Military Capabilities in the Near and Middle East
Christian Mölling 
and
Götz Neuneck
Long before the beginning of Gulf War III, newspapers and commentators focused their attention on the military capabilities of Iraq. Although reliable information on weapons numbers and capabilities are mostly missing, it is safe to assume that Saddam Hussein's military potential has decreased significantly compared to his capabilities during the 1991 Gulf War. This is the result of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC weapons destruction efforts, of sanctions and the embargo, and of the lack of military support from other—in particular western—countries which supplied military technology to Iraq prior to 1991.
But how about Iraq's neighbors? What is the status of their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to build-up weapons stockpiles? These questions are crucial variables in a highly complex formula, and the answers have considerable impact on the prospects of war and peace in this unstable region which is bristling with weapons.
In 1997, former US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen called the Middle East a "chronic disease". Between 1948 and 1982, five major Arab-Israeli Wars took place. The Persian Gulf region saw two "Gulf Wars" before 2003: the first was waged from 1981 to 1988 by Iran and Iraq, and the second took place after the occupation of Kuwait in 1991, between Iraq and the US-led Western-Arab alliance.
Armed conflicts such as these are likely to have far reaching impact on the political and military order of the region. As of today, there is little hope for a stable post-war order in Iraq, and yet this is of utmost relevance for the stability of the region. Failing this, a further escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and fragmentation trends within Iraq are probable outcomes. This constellation, aggravated by the massive presence of US forces in the region, has a high potential to entangle other states in conflict, as well as to shatter the fragile balance between the populace and the political elites.
The following, largely quantitative description of military capabilities is meant to show the tremendous potential of military capabilities in the Middle East.
When investigating into and adding up military arsenals and secret weapons programs, one has to be extremely cautious. Much of the information on the various armed forces are estimates or derive from intelligence sources which cannot be considered objective. Moreover, a sufficient picture of the strategic environment should be complemented by political, as well as economic and geographic, factors. In addition, military arsenals should not only be evaluated by their quantity, but also by their quality and their utility in the context of the prevalent military strategy and the underlying political ends.
The level of militarization in this region[1] is exceptionally high if the number of armed forces, the military budget, and weapons holdings are used as indicators. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2.9 million men are under arms, not counting reserves and paramilitary units. This corresponds to one soldier per 109 inhabitants. This ratio increases in the center region of the Near East, where there is one soldier for every 99 inhabitants.[2]
Within the last 10 years, the military spending in the Middle East rose from US$ 52.3 billion to US$ 72.4 billion —an increase of 20.1 billion dollars, or 38%. And this trend seems unbroken: in 2002, Israel increased its defense budget by US$ 983 million to a total of over US$ 10 billion.[3] Israel's Arab neighbors, in turn, are likely to follow suit.
In the last decade, the Near East is the most heavily armed region in the world after East Asia.[4] The slight decline in heavy weapons can be partly put down to the heavy weapons embargo against Iraq. Moreover, existing systems have become increasingly obsolete and unreliable.
Over 6% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the region is spent on defense. The leading nations are Saudi-Arabia (11.6%), Israel (8.0%), and Jordan (9.5%). In relation to the gross national product (GNP), the military budgets are slightly decreasing. This is probably caused by the excessive armament after the 1991 Gulf War, and by the precarious economic situation of some countries.[5] To this day, the huge arsenals are a heavy burden for the corresponding countries. In the aftermath of the new war in Iraq, additional weapons procurement might further increase this burden. The attempt of the United States to reorder the region might fuel a new arms race in the region.
