Missile Defence as a Step Toward War in Space
David Webb
The use of space by the world’s military is now well established and has become indispensable for the United States. During “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” US satellite information allowed a military response in minutes rather than the hours or days it had taken previously. In a typical battle situation, the US military now relies on space-based weather prediction systems (the Defence Meteorological Support Program), military communications satellites (MILSTAR – to communicate from command centres and between troops), espionage and surveillance satellites (to intercept communications by an adversary and collect images of troop movements and weapons placements), early warning satellites (to provide information on missile launches) and military Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to allow troops and vehicles to navigate and to quickly and accurately specify targets and guide “smart” bombs and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
The US deployed 6,600 GPS-guided munitions and over 100,000 Precision Lightweight GPS Receivers in the Iraq War.[1]1 The U.S. military was using ten times the satellite capacity that it used in the Gulf War of 1991. Nine days before the start of the war, a new US Defense Satellite Communications System was installed to interconnect U.S. military forces on land, sea, and air with the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department and U.S. Strategic Command. Over 100 military satellites supported the U.S. and U.K. war effort including 27 GPS satellites and around 24 communications satellites for command and control and to give warning of missile attack. There were also weather forecasting, TV and other space systems in operation and Director of Space Operations, Maj. Gen. Judd Blaisdel, estimated that 33,600 people at 36 sites around the world were involved in space-war activities.[2]
Of course, the US is not alone in its use of space for military purposes. Russia has a number of military satellite programmes with five types of short-lifetime imaging reconnaissance satellite which can be launched for topographic and mapping information and two series of electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites. There are also four types of Russian dedicated military communications satellites, with some 24 being launched since 1997 (although not all are still functioning).[3] Russia also has a number of navigation satellites and a dual-use Global National Satellite System (Glonass) similar to GPS.[4] The Russian armed forces are to be fitted with Glonass receivers next year.[5] There are also Russian ballistic missile early warning and space monitoring systems.
The military use of space is rapidly proliferating. China has launched a number of military satellites; India has imaging and communication satellites suitable for military use; and Israel has military satellites, has plans for new communications, imaging, and radar satellites, and is considering a system that would allow launch-ondemand of small satellites from fighter aircraft.[6] Other countries such as Brazil, Pakistan, and Ukraine have military space capability or potential[7]; Australia has a dual use military-commercial communications satellite;[8] while in Europe, the UK, France, and Italy make extensive use of military satellites for imaging and communications and the European Space Agency (ESA),[9] set up to be an entirely independent organisation, is slowly becoming politicised (with increasing control from the European Commission)[10] and militarised through its Galileo GPS system.[11]
Anti-Satellite Programmes
This reliance on space for command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) has one serious disadvantage: space-based satellite systems are extremely vulnerable to attack from anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. Shortly before his appointment as Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld chaired the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization,[12] which concluded in January 2001 that the likelihood of an attack on U.S. space systems needed to be taken seriously to prevent a future “space Pearl Harbor.”
In fact, the first actual attack on any military satellite system occurred in 2003 when the Iraqi military unsuccessfully attempted to jam the US Global Positioning System.[13] US Air Force Secretary James Roche commented that this attempt to disrupt GPS-guided weapons demonstrated the world’s understanding of the importance of space to the U.S. military. Interestingly, the US Air Force itself deployed a number of reversible jamming, or Counter Communications, systems in autumn 2004.[14] However, a more threatening scenario is the possibility of the deployment of actual weapons systems against satellites.
Since the beginning of the space age, Russia and the US have both openly worked on several anti-satellite projects. Initial efforts in the 1950s consisted of well known air-launched missile technology but more sophisticated systems have been developed over the ensuing years.
The Soviet Union and Russia
In the 1960s, the Soviet Union surrounded Moscow with nuclear-tipped inter-continental ballistic missiles to act as an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system. These missiles would also have ASAT capabilities as they would be able to destroy all space-based systems in the vicinity of their detonation. However, the main ASAT system developed by the Soviet Union was the “Co-orbital ASAT” – a kamikaze satellite packed with explosives. Development on the Istrebitel Sputnikov (fighter satellites) began in the early 1960s, and the first test flights were made in 1968. The ASAT was to be placed in an orbit close to that of its target and would move in to destroy it within one or two orbits. Initial tests made from 1963-1972 indicated that the system could work from altitudes from 230 to 1,000 kilometres, and the system was declared operational.
The Soviets temporarily ceased testing the system after signing the ABM Treaty in 1972, but resumed again in 1976 and continued until 1982. During this time the effective range of the system was reportedly extended to altitudes from 160 to 1,600 km.[15] In 1983, the Soviet Union declared a moratorium on launching ASATs, on the condition that no other country deployed, and Russia seems to have continued to observe this policy.[16] Jane’s 2001-2002 Space Directory describes the Russian ASAT program as “inactive.”
