Beyond the NPT
The Transformation of the Nuclear Control Regime to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World
Jürgen Scheffran, Wolfgang Liebert, Martin Kalinowski
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was hoped to mark a watershed in the struggle for a nuclearweapon-free world (NWFW). Ten years later, the international situation in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is much worse than before. This is most visible in the fact that two more nations have officially tested nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan) and a third one (North Korea) has declared to possess them. The recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS) intend to maintain their nuclear weapons arsenal indefinitely (and therefore plan its permanent modernization). In particular the Bush Administration has almost completely abandoned arms control and instead justifies its quest for missile defense and space dominance. In the following, we will analyze some of the previous initiatives, the causes for failure and the prospects for transforming the existing non-proliferation regime nto a nuclear-weapon-free world, with the Nuclear Weapons Convention as its core element.[1]
The Birth of the Nuclear Abolition Movement in 1995
Inspired by the opportunities offered by the end of the Cold War, a global movement for the abolition of nuclear weapons emerged in the mid-1990s, further catalyzed by the four-week gathering of diplomats and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in New York in April/May 1995. INESAP used the opportunity to present the results of its Study Group “Beyond the NPT”, which brought together about 50 experts from 17 countries to study the necessity and the possibilities of a NWFW.[2] In the framework of this study the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) was presented for the first time.[3]
A critical mass was achieved at the Forum for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons on 25/26 April 1995, organized by the International Coalition for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,[4] which included the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the International Peace Bureau (IPB), the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES), and INESAP. The authors of this article, together with two dozen speakers at this Forum, among them Joseph Rotblat, Randell Forsberg, Jonathan Schell, Miguel Marin Bosch, and Daniel Ellsberg, emphasized the need to get rid of the bomb before it could threaten civilization and life on our planet.[5] The forum triggered the formation of the Abolition 2000 network which in its founding statement called for immediate “negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.”[6]
The representatives of a large number of NGOs and many diplomats put significant pressure on the NWS at the New York NPT Review Conference. They could not really change the course of action of the nuclear powers and their allies, but the indefinite extension of the NPT could only be achieved because the NWS agreed to minimal obligations towards nuclear disarmament, laid down in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which included a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996, utmost restraint in nuclear testing, a fissile materials cutoff and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.[7]
In the following two years, the call for nuclear abolition attracted considerable attention to the cause of nuclear disarmament and shaped the international policy debate. A majority of nations, former statesmen and generals, many scientists, a group of US Senators, and the majority of the European Parliament signed up for nuclear abolition, and even US think tanks discussed it seriously.[8]
The International Discourse on Nuclear Abolition and the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
Renewed nuclear testing by China and France in 1999, which contravened the above mentioned Principles and Objectives, aroused a storm of protest from both governments and NGOs. This protest and the 50th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in 1995, however, helped to finally stop active nuclear testing and to build support for Joseph Rotblat’s Nobel Peace Price, as well as to initiate the Canberra Commission by the Australian government in July 1996. In its report, the commission explored the requirements and opportunities for a NWFW.[9] One month earlier, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in its Advisory Opinion on The Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”[10] The ICJ underlined this obligation In spite of pressure from the NWS. A few months later, a widely recognized statement by 60 former Generals and Admirals as well as a pledge by more than 100 former statesmen were published, both calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.[11]
In adherence with the obligation stated by the ICJ, Malaysia introduced a resolution at the 1996 UN General Assembly which was reintroduced in subsequent years. This resolution calls upon “all states to fulfill that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.”[12] This resolution received a majority of well above two-thirds of the voting countries, among them the nuclear weapon state China as well as India and Pakistan.
At the same time, the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention proposed by INESAP in 1995 was actively picked up by an international team of lawyers, scientists, disarmament experts and policy makers, led by the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP), IPPNW and INESAP. They drafted a model Nuclear Weapons Convention (mNWC) which was presented at the 1997 NPT Prep-Com in New York, attracting considerable attention among delegates and NGOs.[13] In 1997, a revised version of the mNWC was submitted to the UN Secretary-General by Costa Rica as a discussion draft and thus became an official UN Document which was consequently translated into all official UN languages.[14] The full text was later published in the book Security and Survival along with explanations and comments from experts and activists. [15] INESAP provided scientific input on some of the crucial issues of the mNWC, including the link between civil and military nuclear power, restraints on fissile materials, the definition of nuclear weapons and the verification of nuclear disarmament.
