The PSI and Unipolarity
Realities of a Bitter Age
Luis Gutiérrez Esparza
Last year, on May 31, 2003, in the royal castle of Wawel, Krakow, during a state visit to Poland, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered another forceful blow to world peace. This latest onslaught is part of the hegemonic strategy of absolute domination that the Bush administration has assumed in its efforts to consolidate a unipolar vision of the world that the international community rejects with certain timidity but – with a few exceptions – has ended up accepting in real life.
The so-called “Krakow initiative” or, more formally, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), is in principle aimed at halting the trafficking and increase in weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In formalizing his proposal, Bush’s explanation was as follows: “The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. And we must work together to stop proliferation. … When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them.”
Although he attempted to cloak his words in the rhetoric of legality, the U.S. President promoted and continues to promote a dependent mechanism used by Washington, outside the confines of the United Nations, to control international air space and maritime routes. Initially, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom responded to the call, emphasizing – according to an official statement from the White House released on September 4 – “the need for proactive measures to combat the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”
The goal, to be sure, appears worthy of approval. In practice, however, other nations – Brazil, China, Canada, Russia, South Korea, India, and Pakistan, for the time being – have expressed their concern that the United States seeks to use an instrument of such a scope to strengthen its supremacy in the production of cutting-edge nuclear, ballistic, biological, and chemical technology and to control global transportation routes.
If the PSI is indeed concretized as conceived by Bush and his strategists, Washington will monopolize espionage, the interception of ships on the high seas and aircraft in international air space, and multilateral control devices, all under the pretext of the simple suspicion that WMD or their components could be in transit.
The countries that openly oppose the U.S. proposal have pointed to the danger of a quite flexible interpretation of the legal basis for intercepting international transport, as understood by Washington. A first consequence would be the displacement of other producers of weapons and chemical, biological, and nuclear products, in benefit of the U.S. industrial complex.
According to the interpretation offered by the Bush administration, almost all cutting-edge technology products can be used in the production of WMD and for the same reason, they can be subject to confiscation by the United States and its allies. This immediately and directly threatens compliance with purchasesale contracts worldwide and with free international trade, which would become a virtual monopoly of large U.S. corporations and, to a lesser extent, Washington’s European and Asian partners.
The threat of bioterrorism, for example, which has still not thus far been concretized in specific incidents, has allowed Washington to unilaterally impose much stricter measures of control over foodstuffs and agricultural products exported to the United States and its allied or nearby countries. This, in reality, is an instrument of pressure on exporter countries, which contradicts the norms of the World Trade Organization.
In this sense, the law on bioterrorism is, from the point of view of the Latin American countries, a new and virtually impenetrable barrier to the development of free international trade in agricultural products. This measure, coupled with the U.S. government’s protectionist measures, will sooner than later cause the collapse of the economies in the region.
To be sure, no one can have doubts on the importance of strengthening measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in this sense, Bush’s initiative is aimed in the right direction. However, the way in which its functioning has been structured moves away from such real and desirable objectives, to become an element of hegemonic domination.
The principles that should prevail in the Proliferation Security Initiative should respect international law and the system of norms accepted within the framework of the United Nations. Otherwise, the blow to world legality will be devastating and perhaps definitive.
Nuclear Proliferation Horizontally…
Meanwhile, the number of countries able to produce nuclear weapons now reaches 35 to 40. The most recent members of the club are India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Others, whose respective histories in this regard are surrounded by the veil of secrecy and good doses of clandestine operations, include Israel, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil. In addition, there are those that are currently considering the possibility of joining the group, such as Japan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. An environment of uncertainty and volatility with regard to global security precipitate such decisions, even if for diverse circumstances some nations – such as Iraq and Libya – have had to suspend their activities in this respect, due to economic considerations and external pressures.
International terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda have tried to obtain nuclear weapons and perhaps already have some. The basic knowledge on how to manufacture an atomic bomb has spread indiscriminately, even in easy to access manuals, and the necessary components for such weapons often lack adequate monitoring. Al Qaeda, for example, thanks to the efforts of the great master of global terrorism, Osama bin Laden, managed to obtain technical assistance from the Pakistani nuclear program. Its participation in the high-level drug trade represents a constant access to fresh funds, even though Bin Laden’s personal fortune continues to clock in at around 30 billion dollars. Thus, the elite squadrons of al Qaeda have the resources – if they wish – to develop nuclear arms and to acquire missiles or other devices that can be deployed against specific targets.
The construction of a rudimentary atomic bomb by a person of average intelligence is not an impossible task. The hypothetical individual would need to acquire enough uranium, but it would not have to be of the highly enriched type, in the case of a rather primitive, but not less murderous, bomb. An imaginative, highly motivated person with certain basic abilities could cause truly catastrophic damage with a nuclear bomb of this nature.
… and Vertically
At the same time, the new U.S. nuclear doctrine announced by President Bush that proclaims Washington’s right to launch preventive attacks with nuclear weapons, against countries considered hostile that have or could have arsenals of this nature, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, has caused an inevitable response on the part of those who, quite rightfully, feel that their security is threatened.
For the same reason, Russia and China began to modernize their nuclear arsenals with new submarines capable of firing missiles with multiple nuclear warheads and new intercontinental ballistic missiles. The latter are the most terrifying of all, because they can bring death foretold in a guaranteed mutual destruction from one end of the world to the other.
This qualitative modernization is a form of vertical proliferation that is in opposition to nations’ commitments to nuclear disarmament, according to Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (known as NPT). The collapse of the non-proliferation system is evident. Nuclear proliferation continues despite the existence of a series of international agreements designed to prevent it. The illegal traffic in nuclear arms, the violations of the treaties, and the contempt with which the United States has been acting, particularly during the administrations of Bush Sr., Ronald Reagan, and Bush Jr., have combined to make the non- proliferation system of little value and irrelevant.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Director General feels that the NPT is obsolete because, in fact, it has already experienced a generalized collapse. Based on this reality, a rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons can be predicted among nations, transnational terrorist groups, organized crime, and individuals whose motivation is ideological, religious, or simply mercenary. This will occur unless a new non-proliferation system that is well structured, solid, and obligatory, replaces the one that was gradually destroyed by the hegemonic ambitions of the U.S. government and that of several of its most well-known allies.
Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of the martyred city of Hiroshima and President of Mayors for Peace, an organization that represents 580 cities with much more than 250 million inhabitants, declared that “we are against the idea that some one could, for any reason that he considers legitimate, unleash a nuclear holocaust… We are against the idea that trillions of dollars should be spent on total nuclear destruction while billions of people live in the worst conditions of poverty that place their very lives in danger.
Our immediate target is nuclear weapons, but our long term goal is a new world order… (in which) no one should kill or be killed to defend the wealth or ego of their master… in which we do not see ourselves surrounded by enemies, murderers, thieves against whom we have to defend ourselves, but rather sisters and brothers in whom we can depend for our security, our survival, and our well-being.”
The truth is, that “Nuclear terror has ruled our lives since 1945. As the types, numbers, delivery methods, and owners of nuclear weapons have proliferated, the terror has deepened. The terror is deeply buried, because it is so painful. For two or three generations now, we have been living on the edge of eco-catastrophe, the possibility of ending all life on earth with a man-made nuclear winter.”
This idea, advanced by Dr. Carol Wolman, the eminent U. S. psychiatrist, human rights activist, and a brave and magnificent fighter against nuclear weapons, has taken on new relevance. Besides promoting the PSI and the pre-emptive nuclear attack doctrine, the Bush administration is determined to re-activate the nuclear arms race, even though it potentially represents the most serious threat to the survival of humankind and, in general, to every form of life on the planet that we inhabit.
