Europe – the Leading Space Power?
Regina Hagen
“On the global space scene, the most striking development is the ongoing revision of US space policy,” the Director General of the European Space Agency (ESA) observed.[1] In his view, the increasing pace of US military space activities, together with the expansion of the European Union (EU), the implementation of a European Security and Defense Policy, increased security requirements, and the important role space technology plays for many different users, forces the ESA to re-define its role. This means that in the future ESA is to contribute to European “defense and security.”
This move is somewhat astonishing for an organization that just a few years ago vehemently denied any cooperation with the military, emphatically rejected any reference to the “dual use” of space technology, and by its Constitution is confined to work “for exclusively peaceful purposes.”
ESA could consider such re-orientation only in the light of several policy decisions of the EU, such as the commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastrich Treaty in 1993, the definition of the so-called Petersberg Tasks by the Heads of State and Government of the Western European Union (WEU) at their meeting at Petersberg/ Bonn in the same year, and finally by the agreement on an outline for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 2000.
Since then, “peaceful” does not necessarily mean “peaceful” in the European Union. Thus, for example, in addition to “humanitarian and rescue tasks,” the Draft European Convention lists “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” among the Petersberg tasks.[2]
That development fits in very well with the ideas of some ESA leaders. Space proved a difficult environment in the past years. Due to the economic crisis, public investments were restricted forcing the cancellation of several space research projects. Some large commercial projects also fell through, with major repercussions for the space industry.
Under these circumstances, “military globalization” is seen as an opportunity. The national armies in Europe are not equipped for combat missions between the Atlantic Ocean and the Far East. As in other areas, they fall short of US capabilities for reconnaissance, fast and secure communication, and reliable time control and positioning.
A New Chapter of European Spaceflight
Satellites play a key role in such capabilities – and with them the ESA. In past years and in the course of many meetings, the European Space Agency and the European Commission have staked out a new partnership. While doing so, the taboo of military tasks for ESA has eroded rapidly.
In a joint Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Europe and Space: Turning a New Chapter, the new partners concluded: “Space presents a security dimension, which has thus far only been dealt with, at European level, in the context of the WEU. The forthcoming integration of the WEU into the EU and the new steps taken at the European Summit in Helsinki towards the development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) are prompting the European Union to take space capabilities into account, for instance in decision-making for the planning and monitoring of the Petersberg Tasks (conflict prevention and crisis management).”[3] The paper proposes to build a satellite-based information network in order “to fulfill governmental and political needs such as defence...”
At the same time, tasked by the ESA Director General Antonio Rodotà, the so-called “three wise men” met to discuss “the evolution of the European Space Agency.” Carl Bildt (former Swedish Prime Minister), Jean Peyrelevade (President of Crédit Lyonnaise), and Lothar Späth (CEO of Jenoptik) developed a set of recommendations. Their report Towards a Space Agency for the European Union saw “it as logical to use the capabilities of ESA also for the development of the more security-oriented aspects of the European Space Policy. As the efforts of the European Union in these fields are geared to the so-called Petersberg tasks …, we do not see any problem with the Convention of ESA.”[4]
Meanwhile, a charm offensive aimed to reframe European space development in a new way that would make military space technologies seem natural and necessary “Security” and “defense” are now covered by the concept of “‘utilitarian’ activities: developing space systems to support public services … for the benefit of citizens.”[5] Suddenly, the “military” concept previously rejected has been given a positive meaning, and the boundaries of the ESA Constitution, while formally unchanged, had been redrawn to include it.
An “international report” on space and security policy in Europe, issued in autumn 2003, starts out by stating that “Space is a strategic asset.”[6] The report contends that “The development of dual-use technologies calls for a ‘European’ approach to space security, linking the present national defence programs with mainly civilian European programs.” Consistent with this finding, a native European Space Policy Institute has been founded in Vienna in order to “initiate, support and promote political and societal debate to raise the public awareness of the importance of spacebased infrastructures and services.”[7]
For the time being, the re-definition of European space policy came to end in the Framework Agreement between the European Community and the European Space Agency[8] of October 2003 and the so-called “White Paper” of November 2003. After an allegedly open public discussion, in reality conducted in closed workshops and completely ignored by the media, an “Action Plan (‘European Space Programme’) including a list of recommended actions for the implementation of the European Space Policy” was formulated.[9] The document’s drafters encouraged Europe to take the military space discussion to the next level, representing it as “The Opportunity: To supplement existing space-based capabilities in Europe and examine new ones needed for establishing a credible security capability with high EU added value.”
The Example of Galileo: a Transatlantic Struggle for Power
All documents quoted above mention two systems to make the case: GMES and Galileo.
GMES is more of a European initiative than a full-fledged project. Global Monitoring for Environment and Security was launched in 2000 as “a joint endeavor by ESA and the European Commission to establish an independent capability for global monitoring, in support of European environment and security goals. GMES is envisioned as a complete decision-support system...”[10] By 2008, the system is to link research and earth observation satellites so that satellite data and intelligence derived from it can be used by policy makers. Experience with the system will also play a role in “influencing the design of future European satellite systems.”
