China’s Nuclear Policy
Ye Ru’an
Of all five nuclear weapon states, China and its nuclear policy are very unique. Unlike the two nuclear giants – the United States and Russia – that maintain overwhelmingly huge nuclear arsenals, China’s nuclear force has remained at a very low level in the past four decades; and unlike the United Kingdom and France that are major allies of the United States, China is a non-allied developing country that pursues an independent foreign policy for peace.
On the day when China detonated its first atomic bomb 40 years ago, the Chinese Government solemnly declared to the world that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. Later, China made the commitment unilaterally and unconditionally not to use and threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. This short paper tries to address three questions: 1.What drove China to go nuclear? 2. What is China’s nuclear policy? 3. What is the future orientation of China’s nuclear weapons development?
China’s Decision to Make the Bomb – A Historical Perspective
For more than a century, from the Opium War in 1840 through the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Chinese nation had undergone untold sufferings caused by foreign aggression and subjugation and decades of civil wars. Immediately after China’s War of Resistance against Japan was over, the United States began to give full support to Chiang Kai-shek and his regime politically, militarily, and economically in fighting against the Chinese Communists and the People’s Liberation Army. However, after three years of bitter fighting, Chiang was utterly defeated and fled to Taiwan Province.
When the New China was born in October 1949, the whole country was in shambles, extremely poor, and backward with a meager economic and industrial base. Everything was crying out to be done for national rehabilitation and reconstruction. But the United States, already possessing nuclear weapons at the time, adopted a hostile and confrontational policy toward China. Under the so-called “domino theory,” the United States was intent to “roll back” the “Communist advance” and strangle the New China in its cradle.
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, hundreds of thousands of US troops quickly moved to the Sino-Korean border. American military aircraft frequently intruded into Chinese airspace in East and Northeast China, and American bombs were dropped in Shanghai and Shenyang. In the meantime, the US dispatched troops to station on Taiwan and brought atomic weapons into Japan. The US military encirclement of and economic embargo against China posed an extremely grave threat to China’s security and survival.
What was more serious, in the early 1950s the US repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons against China. For instance, in the US Administration’s policy documents formulated in 1953, it was stated that the United States would regard nuclear weapons as usable as other weapons in a military conflict with China and that once a full-scale conflict with China should break out, the US might launch decisive strikes at Chinese forces and facilities with all kinds of weapons, and if necessary, use a considerable proportion of atomic weapons. At a news conference in March 1955, President Eisenhower alleged that if war broke out in the Far East, the United States would use tactical nuclear weapons.
It was under such circumstances that Chinese leaders made the decision in 1956 on the research and development of nuclear weapons, with or without Soviet help. It was true that the Soviet Union did provide some assistance to China in the initial period of research on the peaceful use of atomic energy in the first couple of years. However, by 1959 and 1960, when Sino-Soviet relations began to rapidly deteriorate, the Soviet side withdrew all specialists, blueprints, and equipment. It was under these extraordinary circumstances that China was compelled to make the bomb by itself.
As noted in numerous statements of Chinese leaders and government documents over the decades, the sole purpose of China’s development of nuclear weapons was to resist nuclear threats and blackmail against China and exclusively for self-defense. Therefore, China’s nuclear weapons pose no threat to any other country. This has been substantiated over the decades not only by China’s consistent stand on promoting international nuclear arms control and disarmament, but by China’s handling of its foreign relations. China has never threatened to use nuclear weapons against any country, nuclear or non-nuclear, even when bilateral relations were at odds or in crisis, or in border conflicts with neighboring countries.
This brief account indicates that the US nuclear threat was the main driving force that compelled China to develop its own atomic bomb. This threat has not been removed even today as the United States still maintains an overwhelming force with thousands of strategic offensive nuclear warheads augmented by emerging missile defense systems. China remains one of the countries targeted with a pre-emptive nuclear strike as publicly disclosed in the latest US Nuclear Posture Review.
Major Elements of China’s Nuclear Policy
1. What is the role of nuclear weapons in China’s foreign and defense policy?
In other words, what is China’s nuclear strategy? To my mind, there has never been use of a single term or set phrase that defines China’s nuclear strategy in official Chinese policy pronouncements or documents. Nor is it correct to describe China’s nuclear strategy by borrowing Western terminologies. However, it is not so difficult to understand China’s strategic concept or policy thinking with regard to nuclear weapons. To be accurate, perhaps I should first quote the official Chinese line as follows:
“China consistently upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and adopts an extremely restrained attitude toward the development of nuclear weapons. China has never participated in any nuclear arms race and never deployed nuclear weapons abroad. China’s limited nuclear counterattack ability is entirely for deterrence against possible nuclear attacks by other countries.”[1]
First of all, “no-first use”, in my view, is the core element of China’s nuclear policy. Of all nuclear weapon states, China is the only country that has undertaken not to use nuclear weapons first at any time and under any circumstances and is unconditionally committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-free zones.
