10 Years After the 1995 NPT Review
A Brazilian Perspective on Nuclear Regime Change
Fernando de Souza Barros
The program proposed by INESAP in 1995 – “Beyond the NPT”[1] – was well timed for Latin America. Free of military regimes, the Southern Cone was a scenario of reborn hopes for social justice, civil rights, and fraternity among neighboring states. New approaches for Latin American nuclear issues had taken place towards the end of the 1980s with remarkable success. In 1989, the new civilian governments of Argentina and Brazil agreed to establish a bilateral system of inspections that soon received the recognition of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This initiative paved the way for the approval by these two nations of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 1990s. This short article gives brief summaries of (a) Latin America’s main nuclear projects; (b) its contributions for nuclear disarmament; and (c) the repercussions of current nuclear-power policies – led by the US – upon Latin American nuclear policies, with a particular emphasis on the Brazilian case.
Historic Background
At the end of World War II, the destructive power of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the expectation of limitless use of nuclear energy in the near future awakened a worldwide military-industrial interest for nuclear energy. By 1950, practically all industrialized and many Third World countries ran nuclear programs. Argentina and Brazil also began their nuclear programs in the 1950s. To this date, these programs remain the most advanced ones in Latin America.
Argentina’s most sensitive facility is a gaseous diffusion plant near the Andes resort town of Bariloche, which was publicly disclosed in 1983. The major nuclear project of Brazil was started by its Navy. Details were only revealed after the fall of the military regime in 1985. This project is at present the backbone of the Brazilian research and development of the full cycle of nuclear technologies. All the above mentioned projects were essentially maintained after the fall of the military regimes in the two countries. Argentina’s advanced technological projects, however, are bearing the effects of its ongoing economic crises. Its gas diffusion plant for uranium enrichment is now practically closed. In Brazil, the Navy’s original project – a uranium-235 enrichment plant based on the gas centrifuge technique – has become the basis for a commercial venture: the Resende facility for production of nuclear fuel.
Latin American countries have contributed to three major initiatives for nuclear disarmament. The Tlatelolco Treaty backs the oldest nuclear-weapon-free zone of the world and was set-up by Latin American countries. The negotiations on this treaty were led by Mexico its depository state since 1967 –, and its catalyst was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Another relevant Latin-American initiative took place in the 1980s at the peak of the Cold War when Argentina participated in the “six countries call” for negotiations between the ex-Soviet Union and the United States. Since June 1998, Brazil has been participating with six other countries in the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), a diplomatic coalition acting within the United Nations for the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[2] NAC’s major contribution was the negotiation of the well known “13 practical steps” in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.[3]
Current Nuclear Issues Seen from Latin America
Latin American diplomacy is now facing contrasting expectations: after the NPT States parties’ approval of the 13 steps, the new US administration now prefers a unilateral “global order” over the trust and respect for international agreements. Five years after the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapon states discard the commitments of the Final Document. The “rule of international law” has come to be considered “not safe” by the US government in view of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Bush administration opposes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The US Senate rejected it already in 1999, and globally, this 1996 treaty remains suspended. American critics say it limits the military options of the United States, including the possibility of resuming explosive tests of nuclear arms. Thus, the overall assessment of world affairs in Latin America is quite sober as is exemplified in the following commentary from a Brazilian journalist:[4] “After the first Gulf War, a lot has was said about a new international order, but that slowly progressed into hollow words. All of a sudden, things were extraordinarily accelerated. Within a few months, the American leadership affected three essential pillars of the Western system: NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. As a matter of fact, NATO had already lost its purpose a decade ago, Europe split over the Iraq war, and driven by the U.S. a severe process of erosion was already going in the UN institution. It was no longer possible to save these alliances and world institutions in decline. Bush’s role was thus limited to the last blow against something that was already falling apart.”
Recent Nuclear Issues in Brazil
During the 2002 presidential campaign, then-candidate Lula was invited to meet with representatives of the Brazilian armed forces. Asked about his position in connection with the nuclear technologies, candidate Lula had the opportunity to comment about the main weakness of the NPT: its tacit recognition of the non-implementation of Article VI by the nuclear powers. President Lula’s wording, however, allowed the interpretation that he considered it unfair that only the five nuclear powers could have nuclear arsenals under the NPT. The official position of the Worker’s Party platform was one of explicit support for international treaties against weapons of mass destruction. After the elections, Brazilian officials in charge of finance and trade affairs also presented their position to the press and openly declared that any Brazilian initiative related to weapons’ development would be damaging to any prospects of improved international relations. However, concerns arose again in October 2003 when then Science and Technology Minister Roberto Amaral said Brazil would join the select group of nations capable of refining uranium via ultra-centrifugation and will acquire full capability of the entire spectrum of nuclear technology. These comments were not backed by President Lula. However, according to critics “it’s not the production of nuclear weapons that appears to concern world opinion but rather the timing of Brazil’s initiative to master these technologies.”[5]
One should be aware that there is a strong nationalistic “wind” in Brazil, and that nationalistic leaders backed President Lula’s candidacy. Members of the political parties that had given open support to the Workers Party candidate were invited to join President Lula’s government. The left-wing parties still maintain their vision of nuclear power from the 1950s. This “vision” is shared by many Brazilian nationalistic groups outside the military – in particular the nuclear engineers! One should note that Brazil has the world’s fourth largest reserves of uranium, the raw material used in nuclear power plants and weaponry. The official position expressed by President Lula himself is that Brazil intends to expand its enrichment capacities to sell low-grade uranium to other nations. These facilities are legal under international treaties, but are subject to IAEA inspections. Brazilian critics doubt the soundness of this commercial venture. Moreover, there is a major splitting within the Brazilian government about the role of nuclear energy in the shortterm planning to meet the energy needs of the country.
Thus, in order to understand the nuclear activities currently taking place in Brazil one must consider their political dimension. This is specially the case for the above mentioned Resende facility. Late last year, Brazil’s nuclear program was once again subject to international scrutiny. The main reason being that any IAEA inspection of nuclear facilities of the NPT signatories must now take place under the Additional Protocols, a protocol so far not recognized by Brazil.[6] Recently, the Brazilian Defense Minister justified the nation’s right to secrecy, saying that this right should not signify an impediment to the inspections. Brazilian officials in charge of the Resende facility said the inspections were unnecessary and intrusive since Brazil formally abstained from nuclear weapon development in the 1990s. Quoting Sokolsky once again: “Brazil’s penchant for protecting its technology feeds expectations that it could be harboring secret nuclear ambitions.”[7]
Conclusion
Since 1995, the Brazilian perspective on nuclear regime change has evolved inwards. For the Brazilian public opinion makers, the central issue is the preservation of Brazil’s technical achievements in this sector. The IAEA is viewed as a “foreign body” and the NPT as a “distant construct.” The Brazilian media is giving poor coverage of the international conferences on these matters and few press professionals are aware that Brazil will be chairing the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT.
In July 1987, in a drive initiated by the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science, more than 60,000 signatures were collected endorsing the statement “The construction, storage and transport of nuclear weapons are forbidden in Brazil.” This pledge and the signatures, cast in the format of a “popular petition,” were sent to the Brazilian Congress with the request that it be acknowledged and eventually included in the New Constitution of 1988.[8] It is hard to believe that the campaign for the above-mentioned petition could have been successful under the current nuclear-power’s policies and the significant increase of the number of nations having atomic arsenals.