The Fading of the Abolition Movement
Despite some success, the abolition movement lost ground after 1997. The CTBT negotiations came to a successful conclusion in 1996 without any realistic chance to enter into force, the further nuclear disarmament process came to a standstill and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament fell in a stalemate which continues until today. Negotiations on the nuclear weapon material production cut-off were postponed to this day. In order to overcome the unproductive confrontation, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) another new international activity started promoting a nuclearweapon-free world in 1998. Since then, MPI has been lobbying middle powers in the hope that like-minded non-nuclear weapon states from the northern and southern hemisphere speak out for nuclear abolition and gain some influence on the international debate.[16] In the same year, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) an initiative of middle powers was formed. In its first UN General Assembly resolution, the NAC called for an “unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of […] nuclear weapons” and suggested amongst others a subsidiary body to be established for this purpose by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as well as an international conference.[17] While 114 states voted in favor of the resolution, 18 opposed and 38 abstained, among them 12 out of 16 NATO countries. The United States, France and the UK voted “no”. Seven years later, the most recent NAC resolution in November 2004 mustered support by a number of NATO states, including Germany.[18] The NWS and many of their allies, however, decided not to move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Even now, the path to abolition is not chosen although it is the most convincing remedy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The year 1998 became a turning point to the worse when India and Pakistan officially tested their own nuclear weapons. They also conducted ballistic missile tests, as did North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. This supported the rise of conservative political forces in the US which, with its 1998 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,[19] drafted under the commission chair Donald Rumsfeld, pinned their hopes not on the elimination of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles but on military countermeasures like National Missile Defense (NMD). With the complete disregard of the Bush Administration for international law and multilateral negotiations, the last hopes for any substantial move towards a NWFW faded away.
Non-Proliferation Regime Change Still Pending
The established non-proliferation and disarmament regime was able to slow down proliferation of and ongoing research on nuclear weapons and allowed for first cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia, but it is not likely to lead to a nuclearweapon- free world in due time and irreversibly. The effectiveness of the NPT is endangered by the discriminating privileges of the nuclear weapon states and by the uncontrollable proliferation of nuclear technology which has contributed to the spread of nuclear weapons due to the close and complex civilian-military ambivalence.[20] The commitment to nuclear disarmament according to Article VI of the NPT was reaffirmed by the nuclear weapon states at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995 with “the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons”.[21] Steps towards that goal, however, have never been seriously on the NWS’ agenda while, rather, decisions are being implemented which confirm the NWS’ reliance on nuclear weapons. As long as some members of the world community have legal access to nuclear weapons, the nuclear threat and the dangers of nuclear proliferation will persist.
International law demands equal rights for all states. In the long run, it cannot be tolerated that some states claim the right to possess nuclear weapons and at the same time deny it to others. In its advisory opinion of July 8th, 1996, the ICJ in The Hague declared that “the threat and use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and particularly the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”[22] Only in the exceptional case of “an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake”, the Court “[could not] conclude definitely whether the threat and use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful.” This in no way provides an excuse to maintain the nuclear overkill arsenals and first-use doctrines, which in their turn increase the likelihood for extreme circumstances. The Court affirmed unanimously that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The unambiguous interpretation of Article VI of the NPT demands that these negotiations must be concluded.
In complete disregard of the ICJ’s ruling, negotiations on nuclear disarmament are being declined and the goal of complete nuclear disarmament is officially being regarded as contrary to the national security interests of the NWS. Developments in the past years give reason to doubt any sincere commitment to disarmament.[23]
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of the year 2001 made it quite clear that the U.S. will rely on their nuclear arsenal in the coming decades. Even worse, for both former opponents in the Cold War, the US and Russia, nuclear weapons still play a significant role in their respective security strategy, which is increasingly directed against nations that were not directly involved in the East-West confrontation. To date, more than 20,000 nuclear warheads still exist in the active and reserve arsenals of the nuclear weapon states and 20,000 more are stored while awaiting dismantlement. The little disarmament that is actually going on in the two countries proceeds at a very unsatisfactory pace.
