UK Position on Missile Defence
Dave Webb 
On 17th December 2002, the Ministry of Defence in the UK received a request from US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, for the upgrade of the early warning radar at the Royal Air Force Station (RAF) Fylingdales for use for missile defence. This request by the US had been expected for some years and the fact that it hadn't yet been made has often been used as a reason for not debating the issue in the House of Commons. As Robin Cook said when he was Foreign Secretary:
"Until we know both the nature of the question and also the circumstances in which we are being asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what might be, particularly since there is no commitment by the United States to ask the question."
Now that the request has been made, there are many indications that the Ministry of Defence will allow the upgrade to take place. Indeed, it is unlikely that the request would have been made at all without unofficial assurances of a favourable reply.
So, now that we know the "nature of the question and the circumstances", what of the debate? A form of 'consultation process' was in fact started in November, when, in a written reply to a question as to whether a formal mechanism would be made available for the public to register their views on missile defence with his Department, Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence, replied that "Members of the public are welcome to write to the Ministry of Defence with their views on missile defence. I intend to publish shortly some discussion material as an aid to public debate...",[1] and on 9th December he told Parliament that he had placed "...further analytical and discussion material in the Library of the House..." and that "...the paper will also be distributed widely and will be available on the Ministry of Defence website...".[2]
A press notice issued by the Defence Select Committee on 18th December 2002, stated:
"The Committee has taken evidence twice this year from the Ministry of Defence [MoD] on this subject: from MoD officials on 27th February 2002 and from the Secretary of State, Geoffrey Hoon, on 20th March 2002. It also has discussed missile defence during visits to Washington D.C. and Moscow earlier this year."
The statement also said that the Committee aims to continue its inquiries into missile defence, and welcomes written submissions to be made by 8th January 2003. Members of the Committee visited Fylingdales on 13th January 2003, and took evidence from Geoff Hoon on 15th January who said in a statement issued by the Ministry of Defence on that day: "Based on the analysis and discussion which we have undertaken so far, I have therefore come to the preliminary conclusion that the answer to the US request must be yes, and that we should agree to the upgrade as proposed."[3]
It is interesting that the only facility that the US has so far requested the use of is the Fylingdales early warning and tracking radar, even though it has been known for some time (since 1997) that the US base at Menwith Hill will be used as the European Ground Based Relay Station for the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which forms part of the proposed missile defence scheme.[4]
Why Does the UK Government Take This Position?
In January 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair said in the House of Commons:
"We share US concerns about the threats stemming from the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction and understand the role that missile defences can play as part of a comprehensive strategy to tackle these threats. I welcome the commitment of both Russia and the US to continue discussions on a new strategic framework including issues related to missile defence."[5]
The Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw, has given strong support for missile defence in a briefing paper sent to all Labour MPs in August 2001.[6] The paper indicates that the government had already accepted the idea of British participation in the US missile defence pro ject. "Missile defence...", it says, "...is not an alternative to our wider non-proliferation effort, but part of it." Mr Straw also stated categorically that 'rogue states' pose a real threat. Mr Bush had argued that the world had changed over the past 30 years, and Mr Straw says that "we agree with that analysis [and] are looking for a prescription to deal with that change."[7]
He has also suggested that a limited missile defence system might encourage non-proliferation:
"What missile defence should do is give pause to those tempted down the path of proliferation even before they begin. Those who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction are not usually irrational. They must make a cost/benefit calculation before seeking to acquire such weapons or the means of delivering them. Anything that affects this calculation by raising the cost or reducing the benefit has to be worth considering."[8]
In the statement of 15th January, Geoff Hoon said that "...the marked increase in the potential threat to our security from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery..." was a justification for the UK involvement in missile defence. He said that although the threat of ballistic missile attack by rogue states was not immediate, it could materialise in the relatively near future, and so it would be irresponsible for the government to leave the UK without the potential to defend itself.
Mr Hoon argued that agreeing to the US request would not prejudice the UK's interests, but would represent "...an invaluable extra insurance against the development of a still uncertain but potentially catastrophic threat to the citizens of this country...". His opinion is that the upgrade at Fylingdales does not commit Britain to any deeper involvement in missile defence, although it does gives the government the option of more participation at a later date.
What is not mentioned is that the UK relies very heavily on the US for much of its intelli gence and information gathering, and that the UK's nuclear Trident submarines are also reliant on US technology for upgrades and support. In other words, the UK is not in a favourable position to say 'no'.
