International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Iran’s Nuclear Programme – Civilian or Military?

Dual-Use Brings About Irreconcilable Positions and a Dangerous Dynamic of Escalation

Martin B. Kalinowski

This article was written in January 2006. See the box below the article for later developments in the Iran case. [The editor]

The Circumstances

Iran is running a nuclear programme that is a cause for concern. Iran claims that it is purely civilian. But behind the civilian programme there could be military intentions and it could also be the case that Iran already has or has had a military programme. There is, however, no evidence for this at all. Admittedly, there are many disconcerting indications that could be interpreted to mean that their intentions are more military than civilian in nature. But intentions cannot be proven when dealing with dual-use technology. Iran has provided a more or less plausible explanation for every single indication that has been discovered, claiming its purposes are only civilian. Iran quotes its right according to Article IV of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereby every party should be provided with full access to civilian nuclear technology. Because of the nature of dual-use technology, it cannot be proven that Iran is in violation of the NPT. No activities have been found that could only serve military purposes and would therefore deliver clear proof of the existence of a secret nuclear weapons programme. However, the situation is very serious for Iran, since it has breached its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on several occasions.

This article concentrates on the technical facts and does not attempt to analyse political statements and activities that have led to Iran coming under unfavourable scrutiny, and because of which Iran is alleged to have the intention of using its nuclear programme to camouflage an enterprise that is actually motivated by military purposes. Clear and extensive conclusions can only be reached in the absence of such allegations and mistrust.

No Violation of Article II of the NPT

Iran has been in breach of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreements that is used by the IAEA to implement the NPT on several occasions. And there are indications that point to the possibility of military intentions for the Iranian nuclear programme. But before one begins to discuss these, one thing should be made clear: the IAEA has as of yet found no evidence that Iran is secretly producing or diverted weapons-grade nuclear fissile material.[2] There is no evidence that Iran wants nuclear weapons, and only this would be a violation of Article II of the NPT. This article forbids any non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the Treaty from acquiring nuclear weapons or any other kind of nuclear device through production or by any other means.

Up to now, the most explosive discovery was made in the Kala Electric Company in Abali near Teheran. The IAEA were able to prove the existence of highly enriched uranium in swipes that the inspectors had taken in 2003 from the surfaces of machine parts used for uranium enrichment. Iran had declared that it had only enriched the uranium up to a maximum of 1.2% U-235. The question of whether a breach of the NPT had been revealed by the evidence of traces of highly enriched uranium was argued over for two years. Iran declared that the traces were due to contamination of the plant which was imported from Pakistan. At first this could not be checked because it was difficult to analyse and decide upon the age of the uranium traces. Eventually, in August 2005, came the all-clear. An international team of experts were able to prove that the composition of the isotopes, that were in the traces found in Iran, matched samples taken in Pakistan and that had been made available to the experts. Thus the Iranian declaration was finally confirmed as being trustworthy because of its consistency with the measurements. But this news was barely reported in the media, and it has only become clear to a few observers that this means that no evidence of high enrichment of uranium has in fact been found in Iran. This means that the IAEA cannot accuse Iran of any breach of its obligations under Article II of the NPT.

Breaches of Article III of the NPT and IAEA Safeguards

The IAEA accuses Iran of having violated its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement[3] in several instances. Both nuclear materials and installations should have been declared. The following list includes facilities without nuclear material, which were not covered by the Safeguards Agreement but only by the Additional Protocol,[4] which was signed by Iran in December 2003.

• Iran fed in and enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) at the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz without declaring it to the IAEA. Iran is obliged, however, to do so. This breach was discovered by the IAEA in February 2003. Iran tried to excuse its behaviour by saying that only tiny amounts had been processed for test purposes.
• A pilot plant at Lashkar Abad near Karaj was built for laser enrichment but not declared to the IAEA. The IAEA visited the plant in 2004 and confirmed its nuclear use.
• The plant at the Kala Electric Company in Abali near Teheran was used for installing centrifuges that had been imported from Pakistan. Neither the existence of this plant, nor the construction of the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, nor the heavy water production plant at Arak were declared to the IAEA.
• The import of natural uranium in 1991 was not declared. The processing and use of this material, as well as the resulting excess waste, were also not declared.
• The enrichment of imported UF₆ at the Kala Electric Company in Abali near Teheran, that was carried out in 1999 and 2002 for test purposes, should have been declared.
• The import of uranium metal in 1993 and its enrichment in the laser enrichment plant at Lashkar were not declared.
• The production of UO2 targets[5] in Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, their irradiation in the Teheran research reactor and the subsequent separation of 0.2 milligramm plutonium between 1988 and 1992 should have been declared.
• The production of various types of uranium oxide, uranium fluoride and of ammonium uranyl carbonate should also have been reported.

