Civil Initiatives for Regional Security
The Japanese “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” Taken by the Word
Kazuhiko Tamaki
Features of the security circumstances today in Northeast Asia can be summarized as follows: first, as the legacy of the Cold War era, there still exist the divided nations, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Second, there are two nuclear powers, China and Russia. Third, the other and most powerful nuclear superpower, the United States, is sustaining forward deployment of large offensive military forces in Japan and the ROK under individual mutual security agreements. Fourth, the military confrontation provides the DPRK with the rationale to acquire and develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to transport them. And finally, by supporting and assisting the socalled “war on terror” by the U.S., both the ROK and Japan are deemed by Islamic societies as the enemy that shall be criticized and even defeated, which generates the potential threat of aggression by non-state entities.
Under such security circumstances, how can we achieve sustainable peace and security in Northeast Asia? This is the common question of all citizens living in this region. I would like to address my view on that question by briefly outlining the current political situation of Japan.
On October 4, 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi’s advisory panel on national security and defense issued its final report. The report describes first that the security of Japan, which is closely related to peace and stability in the whole of Northeast Asia, will continue to depend on the deterrence capability of the U.S. forces. And it recommends and encourages to improve flexibility, mobility, multifunctionality, as well as reliability of the Japanese defense capabilities as well as to introduce ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. It also recommends the amendment of the various U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements to adapt to the ongoing U.S. Global Posture Review and to adjust the decision making systems for contingencies, similar to the National Security Council of the U.S. Thus, the panel proposes a comprehensive review of the “Basic Policy for National Defense” approved by the Japanese cabinet in 1957. Moreover, the report proposes to ease the ban on arms exports to the United States to reflect the progress made in joint research on missile defense.
On the basis of these recommendations, along with those from an internal panel of the Defense Agency, by the end of November 2004 the government is going to finish the review of the “National Defense Program Outline” that has been regulating Japanese defense policy both quantitatively and qualitatively since 1976.
In brief: what the Japanese leadership is going to do is to season the old-fashioned, Cold War-style defense posture, which emphasizes military deterrence and readiness, with the U.S.-made spices of “war on terror”, which in turn is characterized by the prevention of threats through preemptive attacks while ignoring the importance of diplomatic dialog and confidence building measures. It is clear that these postures will, and actually do, bring about nothing but a mindset of alertness and suspicion and incentives for a new arms race among the nations and peoples of Northeast Asia.
Toward Regional Security
In contrast to those military-centered initiatives, we, the Peace Depot, are preparing a proposal for an alternative initiative toward regional common security, based on the will of civil society and on the historical heritage which the citizens of Japan have been enjoying under the Peace Constitution. Its preamble stipulates that “we have determined to preserve our security, and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world,” while its Article 9 renounces any war and maintenance of military force. We must revitalize and implement these principles in the real politics of Northeast Asia.
Among the principles that follow from the Peace Constitution, the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” and the “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” are the most important. As for the Non-Nuclear Principles,” Hiro Umebayashi of Peace Depot drafted an actual and feasible proposal for a “Model Treaty on A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.[1] My speech focuses on the “Exclusive Defense-Oriented Policy” and its regionalization process.
The “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” was first announced by the government in 1970. The policy’s meaning, according to the government, is “that military force cannot be exercised until armed attack is initiated, and that the scope and level of use of defense forces are kept to the minimum required for the purpose of selfdefense. Moreover, the defense capability to be possessed by Japan must be limited to the minimum necessary level. Thus, this policy refers to the posture of passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the constitution.” In compliance with this policy, Japan has renounced the possession of long- and medium-range strike equipment such as ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, and so on, while also renouncing the overseas dispatch of its military forces, symbolically named the “Self Defense Forces.”
Nevertheless, we must state that the “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” has been a fiction. The reason is clear. Under the bilateral “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security” with the United States, Japan has admitted the deployment of offensive U.S. forces, including aircraft carriers and escort ships equipped with sealaunched cruise missiles, a fighterbomber squadron, and a marine expeditionary unit, in its territory and allowed the projection of those forces to Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan. Under the responsibility sharing referred to as “Spear and Shield.” the offensive posture of the United States and the defensive posture of Japan complement each other to form one “offensive defense posture.” This is the reason why the neighboring nations have no confidence in the Japanese “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy.”
