China's Foreign Policy
The Cases of Iraq and North Korea
Dingli Shen 
Since Beijing normalized its relationship with Washington in 1979, the People's Republic of China has accorded this relationship great strategic value and termed it as "the most important bilateral (foreign) relationship." At one point – and in mutual consent with America – the relationship was even labeled a "constructive strategic partnership toward the 21st century."
Such a definition of, or expectation in Beijing-Washington relations, however, has suffered frequent frustrations. China's firing of missiles – albeit without warheads – in the waters of the Taiwan strait during military exercises in 1995 and 1996, the subsequent move of US aircraft carriers close to this region, the 1999 US/NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in former Yugoslavia, and the 2001 air collision above the South Chinese Sea are just a few examples of these turbulent relations. It seemed that the relationship was so fragile that any single crisis between the two countries could derail it.
Indeed, this reflected the fact that the two countries remained strongly suspicious of each other and that their leadership lacked a profound belief in the strategic nature of their relationship and the adequate commitment to it in the face of various challenges.
Nevertheless, since the second half of 2002, and more apparently since early 2003, there has emerged a "new maturity" of Chinese foreign policy. This newly found hyperrealism of China's diplomacy differs from the more traditional pattern of how Chinese foreign policy is conducted: the new model accounts much more for China's reality and crucial interests, with the US counting big on China's calculus.
This new paradigm can be clearly observed in China's general foreign policy practice of the past year, in particular in the way China handled the pre-emptive war of the US against Iraq in spring 2003 and in China's currently proactive stance in facilitating a multilateral approach to resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons peacefully. Addressing these two cases, and analyzing the driving forces behind them, may help understand how China now views and protects its interest. To a limited extent, this may also help understand the inner working of the foreign policy making process in Beijing.
The Case of Iraq: Balancing China's National Interests
There is no question that the Saddam government committed crimes, among them the invasion of the sovereign state of Kuwait and the use of chemical weapons against Iranians and Kurds. It also made several serious mistakes: it violated the UN resolutions that banned Iraqi development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and misjudged the reactions of the United States – and to some extent also those of the international community.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the problems caused by the Iraqi government should be solved. However, there are additional factors that need to be considered as well.
First of all, there had been no solid evidences, even before the start of the war, to prove that the Saddam regime was linked to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Second, though Iraq had challenged the authority of the UN weapons inspectors, it was not clear, by the end of 2002, whether Iraq still possessed certain kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Third, although the Iraqi government did not cooperate with the UN inspectors from December 2002 in a "full, immediate, unconditional, and unimpeded" manner, UN Security Council resolution 1441 did not directly authorize a war against Iraq.
With this in mind, it is not difficult to point out that Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to other countries when the US launched its war in March 2003. Therefore, the threat and waging of an American pre-emption against Iraq was unnecessary and legally unwarranted.
Consequently, China could not be on the side of the US in this war. And, morally speaking, China was entrusted by the international community with a major responsibility for world peace, along with the other four permanent members of the Security Council that possess veto power.
There are other reasons that China could not back the US. China is more dependent on oil from the Middle East than the US, and the dependence is further increasing with the boom of China's economy. Entering the new century, energy acquisition has become a major component of China's security strategy, and a war against Iraq was viewed as potentially helpful in enhancing the US ability to control oil supply from the Middle East and even beyond.
At the same time, China could not take the lead in opposing the war, although China was strongly opposed to it. Given the vast gap between China and the US in terms of national strength and China's heavy economic dependence upon the US (~20% of China's foreign trade according to US statistics), it had to calculate the cost if it took the lead in opposing the war.
Although Chinese print media lacked in public debate on the legitimacy of this war and consequently on the legitimacy of Chinese policy in this regard, China's policy makers seemed to assume that the Bush Administration would go ahead with this war even if it could not secure a UN resolution to authorize military action. There is reason to believe that China came to the conclusion that even if it cast a veto, along with France and Russia, a US-Iraq war could not be prevented in this post-September 11 era where America's security perception had drastically changed.
Any vote in the Security Council after resolution 1441 would have ended in disaster. Given the strong opposition of France, Germany, and Russia, which was highlighted by their debates with the US on February 14, 2003, it was clear that any attempt to get a war mandate would be vetoed in the Security Council. Despite this, the US was still interested in pursuing an 'honor vote', in order to find at least nine supporters for its proposal.
If such a vote had been held, China would have run into great difficulty. Voting for the US was inconceivable, but voting against it would have led to an uncertain but possibly significant cost that could only weaken the stable China-US relationship at a time when it was so important to both China and the US. Abstaining would obviously undercut China's position as a major player in the world and make it appear unprincipled in its stance against the war.
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be credited that – partly due to its splendid diplomatic work – the US government began to realize that it could not even secure nine votes for America. The Security Council prevented a split, and China avoided possibly harmful consequences for itself.
The Case of North Korea: Playing a Proactive Role
The alleged development of nuclear weapons by North Korea presents a far more serious challenge for China: first, North Korea shares a border with China, and second, this conflict is about nuclear weapons.
Even with China's activities somewhat in the dark, the US acknowledged its role in defusing the tension in 1994 when Pyongyang and Washington clashed over inspections at the nuclear facilities in Yongbyang. When, however, North Korea revealed in October 2002 to James Kelly that it indeed pursued a nuclear weapons program, China's relations with the US were tested once more.
The US thought that China had leverage on North Korea and ought to use it in a non-partisan way: for the sake of the US as well as for its own. In early 2003, the US complained that China had not put enough pressure on North Korea. Some officials in Washington were so sarcastic that they advocated letting Japan go nuclear.
