scenarios. According to his article, which appeared in the New Yorker in April 2006, the use of B61 bombs is among those scenarios.[4] This means that NATO member states could be drawn into a nuclear confrontation if the United States became involved in a military conflict where they considered nuclear weapons use an option.

The citizens of the European nuclear sharing countries have no official means to question or challenge NATO’s nuclear policy. Accordingly, citizens and non-governmental organizations have resorted to creative ways of informing themselves and expressing their opposition. This is also true in Turkey. Polls reveal, however, that this exercise of democracy is fully in line with the views of the majority of Turkish citizens.

In June 2004, the Turkish survey group Infakto Research Workshop conducted a public opinion survey for Greenpeace Turkey about the attitudes and perceptions of Turkish public opinion on nuclear weapons. The survey covered a nationally representative sample of 629 people through phone interviews.[5]

Among those surveyed, 45% stated that they think there are some nuclear weapons in Turkey. The percentage of participants negating the existence of nuclear weapons in Turkey was about 30%, and the share of participants declining to answer 26%. There was no relationship between the education level of the poll participants and answers to this question.

When respondents believing there are nuclear weapons in Turkey were asked to state who the user/owner of these weapons is, half of them argued that these weapons are under the control of Turkey and one third did not make a statement. The percentage of respondents believing that these weapons belong to the US or NATO is only 10.5%.

About half of the respondents stated that they are “not at all in favor” of having nuclear weapons in Turkey to provide security for Turkey and other NATO members. The survey also found that, as the education level raises, opposition towards nuclear weapons increases.

Significantly, 57% of respondents stated that they would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from Turkey. Only 34% of participants argued that they would not support the government in such a request. This ratio is 40% for men but only 28% for women.

Another significant finding of the poll was a strong majority support for the suggestion to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone. A total of 72% said that they support this idea, and the percentage of opponents was only 22%.

Finally, public support for the government to lead an international campaign to disarm all weapons of mass destruction in the world was more than 80%. The tendency towards supporting such a campaign increased with higher education levels. These findings indicate that the current Turkish policy of hosting nuclear weapons is contrary to public opinion, although many people are kept in the dark about Turkey’s nuclear role within the NATO alliance. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support.

Incirlik as a Nuclear Weapons Base

Incirlik, which literally means “fig garden,” was a small village on the outskirts of Adana city with its about 2 million inhabitants. What makes Incirlik so well known is the Air Base immediately bordering the village, where the base was originally a few times larger than the village itself. The village grew in terms of population and size once Incirlik Air Base was opened, especially during the first Gulf War. Over the years, Incirlik became a big village with 20,000 inhabitants, with shop names in English and most people able to communicate in that language. The presence of US troops in Incirlik has often been in the headlines of Turkish media, and the usage or non-usage of the base in specific military operations has been hotly debated in everyday conversations, in particularly when it came to the decision about Turkey’s contribution to the current Iraq war. The no-war movement of spring 2003 was the biggest mass-mobilizing event in several decades.

Today, Incirlik no longer has fig trees but one of the darkest secrets of the area: the fact that the Air Base hosts 90 nuclear weapons – roughly the equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshimas. In order to bear witness and raise awareness about the nuclear weapons issue in the public of the Adana area, Greenpeace opened a Peace Embassy at Incirlik.[6] Like everywhere else in Turkey, people in Adana have an ambivalent attitude towards this topic: they have no concrete knowledge about the deployment of nuclear weapons at the base, but they have “always suspected” that something might be going on there.

The people of Incirlik are dependent on the base in terms of economy, so any critical comments about the base are perceived as an attack on their main source of economy, and the fact that there are nuclear weapons in Incirlik is usually denied. And if it were true, the US would certainly have brought those weapons only to protect the people of Incirlik. Many people in Incirlik are retired base workers, and they believe that they would surely have heard of any nuclear weapons deployment. Whatever the public reaction to Peace Embassy information, one thing was certain in Incirlik: no one accepts the existence of these weapons.

Case Study: The Cuban Missile Crisis

Most people know about the Cuban Missile Crisis, but only few are aware that it was a milestones in US-Turkish relations.[7] The deployment of US Jupiter missiles in Turkey at the end of 1960 and equipment of these missiles with nuclear warheads in 1962 triggered an international crisis and lead to a real danger that nuclear weapons would actually be used.

Once the weapons systems were assembled, the Soviet comments became harsher. In May 1962, Nikita Khrushchev condemned the stationing of these missiles. On ­September 11 of the same year, the USSR announced a counter-reaction, which turned out to be the stationing of similar missiles on Cuba.

On October 25, 1962, the USSR representative in Turkey met with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and demanded that the Jupiters be removed from Turkey. According to the US Ambassador in Ankara, Raymond Hare, however, Turkey was content to host these nuclear bombs, thinking that they were an insurance against a Soviet threat.

