Legal and Technical Aspects of Complete Nuclear Disarmament
Summary of Roundtable Meeting in Ottawa, January 2002
Merav Datan 
A roundtable on "Legal and Technical Aspects of Complete Nuclear Disarmament," hosted by The Simons Foundation with the support of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, took place in Ottawa on January 10-11, 2002.[1] The roundtable brought together governmental representatives and independent experts to explore the legal and technical aspects of a framework for complete nuclear disarmament. The roundtable used the model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) to explore the future requirements of a regime for the effective and verified reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.
In advance of the roundtable, participants received a list of 13 open-ended questions regarding technical and legal - including structural - aspects of complete nuclear disarmament (see the list of discussion questions at the end of this article). The roundtable deliberately addressed legal and technical considerations before political questions, in order to generate new ideas and focus on the "how" of nuclear disarmament as distinct from the more familiar discussion of "whether" it is possible.
Discussion and Themes
All the participants strongly and publicly support the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. Governmental participants represented non-nuclear weapon states and non-governmental participants had published on and promoted nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. Nevertheless, there was a range of perspectives on the tactics and strategies best suited for promoting nuclear disarmament, and the role of a future NWC, as well as the role of a model NWC in the current political process. In this context, the roundtable succeeded in engaging these sympathetic skeptics in the exercise of projecting into a future world and exploring the requirements of and obstacles to nuclear disarmament against the background of a currently unfavorable political environment.
Among the themes that emerged during the course of the discussions were the following:
Long-term goal and next steps: To what extent can a focus on the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament facilitate the identification and promotion of next feasible steps? Is it possibly counter-productive - because seen as too ambitious - to discuss the end goal? There was no singular answer to these questions, and a preliminary conclusion appears to be that selective use of the NWC as both a tool and as a concrete political objective is most appropriate. NWC promoters should be sensitive to disingenuous or bad faith claims of support, and take steps to rebut or dissociate from these, but the NWC can be a valuable tool and litmus test of commitment to nuclear disarmament.
Verification and the political process: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) political process benefited from the extensive research on verification that preceded conclusion of negotiations. The NWC, or a future regime for complete nuclear disarmament, could benefit from similar research if it helps establish the feasibility of verifiable nuclear disarmament. The more complex and unresolved political questions, however, make this somewhat more elusive for some than the case of the CTBT. A few participants expressed a preference for resolving questions of political process first.
Societal Verification and Whistleblowers: The role of societal verification and protection for whistleblowers was a recurrent theme. Some saw this as the most promising approach to nuclear disarmament, including education aimed at increasing scientific and societal responsibility. Non-governmental monitoring and other non-treaty based methods of promoting accountability were discussed, as was the potential social and psychological context for citizens who "blow the whistle" on activities that undermine nuclear disarmament. The question of societal norms - and the value placed on nuclear weapons - is a crucial part of this theme.
Delivery vehicles and warheads: On the technical side, verified reduction of delivery vehicles (particularly missiles) in addition to warheads received much attention. The model NWC addresses delivery vehicles in general terms, although these would be harder to hide and therefore possibly easier to verify than warheads. More research is needed on this question.
Costs of disarmament: It was suggested that a thorough exploration of the costs of disarmament would be useful. These are not fully understood. They could also be compared to the costs of armament, although some disarmament activities are likely to be even more costly than the building of the weapons. The larger context, including the political and opportunity costs from building the weapons, could offset concerns about the economic costs of disarmament itself. In any case the costs rise as disarmament is delayed.
Carrots and sticks: The approach in the model NWC places an emphasis on compliance over coercive enforcement, but it would be useful to explore and develop additional possible incentives in order to make compliance more attractive than non-compliance. More carrots, as well as carrot cake, are needed. The model NWC suggests an optional protocol for the compulsory settlement of disputes and an optional protocol providing support for alternatives to nuclear energy.
Non-participants: The likelihood of states that would not participate in the political negotiation process or the implementation of a future NWC raises critical questions about its feasibility. At the same time, this question is not unique to the NWC - since three nuclear weapons capable states are outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime today - and focusing on a nuclear disarmament regime might, in fact, serve to draw in these states or, at a minimum, help identify the source of resistance.
Implementing agencies: There was much discussion but no general consensus on the question of an implementing agency (or agencies) for a future NWC. Should it be a new body, or should it build on the existing implementation and verification bodies? Resolution of this question will depend on political structures that emerge, expertise and experience of existing agencies, bureaucratic culture, concerns about duplicating efforts, and the ability to modify or separate the mission(s) of existing bodies.
