The Looming Crisis
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program and U.S. Policy
Tim Savage 
When inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered in 1993 that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) had lied on its initial declaration of its past nuclear activities, the resulting crisis almost led to war. The United States was seriously considering air strikes against DPRK nuclear facilities when former President Jimmy Carter called the White House from Pyongyang and announced that he had the basis of a deal to defuse the situation. The U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework, signed in October 1994, effectively froze DPRK nuclear activities in exchange for a U.S. promise to build two light-water reactors and to move toward normalization of relations.
From the beginning, the agreement faced a number of problems, from the technical to the political. The idea of building 2 gigawatts of nuclear production capacity in a country with an energy infrastructure as dilapidated as that of North Korea was ambitious, to put it kindly, and even in the best-case scenario, the 2003 target date for their completion was unlikely to be met. Given the continued abnormal state of U.S.–DPRK relations, however, the Agreed Framework was being implemented in far from ideal conditions. Shortly after its signing, the Republican Party gained control of both houses of Congress, and the Clinton administration decided to fulfill only the minimal letter of the agreement rather than risk a political fight with Congress over its DPRK policy. North Korea meanwhile continued to take provocative actions, most notably testing a multi-stage rocket that overflew Japan in August 1998. During its waning days in office, the Clinton administration attempted to negotiate a new agreement on the DPRK missile program, but ran out of time before a deal could be reached. When Clinton left office, the DPRK's nuclear plants remained frozen, and the spent fuel rods were canned and under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Agreed Framework, however, left the all-important question of inspections to verify the DPRK's past nuclear activities to a later date.
The new administration of President George W. Bush included many neoconservatives who see any truck with Pyongyang as appeasement of an "evil" regime. The incompleteness of Clinton's attempt to disarm North Korea left these critics in the position to begin the process of dismantling the policy. After rudely rebuffing ROK (Republic of Korea; South Korea) President Kim Dae-Jung's request to soften his stance, Bush subsequently refused to certify that North Korea was in compliance with the terms of the Agreed Framework, as required under an act of Congress. While the move had no practical effect, as Bush then used his executive privilege to waive the certification requirement, it was a clear attempt to put pressure on North Korea to come into compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency earlier than called for under the Agreed Framework.
Withdrawal from NPT Increases Crisis
For its part, North Korea had not fully embraced the agreement either. While it did freeze operation of its 5 Mwe reactor at Yongbyon, and halt construction on two larger reactors, it also began work on a clandestine uranium enrichment program with aid from Pakistan. When U.S. Undersecretary of State James Kelly visited Pyongyang in October 2002, he confronted his interlocutors with evidence of the program, which the North Koreans first denied but later admitted to. North Korea argued that its nuclear program was justified by the "hostile policy" of the Bush administration and demanded that the United States sign a non-aggression pact. The United States responded that it would not negotiate with North Korea unless the DPRK first verifiably dismantles its nuclear programs.
Since the Kelly visit, North Korea has once again resorted to provocations in an attempt to bring the United States to the negotiating table. Pyongyang announced that it was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while at the same time maintaining that it did not intend to build nuclear weapons. It removed cameras and expelled IAEA inspectors who were monitoring the freeze on the Yongbyon plant, and re-started the 5 Mwe reactor. It is unknown whether North Korea removed any of the spent fuel rods, although spy satellites have shown "furious activity" around the storage site. To date, North Korea has not restarted its reprocessing center, but it is unknown whether the failure to restart is deliberate or due to technical difficulties in the antiquated plant.
The Bush administration, however, has shown little inclination to engage North Korea in direct negotiations. Instead, they have argued that the issue is not between North Korea and the United States, but between North Korea and the international community, as the DPRK breached its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In contrast to Iraq, where President Bush only reluctantly agreed to consult the Security Council, the United States has been pushing for the IAEA to refer the matter of DPRK's nuclear weapons to the United Nations. Rather than indicating a new-found U.S. commitment to international organizations and processes, however, this is a calculated tactical move on Washington's part. The preferred strategy of many of Bush's advisors is to isolate North Korea, squeezing it through sanctions until the Kim Jong Il regime collapses. For any sanctions regime to be effective would require the active support not only of U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, but also of China and Russia, both of whom share borders with the DPRK. By referring the matter to the UN Security Council, the United States can claim the moral high ground for upholding international non-proliferation norms. Russia and China, which have thus far turned a deaf ear to U.S. calls for sanctions, would then be put in the position of being forced to either go along with the program or veto a UN Security Council sanctions resolution, opening them up to charges of aiding and abetting nuclear proliferators. The U.S. policy is thus regime change masquerading as multilateralism.