With respect to the decision to introduce BMD systems, the Government of Japan announced to the public and neighbor states that BMD is for “exclusively defensive” uses. Simultaneously, however, the government announced that BMD will be complemented by the strike capabilities of the United States. Moreover, it is reported that the Defense Agency is seeking the opportunity to acquire capabilities of striking foreign territories of its own to “complement” the BMD. It seems that Japanese strategy planners argued that this is necessary because the current monitoring and detection technology is so insufficient that they need secure the response capabilities of BMD by other means. Consequently, and ironically, BMD opens the door to a pre-emptive “strike before launch” approach that is very far from the “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” indeed. Thus, BMD functions as a catalyst to widen the rift between the defense posture of Japan on the one side and the Peace onstitution on the other.
In addition, in the diplomatic field, there is no doubt that the quick and full support of the U.S. “pre-emptive” attack on Iraq last March has made the Japanese “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” much less trustworthy to the international society.
Therefore, our effort toward a common security in Northeast Asia will include the revitalization and implementation of this “Exclusively Defense-Oriented policy” and its globalization as an essential element. At the start of this process, we must share the common understanding of “Exclusively Defensive” in terms of international realpolitiks.
Defensive Security
In this sense, the United Nations’ report Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies of 1993 seems very suggestive. In the foreword of this report, then-Secretary, General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, illustrated the rather complicated aspect of defensive security as “difficulty, if not impossibility, of distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons systems.” And the report concludes naturally that the “offensive or defensive character of a weapon depends as much on the full context in which it is used as on its intrinsic properties. Even in chess, defensive and offensive games can be fought with the same sets of pieces” (paragraph 134).
In the context of Japanese BMD, the U.S. forces gain overwhelming military advantage to launch anti-land strikes once BMD rendered the ballistic missile capabilities of China or the DPRK powerless. No doubt, China or the DPRK will deem BMD as, at least, a part of an offensive weapon system. It is regrettable that not only the Government of Japan but also the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party, ignore this possible context and support BMD.
Then we must ask, how can the “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” of Japan transform itself from a fiction to a genuine component of regional security? The UN Report is also suggestive on this question. It teaches that the achievement of defensive security depends upon “creating the political and military conditions necessary for eliminating threats to international peace and security through a transformation in the relation between States so that each State can feel secure from military threats.” This suggests that an “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” or posture cannot be achieved unilaterally but only through multinational relations in the region. The UN report also describes that “defensive security” is closely related to the notion of common security, that the security of every State within a given group or region is inseparably linked to that of others, and that it should be achieved through a gradual step-by-step process.
An international non-governmental organization, Global Action to Prevent War, proposes in its Program Statements, drafted by progressive researchers and activists that include Randall Forsberg, Saul Mendlowitz, and Jonathan Dean, a phased process of disarmament to reduce national military forces and replace them with modest UN forces to prevent war. They are:
Phase 1: Take initial steps to reduce the risks of major international war.
Phase 2: Make up to one-third cuts in forces and spending, with deeper cuts in production and trade of major weapons and small arms.
Phase 3: Trial Ban on Unilateral Military Intervention.
Phase 4: Transfer Responsibility for Global Security from National to International Institution.
Phase 5: Limit National Armed Forces to Short-Range Homeland Defense.
It is notable that Phase 5 of this proposal coincides with the implementation of “defensive security” or, in Japanese terminology, with the “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy.”
My view is that the teachings of the UN report and Global Action to Prevent War’s Program Statement are applicable to a process for building common security in Northeast Asia. For achieving this goal, it is critical that Japan should, in the first phase, announce firm and “double-standardfree” fundamental principles for national security.
That is, more concretely, the process shall be initiated by the announcement of a clearly defined “Exclusively Defense Status” by Japan, followed by a UN General Assembly resolution committing international society’s recognition of and respect for the status. This is like Mongolia who unilaterally announced its Nuclear-Weapon-Free status, which was consequently recognized by the UN General Assembly in 1998.
This announcement and its international recognition shall be seamlessly followed by a disarmament plan of Japan with a clear order of priorities, in which the capability of Japanese Self Defense force and the U.S. forces stationed in Japan to strike foreign territory should be eliminated with highest priority. The U.S. Forces cut will require hard negotiations with the United States. It may be difficult indeed, but not impossible, because it is the policy of the United States that it does not insist on stationing specific forces if it risks the partnership of its allies.
Such voluntary disarmament efforts of Japan, accompanied by arms control talks on specific weapons such as conventional ballistic missiles will set the precedence for a more comprehensive disarmament regime and then common security beyond missile defense will come into sight as a realistic goal.
This paper was written for the conference "The Challenge of Hiroshima. Alternatives to Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization in a Northeast Asian Context" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on October 8-11, 2004, in Hiroshima, Japan.
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