Proposed Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space
Horst Fischer, Reiner Labusch, Eckart Maus, Jürgen Scheffran 
Presented at the Conference of scientists against the militarization of space held in Göttingen, Germany, July 1984
Preamble
The State Parties to this treaty
Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons in outer space,
Recognizing that satellites with verification and reconnaissance functions are an indispensable element of strategic stability,
Convinced that, as long as nuclear deterrence appears to be an indispensable means of preserving world peace, stability would be jeopardized by satellite systems whose deployment drastically changes the basis of this stability,
Realized that military use of outer space can be limited effectively only by combined prohibitions of anti-satellite weapons and destabilizing systems in outer space,
Reaffirming the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,
Convinced that a space-based anti-ballistic missile system would lead to an increase in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,
Recalling resolution 38/70 entitled Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 January, 1984,
Recalling also the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space; the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; and the Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries,
Desiring to prevent outer space from becoming an area of international conflict,
Desiring also to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, have agreed as follows:
Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons
Article 1
The State Parties undertake not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other states.
Article 2
In accordance with Article 1, the State Parties undertake not to develop and test or to deploy in outer space, in the atmosphere or on the earth any weapons or weapon systems which serve this purpose.
Article 3
In accordance with Article 1, the State Parties undertake not to utilize space objects to this end.
Article 4
The State Parties undertake by mutual agreement to observe minimal approach distances between their space objects.
Article 5
The State Parties undertake to destroy any anti-satellite systems that they may already have.
Prohibition of Space-Based Weapons
Article 6
The State Parties undertake not to resort to the use of space-based weapons against targets in outer space, in the atmosphere or on the earth.
Article 7
In accordance with Article 6, the State Parties undertake not to develop and test or to deploy in outer space any weapons to this end.
Article 8
The State Parties undertake not to carry weapons aboard manned spaceships.
Prohibition of Space-Based Systems for Direct Guidance of Nuclear Weapons
Article 9
The State Parties undertake not to utilize any space-based system for direct guidance of nuclear weapons.
Article 10
In accordance with Article 9, the State Parties undertake by mutual agreement
1.
to limit the number of satellites which may be utilized to this end;
2.
to limit the transmission rate characteristics of the systems which may be utilized to this end.
Article 11
The State Parties undertake not to set up military command centres in outer space.
Prohibition of Circumvention
Article 12
Each State Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this treaty through any other State or States or in any other manner.
Article 13
The State Parties undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities prohibited by this treaty.
Priority of Treaty Obligation
Article 14
The State Parties undertake not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this treaty.
Article 15
Each State Party undertakes to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes, to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of this treaty anywhere under its jurisdiction and control.
Verification
Article 16
For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each State Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
Article 17
Verification according to Article 16 can be assigned in whole or in part to international organizations which have the necessary technical means of verification.
Article 18
Each State Party undertakes not to interfere with the technical means of verification of other State Parties, operating in accordance with Articles 15 and 16.
Article 19
Each State Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by technical means according to Articles 15 and 16.
Standing Consultative Commission
Article 20
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this treaty, the State Parties establish a Standing Consultative Commission.
Article 21
Within the Framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, the State Parties will
consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and the implementation of this treaty;
provide on a voluntary basis such information as any State Party considers necessary to assure confidence in the compliance with the obligations assumed;
consider, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by technical means according to Articles 16 and 17;
consider questions involving the unintended interference or the unintended impeding of verification by technical means according to Articles 16 and 17;
to discuss and propose agreements to meet the provisions of Articles 4, 5 and 10;
consider possible changes in the strategic situation or technical development, which have a bearing on the objectives and the provisions of this treaty, including the activities of non-State Parties;
consider possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this treaty.
Article 22
The Standing Consultative Commission shall consist of all State Parties to the treaty.
The Depositary Governments according to Article 27 b) of this treaty convene the Standing Consultative Commission one month after entry into force of the treaty.
The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and may amend regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures and other relevant matters.
Final Provisions
Article 23
Any State Party may propose amendments to this treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the State Parties to the treaty and thereafter for each remaining State party on the date of acceptance by it.
Article 24
Five years after the entry into force of this treaty a conference of the State Parties shall be held, to review the operation of the treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and provisions of the treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific, technological and strategic developments relevant to the treaty.
Article 25
This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Article 26
Each State Party to this treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of the treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other State Parties to the treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Article 27
This treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
Article 28
a.
This treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any state which does not sign the treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph c) of this Article may accede to it at any time.
b.
This treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
c.
This treaty shall enter into force on the day of exchange of instruments of ratification by the Depositary Governments.
d.
For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
e.
The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acced- ing States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this treaty, and of the receipt of other notices.
f.
This treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Definitions
The State Parties understand by
1.
"space object": any object, manned or not, stationed on celestial bodies, in orbit around the earth or in any other manner in outer space.
2.
"space-based": stationed in form of space objects.
3.
"weapon": device capable of destroying or damaging targets irrespective of its mode of operation.
4.
"test": field testing of a prototype or bread-board model.
5.
"develop": construct ready for testing.
6.
"direct guidance": guidance through signals which enable a missile to determine its position and velocity or which act upon the missile's steering system.
This proposal was printed in: J. Holdren, J. Rotblat (eds.), Strategic Defences and the Future of the Arms Race, A Pugwash Symposium, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987. The comments of the German version have been revised by Jürgen Scheffran
in 2000 and can be obtained from him (scheffran@hrzpub.tu-darmstadt.de).
