Arms Control, Transparency, and Verification in a European-Russian Framework of Cooperative Security
Conference Summary by Andrew Lichterman 
Moving Beyond Missile Defense (MBMD), a joint project of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, held its third international conference at the European Academy in Berlin from 24 to 26 January, 2003. For three days, 40 experts from Brazil, China, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States gathered, among them scientists, security and policy experts, scholars, journalists, and representatives of international organizations like the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
While the regional focus of the conference was on a European-Russian framework of cooperative security, the entire context was shaped by the current policy of the United States and the Iraq crisis. The opening conference sessions provided an overview of US strategies and actions that affect global security, and their impact on existing arms control measures and on the possibility of further arms control initiatives.
Conference speakers identified the following U.S. policies as having particular importance:
The explicit willingness to engage in preventive war, including acting to eliminate threats "before they are fully formed";
The potential use of nuclear weapons in response to any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical or biological weapons;
The apparent willingness to act unilaterally, outside the international legal framework;
Moving forward with multi-tiered ballistic missile defense, including components in Europe and space-based elements;
Continuing research and development on weapons that operate through or from space.
A number of conference participants noted that these policies are not mere paper pronouncements, but are being implemented through weapons development and deployment decisions. The U.S. is, for example, intensifying research on making nuclear weapons more useable in ordinary warfare, expanding its military budget and appears ready to launch a war—with or without UN approval—against Iraq.
There was some range of opinion on the impact and appropriate response to these policies and programs, but a number of speakers stressed the following points:
The disruptive effect of these polices on existing arms control treaties, both because these policies legitimate the unilateral use of force and the possession of nuclear weapons, and because states that believe they are threatened by the US, with its overwhelming conventional forces, may be more likely to seek to retain or expand existing missile and WMD arsenals, or to seek to obtain missiles and WMD;
The need to make clear that military force is not an appropriate response to the proliferation threat;
The necessity of acting multilaterally, within the framework of international law and institutions;
The key role that Europe, Russia, and other leading states can play, particularly on insisting on resolving disputes multilaterally, through the United Nations.
Several speakers also stressed that related European policies must be re-examined in light of the current crisis, including NATO nuclear sharing, out of area operations, and European theater missile defense development.
The opening session also included an overview of relevant security treaties and related measures. It was noted that there are elements of this system that remain in place and continue to be effective and important. In the current climate where new arms control efforts are at an impasse and even existing treaties are threatened, it is important to sustain key arms control measures that are already in place.
These include the Comprehensive Test Ban Organization. Although the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet entered into force, the nuclear test moratorium has held since the 1998 round of Indian and Pakistani tests, and must be sustained. Also of central importance is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although under great stress due to the lack of progress on disarmament, the emergence of new declared nuclear weapons states, and the current North Korea crisis, the great majority of states parties still remain committed to the NPT.
Perspectives on Missile Defense and Space Warfare
The second set of presentations and discussions addressed "European and Russian Perspectives on Missile Defense and Space Warfare." There was a wide range of opinion on the fundamental acceptability of missile defenses. Some participants stated that ballistic missile defenses against shorter range systems (Theater Missile Defense, TMD) could be useful for Europe or Russia. It was noted that it is difficult to generalize about missile defense perspectives, as there are supporters and opponents of various types of missile defense schemes in most countries. It also was stressed that short range systems, like Patriot or MEADS, should be considered separately, more in the category of air defenses, because of their less significant strategic implications.
A number of participants thought that Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is fundamentally flawed for a variety of reasons: it is inherently destabilizing in a world where large arsenals of missiles and nuclear weapons persist, missile defenses may pose insurmountable technical problems inherent in the interaction of defensive and offensive weapons technologies, and missile defenses will be enormously expensive. Several participants also stressed that the ballistic missile defense programs also can induce both technology development and infrastructure for the possible weaponization of space.
