International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Statement of the Union of Concerned Scientists

May 5, 2005

A Call on Japan to Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty by Indefinitely Postponing Operation of the Rokkasho Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant

Minimizing worldwide stockpiles of weapons usable fissile materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium – should be a high priority for the international community. Doing so would promote nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet Japan is about to join several nuclear-weapon states as a producer of separated plutonium on an industrial scale. At a time when the nonproliferation regime is facing its greatest challenge, Japan should not proceed with its current plans for the start-up of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

The official nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) have all halted their production of plutonium for weapons, and their production of HEU for any purpose. However, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and India continue to separate plutonium on a large scale from civil nuclear power reactor spent fuel.

As a result of this activity, there continues to be a steady increase in the world stockpile of separated civilian plutonium, which stood at 235 metric tons at the end of 2003. This amount of reactor-grade plutonium is enough to make 30,000 nuclear weapons, each with a destructive power comparable to that of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Despite assertions to the contrary, terrorists could use civil plutonium to make potent nuclear weapons with a destructive power equivalent to at least 1,000 tons of TNT.

Many countries, including Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, have decided to end the separation of plutonium from spent fuel for the foreseeable future. Even the United Kingdom, previously one of the principal enthusiasts, is likely to end all reprocessing within the next few years because of the decline in foreign and domestic interest. Indeed, respected voices within Britain have warned of the dangers from Britain’s growing stockpile of separated plutonium. Perhaps most notably, in 1998, Britain’s Royal Society warned that, even in stable Britain, “the chance that the stocks of plutonium might, at some stage, be accessed for illicit weapons production is of extreme concern.”[1]

On December 1, 1997, Japan stated that its nuclear fuel cycle is based on “the principle of no surplus plutonium”.[2]  However, by the end of 2003 Japan’s total plutonium stockpile had grown from 24.1 to 40.6 metric tons – enough for some 5,000 nuclear weapons (some 5.4 metric tons are currently in Japan, and the rest is held for Japan at the French and British reprocessing plants).[3]

Despite the existence of this huge plutonium stockpile, Japan’s nuclear utilities plan to begin commercial operation of a new spent fuel reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-mura in 2007, and to test the plant using spent nuclear fuel beginning in December 2005.

Operating at its design capacity, the Rokkasho plant will separate approximately 8 metric tons of plutonium per year, enough to make 1,000 bombs. The operation of the Rokkasho plant would greatly increase Japan’s domestic plutonium stockpile and postpone for years Japan’s achievement of its stated goal of “no surplus plutonium.” Ultimately, Rokkasho’s operation in the face of large Japanese stocks of surplus plutonium would raise serious concerns about Japan’s commitment to strengthening the NPT.

Because the Rokkasho plant is the first industrial-scale reprocessing plant in a country not possessing nuclear weapons, its planned operation could also undermine international efforts to discourage other countries – including Iran and North Korea – from building their own reprocessing and enrichment facilities. 

Japan has shown great wisdom in not joining the “club” of nuclear-weapon states. We urge it to show equal leadership in deciding not to add to the accumulation of excess stocks of separated civilian plutonium. Accordingly, on the occasion of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, we call on Japan to postpone indefinitely the operation of its Rokkasho reprocessing plant, as well as tests of the facility with radioactive materials.

For the list of signatures, see www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/japan-strengthen-the-nonproliferation-treaty.html.

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1.   The Royal Society, Management of Separated Plutonium. Summary, London, 1998.
2.   International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received from Certain Member States Concerning their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/Add. 1, 31 March 1998; www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf.
3.   International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received from Japan Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/Add. 1/7, 23 December 2004; www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc549a1-7.pdf.