Spreading the Nuclear Disease

The Revival of “Atoms for Peace”

Xanthe Hall

The idea of nuclear proliferation is very alarming to most people. They envisage nuclear weapons in the hands of unstable countries or even terrorists. What does not seem to worry many people, however, is the enlarged interest worldwide in acquiring nuclear technology under the premise of using it “peacefully.” Only in the cases of Iran and North Korea are there any large public expression of concern that they may have other, less peaceful, intentions with their nuclear programmes.

In fact, almost all of the states that have or have had an illicit nuclear weapons programme hid it behind a programme for nuclear energy or research. They frequently received help from nuclear weapons states or from members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)[1] to get the technology and use it to produce their own material for nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) explicitly provides for help to set up a civilian nuclear programme and requires only that the country agrees to certain controls from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that are regulated by so-called Safeguards Agreements.

“Atoms for Peace”

In the aftermath of the development of nuclear weapons, Harry Truman said in a message to the US Congress in October 1945: “The hope of civilization lies in international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb, and directing and encouraging the use of atomic energy and all future scientific information toward peaceful and humanitarian ends.”[2]

As early as 1946, there were those taking a dim view of this idea, such as the Acheson-Lilienthal Committee, mandated to present proposals for the US to submit to the United Nations.[3]They concluded that the risk of nuclear proliferation was endemic to the idea because the pursuit of atomic energy and the pursuit of atomic bombs were in large part interchangeable and that an international inspections regime based on good faith was doomed to fail: “We have concluded unanimously that there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system which relies on inspections and similar police-like methods.”[4] This is pointedly true today, where the NPT relies on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide the technical tools to safeguard its political deal: the exchange of a promise to eliminate nuclear weapons for the promise to deliver nuclear technology for civil use.

The IAEA was the brainchild of Dwight Eisenhower and his beloved US “Atoms for Peace” programme in the 1950s. Originally, his idea was that the Agency would manage a kind of uranium bank. The uranium would be supplied by reducing the nuclear weapons stockpiles, therefore decreasing the threat of nuclear war, and it would in turn be used “to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world.”[5]Eisenhower took this idea further in his famous “Atoms for Peace” speech before the United Nations in 1953 and proposed that in order to control the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear secrets should be shared for the betterment of humankind.

The global outpouring of support for Atoms for Peace – with the notable exception of the Soviet Union – was driven by a massive campaign to promote the beneficial aspects of the application of nuclear energy in the fields of medicine, agriculture and research. A media hype ensured its popularity in the US, while the idea languished in the Soviet Union, which quite rightly saw it as a propaganda tool. In fact, the idea was principally driven by US foreign policy, aiming to bind countries to the West and the idea of capitalism and to demonstrate the West’s lead in nuclear-military potential. Later, the idea was wholeheartedly embraced by the nuclear export industry, which benefited economically.

The Atoms for Peace programme was in reality a far cry from Eisenhower’s uranium bank. It became a collection of agreements on technical cooperation, backed up by a safeguards system that ultimately became the domain of the IAEA. The completion of the NPT in 1968 anchored the concept of the right of all states to the civilian use of nuclear energy, so long as they renounced nuclear weapons, under Article IV of the treaty.

The Role of the IAEA

The IAEA has a major conflict of interests. In order to continue to be funded, albeit not very well funded, it must be seen to act in the interests of its member states and to abide by its statute, which stipulates the promotion of nuclear energy. This puts them in the contradictory position of trying to explain just how dangerous the technologies and materials in the nuclear cycle are and why they need to be pedantically safeguarded, meanwhile claiming that nuclear energy can be used “peacefully” and continues to be the energy of the future.

The IAEA has 139 member states, but only 35 are on the Board of Governors. Its statute stipulates that the following rules for the make-up of the Board apply: “The outgoing Board of Governors shall designate for membership on the Board the ten members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials, and the member most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials in each of the following areas in which none of the aforesaid ten is located: North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East and South Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific, Far East.”[6]

A further 25 should ensure equitable representation from the regions. This means that “top ten” members are almost certainly from the NSG and include the five original nuclear weapons states. These are also the main funders and therefore have more weight when it comes to decisions about how IAEA proceeds when dealing with potential proliferators.

