Power Grid Interconnection for a Nuclear Free Korean Peninsula
Jungmin Kang
The third round of the six-party talks held in Beijing, June 23-26, 2004, ended with an agreement to resume discussions by the end of September. Even though the six parties stressed the need to take first steps toward the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula as soon as possible, big differences remain between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) over the scope of a nuclear freeze, its verification, and other related measures. No breakthrough is expected in the US-DPRK nuclear deal due to a serious lack of mutual trust.
In response to the energy issue, fortunately, the United States agreed to the proposal that other parties – the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, China, or Russia – provide energy assistance to the DPRK if the DPRK agrees to commit to the dismantlement of its nuclear program. It would be worthwhile to consider a new strategy to help the DPRK to de-nuclearize by providing energy support to the country even before such a commitment. Energy support to the DPRK could have positive effects on the resolution of the DPRK nuclear conundrum since it could contribute to reducing political tensions around the Korean peninsula.
The ROK-DPRK-RFE Power Grid Interconnection
Regional energy cooperation could provide various benefits to all participating countries, it could in particular increase the energy security of all participating countries by increasing optimal use of existing resources, technology, etc. and by improving energy market efficiency and secure cost-effective energy supply through energy market integration and system interconnection.
The regional power grid interconnection is a good example for regional energy cooperation. Among others, the advantages are as follows: reduction of future capacity reserve requirements and consequently savings in investment costs; reduction of operating reserves so as to reduce the operating cost; resolution of the location problem; easing of the environmental problems; etc. Hence, the regional power grid interconnection will be to the economical as well as environmental benefit of all participating countries. However, many challenges are anticipated in realizing the regional power grid interconnection for the Korean peninsula, such as: high capital costs and investment risks; no regional financing mechanism; absence of legal systems that deal with different processes on contract enforcement and dispute resolution; and different technical specifications, among them different operating voltages and frequencies of neighboring power grids.
There are several examples of regional power interconnections worldwide. The largest one is located in Europe: the national energy systems of Western European countries are interconnected with national grids of both Central and Northern European countries. Canada and the United States also operate connected power grids, where Canadian hydro power stations provide electricity for US consumers. Another connected power grid exists among ASEAN countries.
A feasible example of a regional power grid interconnection for the Korean peninsula is an electricity transmission system between the Russian Far East (RFE) and the ROK, with the connection running over DPRK territory. It would allow the RFE to export power generated at existing and new hydro power stations to the ROK. David von Hippel of Nautilus Institute estimated that the capacity of the line could be up to 3 GWe with operation start in 2010 and costs of about US$ 2.5 billion. With the help of this line, work on two pressurized water reactors (PWRs) that were under construction by the Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO) at Sinpo in the DPRK could be cancelled.
Benefits for the RFE
The RFE would provide most of the electricity to be exported to the ROK via the DPRK. Recently, the RFE has been expressing that it would welcome such an arrangement. As of the end of 2003, the installed capacity of the RFE was at 7.2 GWe and it will likely increase to about 9.1 GWe by 2010. According to an RFE analysis from 2004, the RFE could supply up to 3 GWe to the ROK. To that end, the 500 kV transmission line from Vladivostok to Chongjin in the northern part of the DPRK could be extended to the border of the ROK and further south. The RFE could thus sell its abundant electricity to the ROK.
Benefits for the DPRK
Against the background of a serious domestic energy shortage, the DPRK has recently shown obvious interest in an ROK-DPRK-RFE power grid interconnection. In May 2004, a DPRK delegate made the following remarks about a power-sharing arrangement in the Korean peninsula at a forum held in Seoul: the DPRK was already building a new power-sharing system with Russia; connecting the system with the power grid in the ROK would make the sharing more successful; and the relevant governments should discuss actual action plans to realize the regional power network. For hosting the transmission line, the DPRK could receive either an annual lump-sum or a certain amount of electricity per kWh transferred.
Benefits for the ROK
The ROK would be the major recipient of electricity to be imported from the RFE via the DPRK. The ROK government showed an interest in such an arrangement for the Korean peninsula at the Seoul Forum in May 2004. The ROK met with considerable difficulties in building new power plants due to strong objections by local communities that concern environmental impacts. With the RFE's electricity supply, the ROK could meet its surging energy demand while reaping environmental and economic benefits.
