International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Russian Perceptions and Prospects for Nuclear Weapons Reductions in Northeast Asia

Eugene Miasnikov

Russia considers the Northeastern part of Asia a very important area. Two of Russia’s largest federal regions – the Siberian and the Far East regions – represent about 2/3 of the whole Russian territory (see Table 1). The territory of these regions is larger than that of the United States or China. At the same time their population is relatively small and comparable with that of North Korea or Taiwan.

The Eastern part of Russia is rich with natural resources including oil, natural gas, metals, etc. In particular, proved oil resources in the region are estimated as 1.3 billion tons,^[2] which is almost 20% of the total Russian proved reserves. At the same time, the territory of Eastern Russia is not well explored yet, so that some experts believe that oil resources are larger by an order of magnitude.^[3] Production of oil in this area is also comparatively low. Only 0.5% of the total Russian oil is produced here.^[4] If oil production is increased and an appropriate transportation system is created, the Siberian and the Far Eastern oil could become an attractive import option for China, Japan, and South Korea, as demand for energy resources grows in these countries.

The situation with natural gas is similar (see Table 3) – rich resources, a scantily explored territory, low production, and a great potential for export to other countries in Northeast Asia.

What is the level of economic cooperation of Russia with its neighbors in this region?

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States considered Northeast Asia as well as any other part of the world as an area of competition for projecting their influence. For different reasons there was very little economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan, South Korea, or China. Meanwhile, the situation has changed and economic relations are improving. The total mutual commodity circulation that reflects economic cooperation has grown rapidly (see Table 4). On the other hand, figures for total commodity circulation show that neither the countries of Northeast Asia nor Russia consider each other as major economic partners. There is still a great potential for joint cooperation.

The demographic situation in the Russian East is growing ever more complex (Table 5). Even at the time of the Soviet Union, the region was not economically self-sustained. The federal center subsidized the region, but the investments were halted after the collapse of the Soviet Union, so that the population found itself in a very complicated situation. As a result, many people chose to move to the Western regions of Russia. The population of the Siberian and Far East regions dropped by nearly 12% during the last eleven years, and it is very difficult to stop this tendency, because the population of Russia as a whole is diminishing. In particular, it dropped by almost 4 million people since 1992.^[8]

At the same time, a high demographic pressure comes from China, where the density of population is much higher. Depending on the area taken into account, the density of population to the south of the Russian-Chinese border exceeds that to the north by a factor from 15 to 30.^[10] In particular, about 100-120 million people live in the Heilongjiang province alone, which neighbors the Primorsk Krai and the Khabarovsk Region. The majority of the population is relatively poor, and the unemployment rate is high. Since the Russian border has been opened for Chinese at the end of the 1980s, many have traveled to Russia as merchants or temporary workers.

The decline of the population and the Russian governments inability to change this tendency gave rise to public concerns over the potential sinofication of the Eastern regions of Russia. Although there are different views on the seriousness of the problem and how to deal with it, experts in general agree that on the longer term Russia may face a Kosovo-like scenario if migrants from neighboring countries eventually make up the majority of the population and therefore dominate the local political power. Thus, Russian politicians frequently raise concerns about the possible loss of control over the Eastern part of Russia not as a result of general war with China or another country, but as a consequence of demographic changes in the region. It should be mentioned that Chinese authorities understand the problem and currently act responsibly. However, it is quite clear that any joint development of the regional resources like oil and gas will require an additional workforce. China is a very attractive source of cheap labor for the region. At the same time, the Russian authorities will have to find ways of keeping control over the migration process.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons and Prospects for Reductions

The level of military confrontation between nuclear powers in the region has substantially decreased since 1980s. The bulk of todays military forces is a legacy of the history. Both Russia and China continue to downsize their forces. Even though military budgets are increasing, modernization still continues, although at a slower pace. At the same time, inferior by quantity but thus far superior by quality of its arms, Russia feels that it needs nuclear weapons to maintain a balance of forces.^[11]

Currently, about 20% of the deployed Russian strategic nuclear forces remain in the Eastern part of Russia (see Table 7). As strategic forces shrink, the pace of reductions in the region is the fastest. In particular, three of the four divisions of the Russian Strategic Forces that have been disbanded since 2000 were located here. And the reductions will continue. Most likely, the SS-18 base at Uzhur will be closed down after 2010. The future of the SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is also uncertain, as they are getting older. The submarine base on the Kamchatka peninsula will likely no longer host strategic submarines once the last Delta-III nuclear submarines will be retired. Thus, perhaps, the only place where strategic forces will remain in this part of Russia is Ukrainka, the home of strategic bombers.

As deployment of strategic nuclear forces in the Eastern part of Russia is curtailed, non-strategic nuclear weapons in the region may be assigned a stronger role. According to the authors assessment, nearly one third of the 3,300 Russian non-strategic weapons^[15] are assigned for deployment with general-purpose forces in the Siberian and Far Eastern military districts (see Table 8). All of these weapons are currently kept at central storage facilities of the 12th Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces. In case of hostilities they can be deployed with surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-ship, antisubmarine missiles, and other dual-use means of the Ground, Air, and Naval Forces.

