Networking to Catch the Bomb
Is There a Future for Research in International Security?
It is a hard time for those who believe in non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The attack on Iraq was claimed by some to disarm Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Until now, their existence has not been proven. From the point of non-proliferation, the invasion was useless because after it there was not more information available than could be gained by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspections. To find this out, an uncounted number of people had to die.
Bush's battle against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) became synonymous with bombing and invading other countries, justified by arbitrary and false arguments, which raised strong international opposition. The UNSCOM inspections in Iraq remarkably disproved Bush's claims that Saddam had WMDs and proved that the international community is capable to act. Instead of pacifying and democratizing the country, the US invasion pushed it into anarchy and disorder, becoming both a platform and a target for terrorists. The capture of Saddam Hussein could not compensate for that. In this regard, Bush's policy did not counter or prevent terrorism but rather inspired and strengthened it, as was to be expected.
With the failure of Bush's policy, the international community has a chance to shape an alternative path to peace and security, built on negotiations and agreements, checked by verification and inspections, facilitated by active conflict resolution and sustainable development. Scientists and researchers can substantially contribute to the whole process and help to resolve some of the problems.
Since the atomic bomb was used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists have tried to catch the genie and return it back into the bottle. A key question is how to design a network, with the number of nodes high enough to avoid smaller fish to escape and the links strong enough to catch the big fish and withstand its power. Thus, there is a tradeoff between both, and with an increasing number of nodes the links become weaker.
Scientific expertise is required in many fields. An overarching question deals with the dual-use problem in the nuclear and space sector, as well as in the chemical and biological industries. Similar technologies pose a challenge for verification, for instance, for the distinction between ballistic missiles and space launchers. Mini-nukes are hard to detect at all.
Throughout the past decade, INESAP has worked on the underlying problems and possible solutions, combining research, networking, and action at the science-policy interface. For a small organization like INESAP, after a decade of immense change in international politics, it is already a success to be still alive and active. This Bulletin is devoted to INESAP's 10th anniversary and the role of scientists in non-proliferation and disarmament. Some of the contributions directly address INESAP's role (David Krieger, Reiner Braun, Bruce Gagnon, Jürgen Scheffran). Other's widen the scope towards broader assessments of the role of scientists in arms races (Jackie Cabasso) and disarmament (Andrew Lichterman). The scientific community is a key player in several regions, fields and movements: India (M.V. Ramana, Shyam Bhatia), Japan (Shoji Sawada), counterrorism (Fernando de Souza Barros), chemical disarmament (Jiri Matousek), the nuclear abolition movement (Frank von Hippel). The UN plays a particular role for education on disarmament and non-proliferation (Kate Dewes).
Proper financial resources are a key factor to make the community flourish. Kennette Benedict of the MacArthur Foundation provides a view from the funding community on the challenges, perils and future prospects facing organizations and projects that address the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. Funding will be crucial in strengthening existing institutions and organizations, and supporting new citizen organizations, younger academics and professionals, as well as promoting new perspectives in international peace and security.
Several articles cover the state and development of the current political situation in international security, in particular the conditions for multilateral disarmament (Jayantha Dhanapala), the link between nuclear and missile disarmament (Regina Hagen), as well as planned activities of the Middle Powers Initiative around the 2005 NPT Review Conference (Douglas Roche). From an NGO perspective, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention is a key instrument to resolve many of the problems and diminish nuclear threats in the long run (Alyn Ware, Neha Naqvi, Merav Datan). The survey by Janet Bloomfield and Pamela Meidell of the Abolition 2000 Report Cards to measure progress toward a nuclear-free world, which have been regularly published in the INESAP Bulletin, comes to the conclusion that the realistic prospects for nuclear abolition are now zero.
All nuclear weapon states have some responsibility for this unfortunate situation, but the United States has taken the lead. As Alice Slater points out, Bush's nuclear policy which expands the use of nuclear weapons against a number of countries, is a recipe for global terror and adversely affects relations with other countries, in particular China (Dingli Shen). As the nuclear complex, both civilian and military, is maintained there is the continued risk of radiological terrorism (Hui Zhang). National Missile Defense (NMD) is inadequate to deal with these and other threats that shape the current security debate, time to think either about stopping or at least limiting NMD (Tom Sauer).
For the future it will be essential to continue building networks on local as well as global scales that provide the fundament for a civil society in which the power players with their big sticks are caught in a democratic framework of rules designed to maintain peace and security. Scientists can play a key role in this process by providing a solid fundament of understanding the problems and resolving them.
Jürgen Scheffran, Dec. 17, 2003