Similar breaches and failures of numerous other countries have also been known without it having lead to a noteworthy international reaction, with the exception of Iraq and North Korea. The frequency and the prolongation of such incidences in Iran, however, as well as the intensity and scope of their secret nuclear programme does represent an anomaly.

After the discovery of these failures, Iran has made an effort since October 2003 to present a clean slate. Cooperation with the IAEA has improved and more transparency has been forthcoming, although delaying tactics and contradictory declarations have provided occasion for further scepticism. The required declarations were eventually made by Iran. All the design information for the named plants were made available. Inventories, material accounts and information on imports and transfers have been produced in detail. IAEA inspections of materials and plants to verify the inventory and further operation have been permitted. All the declared material could be verified and no diversion has been detected.

Iran voluntarily signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, and allowed it to be acted upon before it comes into force. When installations were discovered or suspected, the IAEA was, on most occasions, allowed to make inspections or were at least promised them. For the IAEA, however, unanswered questions remain about the story of the direct and intermediated import of centrifugal technology from Pakistan. In the case of the experiments with laser technology, all activities have ceased and the installation deconstructed. Since the construction site at Isfahan has come to light, in which it is alleged that centrifuges have been tested, Iran has ceased building work and allowed the IAEA to inspect it. Initially, Iran agreed during negotiations with the EU–3 group (UK, Germany and France) to freeze all nuclear activities. Added to this, Iran permitted special measures, over and above those demanded by the usual nuclear safeguards, in order to verify compliance with that freeze.

Breaches of Further ­Obligations?

A decisive turn of events in the Iran crisis came with the Teheran Joint Statement by Iran and the Foreign Ministers of the EU–3 in October 2003 and the conclusion of the Paris Agreement between Iran and the EU–3 in November 2004. With the latter, Iran committed itself to the following:

• to suspend all activities pertaining to the so-called fuel cycle;
• to ratify the Additional Protocol;
• to declare all installations, activities and material and open them up to verification inspections by the IAEA.

In return, Iran was promised cooperation over the issue of regional security and the civilian use of nuclear technology, as well as economic and technical support, that was to be worked out in detail at a later date.

However, the Draft Agreement put forward by the EU–3 on August 5, 2005, offered little more than rather unspecific promises as well as the confirmation of undertakings that had already been agreed on under international law at an earlier time. A positive element of the Draft Agreement was the British and French offer of negative security assurances (i.e. no nuclear attack on Iran).

Iran is accused of breaking its promised freeze on its nuclear programme. At the beginning of August 2005, Iran announced that it would recommence its production of UF₆ in the uranium conversion plant at Isfahan. This measure was announced with the following three justifications:

1. Iran has a right to civilian nuclear technology under Article IV of the NPT, and this right has been unjustly withheld and torpedoed since the early eighties;
2. Iran fulfilled all its obligations under the Paris Agreement but the EU–3 have done practically nothing, they only played for time by dragging out the negotiations;
3. UF₆ production is not included in the freeze agreed to in the Teheran Joint Statement of October 2003 since it is not an enrichment activity. Renouncing this preparatory step for enrichment was not wrenched from Iran until the Paris Agreement of November 2004.

Iran did not recommence UF₆ production until November 16, 2005. The scheduling of both steps (the announcement and its execution) implies that a clear political signal was intended. The removal of the seal was announced on August 1, only days before the EU–3 offer was to be submitted according to European obligation under the agreement. The resoluteness of Iran’s non-cooperative stance becomes even clearer when one keeps in mind that only a day before this announcement written notice was given by the EU–3 to Iran of the intention to present the long-awaited offer no later than August 7. The IAEA seal was removed in the presence of IAEA inspectors, and UF₆ production was recommenced in November 2005. However provocative this scheduling might be, it still does not constitute a breach of the NPT. It could be interpreted as a breach of the additional concessions made to the EU–3 in the Paris Agreement of November 2004, whereby Iran is of the opinion that the EU–3 states were already in breach of their commitments of the same agreement.