Bush, an illegitimate President, whose election was the result of a virtual coup d’état, has ignored or repudiated the U.S.’ international commitments to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, especially, of nuclear weapons. One after another, he has repudiated such treaties, minimized their importance or, simply, ignored them. At this moment, the Bush administration is moving toward a unilateral abrogation of the most important treaty in the field, which requires the North Americans and Russians – who posses the largest nuclear weapons arsenals – to take decisive steps to eliminate this form of terrorism, the worst that exists, and which is moreover and unquestionably much more destructive than the actions perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists.
Motivated and supported by the U.S. industrial complex, Bush and his accomplices virtually pulled from out of their sleeves the theory of nuclear mini-bombs, which, with five kilotons of power, would be acceptable – according to the theory of the Christian fundamentalists who maneuver the President of the United States at their whim and constitute the real power of the new right – for use in limited wars, such as the unilateral and illegal aggressions against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
It is likely that, on the eve of the presidential elections, Bush and his accomplices will abstain from openly renouncing the treaty banning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But with the publicity coup involving the capture of Saddam Hussein and the impressive credulity of an important segment of the U.S. population, President Bush seems to have his re-election sown up. If this turns out to indeed be the case, Bush would not be inclined to accept obstacles in the way of implementing his main strategic designs. These include imposing U.S. hegemony, taking control of the world’s natural resources – especially energy reserves -, introducing weapons into outer space, and using the abovementioned mini-bombs against all those who dare to get in his way.
Meanwhile, Bush has allocated 25 million dollars for the modernization of the Nevada polygon, where the U.S. government seeks to renew nuclear tests. In the re-election agenda, an important weight is assigned to the development of new nuclear weapons for their employment in so-called limited conflicts or, as the hawks in the U.S. Congress prefer to express it, “to defend the country’s most important national interests anywhere that they might be threatened.”
Thus far, Congress has approved 6.3 billion dollars for nuclear arms programs in 2004. This decision, coupled with the more than clear intentions of Bush and his main collaborators, implies a green light for re-launching the nuclear arms race.
For the time being, Great Britain, the U.S.’ main European ally, is evaluating options to produce its own mini-bombs and London’s military strategists are drafting a new doctrine, similar to that of their North American counterparts, which would allow such weapons to be used within bounds that only exist in the deranged minds of their theoreticians.
It cannot be expected that other countries will remain indifferent or sit back with their arms crossed. To begin with, Russia’s reaction can be expected to be of considerable scope. For the time being, in the Western capitals the news that the Russians have deployed new intercontinental missiles with high-precision technology was received like a bucket of cold water. Some weeks ago, in the city of Tatischevo, near Saratov, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov placed a powerful batch of Topol-M missiles (known in the West as SS-27) in a state of alert. Some 45 missiles were involved, the most modern such weapons, sufficient as a deterrence against a possible U.S. aggression.
But if Washington continues developing new weapons and places, for example, nuclear projectiles with mini-bombs in its submarines, in a way that could threaten Moscow from Russia’s own costs, at the same time that the United States has the country encircled by military bases established in European and Asian countries that had been part of the former Soviet Union, the Kremlin’s response will necessarily be drastic. And this is not even considering what the other members of the nuclear club, such as China, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel, might do.
PSI and Interception Practices
Effectively what the PSI does is further extend – in characteristically Bush administration fashion – the now relatively common practice of naval interception operations aimed at blocking activities the international community deems illegal. Ship interception operations in ‘peacetime’ have become frequent since Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. However, the ‘searching’ of aircraft is a much more difficult business, as the only guaranteed means of stopping an aircraft in flight is to shoot it down. Numerous international incidents have been precipitated by such acts, including the downing of a private rescue aircraft by Cuban fighters in 1996, the destruction of a missionary aircraft in Peru in April 2001, and the Cold War Soviet shoot down of the South Korean commercial flight KAL 007 in 1983.