Even worse, all five official nuclear weapon states modernize their nuclear arsenals, in contradiction to their promises given on the occasion of the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. NATO still adheres to a firstuse option, although the alliance has roughly a threefold conventional superiority over other potential alliances. In consequence, Russia has also officially adopted a first-use option. Nuclear sharing has been extended to some new NATO members in Eastern Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), although for the time being deployment of nuclear weapons in these countries is not formally intended. A factual reduction of the military value of nuclear weapons is reflected in the decreasing number of US nuclear weapons deployed in European NATO countries from a few thousands in the 1980s down to the 480 bombs estimated today.[24] Their relevance in Europe is essentially limited to a political function to hold together the transatlantic alliance. Given the absence of an adversary in Europe, they are also increasingly harder to justify, and they are an extremely dangerous heritage of the Cold War.
The lack of commitment for nuclear disarmament by the official NWS and NATO creates an international environment in which nuclear proliferation is harder to prevent, if only because the still excessively large nuclear arsenals provide an excuse for other countries to build the bomb. This goes together with the fact that the existing non-proliferation regime has not been able to prevent even NPT members such as North Korea and Iran from acquiring the basic infrastructure to build the bomb. On the contrary, the spread of nuclear technology for “peaceful purposes” is not only an “inherent right” according to Article VI of the NPT, but at the same time inherently provides the basis for its military use.
In order to completely and sustainably eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons, all nations are required to undertake systematic efforts and agree to negotiations about a road towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is then codified in international law. Only the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons would remove the most prominent motive for other states’ acquisition of nuclear weapons, namely the possession of nuclear weapons by other nations. The resulting nuclear-weapon-free world must go beyond the NPT. It requires a new treaty as its center piece, and we suggest that to be a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
Step by Step Towards the Goal: the Transformation Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World
To remove the capabilities needed to build the bomb, the scientific-technical requirements for nuclear weapons in the civilian sector have to be restricted. This concerns in particular use of weapon-grade nuclear materials and the respective production technologies in civilian nuclear programs. Required are regulations which are binding for all states. The transformation process into a NWFW would comprise a number of single steps which would all serve the goal of eliminating the conditions and capabilities for the development and production of nuclear weapons, thus making the nuclear disarmament process sustainable and irreversible. Even though nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, the barriers against access to them can be raised and the latent technical nuclear option can be dismantled in order to discourage political decisions in favor of nuclear weapons.
The best path to a nuclearweapon-free is heavily disputed. Many analysts are convinced that an evolutionary approach via the NPT would be more appropriate and promising than a comprehensive concept to a nuclear-weapon-free world.[25] In contrast, a number of leading nonaligned states and many NGOs do no longer believe in the “leverage” of Article VI of the NPT. In view of the bad experience with the repeatedly broken promises of the NWS, they demand a strictly planned sequence of nuclear disarmament steps down to zero which would define from the start all individual steps and a predetermined timetable up to point of disarming the last remaining nuclear weapon. That program would be legally bindingly to all nuclear weapon states.[26]
From our point of view, a strict schedule in an early phase would indeed be unrealistic and would probably raise the hurdle for disarmament negotiations. But what is desperately needed is a credible commitment to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world by the NWS. We believe there could be a “compromise” between the different positions if all states agreed in principle on the goal of nuclear weapons abolition by beginning negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention. That would be a convincing sign of the “good faith” willingness of the NWS and it would have politically and also legally binding consequences. In the framework of NWC negotiations, future non-proliferation and disarmament measures can be combined, harmonized and finally be integrated into a coherent concept.[27]
Of utmost urgency are measures for increased transparency and risk reduction, like those proposed by the Canberra Commission. An immediate step is de-alerting in order to terminate the high alert status of nuclear weapons.[28] The target coordinates in the computers used to guide nuclear weapons should be permanently deleted. Strategic bombers can be kept on the ground; warheads can be removed from the delivery systems and be stored separately. To improve the data exchange on missile launches and avoid misunderstandings and accidental warning, Presidents Clinton and Jelzin agreed in 2000 to establish a Joint Data Exchange Centre (JDEC) on missile launches. This initiative, which has been held up by the Bush Administration, should be renewed. Successful implementation would considerably reduce the danger of accidental missile launches.[29]
In the START treaties, the US and Russia agreed to cut down their strategic intercontinental-range missiles and bombers to 1.600 and strategic warheads to 3.000-3.500. After George W. Bush had wrecked the multilateral arms control process, both sides committed in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) to reducing their strategic warheads to 1.700-2.200 each by the year 2012. Even though this is considerable less than at the height of the Cold War, excess nuclear weapons will not be eliminated but kept in reserve. In addition, SORT lacks any implementation and verification mechanisms and thus provides only a weak barrier against break out.
