New Approaches to Nuclear Verification and Nuclear Security
Tariq Rauf 
On 24-26 February 2003, some 50 international experts from research institutes and media outlets met at IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Headquarters in Vienna to participate in a Seminar on New Approaches to Nuclear Verification and Nuclear Security. The seminar, organized by the IAEA's Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination and co-sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the PIR Centre (Moscow), the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and the Nuclear Material Control Centre (Japan), provided a forum for senior Agency staff and seminar participants to exchange information and ideas regarding the Agency's evolving approaches to nuclear verification and nuclear security.
During the seminar's opening session, concern was expressed on the current challenges facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Such challenges include finding a uniform approach in addressing cases of non-compliance; in this regard, the difficulty in distinguishing between intention and capability was acknowledged, particularly in approaching more sensitive technologies such as enrichment or reprocessing facilities. The question was raised as to whether security arrangements based on direct or indirect reliance on nuclear weapons truly allowed all States to feel secure without the nuclear weapons option.
The follow–on session saw further discussion of issues facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, with emphasis on nuclear terrorism and challenges to the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the IAEA. Several participants focused heavily on the prospect of military action in Iraq, the nuclear program underway in Iran, and the recent actions taken by the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Ways to achieve universality of the NPT were also discussed. Descriptions were provided of the Agency's plan of action to protect against the threat of nuclear terrorism and of Agency efforts to incorporate the concept of "proliferation resistance" into future nuclear energy systems. Participants also discussed changes within the global security environment, including plans for a more "usable" generation of nuclear weapons and new threats posed by non-State actors, and the possible consequences of those changes.
The second session covered the legal aspects of the IAEA safeguards system, including efforts to strengthen both IAEA safeguards and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as well as the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Agency officials described the rights and obligations provided to the Agency in the original INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements,[1] the strengthened 93+2 version,[2] and the new tools provided by the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 Corr.).[3] The origin and scope of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) were also discussed, as well as revisions to the Convention currently under consideration. Adherence to strengthened safeguards agreements was noted as a possible avenue of demonstrating renewed political commitment to the NPT, although it was also cautioned that strengthening verification tools should be balanced with continued attention to the root causes of proliferation.
Session three addressed the Agency's efforts in enhancing nuclear security, nuclear safety, and nuclear verification, with particular focus on strengthening physical protection measures and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. Agency officials explained the four primary nuclear security threats identified by the Agency, and the eight areas of activities that constitute the Agency's revised nuclear security plan. Agency efforts to assist in the improvement of physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials and to prevent the illicit trafficking of those materials were also described. Suggestions were given as to additional areas where verification and security measures required improvement, including research institutions and spent nuclear fuel ponds, and weaknesses were highlighted in the current methods of detecting and tracking illicit trafficking incidents.
Seminar participants also received a briefing on the mandate of the Iraq Nuclear Verification Office as provided by the various UN Security Council resolutions (687, 707, 715, 1051, 1284, 1409, and 1441), along with the rights provided through those resolutions. The Agency's past and current activities in Iraq and the capabilities that Iraq had achieved in its past nuclear program, as well as the lessons learned from past and current inspections, were discussed.
Day two of the seminar began with discussions on the progression and evolution of the strengthened safeguards system, including the present status of comprehensive safeguards and Additional Protocols, as well as Agency activities to promote universality of the safeguards system. The analogy of periodical medical check–ups was used to explain the purpose of the safeguards system, which cannot prove healthiness but can only provide assurances that there is no evidence to the contrary. Changes to the safeguards system through the Additional Protocol were described, and emphasis was placed on the financial impact being placed upon the Agency by its continuously increasing verification responsibilities. Participants generally showed support for the current strengthened safeguards system while identifying obstacles to achieving universality of the system and offering suggestions on ways to improve Agency safeguards outreach efforts. The assessment and adequacy of the Agency's current significant quantity thresholds were also discussed.
Session five included descriptions of new technology, detection techniques, and verification tools currently utilized by the Agency, and an explanation on the implementation of integrated safeguards. It was noted that some States may perceive the safeguards system and the non-proliferation regime as an obstacle to their self–defence, and attention was again drawn to the difficulty in finding the appropriate approach with regard to sensitive nuclear facilities.
The sixth session addressed both legal and other responses to cases of non-compliance by States. While the IAEA's legal responses are based upon the Agency Statute and INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), participants also discussed other alternatives, such as "coercive inspections," "natural transparency," and pre–emptive action. Several participants stressed that each case of non-compliance must be addressed on a case–by–case basis, as differing perspectives of national and international security affect a State's willingness to renounce the nuclear option. It was also commented that a binary world in which States are judged to be either in compliance or non-compliance may no longer be sufficient, as the time needed for a State to obtain a "breakout" capability decreases. Consideration must also be given, however, to maintaining strengthened verification capabilities free from subjective political prejudices.
The final session of the seminar consisted of a discussion on challenges faced by the media in covering nuclear verification and nuclear security issues, in separating fact from fiction, and obstacles faced by both journalists and the IAEA in promoting public awareness. While many participants agreed that deadlines, understaffed offices, and other constraints faced by journalists often unintentionally resulted in reporting inaccuracies, participants representing the media encouraged more proactive efforts by the Agency and by other participants to correct such inaccuracies, particularly those by government officials. Methods of increasing media access to credible sources and information, and ways to prevent misquotes or quotes taken out of context were also among the issues discussed.
In concluding the seminar, many participants felt that conversations had only just begun, and many voiced a desire to see continued interaction between the IAEA and the non-governmental and journalistic community.
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[Footnotes added by the editor.]
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