An example of this is the way that the IAEA handled the North Korean nuclear crises. North Korea claims that this was the first time that the IAEA presented a member state with photographs of installations taken by the intelligence service of another member state and made them public. Since then, this has become rather common, and suggests that IAEA’s neutrality has been eroded, especially since intelligence information is often politically motivated or even tampered with, as has been seen in the case of Iraq. In 1992, the IAEA only conducted a small number of inspections in the space of four months before declaring that they had discovered a discrepancy in the North Korean material accounts. The controversy surrounding this very small discrepancy was disproportionately large, in North Korea’s opinion, and led to the ensuing crisis and North Korea cancelling its membership in the IAEA. It is claimed that the then-chief of the IAEA inspection team was of the opinion that, if they had continued the inspections, the problem might have been clarified. But the North Koreans’ perception is that the IAEA Secretariat was in a rush to reach a conclusion about compliance in order to satisfy certain states.

Whether these claims are in fact correct or not is not examined here. The point is that the perception by certain states is that the IAEA looks for and discovers discrepancies more often when directed to do so, whether through denunciation by exile groups or intelligence information from states that have their own political agenda. Abuse of the Agency can not be ruled out, and similarly to the UN Security Council, the power of the nuclear weapons states or the NSG to push their own agendas is evident. Apart from not wanting Iran or North Korea to acquire the nuclear option by developing a fuel cycle, these states want to secure the ability to continue exporting their product – nuclear power – without the accusation of adding to proliferation. Also with a move away from the dependence on oil that gives the Middle East too much power for the taste of the US, the battle for control over nuclear technologies must be won.

Controls and Safeguards

The NSG is a group of 45 mainly industrial countries that have set themselves the goal of developing guidelines for nuclear export controls. Another group that is even more exclusive is the “Zangger Committee”, a club of 35 states that is trying to standardise the export controls for all NPT members. This committee has developed a “trigger list” of countries that are not allowed to receive any exports until they have signed and ratified the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement,[7] which strengthens the safeguards system, by allowing further measures, such as intrusive inspections and on-site sampling.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said in 2004 that “even a verification system making use of the authority under the additional protocol may not reliably detect low levels of clandestine nuclear activity (…) Our recent experience has also taught us a clear lesson regarding the accessibility of nuclear technology. The technical barriers to mastering the essential steps of uranium enrichment – and to designing weapons – have eroded over time, which inevitably leads to the conclusion that the control of technology, in and of itself, is not an adequate barrier against further proliferation.” [8]

He argues that the only way to shore up this verification system is through an effective system of export controls and intelligence information, both of which are influenced by political expediency. He continues to insist, however, that nuclear energy benefits mankind.

An inquiry in 1996 in the United Kingdom into arms trading with Iraq showed that this contradiction between the promotion of nuclear energy and trying to prevent nuclear proliferation is reproduced by governments all over the world. While departments in the Foreign Ministry work studiously on proposals to prevent nuclear proliferation, trade and industry departments are doing their utmost to sell dual-use technologies, pushed by an unrelenting commercial lobby. A good example is the case of the German Hanau mixed-oxide (MOX) plant, which Siemens wanted to sell to China. Standing next to Heinrich von Pierer, Head of Siemens, then Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder announced while visiting China in 2003 that the plant would be sold, thereby completely disregarding current export controls on nuclear goods. Incidentally, an IPPNW campaign effectively stopped this deal from going through.

Although the pace of the spread of a new technology is affected by policy decisions, by the same token, policy decisions can be driven by the availability of technology. In other words, the presence of a nuclear energy programme will always provide a state with the temptation to make nuclear weapons, should it see its security as being at risk. This is demonstrated by a letter from a top Israeli nuclear physicist to the Israeli Defence Ministry, who said:

“I do not think that there is anyone among the responsible individuals in the United States who would believe that a state that was in possession of a large-scale plutonium separation capacity, and which would have the objective capabilities of doing so, would not exploit its knowledge for military purposes or at least conduct experiments in that direction. For this reason it should be clear that to the extent that we would be allowed or helped in research involving plutonium separation, it would mean that we were being actively helped in nuclear weapons research.”[9]

The system of “safeguarding” that is run by the IAEA to enable the continued transfer of nuclear technology has been shown to be full of holes. The case of Iraq showed that declassified information on how to build simple nuclear weapons is widely available. The IAEA relies heavily on voluntary reporting, followed up by inspections. This has sometimes led to discoveries, such as in North Korea and Iran, that the reports do not match up to samples taken on the ground. But these are also subject to political discrimination. It has been shown that the amount of plutonium judged to be present at a given time in a reprocessing plant in France, Japan or Britain can vary by up to 30% from what can actually be measured. The IAEA asserts that the international standard is only about plus-minus 1%, but in the real case of a plant, that made MOX fuel at Tokaimura in Japan, 70 kg (enough for about 8 crude nuclear weapons) could not be accounted for. It took the IAEA two years to negotiate shutting down and cleaning out the plant, and at the end they still could not account for 10 kg.[10]

Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists explains: “For instance, the reprocessing plant the Japanese are building at Rokkasho would have an output of something like eight tons of plutonium a year. If there were a 1% uncertainty in the ability to measure the plutonium going into that plant (it is probably going to be higher than that), this value would be several hundred kilograms. This means that several hundred kilograms would have to disappear from the plant before the IAEA could say for sure that there was a diversion. There could be a diversion of many bombs worth of nuclear material without the IAEA able to say confidently that this is going on.”[11] He continued: “The Liberal Party leader in Japan this week said that if Japan desires, it has enough plutonium to use in its nuclear power plants for 3,000-4,000 nuclear weapons. This was aimed at China. The statement is true enough, but for Japan to actually make a statement like that shows the importance of maintaining stringent safeguards against diversion at Japanese nuclear facilities.”[12]

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)

US President George W. Bush is reviving the vision that Eisenhower once had. More than fifty years later, he plans a massive new investment in nuclear energy and building some 40 new reactors in the US. According to the US Department of Energy (DOE), the initiative “ is a comprehensive strategy to enable the expansion of emissions-free nuclear energy worldwide by demonstrating and deploying new technologies to recycle nuclear fuel, minimize waste, and improve our ability to keep nuclear technologies and materials out of the hands of terrorists.”[13] It promises to provide almost “limitless” energy in an “environmentally friendly manner while reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation.”[14]

Apart from the problems that arise from the use of nuclear energy for health and the environment, which are of major concern and sidestepped by the DOE, the initiative represents a kind of global takeover bid in the field of nuclear technology. It would set up a consortium of countries that would supply ‘fuel services’ to other countries. Bush already made it clear in the past that he wished to disallow certain countries the right to the high-risk technologies, such as uranium enrichment and reprocessing. It is not clear how it would be established, who would be a supplier and who would be on the demand side. India and Russia have, for instance, already been approached with the offer to join this dubious “partnership.” But what is clear is that this initiative plays into the present row over Iran’s nuclear programme and stands to profit from an outcome whereby Iran does not enrich its uranium domestically.

Some have likened this Bush initiative to the “Star Wars” vision of Ronald Reagan. The vision of nuclear energy as limitless and safe cannot be backed up by reality. All of the glossy packaging contains no actual existing technologies that can deliver these promises. Their proposed reprocessing technique is claimed by the US to be proliferation resistant,[15] because the plutonium is mixed with other transuranic elements, making it more radioactive and no longer suitable for making nuclear weapons. In fact, the radioactivity emitted is so low as to be unproblematic to one bent on stealing it, and could be used as fissile material for a weapon, say the Union of Concerned Scientists.[16]

The repercussions for the longstanding agreement enshrined in the NPT are immense. If the internationalisation of “dual-use” technologies is agreed upon, it would mean that a whole new set of rules would have to be established. GNEP proposes that the IAEA Safeguards have to be improved, while so-called safer technologies are put forward. And it would result in a strengthening of the present discrimination to be found in the treaty, which presently divides the world into nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states, by now adding “fuel cycle states” as another class of countries and excluding those on the list of states that the US and the NSG do not trust.

Business with India

There was an outcry from the international community when India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in 1998, although it was in fact known for many years that they possessed at least the option and probably also the weapons. Both countries were able to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies from other countries by illegal and legal means. It has been a commonly held position of the five original nuclear weapons states that India and Pakistan should renounce their nuclear status and become fully-fledged members of the NPT by getting rid of their nuclear weapons. Until this happens, a question mark remains over the treaty as to its effectiveness. However, India has refused to join the NPT because it maintains that the treaty is inherently discriminatory in allowing the five nuclear powers to maintain their arsenals without meaningfully pursuing the elimination of their arsenals as required under Article VI of the NPT.

