An Inappropriate Basis for Decision on MEADS
Bernd W. Kubbig
MEADS elements. Source: Hagena & Partners GmbH
Editor’s comment: The following article was written in February 2005. Since then, the author’s activities resulted in major public discussions and a host of questions being raised on the issue. The parliamentary decisionmaking has as a consequence been postponed to April, and the time limit set in the US-Italian Memorandum of Understanding has been extended by one months – it seems that the third proposal in this paper has been taken seriously by the political decisionmakers.
The German Government intends to participate in the missile defense system MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System), which is designed to ward off airplanes, helicopters, cruise missiles as well as tactical ballistic missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km. The role of MEADS is to protect soldiers on international operations as well as to defend German territory.
When used in combination with the improved Patriot missile and about 300 of the newest Patriot (PAC-3) systems yet to be purchased, the Bundeswehr (German armed forces) is confident of its ability to meet all current and future security challenges and remedy existing shortcomings. According to current plans, these two systems will become the core elements of German groundbased extended air defense after 2012.
The Budgetary Committee (Haushaltsausschuss) of the Bundestag (German parliament) will deal with MEADS in early 2005. German participation in development, procurement, and deployment of this trilateral arms project between the US, Germany, and Italy, which started in the mid-1990s, must be discussed and voted upon in parliament. The governments of Italy and the United States signed the required Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the end of September 2004 and have now begun development of the system. The German government can sign the MoU within six month if the Bundestag gives the green light by March 2005.
Thus far, MEADS has been an issue dealt with mainly in the parliamentary Defense Committee (Verteidigungsausschuss), which convenes behind closed doors. On November 10, 2003, this committee decided to establish a Rapporteur Group “Bodengebundene Luftverteidigung” (groundbased air defense). MEADS was the focus of attention in this group’s discussions, that were attended by seven parliamentarians, one civil officer, and five air force officers from the German Ministry of Defense. The MoD officials drafted a Working Paper which was then turned into a virtually identical Final Report issued by the seven parliamentarians. They thereby accepted the Working Paper unanimously almost word for word. The Rapporteur Group consequently advised the Defense Committee on October 19, 2004, that Germany should participate in the MEADS program, including development and deployment. The committee in turn passed the Final Report unanimously on November 10, 2004.
Both documents estimate the German share in development to be in the order of US$ 1 billion (995 million). However, there is no publicly accessible data available on the number of systems to be obtained or the unit prices. Neither the Working Paper nor the Final Report contain any relevant information. Depending on the method of assessment and the system scope, MEADS can easily turn out to be a two-digit billion uro project.
The defense ministry’s Working Paper and the Final Report by the seven members of parliament, respectively, present the military arguments in favour of this tri-national arms project. This report analyzes the arguments outlined in those documents and in the light of the inaccuracies and inconsistencies revealed, the claims that cannot be sustained, and the lack of transparency shown reaches the following conclusions: The Working Paper/Final Report are insufficient and inadequate as a basis for reaching a decision in the upcoming debates and votes in the Bundestag. Taken as a whole, both, the paper and the report, urgently require greater precision, more information, and further clarification.
Nine Concerns
The nine central points of concern are summarized below:
Inadequate instrument for risk/threat assessment (2.1). As to their military assessment, the central terms “risk” and “(potential) threat” are used synonymously in both documents. The effect of drawing a distinction between threats and risks makes a remarkable difference to any adequate threat assessment, as this distinction considerably reduces the number of states which represent a potential missile danger to Germany.
Inconsistent argumentation for the military necessity of this arms project (2.2). MEADS is designed to repel missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km. However, both documents identify missiles with a range of over 1,000 km as the future potential threat, against which this arms project would not be able to offer protection.
Unclear and for the most part unconvincing military goals for MEADS (2.3). Both documents stress the importance of this project for the protection of soldiers. At the same time, they give the impression that this system can also be used against terrorist attacks, which are usually carried out without early warning. It is misleading to assume that MEADS could protect German territory against terrorism, which is the view put forward in the two documents. In this respect, both the authors from the defense ministry and the parliamentarians fall short of the goals set out in unreleased documents. These documents outline just highly selective protection of outstanding objects. Neither document addresses one of the main weaknesses in the argumentation for MEADS: within a range of 1,000 km, the range for which the system could offer protection, Germany is only surrounded by friendly countries. The effectiveness of protecting soldiers in international operations is indicated as merely “basic protection”. Neither document answers any of these urgent questions, and they do not address any of the required scenarios.
Biased description of the technical capability of MEADS, while not taking into consideration the experience with Patriot missiles during the last Iraq war (2.4). The air force officers portray the technical capability of defense systems in the terminal phase of incoming missiles as a “textbook” situation they list problems and offer solutions accordingly. The “real technicians” from the arms industry, on the other hand, present the same facts from a problem-oriented and cautiously optimistic viewpoint, and see them as extreme challenges to tactical defense systems. It is of strategic as well as of political significance for the German discussion on MEADS that both documents do not consider the results achieved by the U.S. with Patriot missiles in the last Iraq war.
Questionable character of MEADS as a role model for transatlantic cooperation projects and for the German arms industry (2.5). The assessment of this project as a European-American success story depends on the standards applied. Compromises were recently reached in negotiations between the U.S. and the European contractors.