Since the first commercial nuclear power reactor started in the ROK in 1978, fifteen PWRs and four CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors became operational as of mid-Aug. 2004. One more PWR is under construction, with eight additional PWRs to be ready by the year 2015. However, rapidly growing "anti-nuke" movements organized by local residents and non-governmental organizations make it difficult for the ROK to deploy all planned PWRs by 2015. Furthermore, for two PWRs that are planned for 2014 and 2015, no site has yet been designated. The same is even true for thermal power plants planned to be available after 2015. It is safe to assume that by 2015, no more than two PWRs might actually be deployed in the ROK. Therefore, the ROK should seriously consider of ways to cover its electricity deficiency of more than 2 GWe by 2015. Electricity supply from the RFE to the ROK by way of an ROK-DPRK-RFE power grid interconnection could be a solution to meet the ROK's electricity demand in the long-term.
Electricity import from the RFE in the order of 2 MWe could replace the deployment of two 1 GWe PWRs, which would bring major environmental and economic benefits to the ROK: the generation of nuclear wastes such as spent nuclear fuel, Low and Intermediate Level Waste (LILW), and radioactive waste from decommissioned reactors would be noticeably reduced.
Assuming 1 GWe of nuclear capacity, 90% capacity factor, 34.9% average thermal efficiency, and 44,000 MWd/tHM average burnup, the annual amount of spent fuel discharged from a 1 GWe PWR amounts to 21.4 tHM. The 1 GWe PWR would discharge about 856 or 1,284 tHM of spent fuel during its lifetime of 40 or 60 years with lifeextension, respectively. The average annual volume of LILW discharged from 1 GWe PWR in the ROK is about 28 m3. The 1 GWe PWR would accordingly discharge about 1,120 or 1,680 m3 of LILW during its lifetime of 40 or 60 years, respectively. The weight of radioactive waste arising from decommissioning of the 1 GWe PWR is estimated about 10,000 t, according to an OECD/NEA analysis from 2003. Therefore, the 2 GWe electricity supply from RFE to the ROK would provide significant environmental benefits to the ROK by reducing the amount of those hazardous radioactive wastes discharged during the operation and after shutdown of a 1 GWe PWR two times.
Considerable cost savings related to the storage and disposition of those radioactive wastes are anticipated for the case of non-deployment of two 1 GWe PWRs in the ROK. This study assumes that the unit costs for storage and disposition of PWR spent fuel, decommissioning of PWR, and disposition of LILW are 100-200 US$/kg HM, 320 million US$ per one 1 GWe PWR, and 1,600-3,200 US$/m3 LILW, respectively. Based on the above cost assumptions, the cost savings from the avoidance of nuclear waste generation for the case of non-deployment of 1 GWe PWR are approximately 1.0-1.1 billion US$ or 1.4-1.5 billion US$ (total undiscounted costs) over a lifetime of 40 or 60 years, respectively. Therefore, 2 GWe electricity supply from the RFE to the ROK would save the ROK twice the amount of the above mentioned costs. Moreover, the ROK can save the construction cost of the two 1 GWe PWRs of about 1.6 billion US$ each.
If we assume that 2 GWe imported from the RFE could also substitute the same amount of electricity generated at thermal power plants in the ROK, it would not only result in a significant reduction of air pollutants (such as SO2, NOx and other particles) and greenhouse gas (such as CO2) emissions but also solve the problem of having to select power facility sites against the will of the local population.
Conclusions
Even though there would be many challenges in realizing the regional ROK-DPRK-RFE power grid interconnection, it could create a win-win situation for the ROK, the DPRK, and the RFE by providing environmental and economic benefits to all three countries, if implemented.
Furthermore, via the ROK-DPRK-RFE power grid interconnection, energy support to the DPRK could get the DPRK involved in the multilateral energy cooperation system, reduce political tension around the Korean peninsula, and thereby bring a positive effect in resolving the DPRK nuclear conundrum.
