Statement on Biosecurity
INES Working Group on Biological and Toxin Weapons Control
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Representatives, Ladies and Gentlemen,
We at INES do appreciate this opportunity to express our views to you on Biosecurity, from the perspective of researchers working in biomedical fields.
New developments in biotechnology have always taken a central position in the debate over biosecurity issues with regard to strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Biomedical research employing advances in biotechnology, including modern methods of molecular biology, genetic engineering and genomics, is explicitly pronounced in its dual-use character. The application of these modern methods in biomedical research is absolutely essential for elucidating pathogenic mechanisms that will define targets for countermeasures, allowing a more precise and directed battle to be waged against infectious diseases. At the same time, it is quite evident that the advances in biotechnology may be misused to develop and produce biological agents more dangerous than natural pathogens. Biosecurity measures designed to counteract misuse of biotechnology for biological warfare and bioterrorist activities will invariably affect biomedical research developments and must therefore be carefully drafted so as not to impede this research and the benefits that can be gained from it.
We as scientists and engineers in the INES Working Group on Biological Weapons Control are opposed to any blanket prohibitions placed on research activities, no matter how sensitive those activities may be. We join the view expressed in the recent report of the National Research Council of the National Academies in the USA that even the results of research that present the most danger of being misused may still provide beneficial aspects essential for combating infectious diseases [National Research Council, 2003].
Transparency in science is just as essential. In this regard we agree with editors of major scientific journals that results of legitimate research wich can benefit progress in biomedicine should not be censored in any way [Atlas, 2002].
Nevertheless, the biomedical community must address the possible misuse of scientific data. Our Working Group supports the following preventive arms control criteria designed to counteract negative dual-use aspects of scientific endeavor, while allowing positive aspects to be utilized.
Oversight of Genomics
We would like to propose a discussion concerning possible restrictions on information pertaining to the genomic sequences of bioweapons-relevant pathogens. This information could be deposited in a special gene databank (gene safety deposit bank) with access restricted to licensed scientists working in these areas. In this way the information would be open to legitimate scientists with approved credentials. There is of course a danger of unwarranted discrimination that could be associated with this concept. Mechanisms for the avoidance of discrimination would have to be worked out. Otherwise the proposal would be counterproductive for the advancement of biomedicine and science in general.
Oversight of Pathogenic Microorganisms
We also support the registration of all facilities and their scientists working with pathogenic microorganisms (or genetic material and toxic products from these microorganisms) of bioweapons relevance. A list of the agents with an estimation of the amounts produced per year should be supplied. A mechanism for periodic inspection of these facilities should also be established.
Oversight of Research
Preventive arms control criteria emphasize the need for monitoring research, to provide possible early warning of potentially dangerous developments. In this regard, we support suggestions for action as formulated in the National Research Council report [National Research Council, 2003] and the Project on Controlling Dangerous Pathogens [Steinbruner & Harris, 2003] that include a Committee of Oversight in reviewing research proposals of work relevant to the BWC. The review process must, however, be mandatory and it must be applied to government and industry as well as academia. We support the tiered peer review process at the local, national and international levels as proposed by Steinbruner and Harris [2003].
Education
One very important criterion of preventive arms control is the education of professionals and students in scientific fields relevant to the BWC about the Convention and their responsibilities in support of compliance while carrying out research.
They should also be instructed about the options they have in bioethical decisionmaking processes while carrying out research. An example would be the use of the precautionary principle. In this case a procedure is followed that allows an audit or risk assessment of the research at every step. The alternative procedure that would present the least risk would be chosen for the next step. At the same time this auditing process entails the willingness to give up a particular direction of research if this is indicated.
Thank you for your attention.
This statement was delivered by the INES Working Group on Biological and Toxin Weapons Control at the Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, November 10-14, 2003, in Geneva.
| |||||||||||||