Galileo is a good example of the problems that result from the military orientation of European space policy. Originally planned as a strictly civilian system – and as such promoted by the European decision-making bodies,[11] Galileo is a system of 30 global navigation satellites. Slated to be available by 2008, Galileo is to provide real-time navigation, timing, and positioning signals for a wide range of applications. Uses range from fully automatic airplane landing, railway control, fisheries, and oil prospecting to positioning for mountain hikers.
Reports on Galileo usually withhold information about its dual-use capability. Satellite navigation can be used for the precise targeting of missiles and bombs. Remote control of unmanned aerial vehicles is inconceivable without such help. The military also uses satellite-based global positioning data to locate its troops precisely on the battlefield. Up to now, the main source of such information has been the Global Positioning System (GPS), a system developed, maintained, and operated by the US Department of Defense. Galileo promised European independence in this field.
The possibility that an independent provider of this key capability could emerge is precisely what brought the US into the arena. A British scholar once observed that “To the US military, any space programme it does not control is a challenge to its formal policy of dominating space militarily,”[12] Determined to preserve its dominance and to protect its own aerospace industry, Washington insisted on “discussions.” When it became clear that Europe would not do without, the two sides engaged in lengthy negotiations on precision, frequency, and the right to turn the system off. In the end, the Europeans were the losers. Far from guaranteeing Europe’s independence from the US, the new system will now transmit its signals for civilian use on less suitable frequencies with lower precision than originally planned. In addition, the US reserved the option to jam the signals in a crisis after “discussion” with the Europeans. Accordingly, signal usability for both industry and commercial users will be uncertain and the budgeted investments – up to uro 3.6 billion – may be a terrible waste of money.
Galileo raises other issues as well. International co-operation is a high priority for Europe. Co-operation agreements have been signed with China and India, raising arms control questions. The US have already made clear that they will closely observe any technology transfer to China, reserving an option to prevent transfer of technologies it considers sensitive.
The agreements with India precludes transmission of encrypted signals for security and military applications from the outset. India took also has negotiated a parallel agreement with the Russian Federation for the civilian and military use of Russia’s Glonass system. Glonass has been troubled with failures in the past. Under the new agreement, 8-9 new Glonass satellites are to be launched with Indian support, in order to bring the system back to full operability. Thus the arms spiral is being renewed.
European – And National, Too
In Germany, the military use of space will not be limited to GMES and Galileo.
SAR-Lupe (meaning “synthetic aperture radar – magnifying glass”) is Germany’s first satellite-based reconnaissance system. The procurement decision was taken against the background of national space reconnaissance capabilities found to be non-existent during the Yugoslavia war. The prime contractor is OHB-System (Bremen), in which the French military company Thales holds a majority stake. To be completed in 2007, the system will consist of five identical small satellites that deliver highly detailed radar images on a 24-hour basis for the German Armed Forces. According to German Defense Minister Peter Struck, the system will meet “military requirements … for worldwide coverage.” Implementation of this project is “at the same time a prerequisite for participation in a joint European space-based reconnaissance system, to which the partners contribute systems with different sensors.”[13] The French contribution, for example, consists of its military optical Helios satellites.
After several failed bi- and trilateral projects, SATCOMBw (German Armed Forces satellite communication) is a new German attempt to provide a satellite-based military communication system “within and for remote operation areas.” Phase 1 has already been implemented and uses civilian satellite capacities to provide communication networks for out-of-area operations – among others in Afghanistan. In phase 2, data will be transmitted via dedicated military communication satellites. A total of uro 935 million is budgeted through 2013.[14]
Problems, Drivers, and Arms Races
The military re-orientation of space policy confronts both ESA and the European Union with several problems. Although ESA and EU membership are almost identical, Switzerland and Norway are members of ESA but not of the EU. ESA’s integration into ESDP and CFSP and therefore into European military planning is likely to be problematic for the neutral Swiss confederation. EU countries Greece and Luxembourg recently have acceded to ESA, but this will not (yet) be true for new EU members after the May 1, 2004, extension round.
When it comes to a policy of peace, however, the real problem lies in the fact that the massive military use of space technology by the US and their explicit intention to dominate space militarily and to deploy weapons in space to that end, is on the verge of sparking a global space arms race. Even the ESA Director General takes the US military as a yardstick for European space capabilities: “The US Air Force, the executive agent of the American DoD [Department of Defense], will continuously increase its role in space and will, if the present focus in defence is maintained, be the world’s premier space agency.”[15]
Rather than joining together to stop this emerging arms competition, Europe apparently is gearing up to join the race. The old arms racing dynamic appears to be reasserting itself: Where technical feasibility and financial means permit, technical developments by one country are copied by other countries or power blocs, with little apparent thought about the long-term consequences.
In this case, US space dominance, US unwillingness to share information with its allies, and the striving for military independence result in a European desire to make space technology better available for the European military arsenals. As in the US, this will increase European military dependence on satellite systems. From here it is only a small step to fears that space systems might become a key “asset” that could be targeted by an adversary – and to the decision to deploy space weapons to . That’s a vicious circle with no way out in sight.
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