Japan’s Policy on Missile Defense Deployment
Keiko Nakamura
On December 19, 2003, the government of Japan (GoJ) officially announced its plans to acquire and deploy U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) systems and to achieve initial operational capability for both systems. For many people, this was rather a surprise: since the beginning of the Japan-U.S. cooperative research program on missile defense (MD) initiated merely five years before this announcement, the GoJ had repeatedly emphasized that technical research meant neither development nor deployment of the MD system in the country.
The government was unable to sufficiently explain the reasons for its decision to make a single big leap from “research only” to actual deployment of the MD system. In fact, substantial debates on this matter have not taken place in the Japanese parliament (Diet), and there was no public participation in the consultation or decision-making process worthy of mention. While most citizens have no clue whether the polity changes of the GoJ are appropriate, the deployment of MD systems in Japan has become a fait accompli. The Japanese MD decision even lead to certain fatal transformations in fundamental Japanese national defense policies within a relatively short period of time.
Graphic from Japan’s Defense White Paper
U.S.-Japan Joint Research
In December 1998, the Japan Security Council approved to undertake a cooperative research program on seabased missile defense with the United States. In the following year, on August 16, the two countries signed a pact to pursue joint research on MD technology. Exchanging a memorandum of understanding (MoU), they formally agreed to conduct research on four SM-3 components to be developed for the Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD, now renamed as Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense), an upper tier sea-based system of theater missile defense (TMD). The four components being developed with the purpose of improving the performance of SM-3 consist of the following:
lightweight nose cone for the interceptor missile to protect it from air friction;
stage-two rocket engine located in the middle of the three-stage missile;
advanced kinetic warhead designed to destroy target missiles by direct impact; and
two-color infrared sensor to identify and track the target using infrared rays.
It should be noted that the aforementioned MoU has not been made available to the public; thus, the whole picture of the Japan-U.S. pact on missile defense has yet to be revealed. What actually triggered the decision was a missile test in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the year before the agreement. In August 1998, the DPRK launched a Taepodong-1, a mediumrange missile, whose third stage flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean. Despite previous concerns about the missile threat in the region, this particular test firing ignited grave concern in the Japanese public, highlighting the country’s perceived vulnerability to ballistic missile attacks. Subsequently, instigated by sensational media reports accentuating the DPRK threat, national sentiments against the missile threat have grown and pushed the MD issue to the center of a policy debate in the political scene in Japan.
Since the launch of the joint program, however, the GoJ has trodden warily with any reference to a possible transition from research toward the development/deployment phases. Governmental officials repeatedly emphasized that there is a clear-cut line between “research” and the two other phases, and the move forward from “research” would be decided on separately after extensive considerations on the “technical feasibility” and “modalities for the future defense of Japan.” It is also true that, as early as 2002, Shigeru Ishiba, Japan’s former Defense Agency Director-General, was quoted with a remark on his belief that Japan should pursue the project with a view to advancing to the development and deployment stages. Nonetheless, the then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda immediately rebuffed Ishiba’s remark, saying “What Japan’s defense posture ought to be like will be decided after due consideration.”[1]
Introduction of the U.S. Missile Defense System
While the Japan-U.S. joint research framework was still ongoing, on December 19, 2003, the GoJ declared its decision to additionally purchase U.S.-developed MD systems so that Japan can field its own initial missile defense. This move was extremely questionable. As mentioned earlier, the GoJ, which had maintained strong reservations about moving on to further project states, leaped toward “procurement/deployment” in one big step, thus effectively preventing any initiatives to inhibit the government from making such a move.
Projected to be deployed from 2007, the planned system is a multilayered missile defense with an estimated cost of ¥ 1 trillion (ca. US$ 9,3 billion). It comprises the following two components: the first involves Japan’s acquisition of SM-3 missiles that can be fired from Japan’s four Aegis destroyers to defend against short- and medium-range missiles in the mid-course flight trajectory phase. The second consists of ground-to-air PAC-3 missiles. In addition, the Japanese plan involves some improvement of battle management, command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities of both of the sea- and ground-based MD systems, including the introduction of landbased FPS-XX radar systems, which can advance early warning capabilities. In FY 2004, approx. ¥ 106.8 billion (almost US$ 1 billion) of the Japanese defense budget are allocated to missile defense.
