Lessons from Various Arms Control Regimes
Roland Timerbaev 
Over more than thirty years, the international community has accumulated a rich and diverse store of experience in applying collective institutionalized methods for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. They include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) system of safeguards, the Nuclear Suppliers Group,[1] the Zangger Committee,[2] and a recent acquisition—the IAEA Additional Protocol.[3] These regimes, which provide for widespread transparency and verification, have laid down a solid groundwork for further steps leading to verifiable reductions and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
One should not overlook the fact that if and when the nuclear weapons states, both officially recognized and de facto, would be ready to do away completely with nuclear weapons, the problem of nuclear non-proliferation would not disappear since nuclear materials, technology, and know-how are to stay with us forever. It is, therefore, not accidental that in 1995, the parties to the NPT were wise enough to extend this treaty indefinitely.
The existing international nuclear non-proliferation regime, while overall successful in constraining the dissemination of nuclear weapons, is by no means perfect. It needs continuous and persistent improvement and upgrading. As nuclear technologies become more sophisticated, so methods of preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should not lag behind, and should be concurrent with this endless process.
The most immediate task is to widen accession to the IAEA Additional Protocol by states, especially those that conduct significant nuclear activities. As of now, only 64 states have signed the protocol and 28 have ratified it. The U.S., Russia, and European Union members have not yet done so. Another needed step is the accession to, or association with, the Nuclear Supplier Group's Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers by those states that are current, or potential, suppliers of nuclear materials, equipment, or technologies. Of special importance in this respect are such countries as China, India, Pakistan, and Israel, which are not members of the Nuclear Supplier Group.
Notable progress has also been achieved in setting up regional systems of transparency and verification in the framework of Euratom, the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba,[4] as well as the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. It is highly meaningful that these systems work hand-in-hand with the universal safeguards system of the IAEA.
While welcoming the recent achievement of full implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (owing to its ratification by Cuba), one has to admit that the process of entering into force of some of the above Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones, and the establishment of new ones, has recently slowed down. The international community is awaiting the speeding up of the entry into force of those treaties, as well as the finalization of negotiations on a new agreement that would set up a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Central Asia.
In other areas of nuclear arms control, serious achievements in the development of transparency, confidence-building, and verification methods have also been made.
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, and the START–I Treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms of 1991 have opened yet another page in setting up highly sophisticated and, whenever necessary, intrusive systems of arms control verification. The INF Treaty, which is of indefinite duration, was fully implemented by the end of May 2001. This treaty is largely centered on verifying the elimination of launchers and the means of delivery for nuclear warheads. In addition, it provides for radiation control in certain cases, such as during the utilization of mobile launchers, which were originally designed for missiles now destined for elimination (namely the three-warhead SS–20s), with one warhead SS–25s. Verification was achieved by the use of radiation sources in accordance with mutually agreed procedures.
The implementation of the START–I Treaty, which was completed in December 2001, is also based on an extremely comprehensive system of diverse transparency, confidence-building, and verification procedures, including radiation control. These provisions are to be applied to the new Russia-U.S. Moscow Treaty for strategic reductions (the Strategic Offensiv Reductions Treaty of May 2002), at least until December 2009, when the START Treaty is to expire. Hopefully, verification of the Moscow Treaty, which was concluded for a duration of ten years, will be continued either by extending respective compliance provisions of the START Treaty, or by superseding it with a new treaty which provides for more radical reductions and, accordingly, more comprehensive verification procedures.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty also contains an exceptionally sweeping system of verification of compliance. Its fundamental component, the International Monitoring System, which comprises over 300 seismological, radionuclide, infrasound, and hydroacoustic stations, would be able to operate in a provisional mode even if the treaty does not enter into force by the time this system becomes functional. The monitoring system is being progressively installed throughout the world by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, with the effective assistance of its Provisional Technical Secretariat. It is expected that the International Monitoring System could become operative by 2006 or 2007.
Transparency and Monitoring
Over the last decade, Russia and the United States have gathered immense experience in the practical application of transparency and monitoring (some call it "natural transparency"), which has occured as Russia and the U.S. work closer together on the disposition of excess weapon-origin fissile materials, as well as on many other industrial, scientific, and technological projects, including joint exploration of outer space.
A good example is the ongoing implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program, which is now being expanded under the $20 billion Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction program ("10 Plus 10 Over 10"), agreed to by the G–8 Summit in June 2002 in Kananaskis (Canada). Contributions to the amount of up to $18 billion have already been announced, with Russia's forthcoming contribution of $2 billion second in size only to the United States. According to the official spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the rough amounts of financing for the Global Partnership up to year 2012 are (in billions of US dollars): U.S.—10.00, Russia—2.00, UK—0.75, Canada—0.65, Japan—0.20; (in billions of euros) Germany —1.50, Italy—1.00, France—0.75, and the European Union—1.00.
Lab-to-lab cooperation under the U.S.-Russia Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreement is yet another illustration of the efforts pursued by both sides to promote the study, in-depth research, and transparency of complex technical issues associated with nuclear warhead monitoring and verification. Progress in this area, however, has been slow and should be significantly accelerated.
Transparency and verification are important features of the U.S.-Russian agreement for the purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) diluted from 500 tons of Russian weapon-origin highly enriched uranium, and of the bilateral agreement concerning the management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes. As of January, 2003, up to 170 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) had been diluted and shipped to the U.S.