The Middle East continues to be the greatest 'weapons bazaar' in the world. The military buildup occurred in several waves, especially after the wars of 1967 and 1973. The rearmament was supported by the Soviet Union, the US, France, and the UK. Until the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Egypt got its weapons from the Soviet Union, then from the US. To this day, successor states from the former Soviet Union deliver weapons to Syria. Jordan, Kuwait, and most weapons for Saudi Arabia are supplied by the US. Israel imported French military material until the late 1960s, when the US took over the role of the principal supplier.[6]
The Six Day War of 1967 gave Israel a reason to build up their own defense industry. Today, Israel is the only state in the region that maintains its own defense industry. Although dependant on US technology, this nuclear weapons state runs native production facilities for tanks, missiles, airplanes, unmanned air vehicles, electronics, personnel carriers, and small arms. Israel not only produces for its own defense forces, but is part of the "dirty dozen" of the world's leading arms suppliers. Both weapons exports and miliary-technological cooperation (e.g. with China and Turkey) represents an important economic factor. Around one fourth of the Israeli exports consist of armament goods. In 2000, these exports amounted to US$ 3.5 billion, and accounted for 2.2 % of global weapons sales.[7]
However, neither Israel nor the Arab states are independent in the field of defense technologies. All states in the region import their weapons for the most part. Arms imports and the continued military buildup in the region run in parallel. Since the end of the Cold War, around 25% of all arms transfers went to the Middle East. All Middle East states can be found in the upper third of import statistics. With weapons imports of US$ 4.8 billion in 2001, Saudi Arabia is the world's third largest importer of armament goods. The main import products are heavy tanks, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, mobile air defense, attack helicopters, and fighter jets. The overall objective is general modernization of the armed forces. In 2001, imports totaled US$ 2.1 billion. This exceeds weapons imports to South Asia (US$ 2.0 billion). By comparison, Europe imported weapons for US$ 3.9 billion.[7]
Conventional Forces of Middle East Majors States
This section will outline the heavy land and air weapons systems that would play a prominent role in major military operations.[9]
Contrary to public opinion, the Iraqi military is seriously weakened. The sanctions and embargoes have forestalled the rebuilding of a strong army. The Republican Guards are just an instrument to guarantee and exercise power inside Iraq. Combat readiness of the other military forces is estimated at around 50 %. The military equipment is largely obsolete. According to IISS, the air force can use only 55 % of the 350 aircrafts. The artillery has 2,200 systems, and 200 rocket launchers. The number of tanks—2,600—seems impressive, but they are mostly outdated. Overall, Iraq does not pose a significant conventional threat.[10]
Like many other armies in the region, the Syrian armed forces have to cope with a serious modernization crisis. Equal in numbers to the Israeli forces, their weapon systems (3,700 cannons, 500 rocket launchers, 4,700 tanks) are outdated. A modern air defense is lacking, and air force equipment is not combat-ready (approx. 600 fighter jets).[11]
The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), are without question the most modern army in the Middle East (160,000 personnel). This applies, primarily, to the larger part of 3,700 tanks and to the air force. Also, the 2,800 artillery systems, 400 rocket launchers, and 1,300 anti-tank systems are quiet up to date. Israel seeks to modernize its Navy in order to integrate it into the littoral warfare concept. It also seeks to upgrade its reconnaissance capabilities and wants to introduce a "battle management" system. Of equal importance is the Arrow anti-missile system, with a budget of US$ 1.3 billion.[12]
Saudi Arabia
Although quantitatively small (124,000 personnel), the Kingdom's army is reported to be quite modern. 315 modern Abrams tanks constitute the heart of the heavy divisions, comprising 1,000 tanks in total. The artillery with its 300 cannons and 60 rocket launchers is of minor importance. The air force has 600 vehicles of differing ages.
Iran
In view of its economic growth, Teheran strives to modernize its armed forces in the longer term. Especially air defense systems, aircraft and tanks are to be ordered from Russia. Currently, Iran has around 1,500 middle-aged tanks, a huge number of artillery systems (2,300), and 900 rocket launcher. A few anti-tank systems, an obsolete air defense, and an outdated air force are of little value. Teheran holds 520,000 soldiers under arms whose combat readiness, however, is not ensured.
Cairo is modernizing its armed forces (443,000 personnel), in particular tanks and attack helicopters, with strong support from the US.[13] Currently, the army has 3,900 tanks (T-55, Abrams), but the number of artillery systems is quit small.
