A Civil Society Initiative for Northeast Asia Security
Hiromichi Umebayashi 
"A Civil Society Initiative for Northeast Asia Regional Security Frameworks" is a research project largely funded by the Toyota Foundation. It is a three-year project which will culminate in an international conference in 2005, for which funding must still be sought. This paper is intended to describe the purpose and research outline of the project, primarily for the benefit of overseas collaborators and concerned colleagues.
Background
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution "renounce(s) war" and "the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." Moreover, in order to accomplish this aim, it calls for non-maintenance of force and non-recognition of the right of belligerency of the state. Efforts to demonstrate the effectiveness of such a principle of non-violence relative to international peace are becoming increasingly valuable for humankind in its pursuit of a world free from war.
According to the current mainstream interpretation in Japan, Article 9 does not deny the right of self-defense; thus, maintenance of a force for self-defense purposes is accepted. Under this interpretation, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is deemed to be constitutional. Although some remain opposed to this interpretation, for purposes of this project, this interpretation of Article 9 will be adopted in the belief that even this interpretation can serve as a realistic starting point for maintaining and developing the more positive understanding of Article 9.
Japanese peace movements have exerted great effort to protect Article 9. However, successive security policies of the Government of Japan (GOJ) have been undermining the spirit of the Constitution. It is no exaggeration to say that the GOJ in its security policies has been eager to free itself of Article 9, considering it to be an impediment, rather than something of which to be proud and make use. Unfortunately, the struggle of Japanese civil society against this trend is gradually losing its power. This is mainly a result of the GOJ's long-standing and fundamental posture which discounts the Constitution. The range of evidence of adverse impacts in Japan of such neglect can be found in education and an attitude of indifference in the public, to international diplomacy and national defense. However, there is an additional critical consideration in analyzing the public's perception and attitudes about security.
Currently, in a situation where armed conflict has erupted all over the world and outside armed intervention has become common practice, the notion that security cannot be sustained without military power has penetrated into civil society by way of mass media reports. Thus, the majority of civil society understands the issue of security only in terms of military power. In contrast, very few reports on practical efforts to prevent and solve conflicts by non-military means are available to the public. Where such reports exist, they are too modest or too technical to be widely known and to inform the public about the feasibility of non-military options. As a result, knowledge and creative thinking about non-military security is not well-developed in civil society. As well, efforts to overcome this shortcoming have been insufficient among Japanese civil forces of peace whose major contribution has been one of reaction and resistance to often rapidly developing threats to peace.
In order for Japanese civil society to regain its confidence in the fundamental correctness of Article 9 and to revitalize a movement to protect and enhance it, it is vital to present plans for non-military security frameworks that are both imaginative and practical, and are conducive to civil society engagement. The Japanese public is now paying more attention to security issues, in part due to the missile and nuclear weapon programs of the DPRK (North Korea), mysterious ships, abductions, famine, and refugees. Against such a background, it is not only timely, but also urgent to propose new security frameworks in Northeast Asia as a result of our own initiative.
Introduction
The underlying cause of tension and instability in Northeast Asia can be traced back to the history of Japanese colonial rule and aggressive war, the consequent division of the Korean Peninsula, and the rise of the Taiwan issue. Japanese peace activists have undertaken various activities to spread a fair understanding of this history, investigate the facts, and remedy uncompensated damages. Though insufficient, these important efforts are ongoing.
This project will review the current status of such efforts as a basic component of confidence building measures essential for regional security. However, the primary object of this research is to develop policy proposals for establishing cooperative regional systems for conflict prevention and resolution. We will focus on themes that might inspire public interest and invite the participation of Japanese civil society.
From this perspective, research will explore the following four themes with the understanding that as new and innovative ideas are identified, they will be added and developed as additional research themes.
(1) A Northeast Asia nuclear-weaponfree zone (NEA-NWFZ)
(2) A zone for exclusively defensive defense (ZEDD)
(3) A regional missile control system
(4) Enhanced utilization of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
To date, the extent of knowledge and discussion about these subjects varies to a great degree. For instance, while there is a good international body of knowledge on the subject of a NEA-NWFZ, the idea of a ZEDD is totally new and is related to the controversy in Japan over Article 9 of the Constitution. In the current research, we will take varying approaches to the different themes, based on their respective stage of development.
A Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)
Among existing proposals for a NEANWFZ, this project will concentrate on the "3 plus 3 plan", in which ROK (South Korea), DPRK (North Korea), and Japan form the core of the zone and seek provision of negative security assurances from the United States, Russia, and China. A modification of this plan would involve Mongolia. The research tasks include:
1. To demonstrate that the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ contributes to the enhanced security of all countries involved.
2. To draft a NEA-NWFZ treaty. In so doing, to include discussion of the following points:
a. Maritime issues, including international straits and exclusive economic zones
b. As a provision unique to this region where many atomic bomb survivors live, the obligation of the NEA-NWFZ's three core nations to preserve and disseminate A-bomb experience; along with the GOJ's obligation to adopt a non-discriminatory aid policy for non-Japanese Hibakusha (A-bomb survivors).
c. With regard to verification, examination and analysis of past IAEA inspections
d. Reference to other weapons of mass destruction
e. Reference to the effort for the abolition of nuclear weapons
3. Analysis of the current positions of the ROK, the DPRK and Japan regarding a NEA-NWFZ
4. Analysis of the positions of the governments of the United States, Russia and China
5. Analysis of political and social obstacles to a NEA-NWFZ in each country and measures to counter them. As part of this task, we will also consider possibility that Japan will adopt an internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status such as that of Mongolia as a first step leading to an eventual NEA-NWFZ.
