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International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

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Bulletin 23 – Targeting the Law: Non-Proliferation Under Attack

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More Weapons, Less Disarmament

U.S. Missile Programs and Proliferation

Andrew Lichterman

While the main focus of debate over U.S. nuclear weapons programs has been on warhead upgrades like the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, the Pentagon and its contractors are poised to begin development of a new generation of long-range delivery systems. These range from cheap, versatile missiles to more accurate and maneuverable re-entry systems capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear weapons. Such systems, intended primarily to increase the already formidable U.S. advantage in conventional weapons and to reduce political obstacles to fighting the “small wars” of a global military empire, may in the long run be more dangerous than proposed improvements in nuclear warheads. At the same time, the government is considering options for replacement of the intercontinental ballistic missiles that are the core of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, with the goal of “maintaining U.S. qualitative superiority in nuclear warfighting capabilities in the 2020-2040 time frame.”[1] New delivery systems for nuclear weapons would involve many of the same technologies, from more maneuverable re-entry vehicles to improvements in guidance systems that would be developed for long-range missiles carrying non-nuclear payloads. These technologies could provide the building blocks for new nuclear capabilities, particularly in combination with warhead modifications now in progress or under consideration.

New or modified nuclear weapons such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and weapons with lower yields are intended to make nuclear weapons use more effective for particular missions, such as destruction of deeply buried targets and of chemical and biological agents, and to lower political obstacles to nuclear weapons use by reducing levels of death, destruction, and contamination.[2] But significant questions remain about the efficacy of nuclear weapons for such missions, and the taboo against nuclear weapons use, although perhaps weakening among U.S. elites, remains strong in most of the world.[3] New types of ballistic missiles, capable of delivering a wide range of conventional weapons from the United States at global range with great accuracy, or of being launched in large numbers from forward deployed delivery platforms, would be extremely tempting instruments for the newly articulated U.S. preventive war doctrine. In the eyes of their advocates, such systems allow the rapid application of overwhelming force with impunity from afar, avoiding practical and political obstacles ranging from obtaining basing and overflight rights from U.S. allies growing increasingly uncomfortable with aggressive U.S. policies, to combat casualties that make interventions more difficult to sustain politically at home.[4] Among the “examples of technological advances that might provide the USAF with capabilities that will help overcome or alleviate U.S. domestic constraints” identified by a RAND study were “[h]ighly effective unmanned weapons, such as cheap standoff munitions and space-based assets, that pose no risk of U.S. casualties.”

The push for conventional ballistic missiles with global range is giving added impetus to programs that have been underway for years aimed at modernizing existing strategic ballistic missiles and expanding their roles. After the Cold War, U.S. missile technology research and development continued, although slowed by reduced funding. These programs, however, already were accelerating in the late 1990s, as the contractor and service constituencies of the strategic nuclear forces, the weapons laboratories and their representatives in Congress worked to repackage much of the hightech Cold War military, including nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, for a new “counterproliferation” mission.[6] These efforts received an enormous boost as virtually all constraints on military budgets were removed following the September 11, 2001, attacks. Programs already in progress to modernize existing missiles and command and control systems received increased funding, and concepts for new systems, including a variety of ideas for global delivery of non-nuclear weapons, quickly became programs.

New and improved ballistic missile systems now proceeding or under consideration include:

