Counterterrorism and Third World Science
Fernando de Souza-Barros 
We describe recent initiatives in the United States with the purpose of engaging its scientific community in counterterrorism research and technological innovations, and of limiting the flow of new scientific knowledge or technological advances that could eventually reach terrorist arsenals. We are referring to recent reports on these initiatives and comments about related materials that have also appeared. Unilateral initiatives that can give rise to a "snow-ball" process with unexpected dimensions are examined. Negative consequences – latent when restrictions on scientific exchange or association are set – are foreseeable to Third World science.
Scientific Knowledge and Security: The Case of Counter Terrorism
As a consequence of September 11, on January 9, 2003, the US National Academy of Sciences held a discussion meeting on the balance between communication of scientific knowledge and security. [1] The next day, a group of journal editors and authors discussed practical strategies to enhance security. [2] They agreed on a set of new guidelines; one of these being that for certain research results other forms of communication (internal seminars, internet conferences) are more appropriate than scientific journals. The text reads: "We recognize that on occasions an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits. Under such circumstances, the paper should be modified, or not published. Scientific information is also communicated by other means: seminars, meetings, electronic posting, etc. Journals and scientific societies can play a role in encouraging investigators to communicate results of research in ways that maximize public benefits and minimize risks of misuse."
The American Physical Society (APS) bulletin Physics & Society of January 2003 reported about these initiatives. Setting the stage for these questions, the editorial comment of this bulletin (page 1) states, "since good science often underlies national advantages conducive to security, it is occasionally vital to live with effective secrecy in order to enhance security." [3] Blakemore et al. made explicit comments about scientific boycotting, concluding "that the threshold needed to justify a boycott of scientific colleagues elsewhere must be extremely high." [4] They worked out a set of conditions for scientific boycotting, and warn that "(w)hat the principle of science seeks to prevent is the use of scientists as pawns in political activity." [5]
Unfortunately, concrete actions are already compounding these questions from a Third World perspective: research laboratories are closed to foreign scientists; [6] foreign recipients of U.S. Ph.D.s are surveyed; [7] and the U.S. Department of Defense proposes new rules for certain non-classified research "deemed critical to national security." [8] In November 2002 – after refusing a bioweapons verification in its own territory – the U.S. proposed at the 5th Review Conference of the Bioweapons Convention (BWC) the regulation of the biosciences, and lead the approval of a decision to include in the final document of this meeting a recommendation for the discussion of codes of conduct for scientists by the BWC 2005 annual meeting. [9] These actions also highlight the uncontrollable nature of these initiatives. Who decides about the hypothetical scenarios required to assess the risk of scientific knowledge? Who answers for the expectations of misuse by supposedly ill-motivated persons blended into a vast majority of lawabiding citizens seeking scientific knowledge?
Counterterrorism: Figures and Scopes
Counter-terrorism has been incorporated as a worthy item in U.S. research and technical projects. The main drive is concentrated on biodefense but special efforts are under consideration in other fields, physics in particular. The scale of U.S. investments for defense against bioterrorism amount to an unprecedented $5.9 billion planned for fiscal year 2003. The $1.75 billion for the National Institutes of Heath, NIH, is "the largest single increase in resources for any initiative in the history of the NIH." [10] The main goals for this singular support are stressed by the U.S. Secretary of State in a recent commentary that appeared in the bulletin of the APS. One of these goals being to "(h)elp us also to comprehend, to anticipate, and to guard against the dangers that can befall us should technologies fall into the hands of those who would use them to do harm." [11] Special budget priorities such as "winning the war against terrorism and protecting the home land" are affecting U.S. research and development (R&D) with a mixture of flat funding, cuts, and modest increases. [12] The expectations, however, are that this drive should increase in the near future. In the field of physics, an APS task force for counterterrorism had a meeting on the occasion of the September 11 anniversary in 2002. According to the chair, "The objective is to identify areas where the physics community can step forward to assist the government in its response to the attack of September 11." [13] U.S. professional and technical societies are sponsoring workshops and conferences on research opportunities in security. [14]
