The Göttingen Proposal for a Space Treaty
Explanations and Comments
Jürgen Scheffran 
Drawing on the discussion of earlier proposals on space arms control,[1] in July 1984 a group of four scientists presented a draft Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space at a scientific congress against the militarization of space in Göttingen (Germany).[2] Against the background of the renewed Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, provoked by the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, INF) and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the Reagan administration, the proposal was intended to serve as a model for public debate of space arms control, sketching a possible legal framework and building a political momentum to prevent an arms race in space and the destabilization of international security.
At a time when the use of space became increasingly internationalized, the movement to keep space free of weapons was growing, a situation which in some regards is similar today. The peace movement in Germany, which had gained considerable momentum against INF deployment in the years before, joined in opposition against SDI and the emerging space arms race.
The Göttingen proposal outlines the basic legal provisions, leaving further details to negotiations. The German version included comments explaining the rationale and meaning of each of the articles. Further aspects have been explained in various papers by the proposal authors.[3] The proposal was discussed in the German Parliament in autumn 1984 on the initiative of the social democrats (SPD) with support of the Green party, but at that time was refused by the governing coalition of christian democrats (CDU/CSU) and liberals (FDP).[4]
The goals and principles that guided the treaty drafting can be summarized as follows:[5]
1.
All channels for an arms race in space are to be closed.
2.Destabilizing developments shall be prevented; space must remain free of weapons.
3.Stabilizing functions and peaceful uses of space should not be undermined.
4.The treaty elements should be structured stepwise according to their urgency.
5.The draft treaty should be politically feasible and beneficial to all member parties.
6.To ensure transparency of the treaty and to avoid misunderstandings, explanations are given for each paragraph.
7.The treaty terms shall be adequately verifiable.
8.Cooperation and confidence building shall be emphasized and supported.
9.The proposal shall be multinational to reflect the internationality of spaceflight.
10.The continuity to existing treaties shall be ensured.
Besides the preamble and several implementation provisions, the proposal consists of three main parts: a ban on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, a ban on weapons in space, and the prohibition of space-based systems for direct guidance of nuclear weapons, including a ban on manned military command centers in space.
The preamble is an important part of the model treaty since it refers to general principles and purposes as well as to earlier resolutions and treaties (such as the Outer Space Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). It covers a variety of aspects connected to the treaty, including the common interest of mankind in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, the strengthening of world peace and international security, the prevention of an arms race in space, and other risks.
A key part of the proposal is the ASAT ban. No other treaty covers a ban of anti-satellite weapons, a field where technical development is close to passing a critical threshold. Article 1 of the proposal prohibits "to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other states" which means a total ban on any act that interferes with the functionalities of space objects, especially on the destruction of satellites. This would be readily verifiable, because satellite failure can be detected by on-board sensors or by determination of anomalies in behaviour from ground control and communication facilities. This is true also in the case that one country tries to mimick an equipment malfunction on satellites of another country.
The costs for verifying the active destruction of a satellite should be in accordance with the importance of the type and task of the satellite.
It would be most important to identify any attack on an early warning satellite because this information would by itself serve as early warning for a broader attack on earth. Nevertheless there can be no perfect security against a sensor malfunction, indicating an attack that does not exist. Also prohibited is the jamming of communication links or attacks on ground stations, which would be easy to detect. It would be much more difficult, if not impossible, to detect the capability to destroy other satellites. But this is not prohibited by the treaty proposal.
Since a ban on weapons use does not prevent the creation of respective weapons capabilities, it is essential that the stages leading to this capability are also restricted. Article 2 prohibits "to develop and test or to deploy in outer space, in the atmosphere or on the earth any weapons or weapon systems which serve this purpose" (which is stated in Art. 1). This would prevent that dedicated ASAT means are at the disposal of any party to the treaty.
The key point is the ban on ASAT testing, which would prevent new and effective ASAT means (comparable to a freeze) and would effectively stop an arms race with ASAT weapons. As yet, the existing capabilities are limited, but with further technical development the chances of control would sink. A ban on testing and deployment would be easier to verify than a ban on possession or production.
Restrictions on research are not included in the treaty since it was seen as politically unfeasible and difficult to verify research activities during the Cold War; today, however, it might be well worth considering appropriate measures of preventive arms control in research. Even without dismantlement of existing systems would a test ban erode confidence in existing ASAT capabilities over time by increasing the uncertainty about hardware reliability, adequacy of software, and proficiency of control personnel. Confidence in the reliability of the system would be low in times of crisis. Thus, the risk could be decreased over time by a test ban even if some ASAT capabilities were accepted.