The smaller Gulf States[14] do not carry much weight by numbers: taken together, they hardly reach the capacity of even one of the Arab Ring states[15] or of Israel. Radical changes are not to be expected in the near future. An exception are the United Arab Emirates, which have ordered 390 tanks and 140 aircrafts, some of which have already been delivered. Kuwait ordered a notable amount of anti-tank systems (728).[16]
To make up for their individual weaknesses, the smaller Gulf states, along with Saudi Arabia, founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC aims at defining a common defense policy. The focus is on the establishment of a "supreme defense council" and a rapid reaction force of up to 20,000 men, and on the build up of collective C3[17] capabilities.[18]
Even in times of peace, the US forces represent a considerable military potential in the region. The 20,000 personnel are mainly based in Turkey and the Gulf Region. According to Global Security, the U.S. troops were increased to 48,000 in November 2002 and include 400 aircraft and two attack carrier units. The ground units are a mix of special operation forces and expedition troops. Those numbers were increased to approximately 230,000 before the war. Due to a lack of reliable information, accurate numbers and a meaningful assessment are hard to come by.[19]
Israel and the Arab Ring States
The most probable intra-regional conflict would occur between Israel and its neighbors. Although there is open hostility between Israel and other Arab states, the latter do not pose a direct threat to Israel at this time. Even though an Arab alliance has a quantitative advantage, Israel can rely on its technological and military dominance. Summing up the military personnel of the Arab Ring States, the ratio is 1:5 to Israel's disadvantage. The figures are similar for the major weapon categories (tanks 1:2.6; artillery 1:2.8; aircraft 1:2.7; helicopters 1: 1.6).[20]
The Israeli Defence Forces are held in high qualitative esteem. They are very well trained, have first-class equipment at their disposal, and are permanently involved in combat missions. Additionally, Israel has made much better use of the developments from the "revolution in military affairs" than its neighbors. Only the IDF have an integrated command, control, and communication system (C3) that connects all vital elements of warfare – from data gathering to target acquisition and the use of precision munitions. Furthermore, new high-tech weapons are on the ordering list.[21]
For these capabilities, the country is not fully dependent on imports. Israel is the only state in the region that invests a significant amount of its defense budget in military research and development: approx. 10 % of its budget in 2000 (USA: 13%, Germany: 4.3%).[22] A further advantage is its high number of reservists in Israel, who can provide highquality reinforcement in comparison with the Arab reservist troops. In times of war, the size of Israeli troops would be almost equal to the opposing forces (1: 1.3).[23] The IDF have proven on many occasions that its quality makes up for quantitative disadvantages.
Additional positive effects derive from the permanent professionalization of the IDF by constant involvement in combat missions and by the integration of its functional units. No other state in the region can compete with that. It seems possible, however, that Arab troops initiate smaller military operations. In this case, the victims in this populous region will always be the civilians.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Table: Estimates of WMD in the Middle East and their state of development[24] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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According to many statements and analyses, various Middle East states run programs for the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or they already have operational stockpiles. Chemical weapons (CW) have already been used by Iran (1984-1988) and Iraq (1983, 1978–1988). As in Syria, Egypt, and Libya, these two countries have probably chemical weapons arsenals in the form of artillery shells and missile warheads as well as on board aircraft. Moreover, Egypt (1963–1967) and Libya (1987) have been accused of using chemical weapons. Israel certainly has the capability to take up production of biological and chemical weapons at short notice. Tel Aviv has neither confirmed the existence of a nuclear weapons program nor the potential of its missile arsenals, but an operational Israeli nuclear arsenal is deemed certain.
Other states, like Iran, are allegedly developing nuclear weapons. In 1991, Iraq run a crash program for the development of nuclear weapons, which has been largely destroyed or eliminated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) mission.
Finally, some Middle East states posses imported, modified, or self-produced short or intermediate range missiles which can carry biological and are Scuds acquired from the Former Soviet Union. In the past, Iran and Iraq have used missiles extensively against each other. Iran, which is envisaged as a potential military antagonist of Israel, as well as some of its neighboring states such as Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Libya own short range ballistic missiles.
Israel
Israel is the leading Middle East nation in terms of missile arsenals. It holds an independent technological capacity to manufacture medium-range ballistic missiles as well as deployed systems that can be equipped with nuclear warheads. The Israeli defense industry has far-reaching knowledge of the production of cruise missiles and drones, and can produce such systems with a range of 200-400 km. The Jericho missile makes it possible to attack targets in all neighboring countries and in Iran as well as in parts of Turkey, Greece, and Libya. On the other side, Israel is surrounded by countries that own short-range ballistic missiles and that allegedly develop intermediate range missiles. The Arrow and the American Patriot missile defense system shall provide additional protection against SCUD missile attacks.