U.S. Pressure
The Japanese administration justifies the introduction of the U.S.-made MD systems by emphasizing the systems’ technical reliability, its suitability for Japan’s “purely defensive” posture, as well as the outstanding cost-effectiveness because an existing system already utilized by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces would be integrated into the new system.[2]
It seems that the Japanese decision was taken under considerable pressure from the U.S. government. Since the administration of George W. Bush announced in December 2002 that it would field a rudimentary MD system, the U.S. has been pressing Japan to make an early decision on MD on a number of occasions. For example, in June 2003, U.S. missile defense chief Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish told Shigeru Ishiba that the U.S. government wanted to secure closer cooperation from Japan on its planned MD shield and that the U.S. combination of an Aegis ship-based interception system and the Patriot groundto- air system would be useful to Japan. It is fair to conclude that the GoJ’s decision on introducing the USmade MD system is not based on the system’s necessity and effectiveness for Japan’s national defense, but that political decision was taken under the U.S. pressure.
Test Flights Planned
Against this backdrop, the Japan-U.S. joint research scheme has proceeded unrestrained with no further checks and balances in sight. The two governments agreed to conduct two joint tests of SM-3 missiles in September 2005 and February 2006, using the lightweight nose cone provided by Japan. The tests, which are to be launched from an Aegis destroyer off Hawaii, are supposed to involve the interception of a target missile. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the FY 2004 budget for the preparation for these two tests amounted to approximately US $54 million. Reportedly, the Defense Agency of Japan intends to cover part of these cost, ca. ¥ 20 billion (ca. US$ 185 million), which exceeds the total amount of ¥ 15 billion for the past five-year joint research program. Although Japan’s entire budget allocated to the joint research, which includes the flight tests, has not yet been officially announced, it is fair to assume that the amount has been drastically increased.
While SM-3, as is explained earlier, would be deployed to intercept incoming missiles during their midcourse phase, it is reported that the U.S. Department of Defense seeks to improve its capability to also counter strategic ballistic missiles, possibly in the boost phase.[3] It is thought that the U.S. government intends to use Japanese technology to develop missiles with a longer range and better interception capabilities, which is would be contrary to Japan’s official posture – collective defense is prohibited under the Japanese Constitution.
Moreover, in addition to the aforementioned purchase of four SM-3 packages, an extension of research under the cooperative research scheme is an issue. Since 2004, some remarks by both Japanese and U.S. officials about the possibility that the two countries conduct joint research to develop an Airborne Laser (ABL) were reported. The ABL, still severely behind the Department of Defense’s original development schedule, is also expected to have the capability to intercept strategic ballistic missile and to be eventually improved to shoot down all ranges of ballistic missiles in their boost phase. It is needless to mention that Japanese participation in the joint ABL research will put the country’s “defensive defense policy” at risk.
Easing the Export Ban
In line with the ever-expanding joint research program, the GoJ has “successfully” paved the way to move on toward development/deployment by easing its long-standing ban on arms exports. On December 10, 2004, the very day when the Japanese Cabinet adopted new defense guidelines which affirm much closer defense cooperation with the United States, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda stated that Japan would allow exceptions to its arms export ban for exports to the U.S., enabling the country to sell MD-related products jointly developed with the U.S.
For decades, Japan had maintained a policy that prevents the nation from engaging in joint development and production of weapons with any foreign country. This was based export of weapons,” which were originally set to ban exports of weapons to the communist bloc, nations under U.N. embargo, and countries involved in, or on the verge of being involved in, conflicts. In 1976, more restrictions were added, and, since then, the government had effectively banned exports of weapons to all countries. The GoJ decided in 1983 to allow technological transfers to the U.S. as an exception of the ban. However, the U.S.-Japan joint research on MD was actually confined within the framework set by the ban, and the GoJ had repeatedly asserted this point.
The GoJ viewed the export ban as an obvious hindrance in advancing joint research scheme to any further phases, because, under the three principles, it was permitted only to transfer the technology to the U.S., and export of components was regarded as an apparent violation. Not to mention strong pressure from the U.S., some Japanese governmental officials, as well as the defense industry participating in the joint research program, had repeatedly pushed the administration to review the export ban. Actually, the decision to ease the ban chiefly stems from a report submitted by Prime Minister Koizumi’s advisory Council on Security and Defense Capabilities that recommended conducting a review of the ban. In addition, within the Japanese Defense Agency and the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), there had been increasing voices to call on a more drastic review of the ban in order to enable joint production of weapons with other nations as well.