There will remain a residual risk, which depends on the effectiveness of the allowed ASAT capabilities. Because quantity can make up for qualitative shortcomings over time, some numerical limitations could be useful, but would be hard to verify.
To complement the first two articles, Article 3 does explicitly not allow utilization of space objects that normally serve other purposes in an ASAT mode. This concerns the intentional creation of space debris to destroy satellites; using maneuverable satellites for ramming; kidnapping or disabling of satellites by manned spaceships; radiation emission by radio or laser beams. This is a pure ban on use because it is in general difficult to discriminate certain activities for civilian purposes such as repair and refuelling of satellites from a covert test of ASAT capability. The test of normal space objects in an ASAT mode is prohibited by Article 2 when they have obviously been modified for this purpose.
Because it is difficult to distinguish between dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT systems in space, a residual or covert ASAT capability might be left even with an ASAT treaty in place. It is also principally impossible to completely ban all ASAT capabilities as long as there are maneuvering crafts in space. This is a residual risk which has to be accepted with this treaty. With further development of microsatellites (a term not known in 1984), small cheap launchers, and transatmospheric vehicles (spaceplanes), the situation would become more difficult to control.
This risk can be drastically reduced with Article 4, which prescribes the State Parties to observe a mutually agreed "minimal approach distance between their space objects". This is a 'rules of the road' regulation which offers better protection against the near deployment of space mines, and increases the warning time in case of an attack by normal space objects, such that timely countermeasures can be applied. The size of the safety zone, which should not be interpreted as a region of territorial sovereignty, should depend on the negotiating parties and the type of satellites involved. Because of the great number of space objects, such keep-out zones should be introduced only for the most important satellites like space stations or geosynchronous satellites.
Violations of this zone can be verified with ground-based tracking systems by comparing the coordinates of all known or new launched space objects. To allow detection of hidden objects crossing the minimal distance, one can use space-based sensors or radars, especially in the vicinity or on board of important objects like early warning satellites.
The intention of Article 5 is to reduce the risk posed by existing and already tested ASAT systems by their destruction and dismantling. This provision is more difficult to verify than the ban on testing and deployment since civilian systems could be converted for ASAT use without visible changes, but the risk would be low after controlled dismantling. The capabilities associated with known ASAT launch sites and research and development centers would be detectable.
There are some "worst-case" scenarios for covert stockpiling of ASAT systems, but there is a long way from storing to effective use when maintenance and testing are prohibited. If there are well-founded doubts, on-site inspection of launching and support facilities could be useful and efficient but should not lead to serious restrictions on the civilian use of space. Whether the risk posed by covert possession of ASAT systems is acceptable depends much on the kind and effectiveness of the system.
The provisions mentioned above generally protect space objects, regardless of the threat they pose. If a country built a missile defense system in space, other countries might not wish to renounce the possibility to fight such a system.
Furthermore, a missile defense system has a considerable capacity to attack satellites. Therefore, it is essential to include a ban of space-based weapons. "against targets in outer space, in the atmosphere or on earth" (Art. 6). This is supplemented by the obligation "not to develop and test or to deploy in outer space any weapons to this end" (Art. 7) and "not to carry weapons aboard manned spaceships" (Art.8). The latter is important to prevent human beings from becoming a threat or being threatened in space and requires some personal control of astronauts to prevent them from carrying dangerous items such as rifles or pistols when entering a spaceship.
In the definitions at the end of the English translation of the proposal a "weapon" is defined as a "device capable of destroying or damaging targets irrespective of its mode of operation". This differs from the original German version, which defines a weapon as a device "serving the destruction or disabling of targets, independent of the used mechanism" (author's translation). Here purpose plays a bigger role than capability which for the reasons mentioned is difficult to exclude completely.
The proposal focuses on a weapons ban, but is aware of the problems and dangers of military space use and wants to induce a debate on the reasons and possibilities for control of dangerous uses that threaten international security. Satellites in space could be part of a comprehensive warfighting machinery, even when they have no built-in destruction mechanism.
Up to now the military use of space was basically limited to satellites for early warning, reconnaissance, weather monitoring, communication, and navigation. These systems play a role in warfighting on earth, but at the same time may serve conflict prevention or improve transparency, confidence-building, and verification of arms control and thus can have a stabilizing impact on international security. Drawing a line between cilivian and military applications, between desirable and undesirable uses, is complicated by the inherent dual-use potential of many satellites.