In reality, China needs this challenge as little as the US. China's economic development is greatly dependent on a peaceful and stable external environment. In this context, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction does not serve China's interests, especially when it takes place in the immediate vicinity of China.
It is clear that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, no matter how justified it might be for legitimate national defense to counter the American threat, complicates regional security and stability in Northeast Asia. Relations between the US and North Korea would further deteriorate as a result; the risk of war would increase; other parties in the region could be pressed or motivated to go for nukes; and at a time of crisis, exodus of refugees is surely to be expected. Even worse, China would have to take side or sit idle should a military controversy erupt on the peninsula.
To be sure, China cannot claim that it has no leverage on the North. It is believed that China supplies a substantial amount of North Korea's energy, food, fertilizer, etc., that accounts for one third of annual total Chinese foreign aid. But China needs to consider the security interests of all relevant parties. North Korea should be offered a reasonable and reliable alternative security arrangement in return for relinquishing its nuclear weapons. Leverage must be applied cautiously, as it can be counterproductive if used improperly. It should not be ignored that North Korea in its turn provides China with a security buffer.
These points explain China's past pattern in dealing with this question. But, as the stake is raised higher this time with the North's repeated rhetoric of going nuclear, China's diplomacy has taken a new shape since early 2003. Never before has China launched such an intensive shuttle diplomacy: Vice-Ministers Dai Bingguo and Wang Yi were repeatedly dispatched to Pyongyang, and President Hu Jintao sent a letter to Kim Jong-il about his country's interests. Minister Li Zhaoxing and Vice-Minister Wang Yi traveled to Washington to co-ordinate the co-operation of the two countries in facilitating multilateral talks. In addition, Qian Qichen, China's architect of contemporary diplomacy, paid an unofficial visit to North Korea in spring 2003, presumably to defuse nuclear tension and promote talks involving North Korea and the United States.
While China has been credited for making the first round of "Six-Party" talks possible in August 2003 in Beijing, its policy-making on the Korean nuclear issue deserves careful study. The following are a few prominent features of the continuous unfolding of this play.
1. The role of Chinese topmost leaders. Both President Jiang and President Hu are believed to have been personally engaged in this question. A year ago, President Jiang made public remarks concerning North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons development. In spring 2003, President Hu issued a letter to his counterpart in North Korea, reportedly urging North Korea to develop its economy as the best approach to security and urging it to participate in multilateral talks that help to reduce tension. Although this letter has not been made public, it is understood that he asked North Korea to take over responsibility for any mishap possibly arising from its refusal to take part in the negotiations.
2. The role of the Central Liaison Department of the Party. It is understood that President Hu has assumed chairmanship of the Chinese Communist Party's (CPC) small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs, an inter-agency foreign affairs decisionmaking organization. It is observed that CPC's Central Liaison Department has a special role to play within this elite body. Under the leadership of its former Minister Dai Bingguo, this Department established sound working relations with many leading parties around the world. Minister Dai's performance has obviously been highly appreciated, and in spring 2003 he became (First) Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – in terms of the hierarchy of the party system, this means that he is the secretary and leads the whole ministry. Dai's visit to North Korea in spring 2003 turned out to be crucial as he managed to meet Kim Jong-il and delivered President Hu's letter that was reported to have persuaded Kim to agree to the talks in Beijing.
3. The role of the Chinese military. Arguably, some in uniform may not consider North Korea's nuclear weapons capability as big a threat as that of India, and some may argue that China could live peacefully with a nuclear-weaponized North Korea if inevitable. For China, the perennial question of Taiwan invariably affects most of its decision-making processes. Some in the military might perceive the survival of North Korea as helpful in checking the US military in the Far East. In this vein, Chinese leverage must be applied very cautiously, so that North Korea's survival is not endangered.
4. The application of leverage. Despite the denial by some Chinese government officials and companies, it is understood that China "suspended" the oil supply to North Korea for three days "for technical reasons" in spring 2003. In the context of the nuclear issue, it is difficult to be convinced by this explanation. China tries hard to strike a meticulous, and sometimes contradictory, balance. In the IAEA Board meeting, e.g., China supported the resolution to bring North Korea's nuclear issue to the UN Security Council – another sign for the displeasure of China on this question. But in the UN Security Council, China proposed not to discuss the issue, in order to leave room for further diplomatic efforts. After the Beijing talk in late August 2003, Vice-Minister Wang Yi was quoted as blaming the US for a lack in initiative to resolve the problem. China needs to be perceived as an honest and impartial mediator that works for all involved parties, rather than acting out of self-interest or in the sole interest of the United States.
Foreign Policy Under the New Leadership
Although there has been considerable transparency in China's foreign policy making process and it is believed that China's foreign policy is increasingly affected by think tanks and public opinion, much remains opaque.
Even so, now that China emphasizes a "period of important strategic opportunities," its foreign policy became more predictable. China has been prioritizing its relations with the other major powers – and the US is without doubt the most important one. This was recognized at the Beidaihe Summer meeting in 2002 when the 3rd and 4th generation Chinese leadership reviewed a decade of turbulence in China-US relations. It may be predicted that the new leadership will sustain this guiding principle and be more experienced and patient in addressing the challenges ahead.
Its attitude on the Iraq and North Korea issues since November 2002 gives credit to this conclusion. And the outcome of the official visit to North Korea of Wu Bangguo, China's President of the National People's Congress and number two in the lineup of the 4th generation, gives rise to further hopes: on October 30, 2003, Kim Jong-il announced North Korea's willingness to attend the next round of "Six-Party" talks. Although Pyongyang is certain to play diplomatic games from time to time, China will be patient and able to manage. The new group of Chinese leaders is likely to leave its impress of foreign policy in China's history: hyperrealism that serves the nation's interests.
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