The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) considers that there are two major political reasons why the UK is responding to US pressure to support missile defence:
"First, the Labour Party's damaging debates on unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1970s and 1980s left the impression that Labour was weak on defence issues, and were widely attributed to having contributed to its electoral defeats in the 1980s and early 1990s. Blair is keen to avoid a recurrence of these debates and deny the Conservatives a potent political weapon. Central to this agenda is the need to convince the public that Labour is committed to the 'special relationship.'
Secondly, the close ties between the US and the UK affords Britain political, military and strategic advantages that Blair is keen to preserve. The UK enjoys often unique technology-sharing agreements with the US. Examples include the Trident system, the Tomahawk Cruise Missile and the Joint Strike Fighter. Britain also enjoys favourable access to US intelligence operations, particularly through specialist imagery and signals intelligence such as the Echelon system, partly based at Menwith Hill. These benefits guarantee the UK government a level of international prestige and influence that it might not otherwise enjoy. All of this would be at risk should the UK fail to allow the US the use of radar bases for NMD [National Missile Defence]."[9]
Development of a UK Missile Defence Program
UK and US governments have worked closely together on defence issues for many years, and it seems that the UK has thought more about joining a US missile defence system than developing one of its own, or even joining in similar European projects. In October 1998, in answer to a question by Alan Simpson MP (Member of Parliament) on the involvement of Britain in the US Star Wars programme, the then-Defence Secretary (now head of NATO) George Robertson replied:
"Britain's involvement in the US SDI-star wars programme (now known as Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)) consists of research into BMD technologies where there is a common interest."[10]
A little later on the 12th November, Mr Robertson stated in Parliament that:
"The areas of common interest the UK has with the USA in connection with ballistic missile research are many, the most significant being performance of radars and other sensors, the guidance of interceptors, understanding the characteristics of ballistic missiles, the effective interception of ballistic missile warheads, and operating in coalition with Allies in air defence. The Defence Evaluation and Research Agency leads the programmes, working in close partnership with UK industry."[11]
The Ministry of Defence has made its own assessment of missile defence. In a written reply to a question in the House of Commons in March 2002, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon said:
"The Technology Readiness and Risk Assessment Programme (TRRAP) was carried out between 1998 and 2001 at a total cost of £12.5 million. A further programme of work beyond TRRAP to look further at the main technical risk areas it identified, and at the feasibility of defending against more complex and longer range threats, is underway. Studies are also assessing the significance of any capability gap in defence against theatre ballistic missiles, including the role that active theatre missile defence systems might play. The total cost of the current work in this financial year is £3.6 million. This work is due to continue until March 2003 with a similar level of financial provision."[12]
TRRAP was carried out by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) and four UK defence contractors.[13] It had a core team of 25-30 staff and 55 % of the £12.5 million cost came from the DERA.[14] In April 2002, the Sunday Tim es reported Wing Commander Phil Angus, former commanding officer of RAF Fylingdales, as saying that TRRAP was aimed at giving "...a definition and framework to UK ballistic missile defence. It looks at the threat and the technology options required to counter it...". Angus is also reported to have said that 300 people were working full-time on the programme and up to half a dozen computer-simulated "war games" were held as part of it.
TRRAP findings were:
1. "...that surface-based interceptors employing hit-to-kill are a feasible mechanism to counter theatre ballistic missiles and payloads." Hit-to-kill is preferred to warhead interceptors because warheads "...may be less well-suited to destroying targets containing multiple sub-munitions, if these were to emerge."
2. the identification of a number of remaining key technical and system risks, such as dealing with sub-munition warheads and countermeasures, and the distribution of intelligence information.
3. the identification of four main technical risk areas: threat projection; discrimination; engagement; lethality.
4. difficulties in minimising ground effects, usually casualty levels, in the case of sub-munitions—even a few surviving sub-munitions containing biological agents might be capable of causing appreciable casualties on the ground. Deflecting the payload may, in any case, only transfer the problem to a different location, which may or may not be a desirable outcome.
There is no doubt that the UK Government has decided to once again 'buy in' to a US system. In a statement to Parliament in October 2002, Geoff Hoon stated that he had asked for "...detailed analytical work to be completed on the implications of missile defence and its relationship with other elements of a comprehensive strategy against the ballistic missile threat."[15]
He also mentioned that US officials had visited London to "...set out possible approaches to missile defence and to repeat US willingness to offer protection to friends and allies." He went on to say that: "The close access to the US research programme that we already enjoy will be essential background to inform any decisions that we may wish to take on missile defence for Europe or the United Kingdom."