Japan-U.S. Joint Scheme Moving into a New Phase
Japan’s decision to relax its export ban led to a new MD agreement between the two countries. On December 14, 2004, less than a week after the release of the new defense guidelines and Chief Cabinet Secretary’s announcement, Japan and the U.S. signed a pact allowing “comprehensive cooperation” on smother transfers of MD-related technologies. Then, on December 17, 2004, a MoU was exchanged between Japan’s Defense Agency Director-General Yoshinori Ono and U.S. Ambassador Howard Baker which specifies the details of this agreement. According to Director-General Ono’s remarks to the press and an outline of the MoU released by the Defense Agency, the MoU includes operational arrangements regarding information- and cost-sharing on MD by the two countries, as well as the creation of a high-level panel to handle bilateral coordination. Ono said that an annex to the MoU would be drawn up for further cooperation on development and production details. Ono stated clearly that the Japan-U.S. joint research would move on to joint production, and indicated the possibility that two schemes – deployment of U.S.-made MD systems and the joint development/production of another system – would be merged into one overall scheme, saying that “This is the demand of the times.”[4]
A closer alliance between Japan and the U.S. on MD, with a view on moving toward joint development/production stages, was reaffirmed at the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the so-called two-plus-two, held in Washington D.C. on February 19, 2005. A joint statement by the defense and foreign ministers of the two countries appreciates two “achievements” in MD cooperation, namely Japan’s decision to introduce MD systems and its easing of the export ban. The statement says “the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.-Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.”[5]
As mentioned earlier, substantial debates on the propriety of missile defense itself are entirely missing in the Japan’s political scene. Whereas there have been growing voices from experts to question the effectiveness of the missile interception capability, the GoJ has consistently stated that the establishment of a MD system is the sole, irreplaceable defense measure to protect Japanese citizens from incoming ballistic missile attacks, as well as contributing to the maintenance of regional security. Indeed, on December 15, 2004, the day after the Japan-U.S. pact was signed, U.S. Missile Defense Agency announced that its flight test of the ground-based mid-course missile defense system ended in failure, indicating another setback of the U.S. MD plan. Although critics speak elsewhere on the (lack of) technical feasibility of the MD system, little debate took place in the Diet. After the U.S. attempted the second test and failed on February 14, 2005, a Japanese government official reportedly said that the failure would not affect the Japanese plan, because the system Japan planed to introduce is “different” from the one the U.S. just tested.[6]
Regional Security Concerns
The advancement of the joint research program, introduction of the U.S.-made MD systems, and the subsequent relaxation of the long-lasting export ban have been criticized, in particular, by non-governmental organizations and other experts, both at domestic and international levels. Chief issues include legal matters related to Japan’s inability to participate in collective defense, the MD system’s ineffectiveness and extraordinary cost burden for the taxpayers, and security concerns raised by neighboring countries. In particular, the negative impact upon peace and security in Northeast Asia, as well as in the rest of the world, is indeed a grave concern. The GoJ emphasizes that the MD system will be strictly used for defensive purposes and should not be regarded as a threat to neighboring countries; however, there have been growing voices from other nations in the region criticizing the Japanese pursuit of an MD plan, as this implies much closer integration into U.S. strategic policy. China, for example, has been vocal about its opposition to Japan’s MD program. Moreover, many experts warn that the Japanese MD deployment of could provoke the DPRK to bolster its missile capabilities, thus igniting new arms races in the region. It should be recalled that Japan, with its military alliance with the U.S., has already long posed an overwhelming military threat to the region. Therefore, adding its own missile defense capability could never be viewed as solely defensive.
Undermining its bygone diplomatic efforts in the field of confidence building in Northeast Asia, the GoJ is about to make a fatal mistake, retrogressing the peace and security of the region. If Japan wishes to stick to its fundamental policy of a “defensive defense” posture, the government should, instead of pursuing a missile defense plan, take a concrete step to initiate and develop cooperative security frameworks in this region.