Since the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors of November 29, 2005, refers to the Paris Agreement and calls on Iran to suspend all enrichment activities, Iran is accused of also not having complied with this resolution.

Iran’s provocation has led to further escalation of the conflict. The IAEA Board of Governors ascertained in their resolution of September 24, 2005, that the failures to comply with safeguards and facts that have been known for between one and two years constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute. As a result, the country in question must not only be called upon to correct these circumstances, but the IAEA has to report all non-compliance to the UN Security Council. The resolution explicitly threatens that the Security Council will be asked to deal with unanswered issues pertaining to the purely peaceful intentions of the Iranian nuclear programme. Iran is called upon, in the resolution, to re-suspend or continue to suspend all activities related with uranium enrichment. Finally, it was decided to remain seized of the matter, and the pressure is growing within the Board of Governors to refer the Iranian nuclear programme to the Security Council.

Indications of Possible Military Intentions

Alongside the clear breaches of agreements already mentioned, there are indications and suppositions that do not, however, constitute evidence of a secret nuclear weapons programme. Yet Iran has exonerating explanations at hand for all these indications. The sheer extent of these clues, though, rocks Iran’s credibility.

• Overproduction of uranium enrichment: At the moment Iran does not have a nuclear energy programme that needs enriched uranium for its fuel. The dimensions of the uranium enrichment plant, currently under construction at Natanz, could only be understandable if they would have a large number of nuclear power plants to cater for. Iran claims that they are planning such a civilian nuclear energy programme. Sceptics say this is not credible as Iran possesses large reserves of crude oil. However, one should be careful about calling the credibility of a programme into question simply because it appears to be inconsistent with the context of the national power supply.
• Heavy water reactor: A 40 megawatt heavy water reactor is being built in Arak that would be particularly good for the production of plutonium.
• Military connections: Part of the uranium enrichment efforts are being run by the defence ministry. Iran explains this by saying that the Iranian military undertakes similar activities for other commercial industrial operations.
• Building completely underground: The buildings in Natanz where the uranium enrichment plant is housed have been built completely underground. The surface is covered with earth, as though the plant is meant to be hidden. Iran explains this by saying that the plant needs to be protected from the air.
• Camouflage company?: The Kala Electric Company in Abali, near Teheran, that tested the uranium centrifuges bought from Pakistan, was registered as a company of watch makers.
• Obliterating traces?: Before inspectors could visit the Lavizan-Shian Technology Research Centre in 2004 to look for an alleged biological weapon research facility, the building was completely demolished and even the earth was taken away. Iran claims, the land belonged to the city and was being reconstructed as a park. Further investigation showed this claim to be credible.
• Inspectors are led astray: When the IAEA wanted to visit the laser enrichment plant in Lashkar Abad in 2004, they were first taken to a place nearby, evidently with the intention of making the IAEA think that the information they had received from the opposition group National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) was false. Eventually, Iran brought them to the right place.
• Inspections are delayed: There have still been no inspections of the military installation in Lavizan. It is suspected that various activities related to uranium enrichment are taking place there. Among other things, the dismantled laser enrichment experiment could have been reassembled there.
• Polonium-210: Small samples of metallic bismuth have been irradiated using neutrons. Polonium-210 is then generated. This can be used as a neutron source when mixed with beryllium and then used for initiating a chain reaction in a nuclear weapon. Iran explains this by saying that this is only research for civilian purposes that is not finished yet and has been going on for the last 13 years. Polonium-210 is needed by them for the production of nuclear batteries based on radioisotopes (such devices are for example used in the US space programme).
• Other sensitive material and technology: There are signs of other material and technology that are known to be related to nuclear weapons programmes but could not as yet be confirmed by the IAEA. These include an attempt to acquire tritium from South Korea, beryllium from China and highly purified graphite from Dubai.
• Processing of uranium metal: A few days before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 24, 2005, it was made known that Iran had provided the IAEA with technical documents that contained descriptions of mechanical processing of metallic uranium, and in particular the production of hemispheres. There is no possible civilian use for these. This is clearly a military application that can be used for producing the central nuclear components of a nuclear weapon. The media jumped to the conclusion that this was the discovery of a new and particularly serious sign of an advanced nuclear weapon programme. It was implied that the situation was thus aggravated. In contrast, the IAEA assesses the transfer of these documents as a positive step towards fulfilment of the demanded transparency and does not see the existence of these documents as a breach of confidence. Actually, the described documents were found amongst a batch of many unasked for papers that Iran received from the Pakistani A.Q. Khan procurement network almost ten years previously, together with the delivery of the centrifuges. Iran asserts that they did not order any information on the construction of nuclear weapons, nor have they used any.