On 15th November 2002, the head of the US Missile Defence Agency, General Kadish, took time out from a conference he was attending in London to visit the base at RAF Fylingdales in North Yorkshire some 250 miles away.
In December 2002, in response to a question from Patrick Mercer MP, Mr. Hoon stated:
The United Kingdom already has close access to US research and development work on missile defence, taking part in collaborative research and information exchange on ballistic missile defence technologies. UK industry is also playing an active role. UK expertise in such areas will enable us to consider and make informed assessments about technical advances in missile defence.[16]
Popular Opinion and the Media
There is considerable opposition to the US plans for missile defence even in parliament. Between June and October of 2001, over 280 MPs (including 216 of a total of 412 Labour MPs—the total number of MPs being 659) signed an Early Day Motion (which is a motion not generally expected to be debated but which is used as a device to draw attention to an issue, and to elicit support for it by the means of inviting other Members to add their signatures):
"That this House expresses concern at President Bush's intention to move beyond the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in developing missile defence; and endorses the unanimous conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which recommended that the Government voice the grave doubts about NMD in the UK, questioned whether US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community and recommended that the Government encourage the USA to explore all ways of reducing the threat it perceives."
This number of signatures on an early day motion is most unusual—if not unprecedented.
It is also worth noting that 14 major Trade Unions have carried resolutions in opposition to current missile defence proposals.
It would appear that the general public in the UK also do not share the government's enthusiasm for missile defence. In a poll commissioned by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and conducted by MORI (Market and Opinion Research International) in July 2001, 70 % thought that the development of a US missile defence system would encourage other countries to build more advanced nuclear weapons. Over 60 % of those surveyed also believed that international agreement on nuclear disarmament would be harder to achieve in the wake of US plans to deploy such a system. Perhaps more worrying for the Government is that 72 % of those polled felt that the use of radar facilities in Britain for US missile defence would make the United Kingdom a target for an attack directed at the United States' system. In addition, while over half of those surveyed felt that denying use of UK-based radar facilities to be used in the system may harm transatlantic relations, less than a third thought that it is in Britain's best interest to cooperate.[17]
Public dissent has also been visible in the large number of demonstrations at Menwith Hill and Fylingdales (the two US bases in the UK to be used for missile defence), and a number of conferences on missile defence and the militarisation of space have been organised by NGOs with international speakers to discuss and debate the issues.[18]
Most media (and protest movement) attention at the moment is centred on the possible war on Iraq. However, there have been bursts of media activity on missile defence following the US request to use Fylingdales. The coverage has been mixed. Government and right wing media moguls control most of what is broadcast and printed. BBC radio still gives a reasonable coverage with arguments for and against, and some news programmes do appear to be more 'against' than 'for'. The printed press is very mixed. The right wing supporters of the British Conservative Party (the Daily Telegraph, Mail, Express) are well behind the US plans for war on Iraq and missile defence. Other national papers are not so much, with the Guardian and Independent offering considered views that are not favourable to missile defence. Noticeably, the Daily Mirror broadsheet has come out strongly against war on Iraq but seems non-committal on missile defence.
It should also be recognised that according to a recent (21st January 2003) MORI poll, the British public is becoming less enthusiastic about a war on Iraq. 77 % oppose a war if it did not have UN approval: an increase of 7 % from a similar poll in September. 68 %of those asked said they disapproved of the way Bush is handling the current situation with Iraq.[19]
The most common angle in the popular media is that the use of the bases will make the UK more of a target for anyone wanting to attack or harm the US. How the UK government can change people's perceptions of the situation in Iraq will contribute enormously to the public attitude toward the US use of UK bases for missile defence.
Why Missile Defence Doesn't Make Sense
Whilst current plans for phase one of missile defence are modest compared to those of the original Star Wars system proposed by former US President Reagan, one must not be fooled in to thinking that this is as far as current US plans go. The system will develop into a space-based system with weapons in space. Missile defence is the first stage in the larger US plan to achieve "full spectrum dominance"—dominance of land, sea, air, space, and information. By providing space weapons, new air-borne weapons, missile interceptors, and advanced missile tracking technology, missile defence becomes the first big s tep in this direction.
If the UK gives the go-ahead to missile defence, it will become more difficult to reject further developments. The UK will become increasingly tied to US foreign and military policy and will be a key player in the progress of US "full spectrum dominance".
