International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

The North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Negotiating a Way Out

Hui Zhang

After more than two years of negotiations, the six-party talks onthe North Korean nuclear crisis on September 19, 2005, finally produced a breakthrough Joint Statement of Principles to denuclearize North Korea. The six parties unanimously reaffirmed in the Statement that “the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” However, the six-party talks have made little headway since the Joint Statement was issued. This is because the two key players, the US and North Korea, are still disputing a number of major issues, including the timing and sequencing of North Korean denuclearization.[1] Meanwhile, North Korea continues to be unhindered in its efforts to increase its nuclear deterrence. It can be expected that to negotiate a way out of the current nuclear crisis, the six parties have to resolve in the coming talks the outstanding issues including the light-water reactor (LWR) provision, the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, timing and sequence, and verification of the implementation of the Joint Statement.

LWR Provision

The LWR provision will continue to be a big issue in the coming talks. While the other parties expressed in the Joint Statement their “respect” for North Korea regaining its sovereign right to acquire LWR technology, the subject of the LWR provision will be “discussed” at “an appropriate time” which is subject to different interpretations. Just after the Joint Statement was issued, Washington implied it would “discuss” the LWR subject only after the North Korean denuclearization, which could mean never. But Pyongyang demands that the LWR provision should occur before disarmament starts.

Pyongyang’s demand for the LWR provision has several reasons.

1. Building trust through deeds: For Pyongyang, the LWR provision is the physical foundation for building trust between itself and Washington. Pyongyang hopes to have a special interaction with Washington during its disarmament process by linking the LWR provision and nuclear dismantlement, as it did in the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which the LWR topic served as the focal point for scheduling several issues including IAEA inspection at two waste sites, the removal of spent fuels, and the dismantlement of nuclear facilities.
2. Political imperatives: Pyongyang argues that LWR provision was already agreed in the 1994 Agreed Framework, so why not just confirm it now? North Korea is not a defeated country, and both South Korea and Japan have large civilian nuclear programs. Why then does not North Korea have the right for nuclear energy? Thus, Pyongyang wants to use the LWR provision to find out whether the US respects its sovereignty and to test whether Washington has the political will to give up its hostile policy.
3. Energy security: North Korea has very limited fuel resources, as does South Korea, “no oil, no gas, and very limited coal.” But North Korea has plenty of natural uranium, which could supply nuclear power reactors for hundreds of years. While the South could supply two gigawatts of electricity, the North does not want this offer to replace the LWR project which in its view plays a greater role. It does not want its economy to depend on electricity from the South.

Thus, denial of the LWR provision would make North Korean denuclearization difficult. The US and others should commit to the LWR provision, while North Korea proceeds with denuclearization. On the other side, the North Korean “LWR provision first” proposal is also not feasible. The other countries cannot wait for another ten years before North Korea acts. Moreover, Pyongyang must urgently act to modernize its power stations and transmission and distribution systems. Pyongyang should be flexible about the timing of LWR provision. However, such a flexibility should be matched by US concessions on other benefits, in particular the normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang.

What North Korea wants most is for the US to give up its “hostile policy” and provide reliable security assurances, acknowledging Pyongyang’s highest priority, namely regime survival. The most tangible and vital security assurance the US can provide is to normalize relations with North Korea as a first step toward integrating it into the international community. Thus, “normalization” is one major step to remove Pyongyang’s deep-rooted security concerns and thus the justification for its nuclear deterrence.

While the Joint Statement stated that Washington and Pyongyang undertook to “take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies,” the phrase “subject to their respective bilateral policies” is open to interpretation. According to Washington, there will be a long road to normalizing relations with Pyongyang which will include denuclearization, but also discussions on human rights, biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missile programs, conventional weapons proliferation, terrorism, and other illicit activities. Yet Pyongyang wants normalization at a much earlier stage before dismantling its nuclear program and after a freeze. It can be expected that once Pyongyang gets what its most wants, “normalization” and building more trust, the timing of LWR provision would be much more flexible. Thus, the six-party talks should take a strategy of “normalization at an early stage” in exchange for “LWR provision at a later stage.”

HEU Issues

Unlike the already-known plutonium production at Yongbyon, the nature of the North Korean HEU program, the key driver to incite the current crisis, is much less clear. While Washington insists that Pyongyang has a clandestine HEU program, Pyongyang continues to deny such an accusation.