All of the indications listed here, that suggest the presence of nuclear weapons ambitions, in particular because of the number of them, have been explained by Iran and are consistent with an assumption of innocence.

Possible Positions

In light of the nuclear situation in Iran, every party has to take a decision in two respects. Firstly, one can either believe in Iran’s innocence or one suspects a secret nuclear weapon programme. Secondly, one can take the view, with respect to the NPT, that the treaty should not be applied discriminatorily, or one deems that a state that has already breached the treaty should be monitored more strictly, and has forfeited certain rights contained in the treaty. Table 1 shows the four standpoints that can result from these two irreconcilable positions.

Table 1: Two irreconcilable positions and four possible standpoints

1. Victim: Iran claims that it is not guilty of having breached Article II of the NPT. Conversely, they see themselves as the victim of a breach of Article IV since the eighties, and even more so presently. Iran is prepared to indulge inspections, that it considers to be correct and necessary, since it admits that they have not fulfilled their safeguards obligations. But it is determined to realise the goal of attaining an unlimited civilian nuclear programme that has been denied it for so long. Up until now, Iran has only been prepared to tolerate a temporary suspension of its enrichment activities.
2. Perpetrator: The US takes the opposing position. They have suspected Iran for the past 25 years of running a secret nuclear weapon programme and, in the meantime, are of the opinion that the evidence has been provided that Iran has breached Article II and III. Because of this presumption, most Western countries have refused any nuclear cooperation with Iran and have exercised pressure on other countries not to make nuclear technology available to Iran. Germany broke off construction of the power reactor at Bushehr after the Islamic revolution in 1979. Russia will now finish the reactor by 2006, while having taken particular precautions to avoid Iran using the operation of this reactor as justification for its uranium enrichment activities, or that they might divert plutonium from the spent fuel rods. For this reason, Russia provides the fuel and takes back the spent fuel. The USA would like to see all means of stopping Iran from getting the nuclear bomb to be implemented as fast as possible.
3. The principle of equality: The lower left position in the diagram values the principle of non-discrimination so highly that even a violation of safeguards commitments would not lead to treating the state concerned in any other way. This position is seldom held.
4. Innocent until proven guilty: Russia is the foremost representative of this position. The Russian government still believes there are no military intentions behind Iran’s nuclear programme, but supports measures that would reinstate the trust in Iran that it has lost through breaches of Article III.

The EU–3 are somewhere between the top right position and the other extreme just below. It is clear that the EU–3 have their eye on Iran in light of past incidents, and demand stricter controls. The viewpoint that Iran had, or still has, a secret nuclear weapon programme is not openly held. A further judgement comes into play at this point. One can view the past IAEA inspections, the present investigations, and future implementable measures as sufficient to ensure that Iran is no longer running a nuclear bomb programme, since it cannot be kept secret. This viewpoint has the same outcome as the presumption of innocence. The more pessimistic variation is the fear that Iran is determined to run a nuclear weapon programme and that safeguards can never be enough to discover this. It cannot be prevented anyway. The outcome of this are not only the strictest possible nuclear controls but also to forbid Iran any technology that could give it direct access to nuclear-weapon-grade material. This is the same as the bottom right extreme position in the table.

Both the EU–3 and Russia, as well as the US, are insisting on a permanent limitation on the Iranian nuclear programme. They are offering Iran a solution in which Iran and Russia would run an uranium enrichment programme in Russia together. The conversion of uranium into UF₆could continue to be run by Iran but they would have to deliver the UF₆ gas to Russia. The enrichment and fuel production would then take place there. Iran would be party to the profits from international sales. However, end of December 2005, Iran rejected this proposal and renewed its claim to enrich uranium on its own territory.

