The Dutch Position on Missile Defence
Wilbert van der Zeijden 
The day this short overview of Dutch views on missile defence (MD) is written, January 23th 2003, general elections are being held for the second time in eight months in the Netherlands. After an unbelievably turbulent political year, this is the second time that voters are being asked to vote for the national parliament and a new cabinet. The issues that have been debated throughout both campaigns are immigration, "illegals", asylum seekers, minorities, foreigners, and integration. The other issues being debated are crime and the economic recession (in the language of the ruling parties these are in direct connection to immigration). What is completely left out of the political debate is any international political issue. Even the pending war on Iraq and the so-called "war against terrorism" are ignored both by leading politicians and the media, despite the fact that the Dutch army is taking active part in both military operations.
Missile defence is a definite non-issue in all of this. In both election campaigns and also during the 87 days the last cabinet managed to stay in office, the whole issue was not debated once.
A short study of party programmes shows that most parties don't even have any formal party opinion on the matter. Especially the traditionally center-right parties (the Christian Democrats and the Neo-Liberals) have nothing to say whatsoever on the subject. Only the left wing parties (Labour, Socialists, Greens, Communists) and the fundamentalist Christian parties make statements showing their concern about, or even opposition to, MD plans. The only party in favour of active Dutch MD development is the LPF, a party that won 25% of the seats in parliament eight months ago and is expected to loose almost all of it again in todays elections.
Evasive Manouvres
Unless the left wing parties win today's elections, which is very unlikely, the new cabinet is expected to do what has become standard strategy in Dutch politics—avoid the subject of MD as much as possible. They may show concern about the possibly destabilising effects of MD, but will, meanwhile, happily go along with any plan coming out of the hat of Washington or Brussels.
The problem is that, in the Netherlands, a political culture has grown over the years in which the tactic of being evasive works best, especially when it comes to more complex issues related to foreign affairs and defence.
The Prime Minister Balkenende (Christian Democrats), when asked about his position on the war against Iraq and planned Dutch involvement, stated, "It is far too early to claim that we are going to be part of this war. We suggested to our biggest ally (the US) that we would help in preparing for this war, but joining them in an active military strike against Baghdad is too early to discuss since there is no such war yet...". He is expected to get about 33% of all votes today. Politicians in the Netherlands get away with this kind of evasive answering again and again. On the so-called "war against terrorism"; on the expansion of NATO ("there is no expansion yet so we cannot talk about it"); on the procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF, the biggest Dutch governmental expenditure ever), and on missile defence plans.
Dutch Vision
When digging through the Foreign Affairs Committee minutes of the last two years, it becomes apparent that the official government position is that US plans for National Missile Defence (NMD) raise "grave concerns" because the system breaks the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and because of the possibly destabilising consequences to international security (on which there is no further elaboration). At the same time, it is proudly admitted that the Dutch are within NATO "one of the most active allies with regard to Theatre Missile Defence", especially when it comes to the development of Patriots, PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3; together with the Germans) and of course, the 'Dutch Pride': the Goal-Keeper.
In a letter from the Ministry of Defence in early 2001, the government elaborated on the subject in a small chapter called The Dutch Vision. Peculiarly, it starts with one sub-heading called The development of strategical thinking in the US, and ends with that paragraph as well.
All mocking and complaining aside, it is quite clear that the Dutch are actively involved in the development of an expanded European/Russian missile defence. They currently intend only on upgrade existing Theatre Missle Defense (TMD) possibilities, but have a definite interest in future expansion of capabilities, and even the integration of systems into the US National Missile Defense (NMD) systems. At the same time, the Dutch government is reluctant to openly show support for the multi-layered NMD system, while it supports the participation of the Dutch military industrial complex in the development this same NMD.
As a Case Study
Is what the Dutch think, say, or do important? No, not really. Apart from the Dutch taxpayers' wallet, involvement or opposition will go largely unnoticed by outsiders. Yet, as a case study, the Dutch case shows two things.
First of all, it shows how non-transparent European defence politics work. It is simply no longer within the political power of the Dutch government to decide on complex international issues. Decisions are primarily made in Brussels' NATO and EU headquarters, and are largely dependent on the opinion of Washington/London and the French/German axis.
Secondly, it shows how expected economic benefits overrule strategic political thinking in the smaller countries. Politically, the Netherlands are a dwarf, but economically, they are not. The only reason to procure the Joint Strike Fighter was for the revenues expected by Dutch hightech companies, and the same goes for MD development. Already the larger companies, Thales (Signaal), Stork, and Philips have managed to get their hands on contracts for development of NMD-related high-tech, worth several tens of millions of US dollars. Also, the second largest European contractor for MD related technology, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), is legally based in the Netherlands. MD is good for tax revenues.
And again, the US tactic of distribution of economically beneficial orders across allies will work. Once they get the companies involved, the governments will follow. The Dutch companies are getting more and more involved, so, for sure, the Dutch government will follow.
Concluding, the Dutch case shows how the tangled web of political and economic preferences create a de facto situation in which governments in the relatively small countries are unresponsive to requests for open debate. Politically, governments hide behind the big guns and claim that their inability to decide autonomously on international issues is outweighed by the fact that economically, participation in MD development is a profitable adventure. The other way around, a sound debate on economic factors is silenced because of the danger that the outcome of such a debate will go against the will of the powerful allies.
Where does this leave the voter who today decides on who will govern the country for the coming period (something between 87 days and 4 years): largely uninformed. The last survey among the public shows that roughly 60% of all individuals are against the development of MD. Not, however, because of the expected costs or the low relevance to actual threat or the uncertainty whether a multi-layered system will work properly within the next, say two, decades. But rather because of a growing feeling of discontent about US power politics. Another survey by the same institute showed that international politics got the lowest priority primarily because the public feels that it doesn't matter what the Dutch government wants, anyway.
Just a thought
Enough about the Dutch example. Thinking about European/Russian MD, a thought occurred to me. I haven't done the proper maths yet, but I'm going to share it with you anyway. In an attempt to simplify the matter, I tried some game theory on the question of why any government in Europe would wish to join the club of MD spenders. It has probably been done before and probably more thoroughly. It seems to me that the simple maths leads to a classical paradox of collective action.
For any government 'X', the preferred outcome is that there will be an MD system, payed for by all but X. That way, if the system actually worked in the end, national safety would be improved without having to bear the costs of development and maintenance. In the case of Dutch free-rider behaviour, the Germans would shoot down an incoming missile, even if it seems to be directed at defector/free-rider Amsterdam, because you can never know. The worst outcome of course is that country X pays for all the costs alone because the others don't see any benefit.
In the end, this line of reasoning completely excludes politics and is only dependent on economic factors. Looking at it this way, there's no reason for the Dutch government to co-operate, except for expected tax revenues and possibly the creation of jobs and know-how. If it can be shown that the governmental expenditure would outweigh benefits, this might be the key to changing the mindset of Europeans thinking about MD.
It's just a thought....
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