Iran
Iran also becomes the focus of political discussion. US and Israeli experts and politicians warns of an "aggressive program" to develop WMDs and ballistic missiles with a range up to 2000 km. Civilian nuclear projects done in cooperation with China and Russia fuelled speculations that Iran might use its economic power to provide for a nuclear option. In 1992, Moscow and Teheran concluded a treaty on the construction of two nuclear power stations. While Russia hopes for exports of its nuclear technology, the US protests such cooperation because it fears the boosting of Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Further concern was caused by the native development of an Iranian ballistic missile (Shihab–3) with a range of 1,300 km to which Russia and North Korea contributed. Moreover, Iran has two versions of SCUD missiles, with ranges of 300 and 500 km, respectively. It is also assumed that Iran is capable of producing chemical weapons agents and has constructed at least two production facilities. Allegedly, nerve gas production was taken up in 1994. As to biological weapons, it is believed that Iran can start production of Anthrax and Botulinum toxin if necessary.
The threat analysis by the US intelligence services (NIE 2001) points out North Korea assisted Iran in building long-range missiles. The similarities between the Shihab –3 and the Nodong missile seem to support this claim. The partly civilian launch platforms Shihab–4, –5, and –6 show remarkable similarities to North Korean missile projects.
Egypt
Besides Israel, Egypt owns the furthest developed industrial potential in the region and manufactures some conventional weapons on its own. In the 1950s ( with German support), as well as in the 1980s, Cairo had a native development program for ballistic missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km. Currently, the armed forces have imported ballistic missiles (Frog–7, SCUD–B) and antiship missiles from China (HY–2 Silkworm). It is suspected that Egypt operates production facilities for a limited amount of mustard and other nerve gases. Small research activities supposedly take place in respect to biological and nuclear weapons.
Syria
For a long time, the Syrian missile capabilities depended on Soviet imports. Syria invested large amounts of money in its missile program, but neglected modernization of its air force. Moscow delivered Frog–7, SCUD–B, and SS–21 missiles. Reports have it that Syria also obtained a limited number of longer range SCUD missiles from North Korea. Possibly, Syria is able to produce nerve gas agents. This would pose a serious threat to Israel. Some sources assume that Syria also conducts research on biological weapons agents. Syria denies all such activities.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia exposed its missile ambitions by the import of Chinese intermediate range missiles. In 1988, Riad obtained an unknown number of modified CSS–2 missiles from Beijing. This missile can be used to deliver nuclear warheads and has a range of 3,500 km. The CSS–2 could possibly attack cities with conventional warheads. With this missile, Saudi Arabia could threaten its direct neighbors as well as parts of Turkey and Iran. Saudi Arabia is member to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and has announced several times that it will not mount nuclear or chemical warheads on its missiles. King Fahid explained that his country would use these weapons strictly for self-defense only. Israel repeatedly expressed its concern that these missiles could be equipped with chemical warheads.
Conclusion
In sharp contrast to the military potentials that exist in the Middle East, no attempts at arms control and cooperative security have so far been undertaken in order to contain conflicts or prevent escalation. Several existing treaties could be used as a starting point for regional arms control: the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996), which establishes a nuclearweapon-free zone in Africa:, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. First confidence-building measures should urgently be taken to deal with the missile arsenals amassed in this region.
UN Resolution 687of 1992, which deals with the disarmament of Iraq, states that the actions taken for the monitoring and destruction of Iraqi weapons "represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons." However, no apparent efforts are made to reach any of these objectives. On the contrary, the US, as the de facto ordering power, has withdrawn from all arms control negotiations. Washington favors arms exports to this region, stimulating demand by new wars, and prefers classical alliance strategies to fulfilling its responsibility in the region by instigating stability-oriented policies that rely on civil instruments of change. On the global level, one arms control treaty has been cancelled, and several other cannot enter into force. No reasonable initiatives are undertaken to regulate the existing military capabilities, let alone to begin disarmament.
For the time being, solutions seem to rely on the use of force, not on diplomacy.
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