Dual Use is the Source of Escalation

If Iran really does have, or has had, a secret nuclear weapon programme then it is because it was able to camouflage nuclear technology using its dual use trait. This makes the task of revealing true intentions and the provision of hard evidence extremely difficult. Because of this uncertainty, positions tip in favour of the extreme positions of “victim” and “perpetrator” in the diagram discussed above. By taking the role of victim, one can profit and there are no risks attached. That makes it an attractive prospect. The accusation of perpetrator, however, is based on indications combined with suppositions created by mistrust. Rather than allow international security to be endangered, the idea that Iran has nuclear weapon ambitions is adhered to.

If Iran really does not have a secret nuclear weapon programme, then it is the dual-use problem of the nuclear technologies referred to here that is causing this immensely dangerous peace-threatening escalation. Since a mere suspicion is almost impossible to falsify with hard facts, a fear is raging outside of Iran that is not to be stilled and an increasing rage inside Iran about the unjust treatment it is receiving. If fear is driving an escalation in which an ever more humiliating treatment of Iran is demanded, then the anger in Iran will provoke a kind of defiance that ultimately leads to an end to the willingness to cooperate. The recommencement of uranium conversion is such a reaction. Just before their November meeting, Iran threatened the IAEA Board of Governors with the discontinuation of voluntary cooperation with the inspectors and limiting themselves to a kind of “go-slow” with the inspectors, should the case be brought before the UN Security Council.

What Is to Be Done?

Strict Adherence to All Safeguards Obligations

The discovered breaches in the past should give occasion for the IAEA to exhaust all possibilities during further monitoring of Iran that are offered by the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. All unanswered questions and contradictions have to be completely cleared up. All signs have to be followed up. For instance, there is allegedly an extensive complex of underground tunnels near Teheran that, according to information from an Iranian opposition group, are being used for nuclear activities. These have to be inspected by the IAEA. Iran has to allow all these measures. It has to make sure that all activities are made fully transparent and disclosed and should support the IAEA in clarifying historical events.

Experience shows, however, that even if every possible verification method is exhausted, it remains an extremely difficult task to uncover undeclared installations and material. Often a hint from outside is needed in order to bring undeclared nuclear activities to light and inspect them. The early discovery of the construction of an uranium enrichment plant in Natanz was made by a civilian organisation, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), and made known in August 2002. When Iran protracted the planned IAEA inspection, due to take place in 2002, another civilian organisation, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), became active and published satellite pictures that documented the progress of construction at the site. The IAEA was not able to visit the construction site until February 2003 and confirm the suspicions. A similar process took place with the heavy water production plant in Arak and also with the uranium centrifuges tested in Abali. The IAEA then found the traces of highly enriched uranium at the latter that were the subject of debate for a long time.

Improvement of Nuclear Safeguards

The potential of existing methods and technologies used for safeguards obviously need improving as regards their chances of uncovering undeclared activities.

For this reason the General Assembly of the IAEA decided in 2004 to develop new methods and technologies, in particular to accelerate the implementation of the Additional Protocol. In order to implement this decision, the agency called on all member states to support the search for, and development of, new technologies that can enable detection of undeclared nuclear material and installations for production. Primarily, what was meant was the discovery of the undeclared operation of reprocessing or uranium enrichment plants.

The following technologies were explicitly named within the request:

• detectors based on laser diodes for UF₆ and HF gas as an indicator of unreported uranium enrichment;
• monitoring and sampling of atmospheric inert gases (in particular krypton-85) for detecting secret plutonium separation and unreported reactor operation;
• antineutrino detectors to find undeclared reactor operations;
• geophysics methods for detecting undeclared facilities such as tunnels or hidden rooms or for verifying design information;
• in situ analysis of environmental samples.

The Additional Protocol provides the most important legal basis for the use of these new technologies. The technical possibilities of implementing this agreement are, however, not nearly exhausted. This is because further development and adjustment of the appropriate measurement technology for use in the field has to be carried out. On the other hand, procedures about how to use these verification methods and a basic understanding of their possibilities and limits are missing. Last but not least, high development costs and limited budgets stand in the way of speedy application.