The Turkish public was divided, with the opposition and the media very closely following the issue. Some journalists claimed that the US was ready to negotiate (which was true, but at the time Turkey was not informed about the negotiations). Some groups criticized Turkish politics for being too pro-American.

In spite of public doubts, the Turkish Head of State, Cemal Gursel, announced that the US could count on its ally Turkey in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Prime Minister Ismet Inönü stressed that Turkey had been closely consulted by the US, and the Turkish government even asked the US for military support in order to be sufficiently equipped against the Soviet threat.

Just a few days later, on October 27, the US and the Soviet Union came to a secret understanding that the missiles would be removed – both from Turkey and from Cuba. The end of the Cuba crisis and the Soviet agreement to withdraw their missiles were publicly announced, and Turkey applauded the US for preventing a war while protecting the Turkish interests. Even in 1963, when the US “proposed” the removal of its Jupiter missiles, Turkey was full of praise, because the US announced that the missiles would be replaced with high-tech submarines. Although the Turkish leadership tried to show a low profile on the matter, over time there were increased public discussions about the fact that Turkey had obviously been a “bargaining chip” in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

While opposition parties asked first questions in the parliament, Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin insisted that Turkey had actually gained in importance for the US due to the stationing of high-tech submarines. According to him, Turkey had become even stronger because its role in any conventional war had increased the strategic value of the country.

The last Jupiter missile was withdrawn from Turkey in April 1963. Eight year later, Ismet Inönü said in a speech to the parliament: “The Americans told us that they would remove the Jupiters because they were outdated. Instead they would be substituted by Polaris submarines. We learned only later that this was part of the deal with the Soviets. This incident shows that Turkish statesmen should avoid any situation where Americans might drag Turkey in an unwanted crisis and that we better be careful. (…)”

The Cuba crisis had major repercussions in the Turkish public, with the main ones being seriously damaged relations with the US, an increase in the anti-American movement as well as Turkey’s realization of the dangers of one-sided politics.

Nuclear Dangers Today

In recent months there were news reports on possible attacks on the Incirlik Air Base by Iran’s Sahab-3 missiles, and newspapers ran a story on plans by Al-Quaeda to attack the base. This fed long-standing discussions on potential dangers NATO nuclear weapons might pose to Turkey.

The current deployment of NATO nuclear weapons in European countries reflects a Cold War view and mentality. But the Soviet Union ceased to exist and is therefore no longer a threat, if indeed it ever was. The NATO-Russia Council brings the countries together as equal partners and gives the opportunity to identify and pursue joint actions.

Apparently, the dangers are now perceived to come from the Middle East. But keeping nuclear missiles on the outer edge of NATO territory is at best provocative and increases the security threats in the region as well as globally. By basing nuclear missiles in this region, the US puts the local people at risk, with the Bull’s Eye being right at Incirlik Air Base.

The NATO nuclear weapons should be sent back to the US for dismantling. Not only is this a way to increase the security of Turkey as well as the Middle East, it would also send a positive message to countries in the region and globally by demonstrating the willingness of Turkey to support by words and deeds a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.

Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in the region and beyond. Sending these nuclear weapons back to the US and moving NATO towards peace-keeping rather than war-making would take us all on a path of peace and true security.

  1.  Otfried Nassauer, Nuclear Weapons in Europe – A Question of Political Will, Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS), Policy Note 05.4, June 2005, prepared for Greenpeace Germany; www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn05-4.htm.
  2.  Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels and War Planning, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005; www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp.
  3.  “Executing a nuclear option, or even a portion of an option, should send a clear signal of United States’ resolve. Hence, options must be selected very carefully and deliberately so that the attack can help ensure the adversary recognizes the “signal” and should therefore not assume the United States has escalated to general nuclear war, although that perception cannot be guaranteed.” US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Publication 3-12, Final Coordination (2) 15 March 2005; www.wslfweb.org/docs/ doctrine/3_12fc2.pdf. After exposure and public discussion of the document, according to information by Hans Kristensen of February 2006, the Draft has been formally cancelled by the US Department of Defense.
  4.  Seymour M. Hersh, The Iran Plans: Would President Bush go to war to stop Tehran from getting the bomb?, New Yorker, April 7, 2006; http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060417fa_fact.
  5.  Infakto RW, WMD Survey – Research Report, June 18, 2004; www.greenpeace.org/turkey/press/reports/public-opinion-survey-on-nucle
  6.  [the editor:] The Peace Embassy was opened on May 16, 2005. For a report, see www.greenpeace.org/international/news/peaceembassy.
  7.  [the editor:] For a detailed account of the Cuba Crisis, see www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cubamenu.htm.