  • A program to increase the accuracy of the reentry system for the W76 nuclear warhead for Trident submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The original W76 system was less accurate than the newer W88 Trident warhead, the most modern deployed nuclear warhead. Together with warhead modifications already underway for the W76, this upgrade likely would increase the ability of the W76 to destroy hard targets such as missile silos.[7]
  • A maneuvering re-entry vehicle called the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) that would glide to the target with considerable ability to maneuver and decelerate and that could carry a variety of conventional weapons of the kind that can be dropped from aircraft. Although only non-nuclear payloads currently are being considered, the CAV could be designed to carry nuclear weapons as well.[8] The CAV is envisioned to be deliverable in a variety of ways: via current or newdesign ballistic missiles, and in the future by a “Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle” that would take off and land like an airplane, delivering several CAVs from near space, or by a military space plane or “space operations vehicle” that could deliver CAVs from space.[9]
  • New land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), designed to replace the existing Minuteman III missiles that are the land-based element of the old nuclear “strategic triad.” This program is in its early stages, with contractors being asked for concepts to support an analysis of alternatives, including nuclear ICBMs with new capabilities, such as improved re-entry vehicle maneuverability. The alternatives analysis also will consider a variety of ideas for delivering non-nuclear weapons with ICBMs.[10]
  • A new intermediate range ballistic missile to be deployed on submarines, capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads. This program also is in its early stages, with contractors being asked to submit concepts.[11]

It is impossible to tell in advance which set of new missile concepts will be developed and deployed. What is clear, however, is that the United States government has embarked on an intensive campaign to modernize its strategic arsenal and to obtain significant new capabilities for both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons with global range, great accuracy, and a broad range of options tailored to destroy any target that military contingency planners can imagine. There is considerable overlap among the technologies applicable for many of the new weapons concepts being considered or already underway. Improvements in re-entry system accuracy or maneuvering capabilities limited by policy to nonnuclear weapons applications today could be applied to nuclear weapons systems in the future. These delivery system improvements, furthermore, are proceeding together with upgrades in nuclear warheads and of the entire U.S. apparatus for planning and executing nuclear strikes.[12]

The United States justifies this new round of arms racing as necessary for “counterproliferation” purposes, and essentially has proclaimed that no further progress on its part in meeting its disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is warranted until all threshold nuclear states have chosen or been forced to abandon their nuclear ambitions.[13] It is worth remembering that the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom[14] all agreed to their obligation to negotiate for “cessation of the arms race at an early date” and for the elimination of their nuclear arsenals in the face of far graver threats: their mutual efforts to target each others’ nuclear forces for destruction. The arms racing dynamic then created military forces capable of ending human civilization in the act of preserving themselves, an insane contradiction that the nuclear weapons states were forced to acknowledge, however grudgingly, in accepting the NPT bargain. Today the same mad logic flourishes once more, springing anew in inverted form from its roots in the massive institutions spawned by the arms race. Because we possess world-destroying arsenals, we ar told, we can and must use them to threaten others who wish to develop equally threatening weapons of their own. Like the first half-century of military nuclearism, the best this can offer us is an endless life on the brink, with horror beyond imagining awaiting only a misstep. It is long past time that we start imagining instead a world beyond nuclear weapons, and how to get there without relying on them as well.



