Lessons To Be Learned from the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention
Ralf Trapp 
Can the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) be useful as a model for other arms control and disarmament regimes?[1] Only to an extent. It is important that the characteristics of the regime to be formed are fully appreciated. Lessons can be learned and adapting experience made by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) may be useful, but over-reliance on CWC experience may actually be counter-productive. Regimes and institutions need to be built on the specific requirements of the weapons and facilities to be controlled (nuclear, missile, etc.).
An initial question to be raised in this context is this: does the CWC still respond to currently perceived security threats? How does it contribute to national, regional, and global security?
This is a good time for asking such questions, because the OPCW and its Member States are currently preparing for the 1st CWC Review Conference, which will assess the operation of the Convention; the impact of changes in science, technology, industry and the security environment; and make recommendations for the further improvement of CWC implementation.
One must remember that the CWC was negotiated during the Cold War and concluded just after. Many of its provisions reflect the deep mistrust between the two Alliances in the 1980s, as well as the specific way in which chemical weapons had been acquired and assimilated into their military arsenals and doctrines. These conditions have changed and while some of the implementation tasks associated with the chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles of Russia and the US, still reflect these past conditions, mistrust between East and West no longer dominates the thinking about verification. At the same time, proliferation perceptions and thus verification requirements have changed.
The CWC was designed in the light of the concept of "militarily significant quantities" of CW, reflecting the fact that CW had been procured in large quantities (70,000 tonnes have been declared to the OPCW). The use of CW in military conflict as an area-weapon in sustained and combined operations requires hundreds to thousands of tonnes. This explains, for example, some of the thresholds used in the Convention.
The situation changed somewhat during the Iran-Iraq war, when smaller quantities became proliferation-relevant (both for procurement and use) - proliferation-relevant threshold amounts were somewhere above 50 tonnes. The proliferation of CW at that time should be seen against the historic experience that CW are often acquired and used in what could be described as a 'down-hill' conflict - they are used by the side that is more technologically advanced. CW are not a 'status weapon', and their acquisition reflects competition at non-strategic levels. Once offensive programmes have been started, there is also an institutional interest in continuing and expanding such programmes.
Today, the security context has fundamentally changed. New threats include non-state actors such as terrorists, and there are perceptions that terrorist organisations have taken an interest in nuclear, biological, and chemical materials and weapons. Also in general, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are commonly perceived as an increasing threat, and proliferation concerns are associated with regions of tension in which there is a risk of war.
There is consensus among the States Parties to the CWC that the treaty remains an important instrument that continues to serve their security needs in the still-evolving security environment of the 21st century. The weight attached to the CWC varies considerably, however, depending on regional and national conditions and objectives of the country in case.
Continued support for the Convention is manifest by the importance attached to universality (Member States recognise that some key countries/regions have stayed away, including the Middle East and North Korea). There is also a strong commitment of the Member States to rectify the problems recently encountered by the OPCW (i.e. the financial and leadership crises).
Universality is seen increasingly as not just an issue of numbers, but as a matter of the quality of implementation. Accession/ratification is linked not only to the political commitment to chemical disarmament, but also to the ability to fully implement all treaty provisions. As a consequence, implementation support has become a separate dimension in the development of international co-operation programmes under the CWC.
CWC implementation has by and large been a success story, despite problems encountered recently, including the recent budget and leadership crises. The OPCW has fielded more than 1000 inspections since the entry into force of the CWC, some 70% at CW facilities (the focus being on the verification of CW destruction). CW destruction is now under way in all declared CW possessor States Parties.
Lessons To Be Learned
Some of the key lessons to be learned by the OPCW are:
Issues that the parties could not resolve in negotiations can become extremely divisive later on, and not just jeopardise the implementation process but also undermine or politicise the institutions involved (e.g. in the military field: the verification of CW conversion or destruction, where the Technical Secretariat is sometimes seen as taking sides due to a lack of agreed guidance; in the chemical industry: the lack of agreed guidelines leading to unequal implementation with political and economic ramifications). Related to this is the question of "constructive ambiguity". This negotiation approach helps to achieve agreements, but tends to undermine implementation later on. Furthermore, there are the normal teething problems of a new regime (see for example the industry verification regime), which can also undermine institutional credibility.
