A Post-NPT Nuclear Regime Change?
Dingli Shen
A decade has passed since the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely. The leadership role that Jayantha Dhanapala played in 1995 in forging the consensus between the nuclear haves and havenots, by balancing the rights and obligations of the two groupings, is unforgettable.
When reviewing the NPT regime of the last decade, one observes a clear mix of frustration and successes. On the plus side: the enhanced safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been implemented; Libya denounced its nuclear weapons program; A.Q. Khan and his associates were caught and their nuclear smuggling ring stemmed; and a loose coalition, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), brought 60 countries together to interdict suspicious transfer of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems or related items across international land, airspace and waters; to name a few.
On the down side: first and foremost, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not only quit the NPT and thus set a dangerous precedent, but also announced that it has acquired nuclear weapons. Besides, India and Pakistan tested nuclear bombs; both Iran and South Korea have been identified as having conducted unsafeguarded nuclear activities; and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has never entered into force.
If indeed a nuclear regime change occurred over the past decade, it is probably the fact that the current non-proliferation regime has largely failed. The two most prominent threshold states – India and Pakistan – were not dissuaded and deterred by any instruments of the non-proliferation regime. They neither consider that they have a responsibility to curtail their nuclear weapons development for the sake of an international “norm” of nuclear weapons non-proliferation, nor do they accept the “morality” that they should maintain their security without impairing the security of their neighbors. In their view, it is in their best interest to ensure their ultimate security with their own bombs.
The DPRK is another example where the NPT failed. India and Pakistan never joined the NPT in the first place, and therefore never broke an international commitment in this regard. North Korea, however, is a completely different case. It joined the NPT and was suspected of clandestine development of a nuclear program for military purposes. After wrestling with the U.S. for a decade, it eventually exited the NPT and started to seek nuclear weapons “legally.” In the entire 35-year history of the NPT, this is the sole case that an NPT member state left the treaty in its quest for nuclear weapons.
The NPT has apparent failed to retain North Korea in the treaty system, to persuade India and Pakistan not to turn their de facto nuclear weapons status to a de jure one, and to deter the latter from doing so through international sanctions. Basically, the NPT allows states to pursue nuclear development for peaceful purposes while not depriving them of their access to fissile materials for military use. Theoretically speaking, therefore, the NPT regime cannot prevent nonnuclear weapons States parties from diverting fissile materials from their stockpiles for non-peaceful uses, let alone deterring those few remaining outside the treaty from doing so. Though the enhanced safeguards system can help to detect any diversion, it can never prevent and stop such activities.
The primary reason that states seek to retain or acquire nuclear weapons is that they feel a lack of security. The United States did not feel secure when it faced Nazi Germany developing atomic weapons, so America raced with and beat the Germans. Regardless of how many thousands of nuclear weapons it has deployed, and how strong its conventional armed forces are, the U.S. still feels insecure. The U.S. has even decided to research and develop low-yield “usable” nuclear weapons in the post-“9/11” time. The same logic then also applies to other states, as they, without a military as powerful as the American one, may be better situated when they go nuclear. China justified its acquisition of nuclear weapons with a threat from the U.S., and North Korea used exactly the same rhetoric.
Nonetheless, the non-proliferation regime has not been without highlights. Libya is a good story, but its example has not persuaded any other proliferation aspirant to give up such ambitions. Overall, the drawbacks of the regime far outweighed the headway it has made. Today, non-proliferation measures could come far too late to stop some countries’ activities, thus counter-proliferation and interdiction schemes have been drawn up by some states.
Over the last ten years, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has witnessed a shift of emphasis from state-originated threats to non-stateoriginated threats. Until recently, it was nations who competed and rivaled each other, and nuclear proliferation was regarded as a threat from and among states. Prior to “9/11”, hardly anyone seriously associated nuclear proliferation with non-state actors. However, after the terrorist attacks in 2001, states became highly concerned that non-state actors could also be involved in nuclear proliferation – a particularly grim perspective, indeed.
As long as states think that their security is not improving given threats from other states and nonstate actors, there is no reason to hope for radical improvement in the field of non-proliferation. For the foreseeable future, India and Pakistan are unlikely to revert their nuclear course, and it is almost impossible that the DPRK will abandon its nuclear weapons. Iran will not give up its nuclear program although it has oil reserves for the next two centuries, and the U.S. is not ready to strike Teheran’s enrichment facilities and probably will never do so.
The past decade has proven that two systems are missing in the contemporary international order. First of all, there is a lack of mechanisms that make nations feel secure. The U.S. feels insecure because of “9/11” and China; China feels insecure because of the U.S.; and both North Korea and Iran feel insecure because of America. Secondly, despite a considerable enhancement of export controls, they no longer suffice to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. The world today calls for a fissile materials control system.
These two problems must first be solved before we can hope for a meaningful post-NPT nuclear regime change. The first element, security, points to the root causes of nuclear proliferation. Regrettably, although this has been understood at all times, no answer to this problem has been found to date. Fundamentally, the lack of security is due to the anarchic order of the world: there are no cops outs there. The United Nations? Hardly a supra-national organization that provides security to states and the world community readily. The U.N. functions only when the major powers come to a mutual consent, and they hardly ever do. And when the world needs cops most states do not wish to authorize an existing power to serve this role: the U.S. is not accepted as world cop for sure.
As long as this anarchy prevails – and that will surely be the case - , we cannot hope that all non-nuclear weapons states will voluntarily uphold their nuclear weapons free status. The argument deserves to be repeated: when even the U.S. does not feel secure, other states may have still better reason to feel insecure. (This author, however, does not believe in and agree with the notion that as long as a country feels insecure, it should go nuclear.)
We understand the reason, but we cannot solve the problem. The political regime change that will convince all states that they are safe without nuclear weapons will not come anytime soon. Therefore, there is no fundamental guarantee that the post-NPT nuclear regime will successfully ensure non-proliferation.
The second element is the technical prevention of the ability to proliferate. Theoretically speaking, as long as all nuclear-capable countries cooperate on such an initiative, non-proliferation can succeed. But then, take a look at the substance: what will be the ingredients of a fissile materials control regime?
In my view, as the possession of fissile materials enables nations to cheat on the NPT, the technical solution at the source of all proliferation problems is to deny all non-nuclear weapons states control over fissile materials, regardless of where the fissile materials come from – from import, from enrichment, or from spent fuel. The proposed new regime has the following purpose: that a country can access fissile materials, but cannot control them. To some degree, this scheme asks for an international depository center where no single country can control and divert fissile materials. At the same time, the scheme also requires that all sovereign nonnuclear weapons states abandon their right of possessing fissile materials. Once implemented, this scheme will rid the world of the danger that a certain state would break its promise at any time.
A fissile materials control regime, however, will entail new problems of its own: countries like Japan cannot accept it as they want control over fissile materials for their civilian fuel recycling. Some countries will not agree because in effect they want to keep the nuclear weapons option open. In addition, is in an important question where an international depository center will be located and how it would be managed. The new regime cannot be successful if alternative energy supplies are not available to those states that are to abandon fissile stockpiles of their own. Apparently, to bring about a post-NPT regime change is a daunting task.
Looking into the future of the new century, humankind will remain to be troubled with the contradiction between sovereign independence and lack of control and management of a supranational body. Therefore, proliferation by definition is to occur. All efforts of non-proliferation must be necessarily restricted to lessen the speed and the gravity of the damage done.