Assuming that the fundamental ambivalence of satellite technology can be limited by domestic political and budgetary measures rather than by internationally binding legal instruments, the Göttingen proposal largely neglects the military use of space, with the exception of direct guidance of nuclear weapons.
At the time of drafting the proposal (1984), there was a discussion about the implications of using navigation satellites to make nuclear weapons highly accurate. In case of nuclear warfare, this would provoke pre-emptive strikes on these satellites and provide incentives for ASAT attacks, severely undermining crisis stability. Thus Article 9 prohibits "to utilize any space-based systems for direct guidance of nuclear weapons" and specifies in Article 10 the need to limit the number of satellites and their transmission rate in order to reduce their capability.
The basic argument and motivation behind these provisions is still valid today even though the US Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) has meanwhile been fully deployed and has been operating for many years, being the major navigational device in both the civilian and military sector. This would imply that restrictions of the military potential could also restrict the civilian capability. The issue became less urgent since nuclear missiles are now mainly guided by inertial guidance systems rather than by satellites, and the US is already able to decrease the precision of GPS for particular user groups.
Another efficient way of preventing the development of accurate missiles would be a missile flight test ban. But it is still worthwile to consider how the use of navigation satellites for precise guidance of weapon systems is to be limited (the same is true for the future European Galileo navigation system).
The purpose of Art.11 is to prevent the deployment and use of military command centers in space, in particular of manned spaceships or space stations, another military use that should be banned to exclude man from waging war in space. While after the Cold War it seems unrealistic that personnel in space became actively involved in warfare, this would speak rather for than against a ban on this kind of activity
In addition, the Göttingen proposal includes further provisions to regulate its formal and practical implementation, such as the prohibition of its circumvention through other states and organizations (Art.12 and 13); the priority of the treaty in conflict with other obligations under national jurisdiction and control, e.g. against private organization who violate treaty terms (Art. 14 and 15); verification of the treaty by National Technical Means (Art. 16) and international organizations (Art. 17).
Inspections, which were unusual in 1984 and were thus not explicitly mentioned, would play a more prominent role today, both pre-launch and in space. The means of verification are protected against interference and concealment in Art. 18 and 19.
To promote objectives and implementation of the provisions, pursue cooperative measures, exchange information, and clarify questions concerning compliance, a multilateral organization is proposed to increase viability of the treaty, the Standing Consultative Commission (Art. 20-22). This would also play a role in adapting the treaty provisions to a changing world.
The final provisions regulate ratification, entry into force, amendment, duration and withdrawal. Some of the terms need to be adapted to today's terminology, at least by replacing "Soviet Union" with "Russia". The definitions at the end define basic terms such as space object, space-based, weapon, test, develop and direct guidance.
To conclude, the Göttingen proposal is a model treaty born at the height of the Cold War of the 1980s and thus represents to some degree the perceptions of that time. But the basic motivations and most of the provisions are still valid today.
In particular, the proposed anti-satellite ban by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Soviet treaty proposal banning the use of force from space and against space, both presented in 1983.- The congress "Naturwissenschaftler warnen vor der Militarisierung des Weltraums" took place on July 7./8., 1984, at the University of Göttingen and attracted several thousand participants. On the Göttingen treaty proposal see: H. Fischer, R. Labusch, E. Maus, J. Scheffran, Entwurf eines Vertrages zur Begrenzung der militärischen Nutzung des Weltraums, in: R. Labusch, E. Maus, W. Send (eds.), Weltraum ohne Waffen, München: Bertelsmann, 1984, pp. 175-187. For the English version see: Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space, in: J. Holdren, J. Rotblat (eds.), Strategic Defences and the Future of the Arms Race, A Pugwash Symposium, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.
- E. Maus, Prinzipien des Göttinger Vertragsentwurfs, in: Labusch/Maus/Sent 1984; H. Fischer, Völkerrechtliche Schranken der Weltraumrüstung, in: Labusch/Maus/Sent 1984; J. Scheffran, Verifikation ist möglich, in Labusch/Maus/Sent, 1984.
- Bundestagsprotokoll, 10. Wahlperiode, 166. Sitzung, 18. 10. 1984, p. 57; D. Engels, Vertragsentwurf im Bundestag, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 1'85.
- See Maus 1984, op.cit.