US-Russian deep cuts would be an essential precondition to finally involve smaller nuclear powers in nuclear disarmament. Within two decades, the number of deployed nuclear weapons in any region could be reduced to 10-20 without technical problems.[30]
The quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons , however, can only be sustained if new development of nuclear weapons is rendered impossible, beyond the restricted measures of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This could be done, for instance, by way of a moratorium or an international treaty that forecloses future nuclear weapons development.[31] The qualitative nuclear arms race would thus be terminated and an important signal for irreversible nuclear disarmament would be given.
This would also send a signal to the smaller NWS as well as to the de facto nuclear weapon states Israel, India, Pakistan and now North Korea, which at some point must join the nuclear disarmament process. To take the specific situations in the various regions into consideration, regional measures are indispensable. The withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of NATO non-nuclear weapon states is an urgent measure which would further marginalize the significance of nuclear weapons. This is also true for a denouncement on ‘first use’ and security guarantees on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The extension of existing nuclearweapon-free zones (Latin America, Pacific, Africa, South-East Asia, Antarctic) and the potential establishment of new ones (Europe, Central Asia, North-East Asia, Middle East) would also lead in that direction. Measures in the area of delivery systems are also of importance, such as international missile control, a missile flight test ban and the limitation of missile defense systems. In recent years, various missile-related initiatives have been discussed on governmental and non-governmental levels, such as the Hague Code of Conduct, the UN Report on Missiles, the Russian proposal for a Global Missile Control System and the INESAP proposal Beyond Missile Defense.[32]
Fissile materials from nuclear disarmament have to be placed under safeguards. A comprehensive cut-off agreement is an essential step on the road to the NWC. It would ban the production and use of weapon-grade nuclear materials in significant amounts and also cover the existing material stocks.[33] Certain civilian production and usage of weapon-usable material is dispensable and can be terminated (e.g. separation of plutonium from spent fuel for use in mixedoxide fuels). Relevant materials and production technologies which cannot be eliminated should be removed from national control as laid out in the integrated concept of preventive control.[34] Only when the technically meaningless classification of weapon materials as either military or civilian stocks is terminated, would a cut-off convention ensure that any possible new production of nuclear weapons is averted at its source. Besides, suitable procedures must be developed and employed in order to dispose of or eliminate nuclear weapon materials, respectively.
A New Debate Is Needed
Even though today the world’s power structures block progress towards a NWFW, the debate on how to achieve it is a vital challenge for mankind. It is quite clear that the majority of the world’s people and states want to get rid of nuclear weapons. The analysis and the ideas included in the INESAP Study Beyond the NPT[35] is by no means outdated. The debate has to and could be revived along these lines.
The Mayor of Hiroshima, who is President of the Mayors of Peace with almost mayors in 110 countries, was invited by INESAP to speak at a panel during the NPT Prepatory Committee meeting 2004 in Geneva. On that occasion, he also addressed the NPT delegates with An Urgent Call for the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. In the name of the Abolition NGOs, he demanded “here and now that, when the States Parties review the NPT in 2005, you take that opportunity to pass by majority vote, regardless of any nations that may oppose it, a call for the immediate dealerting of all nuclear weapons, for unequivocal action toward dismantling and destroying all nuclear weapons in accordance with a clearly stipulated timetable, and for negotiations on a universal Nuclear Weapons Convention establishing a verifiable and irreversible regime for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. ... Let us ban nuclear weapons in 2005.” Mayor Akiba’s appeal was eagerly taken up by Abolition 2000 and has since been evolving into a global campaign with support from many mayors and grassroots groups. The model Nuclear Weapons Convention plays a prominent role in the campaign to lobby the NPT Review Conference 2005 to commit to commence negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention and to complete them by 2010 with the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons by 2020.