Speakers then provided perspectives from particular countries. In Russia, opposition to BMD long was closely tied to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. There was strong concern in the 1990's about the potential for U.S. TMD programs to develop technologies that would be applicable for defense against strategic missiles. As it became clear that the system the U.S. envisioned for the near term would be unlikely to be effective against Russian nuclear forces, the level of concern was reduced. Currently, there are elements in the Russian military industries that are very interested in collaborating with the United States on BMD technologies, but on the official level there is concern that the U.S. will obtain technologies from Russia, without giving much in return. There is a strong chance that there will be cooperation on BMD, despite suspicion that U.S. overtures on technical cooperation were a device to smooth the way for acceptance of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
On the issues of the militarization of space, the panelists observed that the position of the Russian government generally is opposed to further space militarization. It is unclear, however, how strong the objections are, since many in the military favor continued military space development, but Russia currently cannot afford it. In the end, the Russian position is unlikely to change dramatically in the near term. Russia is likely to remain opposed to the placement of weapons in space, but to accede to further development of other forms of military space technology.
In Europe, there is currently not an in-depth public debate on missile defense. The way the issue plays out is dependent on the relationship of particular countries to missile defense development and deployment. In countries that appear to be ready to accept U.S. BMD components—the United Kingdom and Denmark—public debate has been very limited and has failed to look at the long-term implications. These include the potential for deployment of interceptors in Europe and the long-term costs of the systems to host countries.
In the remainder of Europe, there is not a great deal of public debate about BMD. Many European military contractors, however, are trying to get BMD work. The enormous amounts of money being spent on BMD is having significant political effects. The more European contracting involvement there is the more difficult BMD will be to stop. This may have effects within the U.S. debates on missile defense as well as in Europe, with multinational corporations based outside the U.S. (and hence even more insulated from domestic political pressure than U.S. contractors) lobbying to continue the programs.
Speakers identified some specific aspects of currently proposed European missile defenses that they considered of particular importance. The types of TMD systems under consideration would rely on the global infrastructure of the US military system, e.g. satellites for launch detection and communication. Any system, whether integrated with U.S. systems or not, will be extraordinarily expensive. If TMD is developed in Europe (essentially providing Europe with the equivalent of a national missile defense), it will be difficult to argue that the U.S. should not develop and deploy its NMD system.
In the end, most participants agreed, BMD is a global issue. To be useful, the missile defense debate must extend beyond the immediate implications for the states most directly involved. Even though the ABM Treaty has been abrogated by the U.S., the problem it was designed for still exists. As long as significant nuclear arsenals and the idea of nuclear deterrence persist, deployment of ballistic missile defenses will provoke a response. It will affect the calculations of states and the arguments made concerning what is needed to maintain an acceptable nuclear deterrent. Consequently, continued BMD development will likely be a permanent obstacle to nuclear weapons reductions.
Finally, BMD development cannot be separated from high-tech weapons development in general. The growing superiority in high technology weaponry on the part of the most powerful states impels states that feel threatened to obtain missiles, thus providing the rationale for the most powerful states to develop missile defenses. BMD programs also develop technology base and infrastructure for further militarization, and eventually the weaponization, of space.
Lesson from Various Arms Control Regimes
The next panel examined several existing arms control measures and considered lessons that can be drawn for future arms control and disarmament progress.
The first treaty considered was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was noted that the NPT was a significant achievement, holding the number of new nuclear weapons states below the level expected by most experts before the NPT entered into force in 1970. However, the inherent double standard of the NPT, allowing the original nuclear weapons states to maintain their nuclear arsenals without a time framework for their elimination, while forbidding other treaty parties from possessing nuclear weapons, was a central weakness that has grown increasingly important over time. Dissatisfaction with the double standard has been exacerbated by the fact that the NPT failed to achieve its goal of preventing the nuclear arms race of the 70's and 80's, and also has had little success in facilitating significant progress towards elimination of nuclear arsenals in the post-Cold War period. In addition, the assumption that the spread of civilian nuclear technology could occur without proliferation of nuclear weapons, even with the NPT's system of controls on nuclear materials and technology, seems questionable in retrospect. The number of nuclear weapons-capable countries expanded, and several either had plans or went forward with nuclear weapons programs.