Environmental samples are named as particularly relevant. In the Additional Protocol there are two different categories: on the one hand, samples taken at defined locations (location-specific environmental samples), and on the other hand, the operation of a network of stations over a wide area (wide-area environmental sampling). The latter has not as yet been carried out and needs to have a new board decision from the Governors to define an appropriate procedure. The first category includes swipes from surfaces from declared installations and their subsequent analysis in certified laboratories. These are carried out by the IAEA routinely and in large numbers and have brought important successes. They show, however, the problem of measuring processes, known as nuclear forensics because the analysis of traces and their interpretation requires almost criminological skill. The reliability of a positive measurement is not easy to prove and false alarms have to be reckoned with. A country which is under suspicion can therefore cast doubt on a positive result as being a mistake in measurement. When dealing with an imported installation, the origin of an incontrovertible trace can be shifted onto the previous owner. In the case of the swipe from Abala, it was actually the case that contamination by the previous owner directed suspicion onto Iran.

Clear Signs of a Nuclear Weapon Programme Should be Seen as a Breach of the NPT

A serious weakness of the NPT verification system lies in the inability to use the fabrication of nuclear weapons components that do not contain fissile material as official evidence of a violation of the treaty. This is because verification specifically refers to nuclear materials. Dual-use makes it very difficult to find clear evidence of nuclear weapon production. The already mentioned example of polonium-210 exemplifies this.

The IAEA can only use pertinent indications of a possible nuclear weapon programme as a reason to more precisely conduct permitted checks on nuclear weapon grade material. Only when there is evidence of the diversion of plutonium or highly enriched uranium may the IAEA report a breach of the NPT. Indeed, if such a circumstance should occur then no excuse would be accepted. The purpose of the diversion would not be examined. Such an examination would indeed be very difficult because of the dual-use nature. So any proved diversion of at least a significant amount of weapon-grade nuclear material is seen as a breach of Article II of the NPT. However, there are reprocessing plants in which occasionally even more than significant amounts remain unaccounted for during a material audit. The hypothesis of a possible diversion is not pronounced if this amount could be explained by the statistically possible errors in the measurement.

Forbidding Iran Specific Nuclear Activities or a Voluntary Renunciation?

It has been demanded by many sides that Iran should not be allowed to operate a uranium enrichment or reprocessing plant. It is feared that they would hide military intentions behind ostensibly civilian purposes. As well as dual-use there is another argument for such a measure. Should a purely civilian nuclear programme actually exist then it represents a considerable latent proliferation risk. A secret nuclear weapon programme could progress a long way before fissile material was to be used. As soon as the access to fissile material is used for building a bomb it becomes key that the diversion be recognised very quickly. The IAEA works with strict time specifications as targets for detection are defined by the amount of time it takes for material used for making a nuclear weapon to be processed. With directly usable material such as highly enriched uranium (with more than 20% uranium-235), not more than one month is allowed to go by before it has to be detected. Several observers would like to avoid such a time-critical situation by disallowing directly usable nuclear material from existing or being produced in Iran.

A ban on certain civilian nuclear activities would, however, contradict Article IV of the NPT, according to which Iran has an inalienable right to the procurement and use of civilian nuclear technology. Some experts see this differently. They are of the opinion that a state that has come under suspicion, and in particular has breached its Safeguards Agreement, no longer has full rights under Article IV of the NPT. Iran will not yield to this argument.

The dilemma between compliance with Article IV of the NPT and the military use of installations and material declared as being for civilian purposes could only be solved should Iran voluntary renounce civilian use. The EU–3 managed to convince Iran to at least suspend its uranium enrichment with the Teheran Joint Statement. But in the medium-term it seems futile to expect to sustain a voluntary renunciation, even if there are trade-offs as a motivation to do so.

Would an Internationalisation of Critical Installations Help?

Hope has been placed in the proposal of internationalising the operation of critical nuclear installations. Ideally, no one single country would then have physical control over the nuclear material. But already existing international cooperation for uranium enrichment, such as Eurodif or Urenco, have not achieved this. An earlier proposal by South Africa as well as the recent one by Russia envisage that Iran would participate in uranium enrichment without carrying it out on their own territory. Russia proposed in November 2005 that Iran could continue to carry out conversion of UF₆ in the country, but would transport the gas to Russia, where it would be enriched and processed into fuel. Iran would get a share of the profit from the sales of fuel rods.