United States
The US began tests in 1959, but results were not encouraging and the project was stopped in 1963 although related US Navy projects did continue into the early 1970s. In the 1960s, the destruction of satellites by the use of nuclear explosions was considered. A 1.4 Megaton high altitude nuclear test explosion that was detonated 400 km over the Pacific in 1958 did damage three satellites. However, the potential damage to untargeted areas and systems through radiation and the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) meant that no actual ASAT tests of this type were carried out although the nuclear carrying Nike Zeus was adapted for ASAT use from 1962. A single, nuclear-tipped ASAT missile was deployed at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific until 1966 under so-called Project 505, code-named ‘Mudflap’[17] and was then replaced by the USAF Thor ASAT until 1972.
The resumption of USSR ASAT tests in 1976 could have been the result of reports of a renewed US interest in anti-satellite technology and the development of the US Space Shuttle programme (with was considered to have an ASAT capability). The U.S. was itself concerned with exaggerated reports of Soviet laser and particle beam ASAT/ABM technology and revived its ASAT programme with the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV), which was fired from an F-15 aircraft and was designed to attack Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. The US carried out five tests from 1984-1986 and actually tested the system against a satellite in September 1985.[18] However, considerable cost increases for further development led to the program being cancelled in 1988. In the same year, the US Congress voted against extending a unilateral ban on ASATs and development started on new ASAT systems.
Under President Reagan’s 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), ASAT projects were adapted for ABM use and vice versa. Initially the plan was to use the MHV as a basis for a collection of about 40 space platforms containing up to 1,500 kinetic interceptors. By 1988 the project had evolved into a four stage development. The first stage was the “brilliant pebbles” system consisting of a number of single kinetic interceptors with their associated tracking systems. The second stage would deploy larger platforms, and the following phases were to include laser weapons and later and charged particle beam weapons. Plans were to complete the whole thing by 2000 at a cost of around US$ 125 billion.
The only successful energy weapon to come from SDI was the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL).[19] It can produce a megawatt of output for around 70 seconds and was developed mainly in response to intelligence that the Soviet Union had created a similar system. However, after an official US visit to the Soviet Union in 1989 discovered that the Soviet system was no threat, Congress banned the use of MIRACL in 1991. The development of the U.S. Army ground-based kinetic energy ASAT (KE-ASAT) system was also banned in 1993, but was resurrected in 1996 with US$ 45 million of funding which continued until 2002.
In 1996, the ban on using the MIRACL ended and the following year the system was tested by firing at a USAF satellite 420 km above the Earth – supposedly to see if U.S. satellites could withstand a laser attack. Currently, the KE-ASAT needs more funding and testing before it could become operational. The ALMV has not been tested and there appears to be little interest in reviving the system at the moment. The MIRACL laser is being further developed with Israel but it has not been tested since 1997, and its full capabilities are not known.
China
China does not have a publicly declared ASAT program although its existing launch capabilities could be used as a basis for the development of such a system.[20] A program to field a viable ASAT system consisting of a kinetic kill vehicle, high powered laser, space early warning, and target discrimination system components was abandoned in 1980. Preliminary research on ASATs has been carried out since then, partly funded under a Program for High Technology Development.[21]
In 2003 and 2004, the annual reports to the US Congress on Chinese Military Power quoted an article from a Hong Kong newspaper that reported China as having developed and tested a “parasitic micro satellite” ASAT system. However, this information seems to have originated from an item posted in 2000 on an unreliable internet bulletin board service run by a self-described “military enthusiast”.
Current US Developments
The U.S. has recently shown an increase in funding and support for ASAT and related programmes. In 2004 the Pentagon received US$ 168.6 million for the development of space weapons technology and over US$ 2 billion for weapons related programmes.[22] In August 2004, the USAF released a document entitled Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1,[23] which details, for the first time, US antis-atellite and space weapons operations. The Foreword by Gen John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff, states that “U.S. Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority. Space superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack ...Space and air superiority are crucial first steps in any military operation.” The document discusses air-launched missiles, direct-ascent ASATs, and on-orbit ASATs as possible mechanisms for destroying satellites.
The budget request for space weapons-related programmes for 2005 totalled nearly US$ 3.5 billion.[24] However, the appropriations committees knocked off nearly US$ 1 billion[25]. The Congressional appropriators also directed the Force Application and Launch from the Continental U.S. (FALCON) program[26] not to engage in any “weapons-related work” during fiscal year 2005 and cut funding for the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) by half to US$ 12.5 million (any effort to put weapons on the CAV or test launch it on a ballistic missile was also forbidden). Other space programs suffered funding cuts from appropriators including the Space-Based Radar (SBR), Transformational SATCOM (T-SAT), and Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System (CSRS) programs.