Conspiracies, hidden arsenals and materials: An unexpected theme that received much attention was the possibility of a conspiracy to cheat a future NWC regime. There was a wide-ranging discussion about the likelihood of such a conspiracy in light of the political environment that would exist if an NWC comes into force. A related topic, about disclosing past nuclear weapons programs (as in the case of South Africa) raised the question of encouraging such openness and finding ways to reward or commend the disclosure and decision to abandon the program.
Low levels vs. zero: There was no consensus on the relative difficulty of verifying low levels of nuclear weapons as opposed to verifying maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world. The perspective tended to depend on the possible value of nuclear weapons as this would be perceived by those with the authority and means to clandestinely develop or maintain nuclear weapons. On the one hand, as long as nuclear weapons exist and are known to exist, the relative numbers would be of marginal concern in comparison to the existence of even one weapon or the capability to develop one secretly. On the other hand, maintaining a nuclear weapons free world once the infrastructure had been verifiably dismantled and the nuclear option renounced could be more straightforward than verifying a dynamic and politically sensitive process.
The roundtable participants noted that despite the current and near-term hostile political environment regarding treaties and multilateral - or even bilateral - verification-based regimes and irreversibility, it is important to maintain and develop the knowledge, expertise, and training relevant to disarmament. It is also important to continue to develop and support cooperative, verifiable, and irreversible approaches to security. On a regional level, especially in South Asia, there is an urgent need for cooperative approaches to avert nuclear war.
Questions for Discussion
- What are the essential verification requirements for transition to low levels (hundreds) of nuclear weapons? What are the essential verification requirements for transition from low levels to complete elimination?
- What are the essential verification requirements for maintaining a regime of nuclear disarmament while the capability and technology are still accessible, and in later generations?
- What existing verification bodies and mechanisms (NPT safeguards, US-Russian arms reduction treaties, regional agreements, CTBTO) will need to be expanded? How? How should they be coordinated? Is a new umbrella agency necessary? If so, how would it bring efforts together? If not, what is working best about the regime now that could be built on?
- What should be the elements of a future regime to verify a ban on fissile materials for weapons purposes? How inclusive must it be to facilitate complete nuclear disarmament? What materials, in what forms, would be subject to verification?
- How inclusive must declarations of warheads and fissile materials be? Who should have access to this information? What data-sharing agreements are necessary to balance transparency and confidence with concerns related to non-proliferation and classified information?
- What nuclear facilities must be subject to verification? How intrusive should the verification regime be? What combination of sensors, inspections (systematic and challenge), and data-sharing is optimal to balance confidence-building with certainty and efficiency?
- How inclusive should control over delivery systems be? What existing verification mechanisms are applicable and what must be developed?
- What are the essential elements of a legal regime to enforce state compliance with an obligation of non-possession of nuclear weapons? What types of peaceful collective measures would be effective for this purpose?
- What are the essential elements of national implementation? How do these correspond to a legal regime that provides for effective and fair criminal prosecution of individual violators of basic norms of non-possession of nuclear weapons?
- What will be the role of societal verification? Should individuals be required to report violations of the disarmament regime?
- What are the essential elements of a legal regime that protects individual whistleblowers at both the national and international levels? What protections could a state offer citizens reporting on suspected violations by employers? Should there be transnational protection arrangements for individuals who report violations by states?
- What expertise and skills base must be developed to enable the implementation of a universal disarmament regime? What existing or new areas of research must be developed or expanded?
- What policy and security changes are required to allow the development and implementation of the requirements identified above?
Recurrent Themes
Next steps should be consistent with the long-term goal.
Focusing on the long-term goal should not detract from pursuing next steps.
Verification requirements depend on the political process and climate, internationally and internally.
Open democratic societies are not likely to sustain clandestine nuclear activities under a global disarmament regime.
Societal verification includes informed citizen participation and could require protection for whistleblowers.
Education in proliferation dangers and disarmament norms is essential.
Confidence in fissile material accounting and control cannot be complete and will be increasingly difficult to attain without immediate efforts to document the histories of nuclear programs.
Verified disarmament of both delivery vehicles and warheads should be pursued.
The costs of disarmament should be compared to the costs of proliferation - past and current arsenals, opportunity costs, and the potential costs of use.
More creative arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament carrots and sticks are needed.
In consultation with the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, and Physicians for Social Responsibility. The roundtable was organized by Merav Datan and Penelope Simons.