One should not forget, however, that Iran has already had a negative experience with a similar enterprise. Iran entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement with France and bought into the European uranium enrichment consortium Eurodif as a partner. With this, Iran purchased the right to 250–300 tonnes of 3% enriched uranium. In the eighties, Iran showed no interest and did not keep up with its payment obligations under the Eurodif agreement. But when Iran wanted to receive uranium in 1991 there was a legal action with France who no longer felt bound by the contract. Since then, Iran has not gotten its financial share back from Eurodif and France has promised the US that it will not release the enriched uranium that Iran has a claim to. When France, together with other countries, now demands from Iran that it should not enrich uranium itself, one can guess how this is received in Iran.

Renunciation as an International Norm

The basic problem might be solved by introducing a global norm of renunciation. Doing without the use of critical nuclear technology has to become a general norm that all countries agree to. Refusing access to technology to a single country like Iran could no longer be seen as a breach of Article IV of the NPT, nor would one country be discriminated against.

The aim of such a norm of renunciation would be to make it impossible to have access to directly usable weapon grade nuclear material through nationally controlled civilian programmes. This would involve the following measures:

• no reprocessing and no further use of plutonium;
• no research reactors that are run on highly enriched uranium;
• the stockpiles of unirradiated plutonium would be burnt in suitable reactors;
• uranium enrichment would be limited to internationalised plants;
• excess stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium would be stored behind several barriers so that access is made as difficult as possible.

These measures have been proposed on earlier occasions, such as in the concept for a Comprehensive Cutoff Convention[7] and in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention.[8]

The aspect of non-discrimination by the NPT could be better implemented if the nuclear weapons states were to fulfil their obligation under Article VI and disarm.

Conclusions

There is no evidence for the existence of a nuclear weapon programme in Iran. However, Iran did breach its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement as well as under NPT Article III before October 2003 and conducted numerous suspicious activities without reporting them or allowing them to be monitored. All nuclear material and installations that have been found in Iran are now monitored by IAEA inspectors. A cause for concern is the possibility of further or new secret nuclear activities in Iran and that these might serve a military purpose. This concern is gaining in importance because the IAEA has learnt that it cannot detect most of the undeclared activities without assistance from outside. Thus efforts have been intensified to improve the capabilities to detect secret nuclear activities through using new measurement techniques.

Iran has an unalienable right under Article IV of the NPT to the procurement and operation of civilian nuclear technology. This brings with it the problem of the dual-use of nuclear technology. It acts problematically in more than one way:

• It enables military intentions to be camouflaged by a civil programme.
• It makes it extremely difficult or even impossible to recognise whether indications that are found are in fact evidence of military intentions.
• It induces fear of civilian programmes in which a latent risk of proliferation is slumbering.
• It causes irreconcilable positions that, together with the NPT deal (guarantee of civilian nuclear technology as a trade-off for the renunciation of nuclear weapons) could lead to an escalation that threatens peace.

The only solution that goes further than the current damage limitation attempts is to create a global norm of non-availability of nuclear weapon grade material and to fully implement the norm of a nuclear weapon free world.

Translated from German by Xanthe Hall.

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1.  Full text of Article IV of the NPT:
   • “(1) Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

   •  

   • (2) All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”
2.  The separation of 0.2 milligram plutonium is not considered here as materials production. Instead it is seen as a research activity into the possible production of plutonium. However, this path to weapons-usable fissile material was ended in 1992.
3.  The Safeguards Agreement has been signed by the IAEA and Iran on May 15, 1974. The IAEA concluded similar agreements, which are used to prevent any diversion of nuclear weapons usable materials from civil nuclear programs, with a majority of all countries.
4.  The Additional Protocol has been introduced by the IAEA in 1998 to further strengthen the safeguards measures and is meant for countries who have previously entered into a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Usually, the Additional Protocol enters into force once it has been ratified by the country.
5.  A target is material that is exposed to radiation in order to provoke a nuclear transformation inside the material.
6.  What is meant here is a further discrimination in the field of nuclear safeguards regarding access to civilian nuclear technology. The NPT contains, however, a fundamental discrimination between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.
7.  See Martin B. Kalinowski, Outline of a Comprehensive Cut-Off Convention, in: Martin B. Kalinowski (ed.), Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2000.
8.  See Merav Datan, Alyn Ware, Martin Kalinowski, Jürgen Scheffran, Victor Seidel, John Burroughs, Security and Survival. The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, published by IPPNW/IALANA/INESAP, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999.