A Zone for Exclusively Defensive Defense (ZEDD)
Research on exclusively defensive defense can be divided roughly into the following three tasks:
1. Clarification of the concept of "Exclusively Defensive Defense" (EDD)
2. Examination of subjects related to defense arms and equipment, and defense postures
3. Examination of subjects related to potential means by which to regionalize the zone
Regarding the clarification of the concept of EDD, we will make reference to the concept of self-defense in the UN Charter, past debates on Article 9 in the Japanese Diet (parliament) and courts, studies of exclusively defensive defense by the UN (e.g. Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies, 1994), opinions of scholars on international law, approach taken by the Global Action to Prevent War, and other sources. In addition, we will study how the definition of EDD might be transformed from a unilateral to a bi-lateral or multi-lateral concept, and to formulate a possible regional system to implement such a definition. Also, the relationship between the concept of EDD for Japan and the Japan-US Security Treaty regime requires clarity.
The subjects of defense arms and equipment, and defense postures, will be analyzed in close relation to the abovementioned EDD concept. We believe it is not appropriate to begin by arguing what we should do in case of a sudden attack against Japan, but rather to analyze the process of how a nation comes to resort to such an attack in the first place. We will consider how EDD could be a small part of measures the GOJ could adopt in response to such a circumstance. We believe that this point-of-view will be the most productive and offer the most promising results.
Even if we start with an EDD of Japan alone, its approach should be multilateral, namely the concept of EDD has to be defined by involving concerned neighboring countries. In this respect, the approach represented by Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status may offer a useful model. Also, we should consider various problems that New Zealand's ruling Labour Party has encountered in its review of national defense policy that includes total elimination of its fighter aircraft.
A Regional Missile Control System
In order to initiate a mechanism to eliminate missile threats in Northeast Asia, we should begin with a regional threat analysis—"why and how a missile can be a threat." To be more precise, a missile threat is related to both its capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction and to its ability to attack with a short warning period. With this in mind, we must take into consideration both ballistic and cruise missiles in studying this region which is characterized by short geographical distances.
The research tasks include:
1. Creation of a database of relevant missiles of concern in Northeast Asia
2. Review of the history of missile control and disarmament, along with their existing concepts (e.g. advance notice of testing, test moratorium, verification of space development programs, prohibition of deployment within missile range from targets, advance notice of any launch platform's movement, reduction and elimination, and so forth).
3. Impacts of the US ballistic missile defense (BMD) program in the region
4. Missile and BMD concerns in China (in relation to Taiwan, India, and the US)
5. Current status of Japan-US technical research cooperation on BMD and its regional impacts
6. Participation of South Korea in the BMD program and its regional impacts
7. Possible regional missile control systems reflective of the regional characteristics of Northeast Asia
Enhanced Utilization of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
The ARF is a high-level multilateral security forum that involves all concerned nations in the region. Its concept paper defines its evolution as following three broad stages: (1) Confidence building, (2) Preventive Diplomacy, (3) Approaches to conflict resolution. Therefore, an initiative for non-military security in Northeast Asia can be integral to the agenda of the ARF.
Moreover, since the establishment of the ARF in 1994, unresolved security matters on the Korean Peninsula have been one of the main agenda items of the ARF. In addition, ASEAN, the central player in the ARF process, has practical experience in establishing the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and has been in difficult and protracted negotiations with the nuclear weapon states to secure their adherence to the protocols of the Treaty. The ARF has been indirectly supporting this effort. In this respect, the ARF is very familiar with the issue of nuclear-weaponfree zone.
Although the ARF itself is a foreign ministers' conference lasting only one or two days each year, there are many inter-sessional meetings, including Track II sessions, in which specialists have been discussing specific subjects related to security. The Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security (PCDS), an Asia-Pacific regional NGO closely related to the Peace Depot, has been following the ARF's development from an NGO perspective since 1994. The results of PCDS's research will be very useful to this project.
The research tasks include:
1. Review of ARF discussion on issues related to a nuclear-weapon-free zone
2. Review of ARF discussion on Korean Peninsula issues
3. Review of ARF discussion on confidence building and preventive diplomacy
4. Examination of the potential usefulness of the ARF in promoting cooperative security frameworks in Northeast Asia. Among subjects to be studied are the roles of inter-sessional meetings, Track II sessions, effectiveness of NGO intervention, and potential leadership roles that might be assumed by Canada, New Zealand and others.
Structure of Research Project
Roles and Responsibilities
This joint research project will be conducted by thirteen (13) coworkers. In addition, we will seek the cooperation of experts in various fields. The nature of the contribution of project coworkers and cooperators and the means by which to credit their contribution will be discussed during the research process. In addition, a role for coworkers from China and the ROK is anticipated to assist in organizing conferences in Shanghai and South Korea, respectively. Patti Willis, from PCDS in Canada, will be requested to visit Japan for a seminar on the ARF. (...)
Events
The theme coordinators will organize various seminars. In addition, briefing sessions for interim project reports will be held approximately every 6 month. If warranted, outside lecturers (including from overseas) will be invited to contribute to this project.
Additionally, international conferences, including small-scale meetings in South Korea, a Northeast Asia panel discussion at the UN Headquarters in New York during the UN Disarmament Week (Fall 2003), a symposium on missile defense and NWFZ in Shanghai (Summer 2004), and a symposium to summarize the whole project in South Korea (Summer or Fall 2005), are to be pursued. While funding from the Toyota Foundation will cover the expenditures for core participants and logistics, we will seek other funding sources to expand participation by other potential contributors.
Reports
The final report to the Toyota Foundation will be submitted in November 2005. In addition, the outcome of the research will be published in Japanese and English in the form of policy proposals and recommendations to the GOJ and others. A more concrete plan about the nature and format of the report will be discussed in due course. Theme coordinators and the project leader will draw up a draft framework for the report and request relevant coworkers and cooperators to assist in its revision.