Assessing this project in terms of the original and subsequent demands put forward by the Europeans (as the author of this report does), the result is less positive. One can hardly claim that the MEADS program is still about the common development of a joint arms project. Despite considerable European resistance, the U.S. successfully insisted on employing its PAC-3 weapon for MEADS. The United States has not even fulfilled the significantly weaker European request to grant access to PAC-3 data.
In order to have any positive effect on the German arms industry, exact quantification is required of all aspects of the development process. This is even more true with respect to the financial expenditures needed during the deployment phase and to the total national economic burden.
Unsustained claims for a multilateral arms project (2.6). MEADS has remained a tri-national project. No other NATO country seems to be interested in project participation. There can hardly be a more distinct piece of evidence of the lacking attractiveness of this arms project in military, economic, and technological terms. Such a negative result must not be ignored in parliamentary discussion.
MEADS poses problems for arms control in the context of the overall architecture of missile defense (2.7). The contradictory goals and perspectives which exist between the European and American contractors are not only evident in economic and technical terms, but also in conceptual terms. Germany regards MEADS as a system in itself. The U.S., however, views it as one component in a comprehensive “Missile Defense” configuration that also includes technically more sophisticated and, in terms of arms control, more problematic plans for a global and regional defense shield. This suggests that a follow-up program to MEADS to be used against missiles of longer range will become necessary sooner or later. That armament perspective is included in both documents.
MEADS as an unnecessary and hardly effective signal to Washington on the easing of political tension (2.8). This political argument, constructed in both documents, rests on the claim that MEADS is the only major transatlantic arms cooperation project. This claim is false, as there exist at least two other large military programs. Moreover, there are no “receivers” for such signals in Washington, as the primary U.S. objective in promoting MEADS is economic and has nothing to do with cooperation or alliance (during the Clinton Administration, this was somewhat different). From its financial dimension, MEADS is an “also-run” in the overall U.S. missile defense budget. A strong faction in the pronounced protectionist Congress advocates MEADS under U.S. conditions, not from the point of view of cooperation, but rather because of sales considerations.
Incomplete information on development and deployment costs; at the same time uncertainty, whether military demands for the protection of soldiers and territory can be met within the all edged capability, time, and cost frame (2.9). The discussion on MEADS will concentrate on these questions in the following weeks and months. The German government will have to present the relevant figures, currently not included in either document, to parliament. Moreover, it is essential for the public to be able to get a precise idea of the dimensions of the project (as in the case of the Eurofighter).
Therefore, the upcoming discussions on MEADS in the Budgetary Committee and especially in the whole Bundestag are of vital importance. As mentioned above, it is problematic that both the 17-page Working Paper presented by the defense ministry and the 18-page version passed by the seven parliamentarians are practically identical.
In view of the pending consultations in the Budgetary Committee, the analysis of the resulting costs is of utmost importance. For that reason, the serious objections on the project voiced by the Federal Accounting Office (Bundesrechnungshof) are of central concern.
Three Proposals
Against this background this report concludes with three proposals:
First proposal: The Budgetary Committee should take the concerns and recommendations from the Federal Accounting Office seriously. The Federal Accounting Office brought up a painful subject and formulated reservations and conditions. Its objections and proposals imply a need for clarification on whether the desired systems can be financed before the project enters the development stage even more so since the accounting office combines budgetary aspects with consideration of MEADS capabilities and military necessities.
Second proposal: The Budgetary Committee and parliament should thoroughly review the military argumentation put forward by the defense ministry, initiate a discussion process at the earliest possible, and increase its own analytical resources for the independent evaluation of government submissions on a mid- and long-term basis. Decisions on major arms projects require broad legitimization which is not present in the case of MEADS. Deliberations and consultations took place almost exclusively behind closed doors. It is advisable to involve the public, e.g. at an international expert hearing. Taking into account the almost identical documents, as a mid- to long-term goal parliament should expand its mechanisms for employing specialists in order to do justice to its checks and balances function.
Third proposal: Both the Budgetary Committee and the Bundestag should give priority to the examination of all aspects of the MEADS program as well as to the related foreign policy questions and take the time needed to do this thoroughly. Parliamentarians should regard March 2005 as a guiding principle but not as a “must.” It takes more time to get answers to a number of questions. The Bundestag should not leave control over the issue to the government.
Parliamentarians should only vote in favour of German participation in the development of MEADS if the concerns posed by the Federal Accounting Office are resolved: Can the demand be fulfilled “in the scheduled capability, time, and (particularly) cost frame”? A great number of military, security, technological, alliance, and arms control aspects have to be taken into consideration, which were insufficiently dealt with by the defense ministry and the rapporteur group.
The text printed above is the Abstract of a detailed report which is available in German: Bernd W. Kubbig, Als Entscheidungsgrundlage für das Raketenabwehrprojekt MEADS ungeeignet. Eine Analyse der Dokumente von BMVg und Berichterstattergruppe, HSFK-Report 2/2005, 72 pages; www.hsfk.de/downloads/report0205.pdf.
An update to that report was made available in mid-April on the basis of classified documents: Bernd W. Kubbig, MEADS – Neue Erkenntnisse, neue Fragen, neue Zweifel. Eine Analyse des BRH-Gutachtens, der BMVg-Replik, der Zwischenentscheidung sowie der Vertragsdokumente, Raketenabwehrforschung International, Bulletin No. 57, Frühjahr 2005; www.hsfk.de/abm/bulletin/pdfs/kubbig10.pdf.
