Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Programs
Technical Approaches
Jungmin Kang
The second round of six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue held in Beijing, China on February 25-28, 2004, saw certain agreements on major principles, such as the nonnuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but failed to make any progress on the most urgent issues such as North Korea’s controversial highly enriched uranium (HEU) program and on details such as freezing and dismantling the North Korean nuclear programs, both those based on the plutonium program and on the HEU program, and the compensation that would follow. The result of the talks is that the six nations agreed to hold more senior-level talks before July 2004 and to form a lower-level working group to handle details, but without any breakthrough in the issues.
Background
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula increased due to the North Korean plutonium program, and the prospect of war hung over the peninsula in June of 1994. Fortunately, following three high-level negotiations between the US and North Korea, the two countries concluded the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework (so-called Agreed Framework) to produce an overall settlement of the nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula on October 21, 1994, and calmed the crisis on the Korean peninsula.
Until December 2002, the Agreed Framework had frozen the North Korean plutonium program in return for the supply of two light water reactors (LWR) and 500,000 tons of Heavy Fuel Oil annually to North Korea.
However, North Korea lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear program and expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in December 2002 because the US halted its shipment of Heavy Fuel Oil in November 2002, accusing North Korea of having a secret HEU program in violation of the Agreed Framework. At that point, LWR construction was far behind schedule. The second North Korean nuclear crisis has begun then.
Since then, the situation on the Korean peninsula has continued to deteriorate. According to Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, a Senior Fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory who visited Yongbyon on January 8, 2004, the 5 MWe reactor has been restarted and the spent fuel pond, in which about 8,000 spent fuel rods had been stored, was empty. North Korea claimed to have processed all 8,000 spent fuel rods to extract plutonium during one continuous campaign between mid-January and the end of June 2003. North Korea showed Dr. Hecker what was claimed to be a sample of plutonium metal produced during that campaign.
There were a couple of attempts to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully among the interested nations: the three-party talks in April 2003 (China, North Korea, and the United States), and the first six-party talks in August 2003 (China, Japan, North Korea, Russian Federation, South Korea, the United States). However, they just resulted in confirming each side’s arguments between the US and North Korea.
The US has persistently demanded complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the North Korean nuclear programs, both plutonium- and HEU-based. The United States did not back down from making this demand throughout the second round of six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear program that were held in Beijing, China, in February 2004. North Korea has denied its HEU program and strongly refused the US demand of “CVID.”
Even though the U.S. welcomed the results of the second six-party talks, North Korea regarded the talks as having “no positive result.” The results of the talks were that the six nations agreed to hold more senior-level talks before July and form a lowerlevel working group to handle details, but without any breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear issues.
The North Korean Plutonium Program
According to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, North Korea might have removed a sufficient amount of spent fuel to contain up to about 11 kg plutonium from the 5 MWe reactor, including spent fuel containing plutonium from the IRT-2000 research reactor at Yongbyon.
North Korea removed and stored about 8,000 spent fuel rods containing about 25-30 kg plutonium from the 5 MWe reactor since 1994. North Korea claims to have processed all these 8000 spent fuel rods to extract plutonium by the end of June 2003.
As of January 8, 2004, the 5 MWe reactor has been in operation, and another 8000 fuel rods have been loaded since early 2002. About 6 kg plutonium produced annually will be accumulated in the 8,000 fuel rods if the 5 MWe reactor continues its operation.
More than 50 kg plutonium annually would be produced at the 50 MWe reactor at Yongbyon and more than and 200 kg at the 200 MWe reactor at Taechon once their construction is finished. However, this will take at least another two years.
The maximum capacity of the Yongbyon reprocessing facility is known to be about 0.38 t spent fuel daily, up to about 0.76 t spent fuel if the second reprocessing line in the same facility is constructed. This means that 8,000 spent fuel rods with a weight of 50 t could be reprocessed within 132 days if North Korea reprocessed 0.38 t spent fuel daily. However, the practical capacity of the Yongbyon reprocessing facility would be much lower than this because the facility has been frozen for a decade, even though its maintenance has been kept.
The North Korean HEU Program
According to the US government, North Korea acknowledged its secret HEU program when James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of the US State Department, visited Pyongyang in October 2002. However, it is said that Kelly told the North Korean officials that the US knew that North Korea was violating the Agreed Framework by covertly enriching uranium, but that he did not produce any evidence. North Korea has denied its HEU program. The existence of a North Korean HEU program is still controversial.
The HEU production capability of North Korea depends on the number of centrifuges North Korea has. One centrifuge could produce up to about 30 g of weapon-grade HEU annually, with approximately five separate work units. Therefore, at least 850 centrifuges are needed to produce 25 kg weapon-grade HEU, which the IAEA defines as the “significant amount” of weapon-grade HEU needed to build one bomb. This assumes that all centrifuges would actually be in continuous operation the whole year.
North Korea could not make centrifuges by itself, considering its low level of industrial technology. The typical rotor of centrifuge is spun rapidly at 50,000-70,000 rpm. The North Korea would need to smuggle quite a large number of centrifuges from abroad to produce a significant amount of HEU.
The following statement of John Bolton, Under-Secretary of the US State Department, implies the current status of HEU production capability of North Korea. According to Fred McGoldrick, a nuclear consultant, in 2003, John Bolton said “What we have said publicly and in consultation is not that the North Koreans have nuclear weapons produced through the uranium enrichment program” but that the North Koreans “are seeking a production scope capability to produce weapons-grade uranium.”
Priority of Concerns
Besides using spent fuel containing up to about 11 kg plutonium that North Korea might have extracted before 1994, North Korea already has separated, as it claimed, or could soon separate 25-30 kg plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods. The 5 MWe reactor, in operation since early 2002, could produce another 6 kg plutonium annually in its reloaded 8000 fuel rods. Accumulation of plutonium in the fuel rods increases with time.
Considering the low industrial technology of North Korea and the large number of centrifuges and timeconsuming job needed to produce HEU, North Korea is not expected to produce significant amounts of HEU in the near future.
Therefore, we need to pay more attention to stopping the progress of the North Korean plutonium program rather than the HEU program.
Concluding Remarks
First of all, North Korea should immediately re-freeze its re-started plutonium program and accept the return of the IAEA inspectors for confirmation.
Secondly, North Korea should be co-operative on the process of verification of its plutonium produced and separated recently and/or before 1994, with inspections performed by the IAEA or other special inspection groups. Since 100% verification cannot be achieved, the US and North Korea should negotiate on the verification level of the North Korean plutonium program. It would take more than 3-4 years to finish the verification even if North Korea is willing to be very cooperative.
Thirdly, after verification, North Korea should be cooperative in the process of dismantlement of its nuclear facilities relevant to plutonium production and separation.
The above recommendations are based on the assumption that the US and North Korea reached the same conclusion in removing the North Korean nuclear program by whatever negotiations.
Regarding the controversial North Korean HEU program, the US should have technical talks with North Korea to discuss the US beliefs about the program. If the US is chanting the term “CVID” like a mantra, the North Korean HEU issue cannot be resolved. Detection of an HEU program is very difficult because of the characteristics of the enrichment process of uranium. Unless North Korea makes the unlikely decision to allow all its military bases and underground bunkers to be subjected to inspections, nuclear inspections would be impossible.