Now the US and France are underlining that question mark by doing nuclear business with India. George W. Bush and the Indian Prime Minister Manohan Singh issued a joint statement[17] in July 2005 which signalled a resumption of US nuclear trade to India to develop both its civilian and military nuclear infrastructure and capabilities. Civilian nuclear assistance was stopped immediately following the Indian nuclear bomb test in 1974. On March 2, 2006, Bush and Singh signed an agreement that India would receive full cooperation from the USA to develop its failing nuclear programme and in return would separate its nuclear facilities into clear civilian and military sectors. India also agreed to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing and not to export sensitive nuclear technologies.

There are many problems with the actual content of the agreement:

The most important problem of all, however, is the precedent that this agreement sets. Pakistan is already asking for the same treatment, and although the US has refused on the grounds of its poor proliferation record, other states that have a better record, such as Israel or Brazil, will feel encouraged to apply. Those members of the NPT who have renounced nuclear weapons in order to receive this kind of cooperation with the NSG can quite rightly wonder at this sudden turn-about in world politics. Iran has experienced serious difficulties in receiving assistance in developing its nuclear programme or receiving material from suppliers, despite its membership in the NPT. They ended up having to buy from the so-called Procurement Network of A. Q. Khan, thus drawing suspicion on themselves that they were covering up a military programme (which may in fact be the case, but as yet there is no evidence for this).

The main factor in the US-India equation is the strategic alliance that the US is aiming to build in order to counter China and the fight against radical Islamic movements. The US has already built up a significant military cooperation with India. Here, once again, US interests dominate over multilateral agreements and their actions serve to strongly undermine the international non-proliferation regime as it stands.

Conclusion

The civilian and military uses of nuclear energy are so inextricably linked that ultimately the situation that was recognised by the Acheson-Lilienthal Committee in 1946 has only worsened in the last 60 years. Despite the development of new detection technologies, tightened export controls and strengthened safeguards, the world is still dependent on the good intentions of states for its security. The answer to the problem cannot therefore be found in technical solutions, and the idea of multilateral uranium centres would worsen the perception of states that they are being excluded from having independent access to nuclear energy. The only solution is the phasing out of nuclear power and the development of sustainable energy.

While on the one hand, the nuclear industry is trying to sell the myth of a return to “Atoms for Peace” as a palliative for environmental catastrophe, Iran’s argument that it wants to develop this energy resource to cover its domestic energy needs is dismissed as not being credible. The nuclear industry is trying to sell nuclear energy as economically viable, environmentally safe and proliferation resistant – none of which it is. But in order to sell the third claim, it needs to introduce a new system that directly contradicts Article IV of the NPT – the inalienable right of all parties to civilian nuclear energy. That new system, however, divides the world into another one of “haves” and “have-nots” creating further tensions that will, for certain, tear the NPT apart and could even lead to war.

  1.  Description of the NSG according to their homepage: “The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports. The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government in accordance with its national laws and practices. Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements.”; www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org .
  2.  President Harry S. Truman. Message to Congress on the Atomic Bomb, Washington, DC, October 3, 1945, www.honors.umd.edu/ HONR269J/archive/Truman451003.html.
  3.  The Acheson-Lilienthal Report. Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, 16 March 1946. Committee members: Dean Acheson, Vannevar Bush, James Conant, Leslie Groves, John McCloy. Acheson appointed a board of consultants to work out the details of the proposals. The board was chaired by David Lilienthal, later to become first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and included Robert Oppenheimer, former scientific director of the Manhattan Project.
  4.  Ibid.
  5.  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Atoms for Peace, address before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City, December 8, 1953, www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atoms.htm .
  6.  Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency; www.iaea.org/statute-text.html .
  7.  List of states that have signed and ratified the Additional Protocol at www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html .
  8.  Mohamed ElBaradei, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Global Security in a Rapidly Changing World, Statement at a Conference of Carnegie International on nuclear non-proliferation, 21 June 2004; www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n004.html .
  9.  Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998.
  10.  Paul Leventhal, Safeguards Shortcomings – a Critique, Nuclear Control Institute, September 1994.
  11.  Ed Lyman, Role of nuclear material accounting and control in the NPT, April 9, 2002, IEER Conference, New York; www.ieer.org/latest/npt02el.html .
  12.  Ibid.
  13.  Unites States Department of Energy Office of Public Affairs, Department of Energy Announces New Nuclear Initiative, media advisory, February 6, 2006; www.doe.gov/news/3161.htm .
  14.  Ibid.
  15.  UREX+1a as opposed to the PUREX process that others use.
  16.  Ed Lyman, Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Reactors. U.A. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Initiative; www.ucsusa.org.
  17.  Text of the India-U.S. Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, at www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/July/21.htm.