Back in the early 1980s, China first proposed for the conclusion of a treaty on no-first use of nuclear weapons to be signed by all nuclear weapons states. In January 1994, China put forth a formal proposal with a draft treaty to the UN on this issue. At the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in April 2000, China again called for such a joint commitment by all nuclear states so as to strengthen the NPT. And in September 1994, China and Russia signed a joint statement on “no-first use” and mutual non-targeting of strategic nuclear weapons. But the United States refused to make the same commitment bilaterally with China on “no-first use.” If all nuclear weapon states concluded such a treaty, and strictly abide by it, it would greatly promote nuclear reductions, dampen nuclear arms races, and at the same time better persuade some non-nuclear weapons states to give up their intention to possess nuclear weapons for fear of nuclear attack or blackmail. This would greatly enhance the NPT and the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and create favorable conditions for achieving the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons in the world.
Secondly, China’ unilateral commitment on “no-first use” (and unconditional “no-use” against non-nuclear states and nuclear-free zones) clearly indicates that China’s nuclear weapons are exclusively for self-defense as a necessary means to deter any nuclear attack or as a last resort for retaliation if it suffers from a nuclear attack.
Thirdly, the self-defensive nature of China’s nuclear weapons and its “no-first use” policy pre-determine that China takes an extremely restrained approach in its nuclear weapons development (in both quantitative and qualitative terms). As China’s nuclear weapons are not for offense, there is no intention or motivation for China to have a high nuclear force level, nor to engage in a nuclear arms race. So, the bottom line of China’s nuclear development is to maintain a very small nuclear force with credible survivability and effective retaliatory capability.
In other words, as it may be inferred, China pursues a nuclear strategy of minimum deterrence for self-defense. This is best illustrated by the fact that in the past four decades, the number of China’s nuclear weapons has remained to be a very small proportion of the nuclear arsenals of either the United States or Russia (far smaller of their strategic weapons), and by the total number of nuclear weapons tests conducted by China (45) as compared with that of the US (1,030) and Russia (715) on record. It should be noted with emphasis that while the two nuclear superpowers were locked in their hectic, mirror-imaging nuclear arms race for global rivalry between the 1950s and the 1980s, China’s efforts for nuclear weapons development had remained restrained and modest, even when Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations became very tense and confrontational at one time or another.
2. China’s position on and efforts for nuclear arms control and nonproliferation:
Ever since China recovered its legitimate seat in the United Nations in 1971, and especially in the past two decades, China has been making tremendous efforts to promote international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As early as in March 1986, China proposed that as the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, should assume special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and take the lead in stopping the testing, manufacturing, and deployment of their nuclear weapons of all descriptions and undertake drastic reduction and destruction of the dismantled nuclear weapons, so as to create favorable conditions for convening a broadly represented international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear weapons states.
China has joined many other countries in sponsoring or endorsing hundreds of UN resolutions on nuclear reduction, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear non-proliferation over the past three decades. China’s accession to the NPT in 1992 was a milestone in its nuclear non-proliferation policy and is a great contribution to the universalization of this important treaty and the reinforcement of the overall international non-proliferation system. Moreover, China has persistently, actively, and earnestly been participating in the multilateral disarmament negotiations at Geneva on all agenda items and has made great contributions to the negotiations on and conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and voluntarily placed its civilian nuclear facilities under the IAEA Safeguards and signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between China and the IAEA in 1998, being the first nuclear weapon state that has completed the domestic legal procedures for its entry into force. China became a member of the Zangger Committee in 1997. It supports IAEA efforts for the prevention of potential nuclear terrorist activities and takes an active part in the revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.
Moreover, China has consistently supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) and signed and ratified the relevant protocols to NWFZ treaties in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlateloco), South Pacific (Rarotonga), and Africa (Pelindaba). China has also committed to signing such a treaty (Bangkok) in Southeast Asia, and supports the initiative to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia. As is known to all, China has been playing a unique role in the last few years, making an utmost effort to host several rounds of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing for a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.
3. Tightening domestic regulation and export control:
Being well aware of its international commitments to and responsibility for international nuclear non-proliferation, the Chinese Government has been making great efforts in strengthening domestic regulations and export control over sensitive and dual-use nuclear items in the past decade and more. In recent years in particular, the Government has kept strengthening the building of a national legal system to bolster nonproliferation under the principle of rule of law to ensure effective enforcement of its non-proliferation policy.
China has widely adopted the current international standards of non-proliferation export control, integrating multinational export control mechanisms and successful experience of other countries with its own national conditions. The Government has formulated and enforced a good number of laws and regulations which form an integrate system for the export control of WMD-related items. It has adopted almost all existing international practices such as licensing system, end-user and end-use certification, list control method, the principle of non-proliferation-oriented examination and approval, “catch-all” principle, penalties, etc.