On November 19, 2002, an unclassified CIA report released to US Congress stated that, “North Korea was constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons when fully operational – which could be as soon as mid-decade.”[2]

Pyongyang is accused of the following activities that indicate a HEU program:

• an attempt to buy two electrical-frequency converters from a Japanese firm in 1999 and again an effort for three frequency converters in 2003;
• acquisition of centrifuge prototypes and blueprints provided by Abdul Qadeer Khan according to his own confession;
• obtaining equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems as the Washington Times reported in November 2002;
• a 22-ton shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes (usable for vacuum casings for Urenco-type centrifuges) to North Korea, which was blocked by French, German, and Egyptian authorities in April 2003.[3]

However, this evidence is not sufficient to allow an assessment whether Pyongyang was ever successful in getting significant material and equipment, in particular high-strength aluminium tubes, the key material for manufacturing centrifuges. Based on an analysis of steps for a production-scale centrifuge enrichment program, the status of Pyongyang’s HEU program could be estimated as follows:[4] if Pyongyang has a dedicated HEU program, its status could be somewhere between the research and development level and pursuing an experimental pilot facility. Even if North Korea gets enough material and equipment, it would be several years away from producing enough HEU for one or two bombs. However, it is highly doubtful that North Korea has bought enough material for thousands of centrifuges, at least not by April 2003; otherwise the intercepted shipment of high-strength aluminium tubes would not have been necessary. Moreover, it would now be even more difficult for Pyongyang to get such material, considering the international focus on its nuclear program and much stricter export controls that have been imposed after the nuclear crisis.

It seems to be a fact that North Korea is using its known plutonium production facilities to increase its plutonium stockpile, while the nature of the centrifuge enrichment program is still not clear. Moreover, verification of a centrifuge enrichment program will require more transparency and more intrusive measures, which would be very difficult without more confidence building measures, particulary considering the deep distrust between both sides. Thus, if the dispute over the HEU issue is not to block denuclearization, a “plutonium first” approach,[5] i.e. focusing on the plutonium program at the first stage and then on the HEU program at a later stage, looks more promising in a phased denuclearization process.

In fact, while the Joint Statement did not specifically mention the HEU issue, its “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” should be understood to include the HEU program. Moreover, as the Statement mentions, North Korea would observe and implement the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which includes “no enrichment and no reprocessing” on the peninsula. Thus, the Joint Statement’s treatment of the HEU issue is smart in that it would not allow this issue to block the whole denuclearization process.

Timing and Sequence

The timing and sequencing of the North Korean denuclearization will be a key issue to be detailed in the coming talks. Given the long history of mistrust and animosity between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korean denuclearization will not be achieved in one strike. What is needed is a roadmap that links North Korean denuclearization with the gradual delivery of concrete benefits including security assurances, diplomatic normalization, economic reform, and Northeast Asian security cooperation. The six parties already agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the commitments made in the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action.”

Such a roadmap should include a timetable and reciprocal actions each side should carry out at each stage with the goal of a complete denuclearization of the peninsula. For each stage, the roadmap should make clear what North Korea should pledge to do, what inspection and verification provision should be taken, and what benefits North Korea would receive regarding security assurance and economic aid. For example, based on a “plutonium first” approach and considering that the required measures for transparency and verification for each step should range from less to more intrusive, a roadmap with three stages for the North Korean denuclearization could be defined: the first stage would focus on a freeze of plutonium production (with a time frame around six months); the second stage would dismantle all plutonium programs (with a time frame of a few, say, three years); and the third stage would dismantle the HEU program (with a time frame around one year).

For example, when Pyongyang takes the first step of a freeze on plutonium production, other parties should resume their energy aid to North Korea. Washington should consider taking steps toward normalization of relations with Pyongyang including establishing a liaison office, relaxation of sanctions, and removing North Korea from the terrorist list. At the second stage, when Pyongyang dismantles its plutonium programs and rejoins the Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Washington and Tokyo would normalize their relations with Pyongyang. The US and South and North Korea would also negotiate a peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreement. Meanwhile, the South would supply the North with two gigawatts of electricity until the LWRs start operation. Pyongyang would be helped to become a member of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank and with conducting economic reforms and agricultural development programs. At the last stage, Pyongyang would dismantle its HEU program and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol. All parties would explore means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. After Pyongyang dismantles its plutonium programs, it would be provided with the LWR. Also, other countries would provide funds and technologies for the modernization of the North Korean economic infrastructure including reconnecting its railways with the South and Russia.

It is believed that Pyongyang would most likely abandon its nuclear programs once it is guaranteed to get those benefits. Beijing should have delivered a clear message to Pyongyang: nuclear weapons will not serve North Korea’s top national interests in the long term. To develop its economy, Pyongyang has to speed up its economic reform. Given that North Korea has very limited resources, reform depends on opening the doors to the international community, and especially to foreign investment, trade, and aid from neighboring South Korea and Japan. However, if Pyongyang maintains its nuclear program, its economy will suffer. Since its neighbors have made clear that they cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea, there will be no lasting economic cooperation or aid if the nuclear program continues.

Verification

To achieve the goal of the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as the Joint Statement confirmed, each step toward the complete disarmament should be done with adequate transparency and effective verification measures.[6] For example, Pyongyang would declare and freeze all its plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon at the first stage. With the freeze in place, it should be easier to monitor and verify the status of these facilities, as was lined out in the 1994 Agreed Framework. For example, monitoring the shutdown status of a five MWe reactor includes on-site visits and putting tamper-proof sensors on the pressure vessel of the reactor. Also water vapor from the cooling tower of the reactor would be seen on satellite imagery. The status of the closed reprocessing facility can be monitored by on-site means including tamper-proof seals and cameras.