The perception of missile defence by some is that it will allow the United States to fight wars more efficiently and effectively. By giving them the ability to defend against limited missile attack, they will have the ability to launch a first strike with less concern about a successful retaliatory attack. This will allow them to go to war more often, or at least more confidently, whenever it suits their foreign policy objectives. It is also the perception of this threat that could easily lead to a gradual build up of nuclear arsenals.
As has been seen countless times throughout history, as bigger shields are produced, so are bigger swords. No state can allow itself to fall into a position of impotence. If its current arsenal of weapons is rendered redundant by a new system, it will develop newer or more numerous weapons that can overcome the new system. By creating a stronger shield one only provokes the development of more powerful weapons to pierce that shield.
In addition, the UK organisation, Scientists for Global Responsibility, included the following in their statement to the Defence Select Committee:
"The cost of MD for the US is likely to be as much as $200bn (costs for the UK are as yet unclear)—this is not the best use of material or financial resources at a time when more pressing world problems are mounting.
MD is very poor value for money—defence is much more costly than offense. Any attacker who is capable of sending long range missiles can easily afford to spend a little more on cheap countermeasures against MD. As it is, at least 2 MD anti missiles are planned for each attacking warhead or decoy. Thus even a full scale MD system could only defend against 50 or so mis siles.
MD cannot defend against much more credible—and very much cheaper—non-missile or terrorist threats. For example a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon inside a plane, a weapon in a boat offshore or in a busy port, a weapon constructed inside a city by parts smuggled in or stolen from within the target country. The results of a success would mean a rain of nuclear material, either over the intercept area as the warhead burns up on re-entry into the atmosphere, or over the launch area. Evacuation of such areas would be necessary in any case. MD would thus still leave widespread contamination of large areas."[20]
The US has been trying to develop a missile defence system of some sort since the Second World War—each programme has failed. Tests of the current technology have been very patchy.
In addition to all of the above, the radar at Fylingdales emits electromagnetic radiation which may be harmful to humans and wildlife. The Ministry of Defence has never issued data on the level or form of this radiation. Measurements taken on behalf of the UK Nuclear Free Local Authorities indicate that the levels of emission are close to the maximum suggested under international guidelines.[21]
Further, the accuracy of these guidelines is in doubt and more research is needed into the effects of the pulsed electromagnetic emissions from the radar before any upgrade is allowed.
Why Missile Defence Makes Sense for the Bush Administration
Missile defence provides a market for expensive new military technology and new science, thereby providing jobs, and rewarding key corporate supporters of President Bush's Presidential candidacy. Missile defence thus has a very powerful political lobby and vested interest behind it.
It creates a continuing threat and helps politically justify US military supremacy over a world with only one remaining superpower.
In Conclusion
The CND submission to the Defence Select Committee states:
"It is important to remember that current public plans for missile defence do not tell the whole story. Whilst a software upgrade at Fylingdales may be all that is necessary at present, the full plans for missile defence and the further militarisation of space are far greater and the implications far more destabilising. It is a path that is hard to turn back on once the journey has been started.
Missile Defence
threatens to provoke a new arms race
will lead to the weaponisation and militarisation of space
is provoking concern and anger amongst other states including China, Russia, and Canada
may pose a threat to UK bases
may lead to the sitting of interceptor missiles in the UK
will be a step towards the US military's aim of achieving "full spectrum dominance" through which they will perceive themselves more able to fight wars without threat of retaliation
may increase electromagnetic radiation levels in the North York Moors national park and surrounding villages
will tie the UK ever more tightly to US foreign and military policy
The UK government must take the brave step of rejecting use of Fylingdales, Menwith Hill and any other part of the UK for any component of the missile defence system. Instead they should take genuine unilateral and multi-lateral steps towards nuclear and conventional disarmament and peace and confront the root causes of inequality and unrest, and urge the US to do the same."[22]
We must think of new ways of defining security. It cannot be achieved by the superiority of weaponry and technology—these are material, fallible, and can usually be overcome. The world should learn that creating new levels of warfighting technology has never been a step towards peace and security—and never will be. We must create a world of equality and justice where people and nations help each other through difficult times—not threaten and exploit each other. Unless we change our ways of thinking and behaving as nations, we will obliterate ourselves with greed and mistrust. It may take a long tim e to make the changes in our political and cultural structures, but if we are careful and thoughtful, then, as a whole, the human race has a long time. We are intelligent and adaptable—we just need the will and courage to do it.
|
This paper was written for the conference "International Arms Control, Transparency and Verification in a European Russian Framework of Cooperative Security" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on January 24-26, 2003, in Berlin, Germany.
| ||||