  1. ^ U.S. Air Force Space Command, Final Mission Need Statement, Land Based Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, AFSPC 001-00, January, 2002, p. 1 (hereafter LBSND MNS), available at www.wslfweb.org/docs/lbsd/LBSND%20MNS.pdf. For an in-depth look at the programs summarized in this paper, see Andrew Lichterman, Missiles of Empire: America’s 21st Century Global Legions, WSLF Information Bulletin, Fall 2003 (hereafter Missiles of Empire) www.wslfweb.org/docs/missiles03.pdf.
  2. ^ For an overview of current U.S. research and development aimed at making nuclear weapons more useable, see: Sliding Towards the Brink: More Useable Nuclear Weapons and the Dangerous Illusions of High-Tech War, (hereafter Sliding Towards the Brink), Western States Legal Foundation Information Bulletin, March 2003, www.wslfweb.org/docs/nucpreppdf.pdf.
  3. ^ See: Robert W. Nelson, Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report January/February 2001 Volume 54, Number 1, www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1/weapons.htm; Sidney Drell, Raymond Jeanloz, and Bob Peurifoy, Bunkers, Bombs, Radiation, Commentary, Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2002; and Ian Hoffman, Mini-Nukes Are Too Risky, Experts Say, Oakland Tribune, March 5, 2003.
  4. ^ On this note, a recent RAND study for the U.S. Air Force (USAF) stated that “Most U.S. military operations for the foreseeable future will be undertaken with limited or less-than-majority American public support. Technological advances that expand the USAF’s effectiveness will help it play an important role overcoming possible domestic constraints on the use of force such as casualty sensitivity.”
  5. ^ D. L. Byman, M. C. Waxman, E. V. Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, Rand Corporation, 1999, p.132.
  6. ^ For an overview of these programs at the end of the Clinton administration, see: Andrew Lichterman, Looking for New Ways to Use Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Counterproliferation Programs, Weapons Effects Research, and “Mini-Nuke” Development, Western States Legal Foundation Information Bulletin, Winter 2000-2001 www.wslfweb.org/docs/mininuke.pdf.
  7. ^ The “Enhanced Effectiveness” program will develop a new re-entry system with “dramatically improved accuracy” for the Trident D5 missile, in order to provide “increased capabilities articulated in the NPR, such as prompt accurate strike, defeat of critical targets and selective nuclear options.” See Statement of Rear Admiral Charles B. Young, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, before the Strategic Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee April 8, 2003. The program “is intended to demonstrate a near-term capability to steer a SLBM warhead to Global Positioning Satellite (GPS)-like accuracy,” culminating in flight tests by 2007. See U.S. Navy, RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet (R-2 Exhibit), February 2003, PE 0101221N, Strategic Submarine and Weapons Systems Support, Project J0951.
  8. ^ A document distributed on the web to inform potential contractors interested in the September 2003 Air Force Space Command “Request for Information/Initial Delivery Vehicle Concept Call for the next generation Land Based Strategic Deterrent (LBSD) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)” (hereafter LBSD AoA RFI) stated, for example, that “The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) is currently a specific conventional-only delivery vehicle with high lift-over-drag characteristics. A high lift-over-drag vehicle can be designed and built that can carry nuclear weapons” (p. 4).
    This document, along with the above Request for Information and other relevant documents, have been archived on the Western States Legal Foundation Government Military Space web page, at www.wslfweb.org/space/spacedocs.htm. For more on the Common Aero Vehicle program, see Andrew Lichterman, The Military Space Plane, Conventional ICBM’s, and the Common Aero Vehicle: Overlooked Threats of Weapons Delivered Through or From Space, Western States Legal Foundation Information Bulletin, Fall 2002, www.wslfweb.org/docs/mspcav.pdf.
Andrew Lichterman

Andrew Lichterman is Program Director of the Western States Legal Foundation, Oakland, California, USA; www.wslfweb.org.



  1. ^ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, FALCON Force Application and Launch from CONUS, Broad Agency Announcement, PHASE I Proposer Information Pamphlet (PIP) for BAA Solicitation 03-35 July 29, 2003, p. 1; www.darpa.mil/tto/falcon/FALCON_PIP_FINAL.pdf.
  2. ^ See generally LBSD AoA RFI, LBSND MNS, and Missiles of Empire.
  3. ^ See Department of the Navy, Strategic Systems Programs, Special Notice, Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Technical Exchange, Reference-Number-08252003-0358, August 25, 2003.
  4. ^ See generally Sliding Towards the Brink, op. cit.
  5. ^ See Statement by Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf, Representative of the United States of America to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 28, 2003. Wolf stated there that the NPT is “dangerously out of balance,” with too much emphasis on disarmament and not enough on proliferation. He portrayed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (Moscow Treaty) as sufficient to meet U.S. disarmament goals, despite the fact that the Treaty does not require the destruction of a single warhead or delivery system, and places no limits on qualitative improvements in the thousands of nuclear weapons that will be retained with no end in view.
  6. ^ China and France, two of the original five nuclear weapons states, did not join the NPT until the early 1990s.
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