At the second stage, North Korea would begin to dismantle all its plutonium programs. This stage would include three sub-steps:

1. dismantling plutonium weapons and surrendering all its plutonium;
2. moving plutonium materials out of North Korea; and
3. dismantling or decommissioning all facilities associated with the weaponization program and plutonium production.
4. North Korea should first make a declaration of the total amount of plutonium. However, Pyongyang might prefer to follow the example of South African disarmament, i.e. to first dismantle its bombs, then submit the total amount of plutonium from pits or other stocks, and finally accept verification measures that confirm the termination of its nuclear weapons program. The accuracy of a fissile material balance can generally be verified with pretty high confidence.

To achieve higher accuracy as to the extent of past plutonium production, Pyongyang should provide detailed records of the operating history of its reactors and other plutonium-related facilities. It should also keep all records of its weapons dismantlement and allow interviews with relevant personnel. Pyongyang may choose not to keep or provide all those records. In that case it could agree to other approaches to estimate the total amount of plutonium produced. For example, measurements of total radioactivity of Cs137 and Sr90 in high-level waste would allow an estimation of total plutonium production. Another way to estimate the total plutonium production is to measure the concentrations of some radionuclides (e.g. C-14) in the graphite or steel components of the reactor core.[7]

At the last stage, North Korea would complete dismantlement of its HEU program. From the beginning, North Korea would make a comprehensive declaration of its HEU program including centrifuge design, research and development, procurement, production and operation, and pledge that all associated facilities or items are to be dismantled and decommissioned. Verification of the HEU program depends on the status of the program, such as whether it is producing HEU or not. If the HEU status, as estimated, is somewhere between research and development level and pursuing an experimental pilot facility, it should be relatively easy to verify the declared HEU activities. For example, North Korea should declare and destroy the centrifuge prototypes and blueprints provided by Abdul Qadeer Khan. In addition, other cooperative measures, including interviews with involved persons, should be allowed.

The detection of an undeclared centrifuge enrichment program would be a challenge. At this step, North Korea should have ratified the Additional Protocol to allow more intrusive measures including complementary access and environmental sampling which would make a clandestine nuclear program more difficult. Human intelligence could also uncover a secret nuclear program as shown in the cases of Israel’s and Iraq’s nuclear programs. High-resolution commercial satellite imagery is also making the sky more open. Moreover, the verification provision itself would play a role of deterrence. At this step, it is assumed Pyongyang would have achieved what it wanted most: the full normalization of relations with the US. And given that it would have already dismantled its larger plutonium program, Pyongyang would have no rationale to keep its ambiguity on HEU production, instead, a lack of cooperation would come at a high cost. If Pyongyang took such a risk, it could even lose its chance for its regime survival. Finally, it can be expected that disputes between Washington and Pyongyang over compliance issues would be less severe at this stage as both sides have given up mutual “hostile” policies and built more confidence, and China or Russia would also help to settle some disputable issues.

Eventually, a North Korean denuclearization would be achievable verifiably through the proposed three stages, in accordance with the “reciprocal action” principle. The major obstacles for the implementation of a denuclearization are political, not technical. In particular, it would be dependent on whether Washington, which holds what Pyongyang most wants, has such a political will. The last several years have shown that the Bush administration hard line policy will only backfire. It is time for Washington itself to take real actions to negotiate a way out of the nuclear crisis.

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1.   See, e.g. Daryl G. Kimball, Getting Serious about North Korea, Arms Control Today, December 2005; Paul Kerr, North Korea Nuclear Talks Stall, Arms Control Today, December 2005.
2.   See, e.g. the unclassified CIA assessment as quoted in Appendix I of Beyond the Agreed Framework: The DPRK's Projected Atomic Bomb Making Capabilities, 2002-09, An Analysis of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, December 2002; www.npec-web.org/projects/fissile2.htm.
3.   For details see e.g. Fred McGoldrick, Monitoring and Verification of DPRK Enrichment Freeze, US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop, Washington DC, January 27, 2003; Selig Harrison, Did North Korea Cheat?, Foreign Affairs, January/Febuary 2005; M.Reiss et.al. Red-Handed, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005.
4.   See e.g. Hui Zhang, Chinese Perspectives on the North Korean Nuclear Issue, presentation at 46th INMM Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 10-14, 2005.
5.   Some other experts also suggest a “ plutonium first” approach. See, e.g. Selig Harrison et al., Ending the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: A Proposal by the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy, 2004; http://ciponline.org/asia/Web%20Report.pdf.
6.   See footnote 3.
7.   Steve Fetter, Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Production, Science and Global Security, Vol. 3, Nos. 3–4 (1993), pp. 237–261.

The views expressed here are the author’s alone.