Throughout the crisis, the United States has shown a distinct lack of urgency to find a resolution, despite DPRK moves to restart its nuclear program. The reason for this is a strong belief in Washington that time is not on Kim Jong Il's side. Neo-conservatives take it as a matter of faith that the DPRK regime is hanging by a thread, and they blame Clinton's engagement policy for prolonging its lifespan. In contrast, they point to the "Reagan buildup" of heavy military spending, which they credit for causing the collapse of the Soviet Union. Proponents of this argument cite CIA reports that North Korea may already have two nuclear weapons. Even should it re-start the reprocessing plant, in the short-term, North Korea could only obtain enough fissile material for an additional three or four weapons, which, the argument goes, would not greatly shift the balance of power on the Korean peninsula. Therefore the United States can afford to continue concentrating on the war against Iraq, biding its time and relying on deterrence until the tides of history inevitably sweep away the regime in Pyongyang.
There are several problems with this strategy, if it is even worthy of the term. In the first place, the contention that North Korea already has nuclear weapons, although cited as fact by many commentators, is actually a matter of conjecture. North Korea has never tested a nuclear explosion. The speculation of its existing weapons arsenal is based on the knowledge that the DPRK has stockpiled sufficient fissile material for at least two weapons, and has had ample time to weaponize them. Furthermore, this sanguine attitude toward the possibility of North Korea becoming an open nuclear power ignores the great and lasting damage that such a development would do both to regional security arrangements and global non-proliferation efforts.
Neo-conservatives also greatly underestimate the staying power of the Pyongyang regime. Despite years of food shortages and a collapsing infrastructure and economy, there are no signs that Kim Jong Il is losing his grip on power. The source of legitimacy of the DPRK regime has never been its ability to provide its people with a high standard of living, at which task it has failed miserably, but rather its success in defending the fatherland against foreign domination. The Pyongyang government portrays itself as the first truly independent regime in Korean history, constantly deriding signs of "puppetry" on the part of its southern brethren. President Bush's harsh anti-DPRK rhetoric—terming the country part of the "axis of evil," publicly expressing his disdain for Kim Jong Il, and espousing a doctrine of pre-emption— only serve to reinforce the regime's propaganda of an impending U.S. attack.
Playing for Time Is Not A Solution
Opponents of an engagement policy also overestimate the degree to which the Clinton administration's limited degree of aid helped keep the DPRK regime in power. In particular, they exaggerate the importance of the heavy fuel oil supplied under the Agreed Framework, which never amounted to more than a small percentage of the country's electrical generation. Far more important is the amount of food and fuel that China provides North Korea, some as grants and some as trade at reduced prices. While China is opposed to the DPRK's acquisition of nuclear weapons, its interests in the Korean Peninsula do not coincide with those of the United States, making it highly unlikely to support any sanctions program. A DPRK collapse would likely cause a flood of North Koreans fleeing over the border, exacerbating the refugee problem China already faces. It could also result in an ROK–U.S. military intervention that could end with U.S. troops along the Yalu River. China has been maintaining a carefully calibrated dual-Korea policy that has allowed it to maintain close political relations with the North Korea while greatly expanding its economic ties with South Korea. Beijing's concerns about the DPRK nuclear program are thus outweighed by its strategic calculus for retaining its influence on the peninsula.
North Korea is unlikely to sit back and allow Washington's containment policy to take its course. Pyongyang knows that, once the war with Iraq is over, the United States will be in a much stronger position for dealing with North Korea. North Korea therefore will continue to push the proliferation envelope, and if Washington fails to respond, will likely proceed towards weaponization. To prevent that from happening, the U.S. may consider applying the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive military strikes. Doing so, however, risks DPRK retaliation against Seoul, which is home to 12 million people and lies within range of DPRK artillery. ROK President Roh Moon Hyun, who rode a wave of anti-American sentiment to victory in December's polls, has consistently reiterated that he will not support any military solution to the nuclear crisis. Any indications that the United States is seriously considering a first strike option could lead to a rupture in the 50–year old U.S.–ROK alliance, driving South Korea into the waiting arms of China and greatly damaging U.S. interests in Northeast Asia.
A negotiated solution to the DPRK nuclear crisis is thus necessary not only to preserve peace in Northeast Asia and uphold non-proliferation norms, but also to preserve U.S. influence in a region vital to its security and economic interests. Critics maintain that North Korea has no intention of ever giving up its nuclear program, and views negotiation as a means of extorting goodies from its enemies. While it is certainly true that Pyongyang has yet to abandon its nuclear options, it is equally true that the United States has never fully committed itself to a policy that accepts the DPRK's continued existence. It is time for both sides to cease halfway measures and lay their cards on the table. North Korea must finally and irrevocably make the choice between becoming a garrison state with nuclear weapons or joining the international community and receiving the developmental aid it desperately needs. But the United States needs to offer North Korea the breathing room it needs as a reward for good behavior, and stop simply wishing the problem would go away.
