New Brazilian Government and Nuclear Weapons
Fernando de Souza-Barros 
I would like to start with some considerations regarding Brazil's new administration. I do this because I have lately received many requests to clarify declarations that were made by members of that administration, including President Luis Inácio himself.
During the presidential campaign, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was invited to meet with representatives of the Brazilian armed forces. Asked about his position in connection with the nuclear question, the then-candidate Luiz Inácio (Workers Party) had the opportunity to comment about the main weakness of the NPT: the fact that the nuclear powers have not implemented its Article VI.
President Lula's wording however allowed the interpretation that he considered it unfair that under the NPT only the five nuclear powers could have nuclear arsenals. This was then transformed into an issue by the campaign staff of his opponent, candidate José Serra. The point being that if the Workers Party's candidate won the Brazilian presidential elections he would promote a nuclear-weapon project. The Workers Party clarified its position immediately afterwards—and the Brazilian press did report about Lula's response two weeks before the second election round, on October 27, 2002.The main points presented by the Brazilian Workers Party's campaign officials were:
1. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution forbids nuclear weapons and a President from the Workers Party would never violate the Law.
2. The Workers Party recognizes that Brazil has signed three international safeguards treaties against nuclear weapons (the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Brazil-Argentina Mutual Inspection Treaty, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
However, one should be aware that there is a strong nationalistic "wind" in Brazil, and that nationalistic leaders backed President Lula's candidacy. Brazilian left wing parties supported the Workers Party candidate in the second election round. Comments made by these Brazilian political leaders called the attention of the international press.
Members of the political parties who supported the Workers Party candidate have been invited to join President Lula's government. In Brazil left-wing parties—but not the Workers Party—keep up the 1950's vision of nuclear power and of its necessity for a "powerful and respected" Brazil. We cannot hide under the carpet that these "visions" are shared by many Brazilian nationalistic groups—including many nuclear engineers. And lately, this notion has been reinforced by decisions and statements of the U.S. Administration. But besides the official position of President Lula da Silva, influential members of President Lula's administration know better and have already proven to be vigilant and active against technologies leading to weapons of mass destruction.
Key sources of the international press, however, played up any ambiguous statements that might add ammunition against a government that came into power "expectedly". On November 1, 2002, an article in the National Post stated that Lula da Silva pledged to expand the military and to develop nuclear weapons. It was a bewildering article, as it also linked President Lula da Silva to terrorist groups. These shallow appraisals by the international press brought Brazil in a very difficult position that needs special attention. The implications from these appraisals are that the present Brazilian leadership shall affect Brazil's standing within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and within the United Nations.
The newly appointed Minister of Science and Technology said in an interview with the Brazilian BBC Service on January 5, 2003, that "We cannot renounce any form of scientific-technologic knowledge, whether the genome, DNA, or nuclear fission."
The BBC Service continued, "These remarks by Mr. Amaral coming as we face the 'nuclear crisis' between the United States and North Korea and the U.S. preparing for war with Iraq over its weapons programs, has reawakened debate over Brazil's own nuclear energy and research program, the most advanced in Latin America."
But BBC also added "The new Brazilian government had a quick reaction and Mr. André Singer—the spokesman for President Luiz Inácio Lula of the Silva—was quick to distance the new president from Mr. Amaral's pronouncement saying that the minister's remarks were not an expression of official policy."
My colleague Prof. Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, Brazil's most prominent scientist in the new government (he is Advisor to the President), declared to the Brazilian press on January 8, 2003, that—and I quote – , "Brazil does not have, does not need and should not obtain the knowledge of this technology. The bomb is the plague of mankind."
Yet, according to an article in the New York Times of January 8, 2003, (Brazil Needs A-Bomb Ability, Aide Says, Setting Off Furor, by Larry Rohter), "Mr. Amaral's declarations echoed the certain discontent expressed by Mr. da Silva when he criticized the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as unjustly favoring the United States and other nations that already had nuclear weapons." Mr Rohter then states that "those remarks were made to a group of retired military officers, many of whom supported the ambitious nuclear program undertaken by the military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985, and caused immediate alarm here." Mr. Rohter also added that—and I quote again—"a dozen members of the United States Congress, complaining of his »longstanding relation with and admiration for the Communist dictator and sponsor of terrorism Fidel Castro«, sent a letter to President Bush saying that Mr. da Silva's remarks »raise grave questions concerning the international policies a government of Brazil might pursue under his presidency«." Finally Mr. Rohter stated that "Brazil already has a joint rocket program with China".
The last statement is the easiest to deal with, for Mr. Rohter made a mistake: Brazil has asked China's collaboration for the launching of its satellites.
The truth is that the Brazilian Constitution—promulgated in 1988—forbids the development of nuclear weapons or their presence on Brazilian territory. It is also a fact that Brazil signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty only in 1995, but that it agreed to all the safeguard provisions that are part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty much earlier. Since the mid-1980s, Brazil and its neighbor Argentina negotiated an end to any nuclear projects for weapon technology and began a policy of technical cooperation and exchange of information that lead to a fairly efficient mutual inspection system. On January 14th, 2002, Presidents Lula and Duhalde reaffirmed the commitment of Brazil and Argentina to restrict the "use of the nuclear energy exclusively to peaceful purposes".
The official position of President Lula's platform is of explicit support to international treaties against weapons of mass destruction. The present administration includes individuals who have been actively involved in initiatives against these weapons - both within the UN and in scientific organizations. In particular the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Celso Amorim, played a fairly important role in the New Agenda Coalition; and our colleague, Prof. Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, now member of President Lula's administration, is a former Pugwash World Council member. Officials in charge of finance and trade affairs have also presented their positions to the press and openly declared that any initiative related to weapons' development plows damaging to current prospects of increasing international relations.
In the early 1990s, Ambassador Celso Amorim—the new Minister of Foreign Affairs—was a key person in the reshaping the new Brazilian posture against weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, Celso Amorim also had an active role at the Conference on Disarmament framework in Geneva. I am sure that Ambassador Amorim shall keep these initiatives up in his agenda.
Ambassador Bustani is active again in our foreign relations. As you know, Ambassador José Maurício Bustani was the former General Director of the Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In this position, Ambassador Bustani had the mandate to bring countries like Iraq and North Korea into the organization. This was not welcomed by the U.S. administration. After his sudden dismissal, in a speech in the International Seminar on Civil Defense in the Control and Surveillance Against Chemical Weapons, held in Brasilia in 2002, Bustani said: "I let it to your consideration to evaluate the aspects of justice, correctness, and transparency as represented in the recent events."
This paper was written for the conference "International Arms Control, Transparency and Verification in a European Russian Framework of Cooperative Security" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on January 24-26, 2003, in Berlin, Germany.
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