An recent article in Aerospace Daily & Defense Report[27] quotes a scientist at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) as saying that these cuts are: “largely due to the concern over the proper use of force in space and the vocal anti-space weapons community.” Peter Huessy of the National Defense University Foundation was also quoted as saying that the anti-space weapons lobby has been effective in part because of its significant financial backing. The lobby is “being led, unfortunately, by not just the traditional arms control community, but about $100 million a year from foundations,” according to Huessy. “And that kind of money is so far and beyond anything being spent by the proponents.”
Of course, this is probably just an argument for more funding for lobbying and no doubt that will happen but it appears that the activities of NGOs such as the Center for Defense Information (CDI),[28] the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Monterey Institute of International Studies (CNS/MIIS),[29] assisted by grassroots campaigners such as the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space,[30] may have been effective.
Another project to come up against a funding hitch is the controversial Near Field InfraRed Experiment (NFIRE) of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), whose primary role is to gather data to help differentiate between the rocket and its exhaust plume. The proposal was to launch a platform termed a “kill vehicle” to closely encounter a target missile with an obvious capability to disable or destroy targeted missiles or orbiting satellites. The NFIRE was originally to be launched from a Minotaur missile in summer 2004, but the MDA announced in March that there would be a year-long delay apparently due to having received only US$ 44.5 million of the requested US$ 82 million of funding in 2004. Then, in July 2004, the Congressional appropriators cut all the $68 million requested for NFIRE, although the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended that the program should be preserved. It is now scheduled for launch late 2005 or early 2006[31] and it was reported in Space News in August 2004 that the controversial sensor (i.e. the “kill vehicle”) would be removed from the program. The report stated that “U.S. Rep. Loretta Sanchez, DCalif., championed the effort to persuade Pentagon officials to consider restructuring the NFIRE program to exclude the kill vehicle. ‘My biggest concern,’ Sanchez said last week, ‘was what message we might send to other nations.’”[32]
One other growth area with a clear ASAT capability is the ongoing development and testing of US microsatellite (MS) prototypes, including a XSS-10 MS to manoeuvre around and photograph space objects.[33]
Much of the current US development of space-based technology and weaponry (including space based interceptors[34] and airborne and space-based lasers) is taking place under the missile defence umbrella. As David Wright and Laura George from the Union of Concerned Scientists have stated:
“… current US ASAT capability is fairly limited and, based on current funding levels, dedicated ASAT systems appear not to be high priorities. Some of the planned missile defence systems, on the other hand, would add significant ASAT capability to the US arsenal and have strong political and financial support. This fact should be kept in mind when analysing US capabilities and developing policies relevant to restricting ASATs.”[35]
It seems clear then that projects that are overtly developing anti-satellite or space weapons systems are having some difficulties obtaining funds. However, there are other ways of obtaining large sums of money for very similar space-based programmes under the guise of a system to defend against missile attack from terrorists or “rogue states.”
The Missile Defence Route?
The development of improved space tracking facilities on the ground (such as the upgrading of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning radars at Fylingdales and Thule and the development of the X-band radar) and in space (such as the Space-Based Infrared System, SBIRS) is integral to missile defence but could also be useful for ASAT capabilities. Interceptor missiles for the Ground-Based Midcourse Defence element of missile defence, designed to hit and intercept incoming missiles, could also be deployed against LEO satellites[36].
The Air-Borne Laser (ABL) – currently under development and being tested – is capable of both intercepting missiles and destroying, or at least blinding, satellites.[37] Although the Space-Based Laser (SBL) programme has been more or less cancelled, the idea of a powerful landbased laser using a space based mirror system has been proposed to act as a missile defence and/or space weapon.
Although US missile defence is sold to the American people and the world as a defence against limited missile attack from a “rogue state” or terrorists, it can also be seen as a proving ground for certain space weapon components. Add to this the fact that the U.S. has consistently blocked moves to create a treaty for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)[38] while removing itself form the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and we might come to see a reason why the U.S. military has been so energetic in developing a missile defence system that has been widely criticised as being vastly expensive, plagued by delays and failure, and unlikely to work effectively. It may be difficult to convince the people of the U.S. (and of the world) that space weapons are necessary, but it may be easier to generate a fear of attack from terrorists or states that operate under different and unfamiliar regimes and so justify the development of space weapons technologies that way.
Now more than ever the world needs to determine a way of preventing the further militarisation of space and its ultimate weaponisation and the allies must apply pressure to the U.S. to abandon missile defence and take PAROS negotiations seriously.