From the NPT experience, we have learned that universal arms control measures are more likely to succeed if they aim for the establishment of universally applicable standards, which in turn will be facilitated by open access to the process of negotiating the treaty at the outset. In addition, materials safeguards, verification, and monitoring are important, but not sufficient. More effective non-proliferation measures are needed. These could include technological measures that provide "proliferation resistance" in technology systems. Inherently weapons capable technologies should be avoided where possible.
A second set of arms control measures addressed were bilateral agreements. In this type of agreement, transparency measures are critical—in the case of modern nuclear arms control treaties for example, such items as telemetry data allow determination of whether states are adhering to warhead limits on delivery systems. An emerging issue in U.S-Russia arms control is the development of increasingly capable long-range precision conventional systems, at the same time that the U.S. is pressing to remove dual-capable systems armed with conventional warheads from verification regimes. Both types of systems have strategic significance, and must be encompassed if strategic arms control is to be effective in the future.
Regional Arms control efforts, ranging from modest bilateral agreements to Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, are of particular importance in a time when global disarmament efforts are blocked. Apart from their intrinsic value in reducing regional dangers, they provide concrete experience relevant to broader arms control efforts on verification and other issues. Exploring the technical requisites for arms control and disarmament measures is an important way to improve the chances for treaties both to be negotiated and to be effectively implemented once the appropriate political conditions exist.
In the case of the CTBT, although the Treaty has not entered into force, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is creating the infrastructure for monitoring and verification. In addition to providing the necessary means for CTBT implementation, this effort is providing valuable experience in a variety of areas that may be useful for other forms of arms control, ranging from the technical challenges of integrating large amounts of data from diverse types of sensors to the challenges of assembling the people and creating that institutions that will have the capacity to analyze the data and present it within the time span necessary. It was also noted that the CTBT's history holds important lessons about disarmament efforts over the long term. People began thinking seriously about the technical and political requisites for a test ban treaty and for monitoring and verification decades before the CTBT was signed. These efforts, although they might have appeared utopian at the time, helped make the Treaty feasible when political circumstances changed, and changed in a way and at a pace that few anticipated.
Missile and Space Control Regimes
A principle difficulty in developing effective measures for the control, much less the elimination, of ballistic missiles is the lack of a global norm against their use. Modern militaries employ ballistic missiles in a variety of roles. Due to these factors, existing missile arms control is limited to efforts to control the export of missile technology.
These measures have value in the near term because they slow the spread of missile technology, particularly of more advanced missile technologies. But they are inherently discriminatory, allowing some states to maintain extensive missile arsenals while attempting to deny them to others, and thus are unlikely to be sustainable in the long run.
A universal treaty aiming at controlling and eventually eliminating ballistic missiles over some range threshold may appear politically unfeasible in the current context. As noted above with regard to the long process that led to the CTBT, there is significant value in serious work to explore verification issues, likely obstacles to a treaty in particular strategic settings, the relationship of missiles to other systems, and other relevant issues. These efforts will help to facilitate the more rapid development of missile disarmament measures if political circumstances become more hospitable.
Several past and current proposals for treaties aimed at controlling and eventually eliminating long range ballistic missiles call for a flight test ban as a first step. A missile flight test ban halts technology development—and hence the emergence of new threats—and is verifiable. It is easily understandable as an arms control measure, and hence helps to mobilize public pressure on the issue, and to build towards a norm against ballistic missile possession and use.
The next theme discussed was the growing dangers posed by the possible weaponization of space. These dangers include not only weapons in orbit, but other types of weapons that could operate through or from space, such as conventional intercontinental ballistic missiles, and space operations vehicles that could both deliver weapons and make the deployment of military systems in space cheaper and more reliable.
There have been a number of proposals for the prevention of an arms race in space. However, the U.S. has refused to negotiate any new space arms control measures, and the abrogation of the ABM Treaty removed an important obstacle to the development of space-based military systems. In addition, proposals for an agreement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in the Conference on Disarmament remain blocked by linkage to a fissile materials ban, and by the larger inability of states to agree on a common agenda for disarmament.