Estimates of deployed nuclear forces of China are largely speculative and variable. According to U.S. experts, China deploys about 400 nuclear warheads.^[17] Russian expert estimates of the total Chinese arsenal are about two times higher (about 700 warheads).^[18] The nuclear forces of China will likely grow numerically in response to the buildup of the US missile defense systems.

Fortunately, the current situation in the region is quite stable. Russia reduces its strategic forces deployed in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. There are no signs that Russian non-strategic forces would grow there either. If China builds up its nuclear forces, the current pace is slow. However, it is quite clear that the current state of affairs cannot be preserved indefinitely. In particular, the existing situation reduces chances to open a productive dialog on transparency of non-strategic nuclear weapons between Russia, the US, and NATO.^[19] A way to break this deadlock could be to initiate talks between Russia and China on possible bilateral confidence-building measures in the nuclear area. Such discussions could involve both governmental and independent experts and become an important step toward improving security in Northeast Asia.

Conclusions

Several observations can be made from the above:

Russia is interested in a stable and peaceful development of its Eastern territories. It does not see an immediate external military threat from China or other countries in Northeast Asia, but Russia is concerned with the potential emergence of such a threat in future.

There is a great potential for growth of mutually beneficial economic cooperation between Russia and countries in Northeast Asia. However, the development of natural resources in Siberia and the Far East may create a complex demographic situation and provoke distrust and tensions in the region.

With respect to the regional situation in Northeast Asia, Russia considers its nuclear forces as an equalizer in a balance of military forces and as a “hedge” against potentially undesirable developments in the future (e.g. a Kosovo-like conflict or war).

In order to support a regional military balance, Russia may place more emphasis on non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to its armed forces in Northeast Asia while its strategic forces shrink.

There is a need to start developing transparency and confidencebuilding measures between China and Russia on nuclear forces in order to achieve further reductions of nuclear arsenals.

This paper was written for the conference "The Challenge of Hiroshima. Alternatives to Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization in a Northeast Asian Context" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on October 8-11, 2004, in Hiroshima, Japan.

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The figures for the population of Russia are taken from official data of the State Committee on Statistics (www.gks.ru) and correspond to January 1, 2004. Figures for other countries are taken from: Naseleniye i Obshestvo (Population and Society), N 74, August 2003, Information Bulletin of the Center for Demography and Human Ecology at the Institute of National Economy Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences. New Projects for Production and Export of Oil: Northern, Southern and Eastern Directions on the Russian Oil Compass, Analytical report, The Center for Policy Issues, 2003. V. Yakubovskii, Prospects for the Formation of Multilateral Cooperation on Energy in Northeast Asia: The Role of Russia, Presentation at the Moscow Carnegie Center, February 19, 2004; www.carnegie.ru/ru/news/69818.htm. Ibid. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov. Ibid. The table is compiled from data published in Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official statements; www.mid.ru; Vilya Gelbras, The Chinese Factor of Russian Internal and External Policy, in: G.Vitkovskaya and D. Trenin (ed.), Prospects for the Russian Far East: Crossborder Cooperation, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, June 1999; CIA, op. cit. The population of Russia was estimated at 148 million in 1992; see: Dire Demographic Trends Cast a Shadow on Russias Future, RAND Study, RB-5054, 2001). The data for 1993 and 1998 were taken from: Galina Vitkovskaya and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, New Stolypin Policies in the Far East: Hopes and Realities, in: G. Vitkovskaya and D. Trenin, op.cit. The figures for 2004 are taken from official data of the State Committee on Statistics; . Galina Vitkovskaya and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, op.cit. See for example: Alexei Arbatov, Russian Security and the Western Connection, in: John Newhouse (ed.), Assessing the Threats, Center for Defense Information, Washington D.C., July 2002, pp. 69-84. The Military Balance, 2004-2005, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004. Includes Marine Corps. Data from START I Memorandum of Understanding of January 31, 2004. More detailed information can be found in: Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov, and Timur Kadyshev, Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons. Problems of Control and Reduction, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT, Dolgoprudny, May 2004; www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/nsnw0406.htm. Data for 1998 are taken from: William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock, Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998, March 1998. Data for 2004 are authors estimates. NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November-December 2003. Vyacheslav Baskakov and Alexandr Gorshkov, Beijings Nuclear and Missile Arsenal, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, July 12, 2002. This topic is discussed in more detail in: Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov, and Timur Kadyshev, op.cit.

Eugene Miasnikov is Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 9, Institutski per., Dolgoprudny, Moscow 141700, Russia; tel. +7-095-408 63 81; miasnikov@armscontrol.ru; http://www.armscontrol.ru.