Given the fraught situation with stopping and searching aircraft, it is most likely that PSI operations will be limited to naval activity for some time to come. Specifically in the case of North Korea, the country is almost surrounded by South Korean, Japanese, Russian, and Chinese airspace, and each of those four countries has an operation fighter interception capability. What is required here to, for instance, stop or greatly impair North Korean aerial transport of WMD is agreement by China (principally) and other countries to close their airspace to such flights, rather than a multilateral initiative.
Since the passage of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) in 1966 imposing selective economic sanctions on Rhodesia, and the subsequent British maritime blockade which it authorized – the Beira Patrol – naval interception of suspect ships has been one of the methods available to the community of nations to resolve crisis. However, the practice only took off after the Cold War had ended, with the imposition of UNSCR 661 in August 1990, imposing an oil blockade on Iraq and Kuwait in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion. Faced with the complex internal disputes in the former Yugoslavia, a weapons embargo was implemented by a September 1991 UN resolution and enforced at sea by NATO and European countries. A sea-borne weapons blockade was at that time one method whereby interested states could be seen to be taking action on the conflict without too much danger to their personnel.
Naval interdiction operations in general and the PSI in particular face a number of challenges to effective implementation. These include legal authorization, the political problems involved in constructing and maintaining a ‘coalition of the willing,’ logistical constraints, as well as rules of engagement difficulties. While international law can always become a subject of debate, most states believe at the moment that only a UN resolution can authorize interception and search on the high seas, outside nations’ territorial waters, which would otherwise be piracy. Given the wide dismay with many recent U.S. international initiatives, which have been viewed as unilateral and perhaps unwise, the PSI is unlikely to gain such legal backing in the foreseeable future.
Interlinked with the difficulty of legal authority is the political mustering of a coalition to mount such operations. While at the political level assembling countries interested enough in the PSI may be difficult, it has been agreed that joint civil-military interdiction training exercises would be mounted “as soon as practicable.”
PSI naval operations will be easiest logistically if the most nations possible participate. However, in the current early stage of the initiative’s development it seems only the United States and Australia will be willing to participate, and it seems unlikely given Japanese and South Korean skepticism that any interception operations under the banner of the PSI will be mounted nearby North Korea in East Asia at least for some time to come.
The complicated rules of engagement question is one that has bedeviled previous naval interception operations. Rules of engagement are the set of conditions under which a naval vessel may intercept, challenge, warn, board, or seize suspect ships, and have caused embarrassing incidents in the past, in the case of the Joanna V incident during the British Rhodesian blockade and incidents early during the blockade of Iraq in 1990.
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf relates in his autobiography the difficulties involved in clarifying what action was to be taken against Iraqi vessels, with commanders on the scene being castigated first for not taking enough action, and then having new orders countermanded so that nothing more than warning shots were fired. However, since that time the United States and its allies have undergone 13 years where maritime interception and interdiction operations have been underway, and procedures are now well understood and practiced. However, any PSI naval interdiction operation will have its rules of engagement closely scrutinized, and potentially subject to mid-mission changes, given the delicacy of the projected tasks and the number of nations likely to be involved in the effort.
In summary, the Proliferation Security Initiative is of great interest to the Bush administration but has not found enough support to allow the major changes in international law that would be necessary to legitimize itself in the eyes of most states. This is unlikely to change within the next few months. At present, its overwhelming focus on North Korea has unsettled South Korea and Japan enough that it is very unlikely that any activities under the banner of the PSI will commence in East Asia for some time to come. Interdiction activities may however be practiced in East Asia as part of the routine, continuing web of U.S. and allied naval exercises without being termed as part of the PSI initiative.
Further action will first require a major change in international attitudes and in the real purposes of the U. S. government, to allow boarding foreign ships in international waters, hitherto seen as unlawful. For the time being, the world fears a new outburst of hegemonic military operations designed just to confirm the overwhelming U.S domination as the sole superpower in a bitter age of unipolarity.