In the nuclear field in particular, China has persisted in exercising tight controls over nuclear exports and nuclear materials. In the nuclear materials control, since its accession to the IAEA, China has established a “State System for the Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Materials,” and a “Nuclear Materials Security System” that measures up to the requirements of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. In 1987, The Chinese Government issued the “Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Materials.” Under the Regulations, it instituted a licensing system for nuclear materials control, the application for and examination and issuance of nuclear materials licenses, the management of nuclear materials accounts, the accountancy of nuclear materials, the physical protection of nuclear materials, and relevant rewards and penalties. China’s nuclear export is handled exclusively by the companies designated by the State Council.
China adheres to the three principles of “guarantee for peaceful use only, acceptance of the safeguards of the IAEA and no re-transfer to any third country without the prior consent of the Chinese Government.” In the “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Export” issued in 1997, it is further stated that China pursues a policy of not advocating, not encouraging and not engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons, not providing any assistance to any nuclear facility that is not placed under IAEA Safeguards, not providing nuclear exports to it, and not conducting personnel and technological exchange or cooperation with it. The regulations also provide a rigorous examination system for nuclear export, severe punishment for violations, and a comprehensive, detailed control list.
Future Orientation of China’s Nuclear Weapon Development
Every now and then, some people in the world play up with the fallacy of a “China threat.” They are painting a threatening picture about China’s defense efforts and nuclear modernization. This can be found in media reports and comments or official statements and documents in certain countries.
It is universally acknowledged that strengthening and modernizing national defense is a key guarantee for protecting a country’s security and national interests. China is no exception. It is true that along with its economic growth, China’s defense expenditure has increased in recent years. In proportion to the gross domestic product (GDP), the annual defense spending had increased from 1.09% in 1995 to 1.50% in 2001. The increase is attributable to many items of expenditure, such as rising salary and allowance for both active servicemen and retired officers, more expenses for improving housing and social security, increased cost of maintenance (other than weapons and equipment maintenance), demobilization and rehabilitation funds, cost for international cooperation in anti-terrorism activities, etc., in addition to the improvement of military equipment. However, China’s defense expenditure has remained at a fairly low level as compared with other major powers.
As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, despite possible reduction and de-activation of a portion of US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, the two nuclear superpowers will still retain large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. They, the United States in particular, are continuing to make vigorous efforts to modernize their nuclear forces with state-of-the-art technologies. In view of this, in order to ensure for national security and the effectiveness and survivability of its own nuclear force (smallest of the N-5), China has to make necessary but modest efforts for modernization. However, it can be said for certain that China will continue to restrain itself in future, as much as in the past, in its nuclear weapons development. I think that in observing or estimating China’s effort for nuclear modernization or the modernization of national defense, one should bear in mind the following three determining factors that underpin long-term prospects of China’s national defense:
Basic national conditions:
China has a huge population of more than 1.3 billion, which accounts for about 20% of the world’s total, but its arable land is only 7% of that of the world. Moreover, natural resources in China are not abundant for a rapidly developing economy, which is still at a fairly low level despite the rapid growth in the past two decades and more. At present, China’s per capita GDP is only about US$ 1,000, which is a tiny proportion of that of all developed countries. This will not fundamentally change in many decades from now.
Long-term national development strategy:
In view of the above, economic development and improvement of people’s living standards are and will be the top priority and the central task for the government and the whole nation. In 1979, Mr. Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese leadership laid down this fundamental national development strategy and policy guideline. Its implementation since then has brought about see changes all over the country. This guideline has been fully supported by people of the whole country as it conforms to their vital interest and ensures for national prosperity and long-term political and social stability. This will not change either, irrespective of leadership change.
Independent foreign policy for peace:
Peace and development are the common aspiration of all peoples in the world. China has been pursuing a foreign policy for peace ever since the founding of the People’s Republic. China supports efforts for peaceful settlement of international disputes through dialog and negotiation, opposes policies of war, aggression, and expansion, and is against arms race, nuclear or conventional. As China has entered a new phase of development at the beginning of this century, it all the more needs a peaceful international environment and maintains stable, good-neighborly relations with countries on its periphery. In recent years, the Chinese Government has been making unremitting efforts to develop friendly and cooperative relations with all countries far and wide, and especially with our close neighbors. This will enable China to use its limited resources more for economic development and social welfare, less for national defense.
The conclusion is: China was compelled to develop nuclear weapons under nuclear threats and blackmail; China maintains a small but effective nuclear force only for self-defense purposes, which poses no threat to any other country; and China will continue to exercise utmost restraint in its nuclear weapons development and modernization in future.
This paper was written for the conference "The Challenge of Hiroshima. Alternatives to Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization in a Northeast Asian Context" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on October 8-11, 2004, in Hiroshima, Japan.
|
 |
