U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control
Lessons for a Future Multilateral Verification System
Eugene Miasnikov 
What conclusions from the previous U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control experience can be applied to future efforts to control nuclear weapons and delivery systems? Can the experience with bilateral control of nuclear delivery systems in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) process be extended to a multilateral context? Which verification systems and monitoring technologies exist that can be applied in a multilateral environment?
Most Russian arms control experts are convinced that achieving a multilateral agreement on nuclear arms reductions is important and expedient. The official Russian attitude is similar. In particular, two years ago Russia proposed that the five nuclear weapons states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P5, namely the Russian Federation, the U.S., the United Kingdom, China, and France), should institute and commence a permanently operating consultation process regarding the problems of strategic stability within the P5.[1] There is no doubt that other recognized and de facto nuclear weapons states need to join the bilateral process of nuclear disarmament in order to keep this process progressive and ensure that it is directed toward elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. It is quite apparent that the main problem will be to reach a political consensus between key states in accomplishing this goal. Unfortunately, the current political environment in the world does not give ground for optimism. If, however, the political decision on multilateral verified nuclear weapons reductions were actually made, the next step would be to work out a system for verification of the reached agreement. Existing U.S.-Russian experience seems to be a good basis for creating such a system.
Bilateral nuclear arms control between the U.S. and Russia (Soviet Union) has been going on for more than forty years. The culmination of this historical process was in achieving the INF and START Treaties, signed in 1987 and 1991, respectively. Both eventually became multilateral agreements as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, because the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan, along with the Russian Federation, inherited the Soviet nuclear weapons potential. However, one should note that the verification procedures of the START and INF Treaties were adopted on a bilateral basis.
Of course, tremendous experience was accumulated over this period, and it is impossible to cover all its practical lessons that could be utilized by the international community, in this brief presentation. Following are the author's main observations.
The starting point for the creation of a multilateral verification system is to get a consensus on common goals and verification principles. Over the years, the bilateral U.S.-Russian relations developed the following principles:[2]
Most importantly, verification should be implemented in accordance with universally recognized norms of international law, with non-interference in domestic affairs of states.
Verification measures should be conducive to the scope and nature of obligations accepted by the parties.
Observance of the treaty obligations must be reliably verifiable.
Verification measures need to be economically rational, and simple to implement.
It is important to note that previous bilateral treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms covered mainly delivery platforms. The measures adopted within the frameworks of the INF and START Treaties with respect to warheads were very limited. There were attempts to broaden transparency of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals in the mid-1990s, but, unfortunately, they failed.[3] Further progress in disarmament seems almost impossible without a solution to this problem,[4] and it is crucial to focus the efforts of politicians in this direction.
National technical means (NTM) played a crucial role in verification of the arms control agreements. They were in fact the only means for verification of strategic arms limitation agreements prior to the conclusion of the INF Treaty. NTM proved to be efficient in monitoring the number of deployed silo-based ICBMs and the number of missile submarines. From the perspective of the possible application of the U.S.-Russian experience to a multilateral agreement among other nuclear weapons states, one may conclude that NTM capabilities have grown in the meantime. In addition to military reconnaissance satellites, modern commercial satellites are capable of taking pictures of any place on the globe with a resolution sufficient for many verification tasks. Another example—The Open Skies Treaty—also represents a substantial and unique tool that was not available during the Cold War.
The previous U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreements included provisions that the parties were obligatednot to interfere with the NTM operated by the other side. This principle seems to be promising for future agreements as well. However, there are still "gray zones" allowing for the evasion of such provision. An example of such a loophole was mentioned by Major-General Viktor Koltunov (ret.), Consultant to the Department of International Agreements of the Russian Ministry of Defense.[5] One of the provisions of the SALT II Treaty forbids"to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and launchers during testing".[6] In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union began testing its mobile Topol (SS–25) ICBM at the Plesetsk test range. Missile launches occurred from positions close to silo launchers, and the U.S. blamed the Soviet Union for violation of the provision quoted above. The claim was based on the fact that the U.S. NTM never detected the Soviet test launches. Therefore, the U.S. assumed that the Soviet Union deliberately concealed the association between ICBMs and their launchers. The Soviets responded that the USSR had no intention of carrying out test launches either at a time when the test site is exposed to U.S. reconnaissance satellites or under time and weather conditions that ensure the best conditions for the U.S. to monitor the tests.
