European and Russian Interest in Disarmament
Roland Timerbaev 
After the Cold War, the traditional pattern of arms control and disarmament changed radically. For fifty years—during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath—it was almost a bilateral, U.S.–Russian exercise, with very few exceptions (e.g. the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The Moscow Treaty of May 2002[1] is perhaps the last bilateral arms control and disarmament treaty—although it is rather a codification of the unilateral commitments made by the two states.
From now on, arms control and disarmament, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, will, in all probability, gradually convert from a bilateral to a multilateral paradigm. This has already been in certain ways manifested, in particular at the 1995 and 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences, which adopted programs of multilateral disarmament. Many factors are contributing to this transformation and subsequent internationalization of disarmament:
For over 15 years, the two major nuclear weapons states have been increasingly reducing their nuclear arsenals and will, in all probability, continue this process.
Both countries have, over the years, developed certain rules of conduct with regard to strategic weaponry, which are quite rigorously observed by both sides. Though mutual nuclear deterrence still exists and will continue to stay with us for some time to come, with the continuous downsizing of strategic weapons arsenals, deterrence will progressively be acquiring the less hazardous role of a 'hedge' for situations and challenges that may be forthcoming from unpredictable countries or sub-national groups.
These rules of conduct include a tangible progress with an increase in transparency, monitoring, and verification procedures. This includes what some call "natural transparency", which is developing in many areas of cooperation—especially in the implementation of the so-called Cooperative Threat Reduction program that is now being expanded into the Global Partnership for combating the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.
The next factor is what I would call the focus of nuclear tensions which has been steadily moving from the West to the East and South (South Asia, Iraq, Iran, China, North Korea, and, quite possibly, Japan).
Take, for instance, Japan. According to Asia Times (14.01.03), "Japan for two decades or more has had the scientific and technological capability and the tools and materials to make nuclear bombs in short order—and by now not just crude but highly sophisticated ones... [A]t the end of 2001, the country owned 38 tons of separated reactor–grade plutonium—about six tons stored in Japan, the remainder in reprocessing plants in France and the United Kingdom. The amount stored at home increased by 400 kilograms during the year 2000 at the Tokai facility of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute. This percentage will grow rapidly when a larger commercial-size reprocessing plant in Rokkasho comes on line in 2005". With the modern technology that Japan possesses, reactor-grade plutonium could easily be upgraded to weapons-grade plutonium. So, the nuclear option is mereley the question of a political decision.
Unlike the strategic modus vivendi that has developed over the years in the traditional areas of nuclear confrontation, in these relatively new regions of nuclearization, there is so far no clear understanding or sophisticated know-how of nuclear weaponry (for instance, they lack permissive action links[2], an important feature of nuclear weapons needed for their safety and security). Take, as an example, India. The country is still in a rather early stage of nuclear development, but there is already talk of building up a nuclear triad in the not too distant future. In addition, growing nuclear contradictions in the East and South are aggravated by territorial, ethnic, religious, and other long-standing bilateral conflicts, which do not exist between the West and East. The situation is further upset by strategic asymmetries between various states of Asia (e.g., between China and India, India and Pakistan).
The current wave of international terrorism, whatever may be its roots, is coming from the South. What is more, there is a growing concern that terrorists may resort to the use, or threat of use, of nuclear or radiological means in their hostile actions against countries of the North.
Common Interests in Russia and Europe
The above factors cause similar security concerns both for Russia and Europe as a whole, and point to a commonality of interests in dealing with problems and challenges in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. Let me indicate some of them. Russia and Europe are, in my view, interested in the following:
a more drastic, rapid and irreversible reduction of strategic nuclear arms (Russia will probably have about 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2012 unless it decides to SS–27s with multiple warheads, while the U.S. would, in all probability, keep 2,200);
maintaining tight control, accountability, and physical protection of nuclear materials and radioactive sources;
finding more effective means of management and disposition of excess weapon-origin nuclear materials, including the disposition of decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines;
exploring ways of more vigorously dealing with existing non-strategic nuclear weapons;
starting without any delay, negotiations on a universal Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament;
preventing placement of weapons in outer space;
increasing transparency, monitoring, and verification of nuclear arms control. I am of a strong view that, with the expansion of the European Union and its ever growing status in the world community of nations, a united Europe can play a much more active and productive role in pushing for disarmament - a role that so far has not been on a par with Europe's capabilities. And this is, certainly, in Russia's interests.
It was noted at the April 2002 Prepatory Committee to the NPT that the so-called "NATO–5" (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway) struggled to come up with a common position paper on disarmament—and in the end gave up, although Germany put forward an interesting proposal. It was entitled "Attaining a Nuclear-Free World", and was a conceptual exploration of the pre-requisites for the complete and permanent elimination of nuclear weapons, focusing on "disaggregated and reliable data exchange, effective verification and non-circumvention", as well as on enforcement. The idea of data exchange, it should be recalled, was first put forward in 1993 by the then-Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel who came out with a proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Register. At the Prepatory Committee meeting, Germany also submitted at a paper on confidence-building measures and enhanced security precautions, including reporting by Russia and the U.S. on the implementation of the 1991/92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives concerning tactical nukes.
In introducing the two working papers, Germany emphasized that "The NPT is no license to perpetuate the status of the nuclear 'haves' versus the nuclear 'have nots'. By way of an incremental approach, declared the German delegation, we must make determined, steady and irreversible progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons."
A joint paper on non-strategic nuclear weapons was also tabled by Finland and Sweden.
Building up a nuclear-weapon-free world would require certain political pre-requisites, but also a system, or systems, of transparency, monitoring, and verification. Disarmament and verification are indivisible.
So far, two European nuclear weapons states—the UK and France—have not yet taken part in negotiations on nuclear disarmament in contravention of their commitments under Article VI of the NPT, having preferred to reduce their nuclear weapons unilaterally. However, unilateral and unverified reductions are not irreversible reductions. And this gives an excuse to China to avoid negotiations on nuclear arms control too.
With Russia and the U.S. continuously working through legally binding agreements towards downsizing their strategic nuclear stocks, it is high time for other nuclear weapons states, both officially recognized and not recognized, to embark on multilateral negotiations with a view to moving in the direction of reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
Finally, there is a need to accelerate research and practical application of transparency, monitoring, and verification procedures. The U.S. and Russia have already accumulated a large store of experience in this field—namely with the Intermediate–Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, START–1, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Treaty, the HEU/LUW Agreement, lab-to-lab cooperation, the Trilateral Initiative (U.S./Russia/International Atomic Energy Agency), etc.
Europe is capable of contributing to these efforts. The UK undertook research into verification, and, in 2000, the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston produced a very interesting report, Confidence, Security & Verification. It is expected that further reports will follow. France, however, as far as I know, has not yet undertaken any research in this area. Euratom, in my view, can also contribute to such research, within the constraints of Article II of the NPT.
Last, but not the least, I would suggest that the issue of multilateral disarmament should be discussed at the G–8 Summits, perhaps starting with the next one in Evian.
This paper was written for the conference organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on January 24-26, 2003, in Berlin, Germany.
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[Footnotes added by the editor.]
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