National implementation is key to the success or failure of a regime. It has been fundamentally underestimated in the CWC context and remains an area of major concern (e.g. the lack of legislation, lack of political attention, lack of awareness, experience, etc.).
Part of this problem is that moving from negotiating an agreement to implementing it increases the number and broadens the scope of the authorities that get involved at the national level. Many of them have no reference to why or how the agreements were achieved and what the original intentions were. As implementation proceeds, the government agencies involved my change, so do national agendas. All this requires attention to ensure that, in the implementation phase, the objectives of the regime don't get lost.
Non-governmental actors (e.g. industry, pressure groups) can be important in the implementation process. This can work both ways—difficulties emanating from a 'confidentiality cult' lead to a lack of transparency and public awareness, and political support for the regime may dwindle. It can also lead to a diminishing of parliamentary oversight, and checks and balances may no longer work. A lack of public awareness can weaken institutions and increase their vulnerability to political pressure.
In the case of the CWC, partnership with the chemical industry has been particularly important. Industry was a partner in the negotiation process and must not be reduced to becoming the object of the process once the regime enters into force. The institutions need to stay engaged with the industrial associations if the treaty regime is to function effectively.
Having an international organisation (an institutional as well as a legal framework) to administer the treaty is important to build confidence in the regime as well as in treaty compliance. (It enables regular exchange, the conduct of clarification in a multilateral context, assessment independence, and a degree of political protection in particular for smaller countries, combined with a capability to resolve problems). This, however, requires the confidence of the parties in the institutions (through leadership and openness, independence combined with co-operation, and transparency in decision making).
Decision making by consensus appears to be a necessary methodology in the stage of regime formation, and is used widely in the OPCW. It can create serious problems if the concept is abused to prevent decisions not favoured by some parties. The delays so caused are politically undesirable. At the same time, unresolved issues lead to the need to use national discretion in areas of disagreement. In the treaty implementation phase, this creates inequalities, unequal implementation of treaty provisions, and potentially friction.
There is a (natural) tension between the States Parties and the Technical Secretariat - which needs careful management. The OPCW has had considerable problems in the recent past, which have now been sorted. But the consolidation phase is far from over. Be that as it may, the build-up of a new institution is not a simple task, and getting the relationships between the different organs right in practice is important.
The organisation does not function in a vacuum. (In the case of CW usage that requires an emergency response, e.g., provision of assistance and/or protection would involve many national and international agencies, and a new agency such as the OPCW needs to find a place. Although the CWC is the only treaty with an explicit mandate for an agency to act in such cases, the OPCW would be a newcomer on the scene and not be integrated into existing international mechanisms.) There is thus a need for co-ordination to avoid duplication of effort and operational chaos, to resolve the multiple commitment of assets pledged by States to different agencies and institutions. Also, the expectations of some of the parties are not always realistic—which may give room for misunderstandings on both sides.
An absolute must for any new institution and regime is the maintenance of political support by the parties as well as affected industries.
Dedicated and competent staff are equally important for the success of an agency, and the policies that organisations put in place for their staff will critically influence the success of any future recruitment and the stability of the institution. There is clearly a danger that short-term political considerations lead to decisions on staff policy that may in the long run undermine the institution's ability to function properly and with high competence.
This paper was written for the conference "International Arms Control, Transparency and Verification in a European Russian Framework of Cooperative Security" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on January 24-26, 2003, in Berlin, Germany.
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The Mission Statement of the OPCW says, "Our mission is to implement the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to achieve the OPCW's vision of a world both free of chemical weapons and in which cooperation in chemistry for peaceful purposes for all is fostered. In doing this, our ultimate aim is to contribute to international security and stability, to general and complete disarmament and to global and economic development. To this end, we propose policies for the implementation of the Convention to the Member States of the OPCW and develop and deliver programmes with and for them. These programmes have four broad aims: to ensure a credible, transparent regime to verify the destruction of chemical weapons and prevent their re-emergence in any Member State, while also protecting legitimate national security and proprietary interests; to provide protection and assistance against chemical weapons; to encourage international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry; and to bring about universal membership of the OPCW by facilitating international cooperation and national capacity building. | ||||
