US Missile Defence and the Common European Security and Defence Policy
Preben Bonnén 
On 13 June 2002, the United States formally abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.[1] For the first time in 28 years, US military and national security planners were free to pursue the ABM programmes they deemed the most capable and desirable. There was considerable criticism of the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and many expressed fears of a new arms race.[2]
It is not that US President George W. Bush had not recognized the importance of the AMB Treaty to the Europeans. During his first visit to Europe, in June 2001, Missile Defence (MD) was a prominent topic of discussion in Madrid, Brussels, Gothenburg, Warsaw and Ljubljana. At that time, Poland was the one place where Bush won some support.
European leaders welcomed US considerations on countering threats from terrorist regimes, but French President Jacques Chirac and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder pointed out to Bush that international safety and stability should first be secured, before the possible establishment of a missile defence system.[3] Nonetheless, on 17 December 2002, President Bush said that he would begin deploying a limited system to defend the United States against ballistic missiles by 2004.
Although the first parts of the system will be made operational while more advanced technology is still being developed, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the initial system would probably stop "a relatively small number of incoming ballistic missiles, which is better than nothing".[4] The plan calls for ten ground-based interceptor missiles at Fort Greely, Alaska, by 2004 and an additional ten interceptors by 2005 or 2006. According to Bush, the "initial capabilities" would also include sea-based interceptors and sensors based on land, at sea, and in space.
The Europeans fear that deploying MD would escalate into a dangerous arms race and lead to a weakening of military ties between the United States and its NATO allies. A new arms race as a consequence of Washington's plans for a missile defence system would mean that the European's (limited) arsenal will lose its importance.
Conversely, the US-Russian agreement on reducing the two countries' nuclear arsenals may cause France to appear to be too aggressive if it did not follow in the reduction of arms. Thus, it is no coincidence that President Chirac took the initiative to change France's nuclear strategy, immediately before President Bush came to Europe.[5]
Europe and US Missile Defence
The reason why the United States responded to criticism with equanimity is because it considers the current, limited project to be neither "strategic" nor "global" but "national".[6] Despite the US offer to cover European allies and friends, the intent is for MD simply to defence US territory against only a dozen or so missiles that a rouge state might muster.
As far as the relationship between Western Europe and the United States is concerned, the situation from 1983 seems to be repeating itself. This was the year that former US President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). At that time, Europe also placed a major emphasis on attempting to prevent a destabilising arms race by insuring that the ABMT was upheld.[7]
An attempt was made by the French and German governments to coordinate a common view, although Great Britain thought it best not to come out too strong in opposition, and London had some difficulty in imagining what type of co-ordination could be established. The problem to Europeans then was (as it is now) the prospect of the US following its own policy irrespective of the concerns of its allies.
Today Europeans see a greater cause for concern in connection with the missile defence project. In the 1980s, Europeans were not developing a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), but an important consideration now is: how will the common policy on security and defence and future foreign policy developments affect the European position on US plans for MD? It is still uncertain that Europe can hold a common position this time. Indeed, some European countries' actions on MD may indicate how far Europe can cooperate on security and defence policy, and how their decisions will affect transatlantic ties.[8]
Possible means of overcoming these divergences have been proposed and include an extension of the US MD umbrella to include Europe and a greater US willingness to provide Europe with advanced military technology to support the development of more effective European defence forces. Some suggest that MD be deployed in Europe by NATO and paid for by the EU; which might also facilitate cooperation between these two institutions. Whether or not this is a viable option, a reconciliation of different US and European perspectives on MD could contribute significantly towards maintaining each side's obligation.
Denmark, Greenland, and US Missile Defence
On 13 December 2002, Washington made a formal enquiry to Denmark concerning the use of the Thule base for MD. There will not be any big surprises when Denmark (together with Greenland) table their final decision concerning the US request for use of the radar station. Denmark has, in advance, indicated that it is extremely favourable to the proposition and there is definitely a parliamentarian majority favouring this course of action.
The reason why the request from the US came in December is probably because it was in line with Denmark's own desires, which had been expressed before and during the NATO summit in Prague a month earlier. Denmark will not be able to contribute significantly to the establishment of a NATO Response Force, which the US sees as essential in the war against terrorism. So, as compensation, Denmark has chosen to play its 'Thule card' in order to smooth a way out of this problem. Denmark has previously followed this kind of 'bartering' policy with some success during the Cold War, and appears to be attempting to re-introduce it now.[9]
Greenland is also almost certain to meet Washington's request for upgrading the Thule base. The reasons for this are numerous, but when the rhetoric sometimes deviates from this expected line it is mainly due to domestic politics and the issue of 'Rigsfællesskabet' (the royal union with Denmark) rather than crises with the US. In contrast to Denmark, who seeks to compensate for not contributing to NATO plans, Greenland is trying to get rid of its status as a colony, as established by the 1951 defence agreement between Denmark and the US covering the use of the Thule base.[10]
However, Greenland has an obvious interest in the continuation of US activities at the Thule base due to economic reasons as well as to secure further educational assistance from the US for the Greenlandic youth. Thus, a downsizing or closure of the base would have fatal consequences for any ambitions for more self-determination as well as for the Greenlandic community in general.