The parties to the INF and START Treaties adopted an unprecedented verification measure—on-site inspections. During the Cold War, it was impossible even to imagine adoption of this kind of measure during the Cold War. The INF Treaty contained five types of on-site inspections, [7] the START Treaty fourteen.[8] Of course, the types and quantity of inspections depend on the goals of the agreement. If parties aim at the elimination of certain types of arms, verification measures become simpler than when the goal is not elimination, but limitation. This is probably the reason for the complexity of the START verification system, compared to the verification system of the INF Treaty. At the same time, one should not forget that both regimes were developed when mutual confidence between the parties was much lower than it is now. Due to the previous experience of cooperation between the two sides, Russian experts came to the conclusion that the START verification system was excessive. In particular, it has been suggested that only two types of inspections are required—baseline data inspections and data update inspections during Treaty implementation.[9]
Telemetry data exchange is known to have been one of the most serious problems during the START negotiations.[10] From a verification perspective, telemetry data provides a basis to determine the quantity of warheads deployed on ballistic missiles. If a multilateral agreement is reached, telemetry information exchange between the parties would be very desirable. There is no doubt that such a measure would increase the transparency of the nuclear weapons reduction process. Moreover, it would resolve some existing problems with the START Treaty implementation. In particular, it is well known that the U.S. deploys Trident II sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). At the same time there is a joint U.S.-U.K. program for the development of Trident II SLBMs that will be deployed on British strategic submarines. Unfortunately, tests of Trident II missiles conducted within the framework of the joint U.S.–U.K. program are exempt from having to share the telemetry data with the Russians. Russia is still not satisfied with this state of affairs. In particular, there are concerns that Trident II SLBMs may be tested with more than the 8 warheads currently allowed under START.
There is also a problem of ambiguity with telemetry information. As the experience of the U.S.-Russian cooperation shows, the problem with aunambigously determining the number of warheads involved in during some of the Trident II SLBM tests remains unresolved.[11] Therefore, one should not overestimate the significance of telemetry data. Alternative methods should be developed for the reliable detection of the number of deployed warheads on missiles. In particular, a technique using radiation detection offers some promise. However, the U.S. attitude is not always consistent with regard to this approach.[12]
Characterizing the whole verification system of the START Treaty one may conclude with confidence that it evolved into a reliable means by which to achieve the declared goals. Nevertheless, one should not forget the fact that this system is diffusing, and that there is a danger that it will totally collapse before START officially ends in 2009. It is true—the U.S. and Russia have signed the so-called Moscow Treaty, and there is a good chance that the new agreement will get approval in both countries. However, the Moscow Treaty does not require any verification procedure for its implementation.[13]
The main reason for the existing situation is that the U.S. intends to take their dual-capable strategic delivery systems out of the arms control regime. Today these platforms include submarines carrying long-range cruise missiles and strategic bombers. This list may also include land- and submarine-based ICBMs in the future. In the author's opinion, the principle danger to the multilateral reduction of nuclear arms is the reorientation of nuclear delivery means to conventional platforms.[14] It is increasingly apparent that in order to build an efficient verification system, conventional delivery platforms must be covered as well.
Finally, one should mention that entirely new challenges will emerge on the way to creating a multilateral verification system for nuclear disarmament. In particular, what could be the mechanism for information exchange between the parties? To what extent can the shared information be transparent to the world community? How can national technical means be efficiently implemented while taking into account that the parties have entirely different capabilities? What is the best strategy for implementing inspections? Should the parties inspect each other, or is there a need to create an international organization that will be responsible for inspections?
The importance of these questions can be illustrated by the on-going UN inspections in Iraq. On one hand, the U.S. claim that they can prove that Iraq violated UN resolutions and therefore threaten to use force against Iraq, on the other hand the U.S. are hesitant about providing the international community with the alleged proof.
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This paper was written for the conference "International Arms Control, Transparency and Verification in a European Russian Framework of Cooperative Security" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on January 24-26, 2003, in Berlin, Germany.
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