Here too, however, exploring the requisites for arms control and disarmament measures should continue, in the hopes of future opportunities. There will be a growing international capacity to verify provisions concerning the placement of objects in space, so progress will not necessarily be limited by dependence on U.S. technology for verification and monitoring. The concept of space as "common heritage," partially embodied in the current Outer Space Treaty, should be extended and elaborated to include a vision of common security in space.
Environment and Security
An important aspect of arms control and disarmament is the profound ecological impacts of decades of arms production and of associated industries such as nuclear materials and nuclear power whose development was shaped by their relationship to the strategic imperatives of the Cold War. A set of presentations provided an overview of one part of this complex set of issues, the impacts of nuclear technologies on the Arctic regions. These include the cumulative effects of military activities from nuclear testing and disposal of reactor cores, waste from nuclear weapons production facilities, and the impacts of the civilian nuclear industry, including reprocessing facilities in France and the United Kingdom.
Although the panel focused on radioactive contamination, conference participants observed that the Cold war arms race and high-tech weapons activities that continue today have left behind a variety of other types of toxic contamination, from rocket fuels and high explosive waste to heavy metals and industrial solvents.
Among the points stressed regarding efforts to study and remedy contamination were the need for ongoing monitoring by both governments and non-governmental organizations to avoid corruption and to assure that cleanup monies are spent in ways that are useful and productive and the need to involve affected communities in assessing both the potential impacts of proposed disarmament activities (e.g. missile or chemical weapons destruction) and the appropriate way to go about environmental cleanup of weapons facilities.
Looking Forward
The final set of presentations looked at prospects for arms control and disarmament. The Cold War and post-Cold War efforts to reduce the enormous Cold War arsenals provided a great deal of useful experience. There are a number of significant arms control measures we now take for granted, but that nonetheless are being faithfully implemented. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, the Open Skies agreement, and others are effective in themselves and can provide lessons for the future.
The CFE, for example, was an ambitious treaty. It has led to the elimination of a main concern of the Cold War, that of large-scale conventional conflict in Europe, and provided transparency and confidence measures that helped get us through a momentous historical change, into a period of cooperation in security matters. It is important to consider what lessons this experience has for other regions—e.g. the Middle East, South Asia or North-East Asia.
It is essential to strengthen the credibility of existing regimes, particularly in the nuclear field. There is a great deal of talk about the crisis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although the Treaty parties still largely agree on its value and its goals, it is important to take concrete steps that demonstrate continued commitment by the parties, particularly the nuclear weapon states. There should be an understanding that nuclear weapons cannot be maintained indefinitely, and that lack of progress in disarmament will erode the NPT regime. There must be adherence to the commitments made by the treaty parties at the 1995 and 2000 review conferences (these include, for example, the "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate nuclear arsenals, entry into force of the CTBT, reduction of the military role of nuclear weapons, and making arms reductions irreversible). There also must be renewed emphasis on achieving universality for the NPT. Of particular importance is to prevent states from having an advantage by remaining outside the NPT.
To improve the chances for progress on nuclear disarmament, we need to move from bilateral to multilateral nuclear weapons reduction efforts. Both Russia and many states in Europe want more drastic, rapid, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. The United Kingdom and France need to engage in multilateral negotiations for elimination of nuclear arsenals, in accordance with their NPT Article VI obligation. Their reductions so far have been unilateral, and hence, in principle, reversible. In general, as the status of the European Union grows, Europe can play a much more active role in arms control and disarmament.
Diplomacy First!
The final discussion focused on the need for renewed emphasis on diplomacy. States need to engage in preventive diplomacy, looking down the road, preventing problems, as opposed to reacting to crises. Many types of crises—even widespread famine and outbreaks of genocidal violence—can be prevented or mitigated, and often we know enough, if we are paying attention, to see them coming. Every effort must be taken to avoid isolating any state, and there must be a greater emphasis on both mediation efforts and multilateral solutions.
In the current context, efforts to preserve existing multilateral arms control agreements are particularly important. This includes the CTBT, which must be held together until the climate improves for ratification by key states, and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, of particular value because they eliminate entire classes of weapons.
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