These proposals not only distort R&D goals of U.S. science but they can – via twisted ways – tag advanced Third World research on certain fields as potential targets for boycotting. Nanotechnology stands out as an special case. According to the APS task force, "(o)ne of the more promising areas for physics to contribute to anti-terror efforts is the burgeoning field of nanotechnology. Specifically, useful research areas include the development of miniaturized intelligent sensor systems for detection of chemical and biological agents; nanofibers for protective clothing; nanoporous materials for selective separation of molecules; and new mechanisms to disrupt biological agent viability". [15]
Counterterrorism and Suspicion
The international media have focused on the special role that scientists of the Third World could have for the development of modern weapons. This point was dramatized by the Wen Ho Lee affair. Lee, an Asian-American former hydrodynamics expert at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, LANL, succeeded in defending himself against charges that he had leaked warhead secrets to China. [16] After September 11, this particular affair has been resurfacing again and again as evidence of intelligence failure. It has been cited recently as one of the causes for changes in the LANL administration. Quoting the APS News' Editor about these changes: "In early January, the University of California, which manages Los Alamos National Laboratory for the US Department of Energy, announced the resignation of the laboratory director and his top deputy, in the wake of allegations of financial mismanagement and attempts to cover it up. This episode followed earlier problems including the Wen Ho Lee affair." [17]
The impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on security questions brought new barriers for scientific exchange between the First and the Third World. An example that reveals the dimensions of these barriers is the case of tracking foreign students. The U.S. has nearly a million foreign students and scholars and "the tracking system signals a new era for university officials and for students, particularly those from Muslin nations." [18] Minor errors or mistakes about the data of these students and scholars can yield drastic consequences for their future careers.
The late Iraq crisis prior to the last war highlighted some consequences that Third World scientists might have to bear in the present North-South type of conflicts. As is well known, the viability of scrutinizing interviews of UN inspectors with Iraqi scientists was considered a key issue during the crisis. This was well characterized by Roger Macy: "The commentary by Blakemore et al. on the principle of the universality of science and its obligations on scientists, prompts me to suggest that we should be engaging in a more urgent debate on the role of scientists in legally constituted weapons inspections. The urgency relates to Iraq and the appalling and lonely dilemma that some Iraqi scientists may be facing." [19]
Security and Scientific Activity A repressive atmosphere is not favorable to scientific practice and breeds wastefulness. This special feature is well documented in literature. In a recent commentary, Scott names secret projects as "sniffer planes". [20] "Sniffer Plane" was the name of a fake project sponsored by the French government for the development of a secret device based on a non-existing new particle. The claim was that it would spot mineral and oil reserves from the air. According to Scott, "(i)t applies when governments keep things secret, not necessarily for national security, but for political expediency and to prevent public scrutiny." Scott adds: "Consider George W. Bush's plan to build a national missile defense shield (NMD). The missile defense program has spent $70.7 billion dollars from 1984 to 1994 without any deployable system or technological advancement," and concludes, "The Defense Department has recently moved to restrict access to information about future tests and costs. Thereby removing it from public scrutiny and turning it into a Sniffer Plane Secret."
The consequences of security considerations for science are highlighted in a report of a U.S. Commission on Science and Security. This commission was chartered by the U.S. Department of Energy to evaluate security in the U.S. national laboratories. In its conclusions, this commission states that implemented measures of safety and of counter-intelligence put into risk the capability of scientific and technological production of these laboratories. [21]
Counterterrorism and International Norms
The International Council for Science (ICSU) – created for the defense of the universality of science – is presently proposing a discussion on "new strategies of scientific communication." The statement reflecting preliminary discussions within ICSU stresses that the unrestricted flow of scientific ideas and information is critical to science. We quote one of its considerations: "In today's environment, threats to the principle are as likely to arise from the activities of individuals or small groups as from the policies of a particular government. Clearly, ICSU needs to develop strategies to address these new circumstances." [22] A debate about the possible targets of these strategies is urgently needed because, according to the facts presented in this paper, the magnitude of the security measures shall constrain scientific exchange with severe consequences to science in the Third World.
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