It was announced in Vienna in September 2002 that the so called Trilateral Initiative providing for the verification by the IAEA of weapon-origin fissile material in Russia and the United States had been largely fulfilled. The Ministers of the two states and the Director General of the Agency recognized the value of the groundbreaking work that has been completed over the last six years and directed technical experts to begin work on future cooperation in implementing agreed arrangements within the trilateral format. The proposed verification process to be used by the Agency will be based on a system of "information barriers", designed to allow IAEA inspectors to derive sufficient information to make the verification credible and independent, while preventing access to classified information, in keeping with the obligations under Article I of the NPT.
One should also note an important contribution, leading to transparency and monitoring of nuclear arms control, by the Moscow-based International Science and Technology Center, which is conducting a two-year project on transparency of nuclear weapons reductions with the active participation of Russian experts from Sarov and Snezhinsk—two major Russian federal nuclear laboratories. The project is to be completed by June 2003. Meaningful work in this field is also being pursued by the Program on Science and Global Security of Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Security Affairs, in cooperation with experts from the U.S. national nuclear laboratories.
And last, but certainly not least, the overarching authority in matters of transparency and verification belongs to the UN Security Council, which, under the UN Charter, bears "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". In accordance with the Summit Declaration adopted by the Security Council on January 31, 1992, the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
In practice, the Security Council has already used its authority in the above matters, in particularly by establishing the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to deal with the problem of disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.
Further progress in exploring and promoting transparency, confidencebuilding, and verification methods for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament would depend not only on the continued efforts of the two major nuclear weapons states, but also on the active involvement in this process of other nuclear weapons states. Beyond any doubt, this is a task and responsibility of enormous international significance.
An incipient and encouraging work in this area has been undertaken in the United Kingdom. In 2000, the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston produced a study entitled Confidence, Security & Verification. Let us hope that this research, which is of significant interest to many states, will be continued. It is highly desirable that other NWS, in particular France, and other European countries, within the constraints of the NPT, would join this very complex but essential effort.
Active Role for Europe
In general, Europe could play a much more active and dynamic role in leading the world towards abolishing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. With the growing strengthening of all-European institutions, including common or coordinated foreign policy affairs and defense cooperation, Europe could definitely aim at becoming one of the principal actors in promoting transparency, confidence-building, and the monitoring of nuclear arms reductions and their eventual elimination.
The European continent, which has been the main arena of two fatal world wars, bears an unavoidable responsibility to be among the world leaders in the global effort to do away with the weapons that are capable of bringing doom to modern civilization.
The extensive experience gained over the years in different spheres of arms control, as well as the current atmosphere of growing trust in politico-military relations between former Cold War adversaries—in particular, against the background of the common struggle against international terrorism - creates new perspectives for advancing transparency and confidence-building in dealing with challenges presented by the potential militarization of outer space.
Last June, Russia, in cooperation with a number of other countries, submitted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) a working paper containing Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects. The basic obligations would require from States Party not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; and not to assist, or encourage, other states to participate in prohibited activities.
The working paper suggested certain confidence-building measures that would require States Party to announce their outer space programs, to declare launching sites and the dimensions of areas of launching, to inform about owners and parameters of objects to be launched into outer space, and to report their launching activities. The paper also suggested the establishment of an international executive organization that would oversee the implementation of the proposed agreement, including arranging consultations in cases of suspicions of non-compliance with the terms of the agreement, and undertaking necessary measures for cessation of non-compliance by any State Party.
While strongly supporting the initiation of negotiations on outer space in a CD ad hoc committee on the basis of a negotiating mandate agreed upon a few years ago, Russia, unlike some other members of the CD, does not seek to link negotiations on outer space with the negotiations of the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty that it considers of great significance on its own merits. There have been reports that China might no longer insist on immediate outer space negotiations and would settle for less formal discussion of this issue. That, however, has yet to be seen when the CD meets again.
As to a suggestion of adopting an integrated approach for future disarmament negotiations, this, in my view, would be counterproductive, at least at present. When future negotiations on various disarmament issues prepare the appropriate groundwork for undertaking the ambitious task of reaching a comprehensive disarmament agreement, then it might be advisable to consider a more integrated approach to negotiations.
There have been many complaints in different quarters about the ineffectiveness of the 66-member Conference on Disarmament—the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum established by agreement and approved by the UN General Assembly in 1978, which functions by consensus. Though it has been deadlocked for the last few years, in the past it produced a number of important international agreements, including the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is hardly possible now to renegotiate its composition and rules of procedure. Any attempt to change the forum may, in my view, be doomed to failure. The success of the CD depends on the political will of member states rather than on its format and procedure. This, however, does not preclude the setting up in the framework of the CD of auxiliary negotiating bodies of limited membership, as was suggested by some experts.
This paper was written for the conference "International Arms Control, Transparency and Verification in a European Russian Framework of Cooperative Security" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on January 24-26, 2003, in Berlin, Germany.
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[Footnotes added by the editor.]
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Ambassador (ret.) Roland M. Timerbaev is Chairman of Board and Senior Advisor at PIR-Center for Policy Studies in Russia;
PIR is the acronym for the Russian words Policy Studies in Russia. The PIR Center is a non-profit, independent, Moscow-based research and public education organization, which was founded in April 1994. The Center is currently focused on international security, arms control, and non-proliferation issues that are directly related to Russia's internal situation. That the PIR Center is a Russian NGO is important, because it avoids the current tension between Russian officials and foreign non-governmental organizations conducting research and working on international security issues related to Russia. | ||||
