The Middle Powers Initiative: Focus on NPT 2005
Douglas Roche 
What a difference a few years can make.
The circumstances prevailing when the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) [1] came into existence in March 1998, have changed drastically. Then, a moment of hope was felt that meaningful progress toward the abolition of nuclear weapons was attainable: The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had been indefinitely extended in 1995, the International Court of Justice had ruled in 1996 on the general illegality of nuclear weapons; the long-sought Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) had opened for signature in 1996. The moment continued into 2000 when the Sixth NPT Review Conference adopted by consensus a Final Document pledging an "unequivocal undertaking" to the elimination of nuclear weapons and setting out 13 Practical Steps to attain this.
The moment dissolved, however, with the Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review, National Security Strategy, abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, rejection of the CTBT, development of a new nuclear weapon, war in Iraq, and diminishment of the UN's primacy role for peace and security. Seeing the U.S. reaffirm reliance on nuclear weapons strength despite the publicized reductions of the Moscow Treaty, Russia is also modernizing its nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, having tested in 1998, have now achieved de facto status as nuclear weapons states, as well as Israel. North Korea has broken out of the NPT; Iran's nuclear power program raised suspicions about its true intentions.
The 1998 moment of hope has become, in 2003, a moment of anxiety for those in the nuclear weapons abolition movement. The U.S. Administration is clearly sending out signals that the NPT is meant to stop others from acquiring nuclear weapons while those who have them are so entitled. The longstanding "taboo" or "stigma" attached to nuclear weapons is eroding into a sort of fait accompli of acceptance. The line between "small" nuclear weapons and "smart" conventional weapons is deliberately blurred. The public is being sold on the necessity of a nuclear "bunker-buster" to combat terrorism. The militaristic response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and continuing aftermath of the fear of terrorism have given nuclear planners a license to move forward. The Second Nuclear Age has begun.
In this new context, MPI has been challenged to re-think our strategy. MPI came into existence to help and encourage middle power states to press the nuclear weapon states to fulfil their nuclear disarmament responsibilities, particularly the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. [2] The rationale was that, the Treaty having been indefinitely extended in 1995 with a promise of "systematic and progressive efforts...," the nuclear weapon states would respond favourably to the demonstrated support of middle power countries to achieve the goal of elimination.
MPI was greatly heartened when, just a few months after MPI was created, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC; Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden) came into existence. MPI focused its efforts in giving full support to the NAC. MPI took as a basis the "good faith" stipulated in Article VI. The "normal" would be genuine efforts of the nuclear states to make progress. But the "normal" of 1998 has been turned upside down. "Normal" in 2003 is the U.S. retention of nuclear weapons as the flagstone of an immense and unprecedented military buildup. How can MPI continue to press the nuclear weapon states to move toward elimination when the U.S., the driving force of the nuclear weapon states, flouts elimination and outright rejects some and sidelines many of the 13 Practical Steps?
In short, how can MPI now fight the 2003 "normal" of the continued existence of nuclear weapons? That this new "normal" is leading to proliferation is beyond question. The nuclear weapon states do not want proliferation, but want the NPT to block proliferation on their own terms. What strategy can now be invoked to overcome this perversion of the old "normal?" How can MPI help governments to recover the focus they showed in 2000 when they signed onto the NPT Review Final Document which said: "... the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons?"
Does the topsy-turvy world of "normal" mean that MPI's mission is outdated? Is our mission now an impossibility? MPI does not accept such a concept. The international interpretation of the NPT is right, the International Court of Justice is right, the New Agenda Coalition is right, the multitudinous resolutions of the UN are right, the abolition movement is right – and the Middle Powers Initiative is right. Nuclear weapons must be eliminated or they will proliferate around the world. There is no third way.
The MPI principle remains clear. And, politically speaking, it is certainly in the best interests of the middle power countries that a nuclear-weapons-free world be achieved. But in this inversion of the "normals," MPI must find a way of presenting its case in a clear and, I would say, bold manner. That case can be summarized cogently: "Save the NPT in 2005!"
Having attended both NPT Prepatory Committee meetings (PrepCom) held so far for the 2005 Review, it is clear to me that never has the NPT been in such a weakened state. It is a wounded Treaty. The first PrepCom, in 2002, was an exercise in frustration. Not only did the nuclear weapon states step back from their 2000 commitments, they could not even agree on how implementation reports will be made. The U.S. openly admitted that it "no longer supports" some of the 13 Steps. The second PrepCom was desultory and ritualistic. It was as if the actors were going through the motions, constructing a sort of façade, while outside the assembly the non-proliferation regime is eroding. It was left to the Mayor of Hiroshima to warn that "we stand today on the brink of hyper-proliferation and perhaps of repeating the third actual use of nuclear weapons." [3]
The third PrepCom, in 2004, is supposed to make recommendations to the 2005 Review, but in the present environment the prospect of any such agreed recommendations is nil. The 2003 vote in the UN First Committee on NAC resolutions calling for implementation of the 13 Practical Steps and progress towards the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons shows the continued resistance, even hostility, of the nuclear weapon states toward fulfilling their legal commitments. With the exception of China, which supported the NAC, the other nuclear weapon states all opposed the NAC resolutions. The NATO non-nuclear weapon states abstained, with the exception of Canada, which supported the NAC omnibus resolution. The gulf in the international community remains very wide.
The 2005 Review will likely open with a huge question mark looming over it: Can the Treaty survive? The future of the nuclear weapons abolition movement demands that the answer to that question be a firm yes.
MPI will now focus like a laser in the next 20 months on this issue: "Save the NPT in 2005!"
We must make it clear, of course, that MPI does not have any pretense that we can do this alone. Many in the abolition movement will be similarly focused. Nor do we seek any credit. The credit must go to the governments, particularly those of the New Agenda Coalition and like-minded countries, who are now seeking to strengthen the centre of the nuclear disarmament debate so that realistic progress can be made in 2005. What MPI will do is dedicate ourselves anew to finding creative ways to encourage the middle power governments to press all the nuclear weapons states to live up to their responsibilities to nuclear disarmament.
This renewed work will involve special strategy consultations, delegations to key countries, augmenting our work in developing the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND) and special new publications. We are very conscious of the need to energize parliamentarians to address the issue of saving the NPT with their own governments.
We want to heed the call of Sir Joseph Rotblat, Pugwash leader and Nobel Peace recipient, for a sweeping new campaign to educate and influence public opinion. [4] Such a campaign should contain priorities for action already highlighted by previous MPI Strategy Consultations:
a) Strategic arms reductions.
b) Control of missile defenses and non-proliferation of missiles.
c) Tactical arms reductions.
d) Non-use of nuclear weapons.
e) Ban on nuclear testing.
f) Control of fissile materials.
This is a lot of work for MPI and the other groups in the nuclear weapons abolition movement. But it must be done. The stakes have simply become too high to allow any of us to give less than our full effort.
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