Lessons from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
Wolfgang Liebert 
In my short remarks, I would like to restrict myself to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and some aspects of the non-proliferation regime.
No doubt, the entry into force of the NPT in 1970 was a great achievement. At least the dangerous proliferation dynamics that had been expected in the 1960's were reduced. From today's perspective, however, the NPT was a child of the cold war era and of the nuclear euphoria of the 1960's and had therefore several shortcomings:
The discriminatory character of the Treaty led to different classes of technology access for different States Party and provoked double-standards in its implementation.
The promise of nuclear disarmament enshrined in Article VI of the Treaty is not mirrored by substantial provisions concerning the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The treaty did not even restrict the nuclear arms race.
The bargaining strategy of the Treaty is made under the fatal assumption that the further spread of nuclear weapons could be halted despite the corresponding spread and development of "civilian" nuclear technology.
A spiral of ambivalence has emerged in the past three decades in which attempts to close the loopholes by adding new measures have continuously led to new aspects of ambivalence—which then have to be tackled in each successive round of the spiral. These additional measures are diverse—from concepts of unilateral export control over supplementary safeguard protocols to concepts of counter-proliferation and preventive war.
We have discussed these problems in depth within INESAP ever since its founding. In any case, today we have severe problems with existing weapons-usable fissile material and the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. Both factors contributed to the emergence of a number of nuclear-capable states—and several of them have had plans, have executed plans, or are currently trying to execute plans to become nuclear-weapons states.
Neither has the dangerous chain of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons been effectively stopped nor has the process of nuclear disarmament achieved the envisioned goal. These findings is two of the lessons to be drawn from the experience with the nuclear regime. Let me sketch a few more lessons which might be useful if one wants to discuss new concepts for international agreements or rules in related fields (such as ballistic missile defense or space weaponry):
1. One should try to avoid different levels of approval or denial for different State Parties when drafting an appropriate treaty. If the obligations and rights are not equal—or at least close to equal—,one will face inherent complications concerning treaty implementation and universality. In this case, treaty universality would likely be unattainable.
2. Some degree of trust in safeguards and monitoring procedures is necessary, otherwise a treaty will not function. However, one should avoid to overemphasize this aspect. In my judgement, safeguards and monitoring only play a role as confidence-building measures. If sensitive technology is already available in some country, there is a continuing danger of bypassing controls or an increased probability of a withdrawal from the treaty. Political circumstances may change comparably fast, whereas the existence of dual-capable technical possibilities, once installed, has a more permanent character, which leads to inherent dangers. In general, verification procedures can only verify what has already occurred in the past. Therefore, one has to develop measures that are better suitable for preventing treaty outbreak. Wherever possible, one should try to go beyond concepts of safeguarding by introducing intrinsic technological measures. One should strive for proliferation resistance in the design of technologies that are covered by, or involved in, treaty considerations. For the worst case, one should provide for a mechanism of challenge inspections—which are considerably more effective than routine safeguards.
3. Terms like the "inalienable right" to develop, to use, or to import without any wise restrictions all sorts of technologies in a specific technical field have to be avoided if there is a potential for civil-military ambivalence of such specific technologies. In my view, this is, ultimately, the most dangerous pitfall.
4. International efforts to control the usage of technology are far less promising when the respective technological artefacts are already available, even more so if they are used for military purposes in some States Party to a treaty (as was the case in the nuclear field.) If this is not yet the case, one could try to reserve access to the corresponding technology by an international body which in turn is supposed to provide its services to all States Party to the respective treaty framework. If it is too late for such an approach, one should carefully investigate whether the incentive for indigenous development of sensitive technology could be reduced by a similar concept. In fact, one should reflect upon the specific purpose of a given technology in order to understand why access might be desirable. My guess is that in most cases, one could find or develop and provide a less dangerous technological alternative which would serve the expected needs.
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