Greenland and Its Demand for More Autonomy
Should the United States decide to establish an alternative to the Thule base and, as a consequence, downsize (rather than close altogether) the activities of the base to an absolute minimum, bringing economic losses to the Greenlandic community, the policy of the self-ruled authorities in Greenland will be hit by a boomerang effect.
Any reduction in the base's activities would have an impact on the Greenlandic economy that can only be compensated by additional economic subsidies from Denmark. Moreover, Greenland will lose its best bargaining chip, when it comes to ongoing negotiations with Denmark, in matters concerning greater autonomy and/or independence.
The Thule base brings in approximately Danish kroner (DKR) 86 million out of the Greenlandic self-ruled authorities' total revenue of approximately DKR 5 billion or the total revenue from taxes of DKR 1.3 billion (these figures are taken from the state budget of 2001.) This is the amount that the Thule base brings in to Greenland in terms of direct and indirect taxes from the total of 550 Danish and Greenlandic civil employees receiving a total payment of DKR 187 million from the United States.[11]
Any decision to decrease the activities of the base – and to decrease the level of non-US employment – could result in up to 440 Danes returning to Denmark and approximately 110 Greenlanders losing their jobs. The Greenlandic employment force accounts for approximately 25,000 people. In terms of the Danish labour market, 110 jobs in Greenland would correspond to some 12,500 persons in Denmark. It could cause a cut in tax revenue of up to DKR 86 million.
To this could be added the Greenlandic self-ruled authorities' share of a possible profit from Greenland contractors, induced effects on the Greenlandic employment, etc. Even though the 86 million dkr accounts only for one percent of Greenland's total gross domestic product, it corresponds to 36 percent of the revenues from tobacco taxes, ten percent of the administrative costs of running the public sector, or five percent of the costs for health services.
US Missile Defence and the Perspectives for the Danish Royal Union
The US military base in Greenland will only remain of interest to the United States if permission is given to upgrade it with new software and, in the longterm, to establish a so-called "X-band" radar system there as part of missile defence. Regardless of how the Danish government chooses to incorporate and handle the Greenlandic self-rules authorities' concern about missile defence, deeper and long-term cracks in their relationship are unavoidable.
If Denmark supports the Greenlandic self-ruled authorities' critical line (motivated by domestic concerns), Greenland will – contrary to its own desires – become more dependent on Denmark due to the need for increased block grants. In the future, this will give rise to further friction between the Greenlandic self-rule authorities and Denmark and by implication the royal union of Denmark and Greenland in general.
Taking the current situation into consideration, Denmark seems more inclined to support the expansion of Thule despite Greenland's protests and the royal union of Denmark and Greenland because of its foreign policy interests. Danish policy will be very hard to understand if the government answers with anything other than a "yes" to the United States. It may not be seen as financial sense to say "no" to the US and NATO because of the increase in military spending if, by taking this position, they would have to increase the grant to the Greenlandic self-ruled authorities.[12]
Great Britain and the Danish Support for US Missile Defence
After Great Britain granted permission for the US to use the radar complex at Fylingdales for their planned missile defence system, the pressure on Denmark has increased. For this reason, Washington's missile defence plans have immediately become an 'urgent matter' for Denmark. This leaves a justified doubt concerning how much room for discussion there will be in any subsequent Danish debate. It is equally doubtful whether the British and Danish "yeses" will be cost-free for both countries.
In order to ensure that a US missile defence system will function properly for European states, it will be necessary to position ABM launch units in or near Europe. Without the positioning of these launch sites in, say, Greenland, Great Britain or Eastern Europe it will not be possible to achieve the kind of protection expected by, for example, certain sections of the Danish parliament. The geographical distances and time scales involved are such as to render the US ABM missiles, now being installed in Fort Greely in Alaska, ineffective for the protection of Europe.
If Europe – and in the first place Great Britain and Denmark – do not recognise this requirement and do not agree to a subsequent need for these launch sites, then the consent of any country to participate would not only be useless but also damaging for any attempt to develop a Common European Security and Defence Policy. Useless because the missile shield for Europe promised by the US would not be possible, and damaging because a British and Danish blue print will complicate the development of CESDP.
By not taking the broader consequences into consideration, Great Britain and Denmark will expose Europe to huge problems when it comes to developing a common policy within the area of security and defence. In addition, the relationship between Europe and the United States could be damaged because Europeans do not expect to significantly contribute economically to a missile defence in Europe.
As outlined above, Denmark will have taken on a big responsibility by saying "yes" to upgrading the Thule base because it will at the same time be considered as a "yes" to accepting ABM launch sites perhaps on Danish/Greenlandic soil and may aggravate the currently strained relationship between Europe and the United States in the long run.
Finally it is also worth noting that this comes at a time when Denmark is already placing obstacles in the way of developing a common European policy on security and defence.
This paper was written for the conference "International Arms Control, Transparency and Verification in a European Russian Framework of Cooperative Security" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on January 24-26, 2003, in Berlin, Germany.
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